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ABSTRACT
The Opium question in China from 1860 to 1837 
was composed of three inter-related as>ects: the 
taxation of foreign opium; the Jhinese customs blockade 
of Hong Kong (and Macao); and the growth of native 
(Chinese) opium. The Question arose as a result of the 
legalization of the opium trade in 1860. During the 
period that this Question was in existence, attempts were 
made by the Chinese and British governments to reach an 
agreement over the taxation of foreign opium and to 
dovise means to put an end to smuggling from Hong Kong 
so that the blockade could be lifted. The Aloook Convention 
of 1869 and the Chefoo Convention of 1876 contained 
stipulations that would provide solutions to these out­
standing problems. Their rejection by the British government 
meant that negotiations had to be continued, both at 
Peking and London, and on the local scene, at Ilong Kong 
and canton. Signing of the Additional Article to the 
Chefoo Convention in 1835 provided settlement of the 
taxation issue; and promulgation of the Ordinance on 
opium in 1887 by the Hong Kong government solved the 
blockade issue. During this period, the growth of native 
opium greatly increased and it competed successfully with 
the Indian import in China. This fact, together with the 
increasing activity of the Anti-opium Society in Britain, 
contributed much to the .Agreement of 1885.
This dissertation is concerned with an analysis 
of the Opium Question briefly explained in the pi’eceding 
paragraph. It also analyses the various governments and 
personalities involved. For Britain, these included the 
Home government with its Foreign, Colonial and India 
Offices; the Hong Kong and Indian governments; and the 
diplomatic service in China and the Governors of Iiong Kong. 
For China, these included the Imperial and provincial 
governments, the Foreign Inspectorate, and responsible 
officials such as Li Eung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang and 
Tseng Ohi-tse. A more astute understanding of Sino-British 
relations during this period, both diplomatic and 
commercial, is reached by such analyses.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.
The second Anglo-Chinese V/ar that ended with the 
Treaty of Tientsin (1858) and the Convention of Peking (1860) 
was followed by the legalization of the trade in opium.
The opium problem had of course existed before - and was 
to exist after - these dates. This dissertation, however, 
is confined to the period 1860 to 1887, but for a full 
understanding of the ’Opium Question1 "'‘during this period, 
a brief history of the opium trade is essential
History of the opium trade and its legalization
Both the Opium Question and the opium trade can be
traced to the introduction of opium into Taiv/an by the
Dutch in the early sixteenth century, for medicinal
purposes. By the end of the century, opium smoking had
become an addiction and was widespread in Chiha, especially
in the coastal areas. The effects on thq health and morale
of individuals, and by extension, on the country as a
^whole, were already being felt.' In 1729 Emperor Yung-cheng
issued the first of a series of Imperial proclamations
2forbidding opium smoking and trade in the drug . As with 
similar proclamations issued during the following century 
and a half, -it produced little result. The number of 
smokers continued to grow, covering an ever-widening 
.range of society. The wealthy scholar-gentry and official 
classes no longer had the monopoly of the habit. Soldiers, 
labourers, peasants and even women took up the addiction 
in increasing numbers.
China had not yet begun to cultivate the poppy 
extensively; the drug being imported from India and 
Turkey. In the former area, profits from opium prompted 
native states (Malwa district) and the British East India 
Company (the Bengal district) to cultivate the poppy on
t
an organized basis. The first decade of the nineteenth 
century, prior to the outbreak of the first Anglo-Chinese 
V/ar, witnessed a very rapid increase of opium importation 
J.nto China^.
1.2
The island of Lintin, situated half-way between Macao 
and Hong Kong on the Pearl Estuary (or the Canton River), 
became the warehouse of opium and the haven of smugglers. 
Opium was smuggled into Kwangtung through the innumerable 
inlets along the coast and from there was distributed 
.throughout China. Even the British factory in Canton 
became a dep6t and the selling of this forbidden article 
to willing merchants was conducted more or less in the open.
The Imperial government was greatly alarmed by the 
development of this contraband trade. In the mid-eighteenth 
century, when the Canton System came into existence, it 
was regarded as an extension of the tributary system purely 
for the benefit of the commerce-starved western traders. 
Trade throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
had always been one-sided: China sold tea, silk and other 
items to the western traders in return for bullion or
4
treasure. The western merchants could not sell many of 
their products except curios and the like, owing to the 
self-sufficiency of China's agrarian economy and the 
restrictions of the Canton System. As long as this state 
of affairs lasted, the Imperial government was willing to 
tolerate the^presence of these traders in the southern­
most port of her empire. But the increase of opium import­
ation by the turn of the century brought about a different 
baiance of trade. Instead of the western merchants importing 
silver to pay for Chinese products, the reverse was now 
true. With each succeeding year, more silver was exported 
from China to pay for the increased import of opium. This 
phenomenon was most evident during the years from 1855 to 
SX8394.
This led to a renewal of prohibition proclamations 
imposing the death penalty on smokers, traders and cultiva­
tors of the poppy. In 1832, Li Hung-ping, Governor-General 
of Liang-kwang, Was dismissed for failing to prevent the 
\£utflow of silver at Canton, and his office was taken over 
tfby Lu-k'un, who had specific orders from the Emperor toI
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investigate and to put a stop to the illegal opium trade^.
Such proclamations, however, proved entirely ineffective
and opium continued to be smuggled into China in increasing
quantities. This led Hsu Nai-chi, a senior official of an
educational institution, to memorialize in 1836 that the
import of opium should be legalized. He argued that since
it was impossible to put a stop to the opium trade and
suppress opium smoking, it would be better to revert to
the system adopted during the reign of Ch'ien-lung, when
the drug v/as admitted as 'medicinal herb' and taxed. He
proposed that only Chinese produces could be exchanged for
opium, and it could not be purchased with silver. This,
Hsu reasoned, would not only prevent the outflow of silver,
but also increase China's revenue. He also advocated that
prohibition of poppy cultivation should be relaxed, since
native opium was both milder and less harmful^. This
«
memorial impressed Emperor Tao-kuang, and Teng T'ing-cheng,
Governor-General of Liang-kwang, Ch'i-kung, Governor of
Kwangtung, and Wen-hsiang, the Hoppo, were instructed to
deliberate and memorialize. They agreed with what Hsu had 
7proposed'.
Hsu's proposal, however, aroused unfavourable reactions 
from other officials. YUan Yu-lin, a censor, memorialized 
that prohibition must be rigorously pursued. He utilized 
arguments such as the contentions that legalization 
would pose severe moral and ethical difficulties, and 
that poppy cultivation would result in a drastic reductionQ
in the production of food crops . This memorial was not 
taken too seriously by the Emperor. Nevertheless, it did 
mark the beginning of a series of memorials from other 
high-ranking officials supporting his contentions, though 
differing in emphasis and the means of achieving total 
suppression. Of these the most noted was that by Huang 
Chueh-tzu, minister of the Hung-lo Ssu. Huang explained 
in great detail why opium should be prohibited and also 
outlined the means by which prohibition could be effectively
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carried out. He reasoned that although it seemed difficult 
to enforce the prohibition, yet with a proper course of 
action it could be done. By forbidding opium smoking under 
severe penalties, the opium trade would phase itself 
out. 'Smokers should be given a year to discard their 
addiction, at the end of v/hich period, if they still had 
not succeeded, they would be decapitated. Five families 
would form a unit to mutually watch over each other and 
to report on offenders. The same method could be used for 
officials and military personnel^.
As a result of Huang's memorial, the Emperor once
more ordered all high-ranking officials to deliberate and
express their opinions* Of the twenty memorials that were
written, twenty were against Huang's proposal while eight
supported it, dividing them into two opposed .'factions'.
Of the ones that voiced opposition, Ch'i-shan and I-li-pu
«
were among them; the supporters included Kuei-liang and 
Lin Tse-hsu"^.
Despite the number of officials who were opposed to 
Huang's proposal, Lin- T-se^hsu's memorial impressed the 
Emperor. Apart from commenting on the evils of opium 
addiction, Lin proposed a six-point programme for effect­
ive suppression. These included the confiscation of all 
opium smoking equipment, educating the people in the ways 
to discard their addiction, and severe punishments for 
offenders. During his governorship at Fukien, he had 
carried out his programme and had succeeded in prohibiting 
the drug trade and smoking there1 *^. As a result, he was 
summoned to the capital, and after nineteen audiences with 
the Emperor, was appointed Imperial Commissioner on 31 
December 1838> his commission being to examine the opium 
situation at Canton and to put an effective end to the 
drug trade. At the same time, Imperial edicts v/ere issued 
to provincial authorities ordering them to devise ways
and means to carry out the prohibition proclamation. 
c  ■
Thus, after some years of uncertainty, the Imperial
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government had finally decided on a definite course of 
action.
With Lin Tse-hsu's arrival at Canton on 10 March 1839, 
the stage for the first Anglo-Chinese War was set.
Brevity of this introduction prevents a full discussion 
of the various causes of this so-called Opium War. It can 
be stated without reservation, however, that as far as 
the Imperial government was concerned, opium was the sole 
cause of the war. It was acting in accordance with past 
examples of penalising uncouth foreigners. Trade was only 
a concession to foreign merchants, one which China had 
every right to withdraw.
The war ended in defeat for China, and she had to 
accept the first of a series of the so-called 'unequal* 
treaties. The Treaty of Nanking (29 August 1842) and the 
Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue (8 October 1843), 
negotiated between the plenipotentiaries Ch'i-ying and
12Pottinger, opened China to limited commercial intercourse
There was, however, no settlement of the question of
opium. Two days before the signature- of the Treaty of
Nanking, Pottinger tried to impress upon Ch'i-ying the
futility of suppression and advocated the inclusion of
opium in the Tariff, in other words, its legalization.
Ch'i-ying replied that under the conditions of the time,
he dared not raise the matter with the Emperor; Pottinger
did not pursue the subject further since his instructions
13were to suggest legalization but not to press for it .
Though there was no opium clause in the Treaty of
'Nankingf,in China's treaties with the other nations -
namely, the United States, Prance and Russia - it was
14included, and opium was labelled contraband . However, 
this was merely words on papers and enforcement was not 
envisaged by the' treaty makers.
The illicit opium trade continued to flourish. It Is 
necessary to explain how it was conducted during the 
years between the first and second Anglo-Chinese conflicts 
(1842-38). For their part, the British authorities in
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China, by adhering strictly to treaty stipulations,
made a clear distinction between legal and contraband
imports. Opium was considered contraband because it was
not listed as an article of trade in the Tariff. Thus*
only legal goods could be imported into the five Treaty
ports opened to foreign trade. If opium were found on
board British ships or in the possession of British
merchants, the consuls would start prosecution proceedings,
ISas happened in the Amelia and Mamgay cases Also, if 
any British merchant engaged in this clandestine trade 
was caught by the Chinese authorities, he would not 
receive any help from the consular service. However, if 
the transactions were conducted outside Treaty port limits, 
the consuls would not interfere, and the merchants had 
only the Chinese authorities to contend with. H^ ong Kong
had been ceded to Britain and special arrangements were
16 * made for .the Colony . In subsequent years, official
British policy remained unchanged. Plenipotentiaries such
as Davies, Bowring and Bonham did try to bring about
legalization, but failed through the lack of response from
China17.
As to the^Imperial government of China, the solution
that it had to offer varied little from that before the
war. Moral and ethical values were still placed foremost.
The opium trade was to be prohibited. A few more Imperial
edicts were proclaimed to that effect, and on paper at
least enforcement of these was to be stricter. When
Hsien-feng ascended the throne in 1851, he issued a stern
edict: opium smokers were ordered to abandon the habit in
five months, at the end of which any person caught taking
the drug would be decapitated, their families sold into
slavery and their descendants excluded from the civil
18service examinatibn for three generations . This edict 
sounded very severe but the laxity of Chinese officialdom 
nullified its effect.
The actual conduct of the opium trade enjoyed far more
i:7
freedom than the policies of the two governments would 
suggest. It is true that no such trade was conducted in 
the Treaty ports by foreign merchants (especially British) 
for fear of reprimand from the consuls, yet it flourished 
outside the port limits and all along the south China 
coast. The trade was not even interrupted during the war 
years. After 184$ receiving ships were set up outside 
the Treaty ports, and even at ports unopened to foreign 
trade. Hong Kong became the dep6t and Capsuimoon - Just 
outside the Colony - the ’permanent1 anchorage. In Canton, 
for example, as early as 1844, 'opium was openly 
carried about the streets in chests, and sold like an 
unprohibited article.1^  Local Chinese officials did 
nothing to put a stop to the illicit trade because they 
profited from it through the 'squeeze' system,, and 
preventive services were archaic and ineffective. Officiali
connivance in the trade was practically throughout China.
During the fifties, in desperate need of money to
'finance military expeditions to suppress the rebellions,
provincial authorities began to levy dues on opium. In
1854 the Shanghai authorities began a levy of 24 taels
per chest, and in 1857 & censor suggested that likin on
the drug should be levied at Shanghai which would increase
the Imperial revenue by one million taels a year. The
Governor-General of Liang-kiang, I-liang, however,
memorialized that this would be contrary to the policy
of prohibition adopted by the Imperial government but
20suggested instead .. a contributory duty , which was
21first 10 taels and then increased to 20 taels per chest
22Fukien followed in the same year . Then m  1858, Ho
Kuei-ch'ing, Governor-General of Liang-kiang, memorialized
23that the drug should be legalized .
The volume of' the drug import climbed steadily during 
these years. In 1840, because of the war, the estimated 
import dropped to 16,000 chests, in round figures. It 
rose to 53,000 chests in 1845, 45,000 chests in 1850
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and 6^,000 chests in 1855 • Thus, by the outbreak of
the second Anglo-Chinese War, it was apparent to all 
concerned that the suppression of the drug traffic was 
practically impossible and that the reality of this 
should be recognized and the importation of opium 
legalized.
When Lord Elgin was sent from Britain to negotiate
for a new treaty with China in 1857, his official
instructions from Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Minister,
did not include any specific reference to opium. In
a private correspondence, however, he was instructed to
'ascertain whether the Government of China would remove
25its prohibition of the opium trade.1 ' During the initial 
stages of the negotiation at Tientsin, the subject was 
not raised by Elgin, who was more concerned with the
9
settlement of more important issues such as the residence
of the British envoy at Peking etc.. The*Treaty of Tientsin
signed in June 1858 made no mention of opium.
The question was raised in China's negotiation with
the other Treaty powers, notably the United States and
Russia. The American negotiator, W.B. Reed, had arrived
in China personally committed to an anti-opium policy;
he was also under instruction from the State Department
that the United States 'neither sought the legalization
of‘ the traffic nor would uphold its citizens in their
26violation of Chinese law.' The Russian negotiator,
27Poutiatine, received similar instructions Thus the 
draft treaties China made with these two nations specific­
ally declared opium to be contraband. But the actual- 
treaties signed on 13 June v/ith Poutiatine and on 18 
June (1858) with Reed omitted such a clause. This was a 
concession to objections raised by Elgin, who said that
inclusion of an anti-opium article would seem 'a gratuitous
28slap at British policy.'
The development of the opium trade, the increasing 
involvement of British mercantile interests in it, and
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the fact that provincial authorities of China had already 
come to regard the trade as a legal one by imposing 
duties on the drug, convinced Elgin that the opium 
problem could no longer be left hanging in the air, as 
it had been in the 1840s, To Elgin then, the best 
solution would be to legalize the trade. However, he 
believed that he could not rightly press for this 'under 
the kind of pressure which we were bringing to bear upon 
at Tientsin', but thought the tariff conference at 
Shanghai later would be the ideal place to bring up 
the subject with the Chinese negotiators^^.
The two sides met in Shanghai from 12 October to
8 November 1858, and Elgin raised the question of
legalization. To his surprise, it was met with an outright
approval from the Chinese negotiators, who said that
China was ready to admit opium into the Tariff as 'foreign 
50medicine1^  . At first they asked for a Tariff duty of
5160 taels per picul^ but the British negotiators warned 
that placing a high duty on the drug would drive the 
trade into illicit channels, and added that at Shanghai 
the amount then collected was only 24- taels per chest. 
After some bargaining, the duty was settled at 50 taels 
per picul, approximately 7-8$ of the average value. This 
item of trade, however, was to be treated differently 
from other foreign imports under Rule V of the Tariff 
and commercial agreement: 'Opium will henceforth pay 
50 taels per pecul import duty. The importer will sell it 
only at the port. It will be carried into the interior 
by Chinese only, and only as Chinese property; the foreign 
trader will not be allowed to accompany it. The provisions 
of Article IX of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, by which British 
subjects are authorised to proceed into the interior 
with passports t6 trade, will not extend to it, nor 
will those of Article XXVIII of the same Treaty, by 
which the transit dues are regulated; the transit dues 
on it will be arranged as the Chinese Government see fit;
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nor in future revisions of the Tariff, is the same rule
. . 32of revision to be applied to opium as to other goods.
Opium was finally legalized after one and a half centuries 
as contraband. This marked the beginning of the Opium 
Question that this dissertation is concerned with.
The legalization of opium was not followed by . 
any 'legislation' to regulate the trade. The British 
government still adopted the attitude that it was solely 
the responsibility of the Chinese government to ensure 
the collection of its revenue and the prevention of tax 
evasion. The Chinese negotiators were primarily interested 
with the termination of the war'and a peace settlement.
It must be remembered that during this period of her 
history, China was more concerned with internal problems. 
Since the early fifties, the empire had been virtually 
reduced to chaos, administrative and otherwise, by the 
so-called 'mid-century rebellions'. During the war with 
Britain (and France), China was at her weakest, politically 
and militarily. A speedy settlement with the Treaty 
powers would mean that she could turn all her attention 
to the suppression of the devastating rebellions. By 
not asking much from the Treaty powers, she could ensure 
their support and perhaps even actual assistance, which 
was indeed what she did obtain.
* There were other considerations that prevented China 
from 'legislations' to control the opium trade. Legalization 
was a necessary and utilitarian step, but it meant that 
the Imperial government had to abandon a policy of 
prohibition adopted since the first decree of 1729; it 
had been a policy based on moral issues. To introduce 
'legislation' would provide the onus of the Imperial 
government desiring a revenue that was morally unjust. 
Moreover, the Imperial government had always depended 
on provincial authorities to collect enough revenue for 
its needs,, and they we re given a great degree of autonomy 
especially in regard to taxation. As long as the Imperial
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government received its due share of the provincial 
revenue, no attempt would be made to exercise any control 
over the administration or collection. A case in point 
was when dues were collected on opium before its 
legalization, the Imperial government only expressed 
verbal disapproval, but did not take any direct action 
to intervene or stop such 'illegal' collections. Further­
more, with the rebellions in progress, there was an 
even greater degree of autonomy for the provincial govern­
ments, especially in rebel-affected areas. Thus, whatever 
legislation of the opium trade there might be, it was 
left to the provincial authorities. Moreover, opium 
had been kept apart from all other imports, and with 
China's right to do whatever she wanted with it after 
leaving the importer's hands, legislation, if,and when 
needed, could be worked out in due course. The Foreign 
Inspectorate was to be established shortly and this new 
customs organization would collect the Tariff duty 
thereby ensuring a 'guaranteed' revenue on opium.
Hong Kong: its special role
One point which the negotiators on both sides failed 
to grasp was. the importance of Hong Kong to the opium 
trade^ . It would be relevant to trace briefly the 
history and development of the Colony in order to under- 
. stand .why it played such an important rdle in the Opium 
Question.
Prior to its cession to Britain in 1842 by the 
Treaty of Nanking, Hong Kong was insignificant. It was 
a small barren island and as such was of no political, 
or economic interest to either the Chinese or foreigners.
A tiny village of fishermen and pirates (known as Aberdeen 
after the British occupation) on the southern coast of 
the island was the only inhabited area. It played no part 
in Sino-western trade activities of those days. For the 
—-illicit opium trade, the centre of activity was at Lintin.
' Captain Charles Elliot, the British plenipotentiary,
1.12
was asked by Palmerston to secure an island from the
Chinese, and he chose Hong Kong. This was due to its
nearness to Canton (seventy-five miles away), then the
centre of foreign trade, and its excellent natural
harbour. In the abortive Treaty of Chuenpi, the island
..and its harbour was ceded to the British Crown in perr
petuity. The British government was at first very
apprehensive about this choice, since it had contemplated
the acquisition of an island near Shanghai. Nevertheless,
the decision was agreed to, and the Treaty of Nanking
34validated the cession^ .
^  The acquisition of Hong Kong meant that all the
activities previously centred in Lintin were immediately
transferred to this new colony. The advantages to both
legitimate and illegal trade were obvious. Prom the
outset, Elliot had declared it a free-port and merchants«
were not slow to grasp its significance. Above everything 
else, it meant that all goods, including opium, could 
be imported freely, there being no customs. The goods 
could be stored in Hong Kong, and when needed, conveyed 
to the Treaty ports. As for opium, the advantages were 
even greatep. Opium firms could import the drug into 
the Colony and sell it to Chinese purchasers from the 
mainland. It was up to the latter to devise ways and means 
of transporting it to China. Furthermore, Hong Kong 
was under British jurisdiction and administration; 
merchants, whether foreign or Chinese, would have no 
fear of molestation from the Chinese authorities. Thus 
the combination of a free-port, and a Colony meant 
advantages to trade, both legal and illegal. Hong Kong 
was soon the depdt for foreign goods, and it was also 
quickly utilized as a haven by smugglers.
When Elliot 'chose Hong Kong as the most suitable 
acquisition for Britain, he had already realized the 
possibility of the island becoming a centre for smuggling. 
Thus, in the Treaty of Chuenpi, a clause was included:
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'All just charges and duties to the empire upon the 
commerce carried on there /Hong Kong7 to he paid as 
if trade were conducted at Whampoa /Canton7-1 In what 
manner the collection was to be made, however, was 
not specified. In any case, the treaty was repudiated 
by the British government. But before Pottinger was 
sent to China to replace Elliot, Palmerston instructed 
him that since there had been instances in Europe of 
'Duties collected in the Territory of One Power by the 
agents of another Power*, China, if she wished, could 
instal customs offices in Hong Kong to collect the legal 
dues on goods so as to exempt them from payment on 
arrival at the Treaty ports. He believed that with 
such a measure, 'British commerce might be much 
encouraged.'
When Pottinger arrived in Hong Kong, he found public 
opinion very adverse to such a move. Subsequently, it 
was not included in the negotiations with China. Never­
theless, he was very much aware of the problem and 
tried to effect a solution in a way that would not be 
found objectionable by the mercantile community. On 
15 April 1843, he issued a proclamation to the effect
that a fair and regular tariff was now in force and
36all smuggling activities must cease^ . Furthermore, m  
the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue,'Articles XIII,
XIV and XVI were inserted to ensure that there was to 
be no illicit -trade from Hong Kong. These articles called 
for the issuance of passes by the Chinese customs to 
junks trading with Hong Kong, without which the Colonial 
authorities would not permit their entry into the 
harbour; and monthly returns were to be compiled by both 
parties of the number of passes granted and details of 
cargoes carried by junks^.
The intentions were good but these provisions were 
not carried out, either by the Chinese or the Hong Kong 
authorities. The former could be said to be incapable of
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enforcing these articles, while the latter w.as subjected
to constant constant pressure from the mercantile
community to maintain the free-port status of the Colony.
'The non-enforcement of these regulations■meant that the
smugglers, especially those dealing in opium, were given
a free hand to do whatever they wanted. The trade in
opium expanded greatly during the years between the two
wars. Hong Kong's prdjjperity also kept pace with it.
^  The treaties of 1858 to 1860 brought with them new
problems. Legalization of opium in the Treaty of Tientsin
also saw the abrogation of the Supplementary Treaty of
the Bogue. Clauses in the latter treaty which, in
enforced, could stop smuggling, were not replaced by a
new set of rules and regulations. In fact, Hong Kong and
its peculiar problems, were not mentioned at all. The
Convention of Peking merely added the peninsula of Kowloon
«
to the Colony, but no new rules were established. Within 
the 'vacuum' so created, the clandestine trade found 
.^ even more space to expand.
Junk trade and opium trade after 1860
As far as the opium trade was concerned, it could be
58said to be confined solely to the so-called junk trade^ .
This was carried on by Chinese junks that sailed between
Hong Kong and the various un-opened ports along the coasts
of Kwangtung, Fukien, Formosa and Hainan. They were,
on the whole, confined to the southern coastal areas. The
junks conveyed to Hong Kong Chinese produces such as
tea and silk, and transported back to China foreign goods,
opium, salt and munitions of war (the last two were still
contraband after 1860).
Large scale smuggling by fleets of armed junks was
not an uncommon sight off the southern coastal provinces.
\
The junk trade had begun soon after the first Anglo-Chinese 
war, but had expanded in the succeeding years. Of the 
goods smuggled, opium ranked first because its value was 
high, its bulk small and there was a ready market for it.
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The legalization of the drug meant that by importing it
into the Treaty ports, it would be subject to the Tariff
duty and a number of local levies totalling between 60
and 100 taels per chest, depending on the port of import
and the type of opium. Such a high 'premium1 and the
ease of smuggling prompted even honest traders to attempt
some occasional concealment of opium in their regular
cargoes. The foreign importers more than welcomed this
clandestine trade. By selling their opium in Hong Kong,
they could do so cheaper and with less bother than at
the Treaty ports, as they neither had to pay the Tariff
duty and transportation charges' nor did they have to go
through the trouble of customs clearance. Furthermore,
they could also avoid market fluctuations at the Treaty
ports. Such a pattern of trade worked well foy the merchants
concerned, but it was severely detrimental to the Imperial
and provincial revenues. In 1866, annual returns of the
Foreign Inspectorate estimated that of the 18,000 chests
brought into Canton that year, nearly 15,000 chests had
evaded the Tariff duty, which amounted to a loss of
450,000 taels^ . It was also estimated that one-fourth
of the total import of opium into Hong Kong was smuggled
40into China by junks . Even with foreign trade in general,
Canton consul Robertson remarked in 1867 that the Pearl
Estuary was 'studded with towns of great commercial
importance and a direct trade with Hong Kong is carried
on which Canton can have no part or over which the Canton
41Customs any supervision.' Though this seemed to concern
only Canton, its effect was felt throughout China. The
necessity of exercising some control over this aspect
of the trade from Hong Kong is evident. In 1868 Jui-lin,
Governor-General of Liang-kwang. initiated his customs
42blockade of Hong* Kong (and Macao)
We have so far considered the opium trade before 1860 
and Hong Kong1.s r61e after this date. It brings us to 
the decade after legalization and the manner in which the
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trade was conducted generally. There were three very 
different aspects of the opium trade: 1) the trade in 
which the drug was conveyed to the Treaty ports by 
foreign steamers and consigned to foreign firms at the 
ports; 2) the trade in which opium was sold to Chinese 
buyers at Hong Kong and conveyed by them in junks to 
the Treaty ports along the south China coast; and 5) 
the trade in which opium, bought by Chinese merchants at 
Hong Kong, was conveyed in native junks to non-Treaty 
ports and small harbours along the south China coast. 
According to Rule V that governed the opium trade, the 
first type was legal, but the second and third types, were 
illegal.
In the first type, the import and distribution of 
opium at the Treaty ports followed a more or iess set 
pattern. Hong Kong continued to be the warehouse for the 
drug, and one of the two centres ior the entire trade, 
the other being Shanghai. All cargo-stearners bound for 
China called at Hong Kong, either to load or unload 
opium, and to seek information about the market of the 
drug in China - its saleability,' price and demand. Opium 
so stored in^  Hong Kong was sent by steamers to the 
southern Treaty ports - Canton, Amoy, Swatow and Foochow - 
which were distribution centres for South China. Shanghai 
acted as the centre of distribution for the provinces 
along the Yangtze, and to some extent, north China. Opium 
consumed in North China and Manchuria was also imported 
through Tientsin, Chefoo and Newclhwang. The drug thus 
imported into the Treaty ports wa.s placed in bond at the 
hulks or warehouses of the Foreign Inspectorate. The 
foreign importer then pay the Tariff duty and sell it to 
Chinese buyers, who pay local du_es levied at the ports 
for consumption there. When.it was taken into the interior 
of China, it was subjected to provincial levies at the 
numerous barrier stations en roube to its destination.
The second type was illegal because opium could ■ .
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only be imported into China by Toreign merchants according 
to the Rules of Tariff of the 1858 agreement. However, 
the provincial governments concerned did their best to 
encourage this type of opium tra.de. This was because the 
Foreign Inspectorate had no jurisdiction over the junk 
trade, which was administered by the native customs, 
commonly called the 'haikuan'. The revenue so collected 
went to the provincial coffers, while that collected by 
the Foreign Inspectorate went tco the Imperial treasury 
or the Board of Revenue. It is -therefore clear that the ' 
local authorities encouraged thee junk trade in opium 
despite the 'technical' illegality. Thus dues levied on 
opium by the native customs difjfered from those of the 
Foreign Inspectorate. Though thee amount varied from place 
to place, it was, as a rule, always less than, the Tariff 
duty. Foreign merchants at the Treaty ports objected to 
this differential treatment, but the British government 
had no legal right to interfere,. This trade could be 
considered as an 'extra-treaty' one; and as long as the 
Imperial government was willing to tolerate its existence, 
the British government could do nothing except making 
unavailing protests. As regards the foreign opium merchants 
at Hong Kong, it has already be<en pointed out that they 
welcomed this type of trade.
Of the third type, junks ca:rrying opium to the 
un-opened ports can be divided :into two categories: those 
that called at ports where ther>e were native customs 
establishments, and those that 'tried to unload their opium 
at small harbours and anchorageis that did not have 
customs stations. The former would pay the same as junks 
that called at the Treaty portss, though at times the 
amount levied was less; whilst the latter would attempt 
to evade all duties and dues anid smuggle the drug into 
the interior. The provincial authorities tried to stop 
the second but permitted the fi.rst type. Owing to the 
countless number of harbours amd inlets that exist along
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the coast, especially in Kwangtung, it was practically
impossible to exercise any effective control over
smuggling. It is easy to see how these illegal activities
affected the opium trade at the southern Treaty ports,
especially Canton, where the import declined sharply
year after year ..In the sixties, especially during the
latter half of the decade, piracy along the south China
coast had been suppressed to such an extent that it no
44longer posed a serious threat to the coastal trade 
Ironically, safety from piracy on the high seas enhanced, 
rather than diminished, smuggling activities by junks.
Taxation of opium
Apart from the Tariff duty of 50 taels per picul, 
other dues on opium were very much undefined in that they 
varied from province to province, and port to *port. As 
a general summation, however, they can bp classified into 
two broad types, but levied together: likin and chlian. The 
first was based on pai-huo likin (likin on general merchan­
dise) and the second on chf uan-chUan (induced contribution)’, 
both advocated by Lui I-ch'eng, an Imperial censor and 
member of the Board of Punishment, in 1855 (based on the 
advice of Ch'ien-kiang, his counsellor). These suggestions 
were made because of the need for additional revenue to 
pay for increased military expenses due to the outbreak of
the mid-century rebellions, and were accepted by the
................4 5 .....................................
Imperial government .
In the years between 1860 and 1869 (from legalization
to treaty revision), the Imperial government made some
attempts to instal a systematic collection of the Tariff
duty and other dues on opium, but with little success. In
1860 the Board' of Revenue directed that the method of
collection at Shanghai should be adopted at all the Treaty»
ports. The likin offices were delegated to collect the 
Tariff duty and another 70 taels per picul as a combination 
of all dues, which would free the opium from further levies 
until it reached the inland market, provided seals on it
1.19
were not broken. Accurate accounts of the amount collected
were to be kept and submitted to the Board once very three
months. Apart from a certain percentage to be used for
local military needs, the rest was to be remitted to
Peking.' Customs barriers were also to be established at
key crossroads to prevent any evasion of duty and preventive
4-6services were also to be strengthened . From the different 
rates of likin and other dues that were levied after 
this date, such a directive obviously went unheeded, and 
the Board of Revenue soon after appeared to have lost 
interest.
In 1861, the Tsungli-yamen, consequent to a memorial 
from Robert Hart on the subject, seemed to have realized 
the necessity of framing rules and regulations for the 
taxation of opium. A memorial was submitted to ,the throne 
asking that the Board of Revenue should be given the task 
of formulating the necessary regulations.* The Board, in 
its turn, memorialized that the Tsungli-yamen should be 
entrusted with such a responsibility since its job was to 
deal with the Treaty powers^. Through the evasion of 
responsibility by these tv/o departments, the matter was 
shelved.
What Hart had suggested in his memorial had contained 
concrete proposals and positive analysis of the taxation 
of opium. He pointed out that 70,000 chests were imported 
into China annually and a heavy duty'would place a premium 
on smuggling. He noted that as an example, Shanghai had 
collected 80 taels per picul ($0 taels Tariff duty and a 
total of 50 taels of other dues) but did not bring in much 
■ revenue as shown by the returns of the customs. He proposed 
two alternatives: 1) a heavy import duty of 60 taels per 
chest be imposed, allowing the opium freedom from further 
levies; or 2) a tdriff duty of 50 taels from the foreign 
importer and 15 taels from the Chinese purchaser which 
would allow the opium free circulation in the prefecture in 
which the Treaty port was situated, but after leaving the
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area, it could be taxed as the provincial authorities saw
fit. He also suggested that Chinese opium dealers should
be registered and be issued with licences. With such
arrangements, duties could be collected on about 60,000
chests of the 70,000 chests imported annually, and more
revenue would be obtained than if the Shanghai system 
zi-8
were adopted
In 1864 Li Hung-chang suggested that small levies be
dropped from the collections at the Treaty ports so
smuggling could be minimized. This received Imperial
49approval but was not carried out at the ports .
Such were the 'attempts' to'introduce some sort of 
'legislation1 over the opium trade and its taxation by 
the Imperial government. Upon reflection, they should be 
called 'gestures' in that they were only half-rhearted 
endeavours and lacked any conviction or intent. Given
4
this lack of guidance, the provincial governments, especially'
the ones along the coast which embraced Treaty ports, were
not slow to take the initiative in 'legislation', and each,
formulated its own measures deemed most suitable. As a
result, there Was no uniformity in the systems adopted,
whether they^ be the means of collection or the types and
rates of dues. To these the Imperial government offered
no interference. Some provincial authorities presented
their proposed regulations and received due authorization
from the Emperor, while others just initiated them without
seeking Imperial sanction, and the absence of reprimand
was taken as tacit approval.
Before we discuss the different regulations or systems
framed by the provincial authorities for the taxation of
opium, it is appropriate to clarify the types of dues
60levied on it apart from the Tariff duty^ . The example of 
Foochow can be t&ken, since this port from the beginning
51collected the heaviest and the most varied types of dues^ :
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Malwa & Persian • Bengal 
(alljper picul)
Tariff duty @ 50 taels plus 10°/o 53*0.0 33*0.0
Chinese duty & meltage fee 
(Hwa-shui - imposed in 1860-61)
41.4.0 49.6.8
Likin proper & meltage fee 
(imposed in 1857)
24.0.0 29.0.4
P'iao-shui & meltage fee 
(imposed in 1865)
17*6.0 21.1.2
Fee on each chest 
(Kuan-hang - imposed in 1866)
1.4.4 1.4.4
Total taels 117.6.4 134.2.8
In a report made to Hart by'I. Dick, the commissioner 
at Shanghai, an assessment of the average total amount 
collected at the Treaty ports was compiled. The first 
collection of any type of opium duty was at Amoy in 1855 
to the amount of 1.4 taels per chest. Foochow and Chefoo 
followed soon after and the levy was increased to an 
average of 47 taels. In 1857* Shanghai also started to 
collect a local leyy and the average rose to 49 taels.
The war years saw a slight decrease to 40 taels in 1858, 
and then an increase to 45 taels in 1859* In 1860, when 
the importation of opium was officially legalized, the 
average collection in fourteen ports was 53 taels (exclud­
ing the Tariff duty)• Between 1861 and 1864 additional 
local charges brought the average to 64 taels. From 1865 
to 1869 it rose to 76 taels^V From the above it can be ■ 
seen that there was a steady increase in the amount of * 
local levies, and therefore a continuous stimulus to 
smuggling.
The reasons that motivated the provincial authorities 
to levy local dues on opium can be summarized as follows: 
Tariff duty on the drug was collected by the Foreign 
Inspectorate and earmarked for the Imperial coffers of 
which they had no part. Thus they had to devise their own 
ways to collect dues for provincial use which was dependent 
on two factors - the amount levied could not be so high
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as to provide an incentive to smugglers and the mechanisms 
of collection could not be too vexatious or involve too 
much expenditure as to make the balance too minimal as 
a source of revenue.
With such considerations in mind, it was only too 
natural to turn back to a system akin to that of the 
'co-hong' of the pre-treaty days. In most of the Treaty 
ports, opium monopolies were formed.by prominent Chinese 
merchant firms. They were variously known as opium farms, 
opium guilds and opium farmers. Tlhe monopolists signed 
agreements with the local authorities, ranging from one 
to five years, guaranteeing an anmual payment of so many 
taels for the monopolies, which meant that they possessed 
exclusive rights of purchasing opium from the foreign 
merchants and selling it. Their amnual payments to the 
local authorities were based on a;ssessments on the amount 
imported, and the averages so arrived at* were seldom on 
the maximum amount imported so tluat the monopolists would 
derive a profit. The local authorities, on the other hand, 
were satisfied with such monopolies because they not only 
guaranteed a steady revenue but also would do away with 
an expensive and perhaps inefficient preventive service. .
In 1859 this system was already iin use at Canton5. If such 
a method was not practised, collection of dues were 
entrusted to special offices set lup for the purpose: the 
opium likin offices which employe<d their own likin runners 
to prevent duty evasion by the Chinese merchants.
Response to such arrangements, from the British
authorities in China on the whole; took the form of a
'laissez-passer' policy. They realized that opium was to
be treated differently from all oither articles of trade*
and the Chinese government had every- right to tax and
regulate it as they saw fit. The formation of monopolies
violated treaty stipulations, but; as long as it concerned
54only opium, there were no legal g;rounds for objection^ •
The British government, likewise,, adopted the same policy^.
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Although opium monopolies at tfche Treaty ports were
56common practices after 1860, the Canton government*' went
a step further in 1868. Smuggling had not decreased with
the introduction of the monopoly ait Canton, and it was .
decide'd to effect a different ratee of payment for opium
conveyed to Treaty and non-treaty ports. Opium imported
into a small port fifteen miles away from Swatow paid
57exactly half of what was levied atfc that Treaty port^'. The 
differences between Canton and thee neighbouring port of 
Kiangmun were just as pronounced: opium brought in by
foreign vessels to Canton had to jpay a Tariff duty of 
30 taels per picul, likin of 18.*4 taels and 8 taels to 
the opium monopolist, making a tottal of 64.4 taels. From 
there to the North and West Riveres, additional levies of
23.3 taels had to be paid (4.3 taeels to Canton, officials,
10.4 taels for passing the tax steation at Samshuy, the 
same amount at Lupaou or How-le sttations - one for the 
North and the other for the West IRivers) making a grand 
total of 89-7 taels per picul. If opium was imported to 
Kiangmun, on the West River, by neative junks, for every 
picul there was a duty of 22.4 taeels and likin of 16 taels
58making a total of 38.4 taels. By tfchis differential treat­
ment of levies, smuggling was reduiced somewhat and the 
provincial coffers enriched. Howewer, this meant that for 
every picul imported through Kianggmun the Imperial govern­
ment lost 30 taels (Tariff duty); the Foreign Inspectorate 
complained of this irregularity brnt to no avail.
Native (Chinese) opium
After 1860 China’s own producttion of opium, commonly 
called ’native opium* as distinct from ’foreign opium1 or 
’Indian opium’ \ came to play an imcreasingly important 
part in the formulation of opium ^policies by both the1
Chinese and British governments. 3Its importance cannot be 
overlooked.
Sources vary on the time when. China started poppy
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cultivation. During the reign of' 1 1ang Kao-tsung (650 -CQ
684 A.D.), opium was already known in Chinay . The 
earliest extant record that Chinia knew of the art of 
cultivation and the extraction o>f the opium juice is 
in the ‘Pen-ts’ao Kang-mu' ('Greiat Materia Medica1 - 
: compiled by Li Shih-chen in 15720 which describes the 
process in great detail^. Opiumi was used to cure 
diarrhoa, indigestion, fever andl various internal 
ailments. If we were to take thi-s work as the reference, 
then the art of poppy cultivation had been known in 
China for three centuries before* our period of survey.
There is, however, no record of its being cultivated 
during that time. Prior to I860,, foreigners were not 
allowed to go into the interior of China and therefore 
could not make any reports or observations on the extent 
of poppy cultivation. The provincial governments, because 
of the prohibition of the drug, would not enter it in 
their records, nor would the Imperial government receive 
any reports of it. It is therefore largely guesswork 
to put a starting date to poppy cultivation in China.
A distinction must also be made between the cultivation 
for medicinal use and for commer?cial use - separated by 
the amount of land used. Por medLicinal purposes, the 
drug must have been produced about the sixteenth century 
or even earlier; for commercial purposes, various 
estimates have placed the earliest date of cultivation 
at between 1750 and 1800, when tfche drug became ‘popular1 
in China. It was started at Yunnan using poppy seeds 
obtained from India via Burma. By the nineteenth century, 
poppy cultivation had spread to Szechuan and Kweichow.
It is to be noted that these weire the three western-most 
provinces which enjoyed a maximum degree of local autonomy. 
Prom there the cultivation spresad so that by the 1860s, it 
was reported eleven provinces weere engaged - Yunnan, 
Szechuan, Kweichow, Honan, H'Opehi, Kiangsi, Shansi, Shensi, 
Kansu, Shantung and Manchuria^,.
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The financial incentive of poppy cultivation was 
particularly attractive to the fairmer. It was estimated 
that a mou of land (six mou equalis one English acre) could 
yield an average of eighty taels weight (1 tael equals 
1 1/5'ounces) of opium juice which, when finally prepared 
into smokable opium, would weigh about twenty taels.
About 1 tael weight of the prepared opium would sell for 
$1 (Mexican). The total retail vailue would amount to $20.
The cost of production, including; labour and fertilisers, 
would be about $2, thereby realising a profit of $18 per 
mou of land. This was three times greater than that of 
beans or wheat, the alternative‘crops. Moreover, for 
food crops, there was the additional cost of manure; 
whilst cultivation of the poppy, on the contrary, enriched 
the soil. The residue from the poppy was very .useful.
The stalks could be used for fuel, and oil extracted from 
the seeds for burning and cooking. Such oil was cheaper 
than bean oil, then commonly in use. Furthermore, the 
duration of the poppy crop was only six months; and 
during the rest of the year, the same field could be used 
for the growing of rice . With tfchese advantages, and 
given official patronage and non-interference, poppy 
cultivation became widespread.
Ever since the poppy was culifcivated for commercial
purposes, prohibition edicts had been issued, but these
were largely ignored. In the 1860s, two such edicts
were proclaimed . For the provinces of Shansi and
Szechuan prohibition was ■ quite effective; but in other
areas the edicts were used more ifoo obtain further 'squeeze1
from the farmers. Nevertheless, -tfche limited success prompted
the commissioners of the Foreign Inspectorate at Tientsin
and Shanghai to remark in 1865 tlhat there was an increased
importation of fbreign opium to compensate for the
decrease in the native production. These remarks showed
that the native drug had begun to compete with the
64foreign varieties
1.26
As to the levy of 'unlawful1 duties on native opium,
they were always very light, since the authorities had
practically no way of enforcing their collection except
the land tax, which was minimal. Some squeeze was also
‘obtained such as the report that the opium farmers in
Szechuan paid to the local authorities a local tax of
5 to 7 taels per picul., and an octroi (or squeeze) of 
652 taels . When native opium was conveyed to the Treaty 
ports, it paid, as a general rule and if payment was not 
evaded altogether, half the local dues levied on the 
foreign drug. As a native produce, it was of course 
exempted from the Tariff duty. At Foochow, for example,
rz fz
the likin on native opium was 55 taels per picul 
Comparing this with the average total of 100 taels per 
picul levied on foreign opium, one can well s,ee the 
striking difference in cost between the two types which 
enhanced the saleability of the native variety, especially 
during this period when its quality was improving rapidly.
General survey of Sino-British relations
A brief outline of Sino-British relations during 
this period will help to underlay the broad factors that ■. 
affected the .Opium Question. It must be pointed out that 
this is a generalisation, and as such is not to be 
subjected to empirical examination, as there are bound to 
be cases in which it becomes misleading.
The Convention of Peking was followed by an era in 
which the British government adopted a general policy of 
tolerance, if not friendship, towards China; and the 
Chinese government also did its best to reciprocate.
The British authorities - the diplomatic service in 
China and the Home government - adopted a new policy of 
conciliation and co-operation because it was realized that
9
China was weak, internally and internationally; and because 
she had shown a willingness to effect changes and to join 
the 'world community*, Britain should help her along, as a 
friend instead of as the antagonist of the previous decades.
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Two wars had been fought and thesse had been mainly due
to mercantile pressure for more (commercial concessions
from China. By the agreements of 1858 and 1860, Britain
had obtained for her merchants whiat they had wanted,
and tliey should not make further demands. In the process,
Britain had also obtained political concessions from
China in the sense that full diplomatic relations were
now established. In order to ensuire the smooth working
of treaty stipulations, both commnercial and diplomatic
ones, a policy of understanding was necessary. The
diplomatic service in China was (competent to ensure such
a policy, but it was instructed'tfco exercise moderation
and co-operation. Such a policy was supported in general
by the other Treaty powers. This change of attitude on
the part of the foreign governmemts gave 1 forward-looking1
Chinese officials a favourable atfcmosphere in which to
♦
conduct international relations sand to seek admittance 
into the 'world community'.
The Imperial government of Clhina, after her second 
defeat, also realized the need fcor change. A group of 
'enlightened' officials came to cdominate China's foreign 
policy, persons like Prince Kung,, Li Hung-chang and 
Kuo Sung-t'ao. Together with the establishment of two 
new departments to centralize comtrol over foreign 
affairs in the diplomatic and commercial spheres - the 
Tsungli-yamen under the leadership of Prince Kung, and 
the Foreign Inspectorate (or the Chinese Imperial Maritime 
Customs) under Robert Hart - Chima was able to embark 
on a new policy towards the Treatty powers. It was one 
marked by the strict adherance t(o treaty stipulations on 
the one hand, -and the utilizations of international law 
and western diplomacy on the otheer.
The Tsungli-y amen was established because the Treaty 
powers wanted to be able to deal with a central office 
at Peking. Although it was foundeed by the force of 
circumstances and was never intemded to be a permanent
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department of the central government, yet under the 
energetic and enlightened leadership of Prince Kung, it 
became distinctive. Its ministers became aware of the 
necessity of a thorough understanding of the West in order 
to dea'l with the Treaty powers on am equal basis. They 
learnt, adapted and adopted from the West and were able 
to practise the motto of 'using barbarians to control 
barbarians' successfully, though it; was used in an 
entirely different context from the forties and fifties.
The Foreign Inspectorate, which controlled all customs 
matters of China's foreign trade, under the energetic 
leadership of Robert Hart, was able to discharge its 
duties with integrity and efficiency. This helped greatly 
in shaping the image of China in the eyes of the Treaty 
powers, which contributed to the success in China's new 
'foreign policy'. It also worked in close co-operation 
with the Tsungli-yamen, especially in customs and revenue 
matters related to the foreign trade, and helped the 
latter to solve many unfamiliar problems.
It is within this context that Sino-western, but more 
particularly Sino-British, relations should be looked at.
The Alcock Convention of 1869 is the classic example of 
a settlement negotiated in this atmosphere of co-operation 
and conciliation. Its non-ratificaibion temporarily 
shattered the illusion the Chinese government held of
Western friendship, but it did not destroy the new policy
adopted. Solutions of the Opium Question provide the 
best example of a negotiated settlement within this context.
Definition of the Opium Question
The Opium Question as defined in the beginning of this 
introduction is far too large a subject to be discussed 
competently in one study. It invoives a tremendous span
l
of time - from perhaps the beginning of the eighteenth
century to the present day because opium addiction is still
in existence. It was influencedby many factors - diplomatic, 
commercial, religious, moral, social and ethical, to name
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the more important ones. Thus, it is the intention to 
study this problem over a very limited time-span and 
restricted to a few factors. The period so chosen is 
from 1860 to 1887, that is from the time of the legaliz-' 
atiori of opium to the beginning of joint collection of 
the Tariff duty and likin on opium. The main emphasis 
is on the taxation of foreign opium, as suggested by 
the period chosen. However, other factors related to 
this issue will also be considered. They are the customs 
blockade of Hong Kong and the growth of native opium - 
each important in its own right, but together with the 
question of taxation of opium, 'they serve to define the 
Opium Question with which this dissertation will study.
A brief definition of the three aspects of the Opium 
Question is as follows: ,
1. The taxation of foreign opium - Legialization of
i
the opium trade only provided for the levy of a Tariff 
duty of 50 taels per picul on foreign opium, but did not 
deal with the problems of inland taxation such as lilcin, 
and the methods of collection. Attempts were made in the 
Alcock Convention and the Chefoo Convention, and in 
subsequent negotiations until the signing of the Additional 
Article to the Chefoo Convention of 1885 which settled 
this aspect of the Opium Question.
During these years, interested parties made their 
voices heard, and added further complexities to the 
problem. On the international level, the 'interference* 
by Germany complicated the negotiations between China 
and Britain. With the Chinese government, conflicts arose 
between the Imperial and provincial governments, between 
the Foreign Inspectorate and the Chinese native customs, 
and among; officials with their own interests or principals 
to maintain. *
Likewise, the British government also saw the emergence 
of differences of opinion among the various departments - 
the Foreign, India and Colonial Offices. The first '
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had no vested interests in the opium problem, but the 
India Office had to represent the very real interests of 
the Indian government while the Colonial Office had to 
take into consideration the trade and status of the Colony 
of Hohg Kong. Added to these complications were the 
views advocated by mercantile communities and anti-opium 
societies, both of which were politically powerful.
All these factors added to the complexities towards 
reaching an agreement over the taxation of foreign opium; 
but also provide an insight into the 'history1 of China 
and Britain - internal and external^.
2. The customs blockade of Hong Kong by China - The
blockade came about as a result of increased smuggling
from Hong Kong, especially in opium. It was instigated
in 1868 to end the clandestine trade from the .Colony and 
68Macao • It started as a purely regional or provincial 
affair since it was the Canton authorities, and not the 
Imperial government, that organized it. However, the 
•very nature of the blockade turned this issue into an 
international matter. It became irrevocably interwoven 
with the problem of the taxation of opium, and was as part 
of the Opiura^Question as the latter. The enforcement of 
the Additional Article of 1885 became dependent upon it, 
and legislation of the opium ordinance in Hong Kong in 
18*87 saw the conclusion of both problems.
The blockade also saw conflicts between the Canton 
and Hong Kong governments, between the latter and the 
British consul at Canton, and strong complaints raised 
by the Hong Kong merchants. Though these were basically 
'local' in nature, they did reflect, on a smaller scale, 
the conflict between the Chinese and British governments.
2. Native opium - Our period of survey saw an acceleration 
in the quantity of opium grown in China. This led to new 
considerations by both the Chinese and British governments 
in their respective opium policies.
The Chinese government was faced with the conflict of
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two factions: one advocated the total suppression of 
native opium and the other argued for encouragement of 
poppy cultivation in order to compete with the foreign 
drug. It was a moral argument versus a utilitarian one.
The Indian government and the India Office became 
increasingly worried by the effect native opium had, 
and would increasingly have on the demand of Indian opium 
in China. This led to a nev; appraisal of policy by the 
various departments of the British government., and greatly 
influenced the decision-making concerning the taxation 
of opium issue.
These are the three aspects' of the Opium Question 
that will be dealt with in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2 : INSTIGATION OF THE CUSTOMS BLOCKADE.
Smuggling activities and Preventive measures 
before the blockade
Despite initial proclamations by Charles Elliot in
1 ' 2 1841 and Henry Pottinger in 1843 to prevent Hong Kong
from becoming a smuggling dep6t after it became a British
Colony, it quickly became one. Some details of the
Colony's smuggling activities have been given in the
previous chapter , but in order to fully comprehend the '
magnitude and intensity of such activities, more
enumeration is needed.
In 1862, only two^'afters after opium had been
officially legalized as an import, D.B. Robertson,
British consul at Canton, reported that smuggling
activities were greatly on the increase owing *to the
free-port status of Hong Kong, the numerous bays, rivers
and inlets along the south-west coast of China, and the
inability of Chinese officials to suppress them and even
4their connivance at such activities • W.H. Peddar, British • 
consul at Amoy, also reported the same occurrences and 
even said that a Portuguese-owned clipper schooner was
5
solely engaged m  clandestine trade along the coast . Of 
the goods smuggled into China from Hong Kong, opium ranked 
first, not only in bulk and value, but also because of 
the excessive local taxation imposed upon it. A.W. Hewlett, 
British consul (acting) at Foochow, supported this 
statement, saying that at least 16# of opium imported 
into the port came in through clandestine means^.
Smuggling was increased by the fact that by then the 
junk’, trade, i.e. imports to and exports from Hong Kong 
carried in junks owned by Chinese traders, had almost 
completely taken over the coastal trade in south China.
i
Moreover, foreign imports seemed to be completely dominated
7by Chinese merchants and their junk trade . Chinese 
merchants could purchase foreign goods in the Treaty ports; 
however* since Hong Kong was only a six hour journey by
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boat from Canton, the merchants found it more convenient' 
to go there and purchase such imports. By carrying goods 
from Hong Kong to the un-opened ports along the south 
China coast, they could evade the payment of all duties.
As articles were successfully smuggled to the un-opened 
ports and villages, the legal trade at Canton suffered 
which also affected other Treaty ports and China's 
revenue8. In 1866 Robertson once again pointed out the 
ease with which smugglers could evade duties, and estimated 
that the annual consumption of opium in Kwangtung should 
be in the vicinity of 18.,.000 chests, but only 3*4-00 chests 
were legally imported into Canton. The difference was 
made up either by smuggling or by unloading at places 
along the coast where the native customs charged much less 
than the Tariff duties^.
The Canton government was very much aware of the
4
extent of smuggling activities and had already taken 
some preventive measures. It should be pointed out that, 
despite the fact that the Governor-General was the 
highest authority within the provincial administration, 
the collection of Tariff duty and other dues was vested 
in the hands^of many bodies with different interests and 
affiliations. The Foreign Inspectorate, directly under 
the control of the Imperial government at Peking, collected 
all Tariff duties on imports and exports at the Treaty 
ports. The amount collected, after deducting expenses 
involved, was remitted to the capital. The Governor-General 
and Governor collected the likin and some other local 
levies. These were almost totally retained for provincial 
uses though some were remitted to the capital. The Hoppo, 
or properly known as the Imperial Superintendent of 
Customs, was an imperial clansman sent by the Emperor to 
Canton to collect special duties for the throne's own 
coffers. These constituted special levies such as the 
nei-ti shui (inland tax). The salt comptroller, basically 
a tax farmer, monopolized the salt duty under special
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I licences issued by the provincial authorities. Apart from
t
i the variety of tax collectors, in the actual collection,
and supervision of customs, there was no collaboration 
; among these different groups. This situation, therefore,
complicated all the procedures. Effective means of 
revenue collection became the responsibility of local 
officials1 .^ In Kwangtung, before the initiation of the 
customs blockade in 1868, various measures had been 
resorted to., but they either met with little success or 
were strongly objected to by the Treaty powers on grounds 
of violation of Treaty regulations. Sometimes measures 
proposed were not even put into'practice.
One of the first suggestions was made by the Hoppo 
as early as 1859, when Tariff negotiations had Just been 
concluded at Shanghai. Unable to obtain any guarantees 
from merchants against smuggling, he obtained the petition
4
of a group of 'honest1 merchants who wanted to set up 
a guild to ensure revenue collection for him. Kingkwa, 
a former co-hong merchant, was given the monopoly. This 
was strongly opposed by the Canton consul, Rutherford 
Alcock, who maintained that such an establishment was 
against treaty stipulations and that it would definitely 
result in malpractices, similar to the co-hong before 
treaty days. In his concluding remarks, however, Alcock 
said that he was ready at all times to do whatever was 
in his power to facilitate the rightful collection of 
duties guaranteed by treaty and to put an end to any 
abuses'1'1. It is probable that such a favourable attitude 
from the British consul gave the Canton authorities 
• an incentive to institute measures:, that would end 
smuggling without contravening treaty stipulations.
The contemplated action of the Hoppo quickly led the
Acting Governor-General, in September 1859, to establish
12an opium monopoly similar to the one m  Hong Kong
The first contender was also Kingkwa, who was willing to
pay a monthly rental of 20,000 taels for the monopoly.
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But when the scheme came into existence in October, the 
monopolists were Pontingqua and Mingqua, also former 
co-hong merchants, who had devised a more flexible system, 
but one still reminiscent of the old c.o-hong methods. The 
monopoly would levy a combined duty of 50 taels per chest, 
of which 50 taels would go to the Canton government, 3 
taels to the steamer that would be chartered to bring
13the opium from Hong Kong and 17 taels to the monopolists .
Nevertheless, this system did not put an end to smuggling,
since the monopolists only exercised their monopoly in
the city of Canton and nowhere else. >
Attempted measures to prevent smuggling ended there
apart from Robert Hart's suggestion to the Tsungli-yamen
14in 1861 but which was not acted upon . Then in 1866, 
Robertson once more raised the question. Being aware of 
the extent of the clandestine trade and the anamolous 
situation of Hong Kong, he suggested a possible remedy.
He argued that owing to piracy and the inefficiency of 
Chinese revenue officers at suppressing smuggling, the 
Chinese government should permit foreign vessels to call 
at un-opened ports, but they should have customs officers 
on board to ensure that the vessels would return to Canton 
to pay duties on their cargoes. He argued that this 
would not only prevent smuggling to a great extent, but 
would also enhance the foreign trade at Canton. This
15
suggestion was officially made but no action was taken .
Thus, during the decade before the customs blockade 
was instigated, attempts made against smuggling had all 
proved futile. The only successful instance was the 
customs house at Taiping, which managed to collect a 
great deal of revenue. This prompted the Emperor to express 
gratification and to ask that the system there be extended 
to other custom^ stations. However, this apparently 
became a dead letter since no action was taken on the 
edict by the local authorities^.
So far we have only dealt with attempts made to prevent
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smuggling and duty evasion. During the sixties there 
were three notable cases which resulted from such 
undertakings, and which directly affected Hong Kong. In 
these three instances, the Canton government, though 
showing some degree of lack of awareness and understanding 
of international law, was nonetheless very prompt in 
redressing the mistakes made. These incidents can very 
definitely be regarded as the prelude to the blockade 
which demonstrated the strict observance of treaty 
stipulations and international law, creating a landmark 
in the history of Sino-western relations.
The first was the ’Prince Albert1 affair. On 21 March 
1866, a Hong Kong registered steamer, the 'Prince Albert', 
owned by a certain Kwok A Cheong, was chartered by a well- 
known Chinese merchant to look for a disabled junk that 
had come from Indo-China carrying a cargo of rice. The
4
steamer was unable to find the junk, and in fear of
suspected piratical junks, had anchored some miles off an
un-opened port, Shui-tung. It was seized there by the
native customs revenue cruiser 'Hai-ching' on 25 March,
on the grounds that it had violated Article 4*7 of the
17Treaty of Tientsin f. The steamer was found guilty at
a special hearing at the customs house in Canton attended
by representatives from both sides. As a result of the
18verdict, the steamer was confiscated
The owner then petitioned the Governor of Hong Kong,
Sir R.G. MacDonnell^, who acknowledged that the steamer
had violated the article, but contended that the penalty
had been unduly severe, since it could not have and had
• not been engaged in smuggling activities. The Governor
appealed both to Alcock, the British minister at Peking,
and to the Colonial Office pleading the innocence of the
20vessel and asking* for its release . After reviewing the 
entire case, both .the Colonial and Foreign Offices agreed 
that the steamer had indeed violated treaty stipulations 
and the Chinese government had acted correctly. However,
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in view of the unproven nature of its attempted smuggling
activities, mitigation of the offence was asked from
21the Tsungli-yamen , which duly asked the Hoppo at
22Canton for mitigation . This was complied with by asking 
the ov/ner to pay $9,000 for buying back his ship, but 
the payment was eventually settled at $4,000, which was 
one-eighth of the price the owner had quoted for the 
vessel^.
24Although further complaints came from MacDonnell ,
the case had been settled and both the Foreign and Colonial
26Offices regarded the matter as closed . It is also
important to note the differences in the interpretation
of the outcome of this case. On one side, the Hong Kong
government heralded the 'Prince Albert1 affair as a
victory, though MacDonnell was reprimanded by ,the Colonial 
26Office for this . Alcock and Robertson, on the other
#
side, claimed it only 'an act of grace' by the Chinese 
27authorities r.
The 'Prince Albert' affair in fact had two precedents.
28They were the cases of the 'Scotland' and the 'Mercury'
The point to note is that the Chinese government acted 
perfectly within its rights and according to treaty 
stipulations. However, once representations were made by 
the British government, both the Imperial and Canton 
governments were very willing to agree to a mitigation of 
the offences, although they had every right to insist on 
the original verdicts. Such an attitude led to a more 
than cordial relationship between the Tsungli-yamen and 
the British Minister, and between the Canton authorities 
and the Canton Consul. On the other hand, the Hong Kong 
government, eager to preserve the prosperity of the 
Colony, was perfectly willing to side with the culprits, 
a factor that wa^ to dominate the estranged relationship 
between the Governor of Hong Kong and the British diplomatic 
corps in China, and between the Colonial and Canton 
authorities throughout this period. It is this conflict
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of interests, and the differences in interpretation of 
issues that is distinctive of Sino-British relations 
during this period.
The second case concerned the seizure of an opium 
junk in Hong Kong waters. On 15 October 1867, the 
revenue cruiser 'Hai-ching*, captained by W.N. Folsom, 
seized a junk that had just left Hong Kong harbour, in 
which 4-6 balls of unstamped opium, plus general cargoes, 
were found. The junk was then towed to Canton, where it 
was found guilty of attempting to smuggle opium in 
contravention to the Governor-General1s proclamation that 
to avoid seizure any junk v/ith opium on board must pay 
the likin dues at Canton, either by the owner himself or 
through an agent, and be issued a pass.
MacDonnell then made very strong representations on
the owner*s and the Colony's behalf, maintaining that
«
according to treaty stipulations and the existence of 
friendly relationships between Britain and China, Hong Kong 
and Canton, such a seizure, in open sight of the harbour 
master and within the three-mile territorial limit of 
the Colony, constituted an act of hostility. Moreover, he 
complained that such seizures, with the 'Hai-ching* at 
the eastern pass of the Colony and two revenue junks at 
the western pass, posed a virtual blockade of Hong Kong, 
and obstructed the entire junk trade of the Colony. He 
insisted that the Canton government had no right to act 
in such a way, since it was their duty to levy dues at 
the port of disembarkation when the cargo was being 
unloaded. That such duties could not be carried out 
should not mean that seizures could be made directly 
outside of Hong Kong waters. MacDonnell demanded the 
return of junk and her cargo, and even threatened that 
if any such seizures were made in future, very strong 
reprisal actions would be taken. He further said that if 
the junk had been seized because it had opium on board, 
it should be noted that the opium smuggled from Hong Kong
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was minimal, and this seizure was therefore out of propor­
tion to the gravity of opium smuggling. He also said 
that if such a blockade of the Colony were instigated, 
other articles of trade, such as cotton, whether they were 
for transhipment or not, could be seized. This would 
lead to a total destruction of the flourishing junk
2Q
trade of Hong Kong .
Robertson, in his assessment of the legality of the
seizure, replied that according to the testimony of the
captain of the 'Hai-ching1, together with a chart and a
reply from the Hoppo to whom the revenue cruiser was
responsible, the seizure had be6n perfectly in accordance
with treaty stipulations especially in regard to Rule V
and article 4-6 of the Treaty of Tientsin^.
The entire matter was referred to the Colonial and
Foreign offices and the Board of Trade. The last two
concurred with the legality of the seizure, saying that
31m  Britain there existed even more stringent measures^.
The Colonial Office, however, though condemning MacDonnell (
for the harshness of his tone to the Chinese government,
advised the Foreign Office that new regulations or a
clearer understanding of the right of seizure should be
32obtained from the Chinese government-^ .
Upon further representations by Robertson on behalf 
of* the Colonial government, the Governor-General, who 
had been eager to maintain a cordial relationship with 
Hong Kong, decided to and did return to the owner, through 
the offices of the Colonial government, the amount 
received for vessel and cargo already sold for $1,112 and 
$756 respectively. This was, however, accompanied by a 
statement of principle. The Governor-General maintained 
that he reserved the strict legality- of the seizure. 
Nevertheless, he’was of opinion that there were circumstances 
attending the case which could lead to a misconstruction 
of the acts of the Canton authorities, and with the view > 
of removing any doubts on that head, he had directed the
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amount realized to be remitted to the owner^. Moreover, 
in order to maintain friendly relations with the Hong 
Kong government, the Governor-General had ordered that 
in future revenue cruisers should only malce seizures 
that ftere definitely outside the territorial waters of - 
the Colony^.
The opinion of the Lav/ Officers in London was that where 
there was no three miles difference betv/een British and 
Chinese territory, the middle of the channel should be 
the dividing line separating the territorial waters of 
the two countries^.
The seizure of the opium junk points clearly to the 
greatly divergent opinions on the interpretation of treaty 
stipulations and sentiments on the part of the diplomatic 
corps and the Hong Kong government. The formes?, supported 
by the Foreign Office, maintained that the seizure was 
legal and that the Chinese government could do anything 
it wanted. This attitude was reflected not only in the 
instigation of the blockade, but also in subsequent 
incidents. That MacDonnell again chose to defend smugglers 
from Hong Kong made it a point that smuggling was of 
minimal amount showed his bias. The Governor-General of 
Liang-kwang, Jui-lin, demonstrated his ability. On the 
one hand, he maintained strict adherence to treaty 
stipulations; on the other, aware of the necessity of 
maintaining a cordial relationship with the Canton consulate 
and the Hong Kong government, he was willing to compromise. 
That he agreed to refund the money is ample proof of a 
dexterity in western diplomacy which he was to prove 
innumerable times in subsequent years.
The third case v/as concerned with the levy of salt 
dues in Hong Kong v/aters. In the two cases just mentioned, 
the Canton authorities had acted legally; but in this 
case, it was an unlawful act. However, the fault lay with 
the salt monopolist and not with the government-, though 
as with previous cases, it was more than willing to redress
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the wrong done. This gave the Hong Kong government and • 
the merchants a boost in morale, but apart from this, 
nothing important resulted from the incident.
Between 5 and 7 January 1868, several fishing junks 
in Tdotewan, Stanley and Aberdeen were visited by two 
fully-armed salt revenue junks. They demanded and obtained 
money for salt warrants, the procurement of which meant 
that the fishing junks would be free from salt levies 
for one year. However, these revenue junks had levied 
the dues in Hong Kong waters, and strong objections were 
raised by MacDonnell^.
He called such activities an infringement of the - 
territorial v/aters of Hong Kong and a definite violation 
of international law, which might lead to very serious 
consequences. Representations were made to Ro,bertson, as 
well as the Colonial Office. Both regarded the matter as 
very serious. The Colonial Office wrote to the Foreign 
Office asking for clarification and demanded that justice 
be done. It suggested that, ’after making all allowances, 
the proceedings of these Chinese Customs cruisers,....have 
been of so flagrant a violation of British territory 
that the persons guilty of them ought not only to be 
prevented from repeating them but also be subjected to 
some deterrent penalty the nature of which is not 
material but which perhaps would most properly take the 
form of payment of such a sum as Would enable the British 
Government to repay all the sum received by the contractor 
in British waters to the fishermen from whom the contractor 
thus improperly exacted them.1^
Robertson, instructed by Alcock through directions
38from the Foreign Office^ , made representations to Jui-lin 
asking for 'an official and distinct disavov/al of the acts 
of the cruisers ,Vwith an expression of sincere regret and 
the offer of reparation to the persons illegally mulcted 
of money....an equally formal censure of the Balt Comp­
troller, with a warning of serious responsibility to attach
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to him personally for any future offence of the same 
59character.1 ^ ' However, in semi-private correspondences 
between Robertson and Alcock, both expressed the view 
that an apology was sufficient aind that although the 
modud operandi of the salt gabeile cruisers was indefens­
ible, yet the lack of sympathy on the part of the Colonial
40government was also to be regretted .
When the Governor-General was approached by Robertson
to effect remedies, he immediately apologized for the
incident and .promised that a full investigation would be
41conducted and the guilty parties punished . This was
considered as insufficient and ^ further representations
resulted in the Governor-General, offering a written
apology as well as verbal apologies and his agreement to
pay the Hong Kong government 100 taels as the, sum the salt
revenue junks had collected. Indeed, the amount actually
42 *collected was not more than 10 taels . The extent to 
which Jui-lin had gone to remedy the offence greatly pleased 
the British authorities. The readiness to effect compen­
sations where they were due was made a point of special
45compliment by both Robertson and Alcock . Even the
Colonial Office and the Hong Kong government expressed
44satisfaction at the result . Buit, m  one of his despatches, 
Robertson once again pointed out; the extremely serious 
nature of smuggling activities jfrom Hong Kong and complained 
that though it was true the Colonial government had no 
obligation to help the Chinese government, it should not 
have offered resistance to every effort made by the latter 
to collect its rightful shared-
As had been pointed out earlier, these incidents on 
the one hand showed the differences in interpretation 
adopted by the various authorities concerned; but, on the 
other, they alsd reflected that without'a carefully- 
organized and thoroughly-regulatbed preventive service, 
disputes to the detriment of the Canton government would 
always arise. Such factors promoted the establishment' of
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the customs blockade in 1868.
Reasons behind the establishment of the blockade
The problem of revenue had always troubled the Imperial 
government and the provincial authorities. It was veryf
much intensified by the rebellions in the eighteen-fifties,
when expenditure greatly increased and income was
correspondingly reduced. Though the biggest of the
rebellions, the Taiping, had been suppressed in 1864,
the others were still very active and large amounts of
money were needed to finance military expeditions. One
case in point was Tso Tsung-t1ang1s urgent request for
46money in January 1868 . Moreover, the recent defeat of
China between 1858 and 1860 had caused her to pay a heavy
indemnity; All of these vast expenditures had to be met
and money had to be obtained from somewhere. The revenue
derived from the Foreign Inspectorate ha<JL mostly been
accounted for and other means had to be sought. Likin had
already been introduced in 1853 but it had only slightly
alleviated the financial plight of the government. Provinc-'
ial governments were urged to devise new ways and means
to secure more revenue.
In the Liang-kwang area, the loss of revenue was even
more acute because of the ease and therefore the prevalence
of smuggling from Hong Kong of opium and other goods.
Shortly after the arrival of Jui-lin as Governor-General
in 1866, a successful reform was made by Chiang Yi-li,
Governor of Kwangtung from 1866 to 1868, at the Taiping
48customs at Shao-chow fu . Previous to the reform, this
station was farmed out by the local taotai and the tax-
farmer obtained a fortune, at the expense of the government.
The standard collection of 134,861 taels had never been
effected since 1858 and annual deficits rose to 72,830»
taels by 1865. Chiang, instead, appointed the taotai of 
Shao-chow fu to supervise the collection personally as an 
experiment. During the period from 30 November 1866 to 17 
November 1867, he collected 189,825 taels. This was three
i
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times more than the previous year's collection and exceeded
the standard collection by 97>900 taels. Expenses towards
collection only amounted to 40,189 taels, thus there was
a net revenue of 149,636 taels. These returns did not
include collection of duties on opium, which during this
period amounted to 19,489 taels^,. The success prompted
Robertson to remark that if revenue were properly collected
and paid into the treasury, the Chinese government would
SOhave enough to run the country^ .
Following closely on the heels of the successful
customs reform, Jui-lin was asked by the Imperial government.
to effect payment of 100,000 taels additional to the
normal remittance, in January 1868^. This additional
payment was to be increased every year. Since the Canton
government was already deeply in debt and unable to obtain
52loans from anybody*' , Jui-lin had to resort to new measures
more intensive and all-embracing than the Taiping customs
reform. He knew that this reform was on a very smalllscale
and similar reforms with other customs could not yield
the sufficient amount required by the Imperial government.
However, realizing that smuggling of Hong Kong v/as
extremely widespread and the yearly loss in revenue more
than significant, Jui-lin decided, to direct his attention
to the British Colony. He instigated the so-called
55customs blockade of Hong Kong and Macao-' , the latter
being a Portuguese-rented island lying about forty miles
to the south of Hong Kong and at the other end of the
Pearl Estuary.
In anticipating his future dealings with the Hong Kong
government, Jui-lin was very much aware of the complications'
that would result. However, v/ith the results of previous
54incidents to rely upon^ , he was able to map out a plan 
that would benefit greatly the provincial and Imperial 
coffers, but one that the British and Hong Kong governments 
could only complain but do nothing about, since every 
procedure v/ould be conducted under treaty stipulations and
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perfectly within the bounds of international lav/.
Although it is impossible to say how long Jui-lin had
conceived the idea of a blockade before its implementation
he did contemplate it thoroughly and obtained the approval
from 'Consul Robertson before it v/as finally instigated.
A look into Jui-lin's negotiations with Robertson will
give evidence to the above assertion.
Before embarking on this novel method of duty collect-
55ion, Jui-lin communicated his intentions to Robertson*".
The reasons for such discussions v/ere obvious. Jui-lin
wanted to sound out the opinion of the British government.
Robertson saw immediately the detrimental effect such
stations would have on the foreign trade of Hong Kong
and the severe implications it might have on international
trade at large. As an alternative he suggested that
some more ports along the Kwangtung coast could be opened
for the reception of opium, and that licences could be
issued to junks to carry opium and other foreign products.
Such a measure would not only raise immediately a huge
sum of money but would also encourage honest traders,
56thus bringing more junk trade with Hong Kong' • Jui-lm
was receptive to the. proposal, but he doubted, quite
correctly, the honesty of and the reliance he could
57place on the traders".
Failing to persuade the Governor-General to do 
otherwise, Robertson informed his superior, Alcock, of 
the plan and added that he himself believed nothing could 
be done to prevent the Governor-General from carrying 
out such an action*^. Alcock's reply to Robertson v/as in 
a similar vein. He agreed that such a measure was distaste 
ful to traders and Hong Kong, but was perfectly legitimate 
according to treaty stipulations. He advised Robertson 
not to do anything to stop such a move. He went further 
to say that the Chinese government 'had a perfect and 
undoubted right to take what measures it deems best for 
the collection of its revenue.' He also condemned the
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smuggling activities from Hong Kong, calling the Colony
a 'depbt for smugglers' and said that it was publicly
known that China lost about one million taels every year
59through opium smuggling alone^ .
Evfen before Alcock's instructions to Robertson
arrived in Canton, Jui-lin had already prepared a list
of possible sites for the proposed tax stations. Upon
reviewing these, Robertson immediately objected to two
sites which were either too near or within the territorial
waters of Hong Kong and which could lead to political
and judicial complications^. Jui-lin took into consideration
these objections and instructed borne of his trusted
subordinates to re-investigate and to make recommendations
61for the best possible sites for the tax stations . By 
this time, the Governor-General was perfectly .^ware of 
the fact that Robertson was in full sympathy with his 
scheme.
Thus, in a communication to Robertson on 28 February 
1868, Jui-lin emphasized that 'the opium-tax leviable at 
various places on the coast of Kwangtung is constantly 
evaded by the operations of smugglers, and that in view 
of the fact that opium imported from foreign countries is 
stored at Hong Kong and Macao, it is now intended to fix 
upon an eligible point in the direction of those two places 
at which a central station shall be established and civil
and military functionaries be detailed for the purpose of
62levying the tax on opium.'
After obtaining an agreement from Robertson to the 
effect that it was perfectly legal for China to use what­
ever means it thought necessary to ensure the proper
collection of taxation, Jui-lin supplied a map listing
65the places where tax stations would be situated . He also
asked Robertson tb notify not only Alcock but also the
64Hong Kong government
After such preliminary steps were completed, on 1 July 
1868, an official proclamation was made in the names of
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the Governor-General and Coramander-in-Chief of Liang-kwang 
and the Governor of Kwangtung: 'An announcement that 
Tax-offices are to be specially established on the Coast, 
for the better administration of the revenue and in the 
interest of the trading classes. Whereas in the collection 
of supplies in the Province of Kwangtung the item of 
primary consequence is the merchandize tax /Tikin.7 , in i
which, again, an important amount accrues from opium.... 
although the annual import of opium reaches the number of 
several thousand chests, yet, from the time when Opium-tax 
Offices were first established, the amount of tax collected 
shews a deficiency of more than one-half....abuses must be 
prevalent in this matter....lawless persons...have fraudent- 
ly assumed the guise of military officials...under the 
pretext of employment for the apprehension of smugglers....
In so far as the traders are concerned, since they suffer 
harm in consequence of their greed of gain, there is but 
little reason for sympathy in such cases; but there are some 
who, without desiring to evade the payment of duty are 
unable to preport their merchandize for payment of the tax 
owing to their not having reached the stations where it is 
levied, and are befallen with the like calamity, and the 
losses that such men incur do indeed call for commiseration.• 
..The Viceroy, moved by these considerations, has now 
established regulations in accordance with which offices 
for the levy of the tax on opium will be opened in the 
neighbourhood of ... the District of Sin-ngan...and in the 
neighbourhood of the ...District of Hiang-shan...where 
civil and military officials will be stationed to levy the 
import tax on Opium, according to the following rates.... 
Stamped tickets and brand-marks will be issued, together 
with receipts in triplicate, after which, on opium being 
brought to Canton' and Whampoa, Ch' ao-chow-fu and Swatow, 
the tariff duty on the Opium must, as heretofore, be paid 
.at the Maritime Custom's /sic7 offices, in order that the 
regulations be fully complied with....' This was followed
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65by details of punishment for offences etc.
This proclamation is worthwhile quoting at some length
because it represented the awareness of the Canton
authorities concerning treaty stipulations and their
willin'gness to abide fully by them. Thus, although they
were only concerned with the collection of likin, with
the establish®^ of the tax stations, that merchants should
also pay the Tariff duty at Canton or Swatow is demonstrative
Of such an observance. The proceedings of the tax
stations and revenue cruisers were no longer extra-legal,
and valid reasons were given for the installation of such
stations. Moreover, this proclamation covered all aspects
concerning the method and amount of collection, types of
punishment for duty evasion etc.. Neither Hong Kong nor
Macao was specifically mentioned in it - but Hong Kong was
situated in the Sin-ngan district while Macao was in
«
Hiang-shan; this was done on purpose to*avoid any'possible 
complications with the authorities of these two places. 
Furthermore, the six stations (three for each place) were 
all outside the territorial waters of' Hong Kong and Macao, 
and placed in such a way that the two exits from the Hong 
Kong harbour n(and similarly for Macao) - Lyeemoon and 
Capsuimoon - were well-guarded by the stations equipped 
with revenue cruisers and junks. Under these circumstances, 
it became virtually impossible for any vessel to attempt 
to smuggle anything out or into these two places.
Following this move, agreement was reached with 
Keppel, the British Admiral, for the prohibition of 
armaments and ‘stinkpots’ on fishing junks^. The regulations 
made were all-embracing and underline the desire.of the 
Governor-General to appease Britain, since piracy affect'ed 
British shipping as well.
Thus began thfe customs blockade. It provided the most 
effective means of checking smuggling at a minimal cost in 
the maintenance of customs stations and revenue vessels. 
Moreover, about one year after its initiation, foreigners
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were employed to captain the cruisers, especially the
newly-purchased steamers which had greater speed and
67manoeuvrability (. Though the cost of their maintenance
68v/as very much increased, to 10,000 taels a month , yet 
it was'minimal compared with the cost that would be 
incurred if effective patrolling of the entire coastline 
of Kwangtung, if not the whole of south China, was to 
be executed.
Inclusion of other levies
Initially in 1868, when Jui-lin established his-cordon
of customs stations around Hong Kong and Macao, it v/as
for the collection of just the likin (or chou-li) on opium.
It was a collection on native craft or junks embarking
from Hong Kong for places other than Treaty ports, where
no customs supervision was either available or ’possible.
The success of the blockade saw in la,te 1870 an
attempt by the Hoppo to introduce a similar cordon of
stations and revenue cruisers to collect .first the Tariff
duty on opium, and later Tariff duties on all foreign
imports that were conveyed in native crafts to non-Treaty 
69ports . The acting commissioner at Canton reported this
to Hart who, after consultations with the Tsungli-yamen,
instructed him as follows: that if the Foreign Inspectorate
at Canton was to collect the Tariff duty on opium, it would
be entered into the report of import duties, and the steamer
'P'eng Chao Hai*, under the command of deputy commissioner
Brown, should be made available as a revenue cruiser; or
that if the Hoppo was to undertake the collection himself,
he would have to surrender to the Board of Revenue at
least 60,000 taels a year to commence with and could obtain
the services of the steamers 'Fei-hoo' and 'Ling-teng1 for
70a rent of 5,000 taels a month/ .
I
The sum of 600,000 taels was arrived at as follows: 
during 1869-70 88,000 chests of opium arrived in Hong Kong 
and only 50,000 chests paid the Tariff duty; after the 
establishment of the customs blockade, 20,000 chests had
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paid likin» but of this number, only 1,100 chests went 
voluntarily to the Foreign Inspectorate to pay the Tariff 
duty. Therefore, if the Hoppo wanted to collect the Tariff 
duty on opium proceeding to un-opened ports, the Imperial 
government should be compensated for the amount the 
Foreign Inspectorate would be unable to collect$ the 20,000 
chests paying the duty of 30 taels would amount to 
600,000 taels^. This suggestion from Hart was not acted 
upon. Instead, following another suggestion made by the 
Tsungli-yamen and the Board of Revenue, an Imperial edict 
called on the Governor-General and the Hoppo to ensure
that the Tariff duty on opium shbuld be collected as well
. . 72as the liltin' .
In fact, the Hoppo had already begun his collection of 
Tariff duty on opium on 18 June 1871, without £irst waiting 
for Imperial approval^. He had also purchased the ’P’eng 
Ghao Hai1 with 120,000 haikuan taels, and the vessel was
niL
to be commanded by a Captain Vassallo' . The Hoppo in fact
used the Governor-General1s chou-li stations to collect
his dues; in 1873 Wen T ’ien became the new Hoppo and he
75started the levy of dues on general cargo' . The problem 
of establishing stations near Macao proved more of a 
difficult operation, but a compromise was eventually 
reached in August 1871^ •
Although the Canton branch of the Foreign Inspectorate 
was not involved in the operation of the blockade, it was 
frequently consulted by the Governor-General and the Hoppo. 
In order to clarify the r8le of the office, Hart issued 
the following instructions in January 1872: *1. The 
collection of revenue from goods carried in Chinese bottoms 
in Chinese waters is a matter in which China is competent 
to legislate and take action without consulting any one.
2. The British Government has declared that so long as 
China does not take action in Hong Kong and does respect 
what can fairly be styped British waters, the Colonial 
Authorities cannot interfere with the proceedings of the
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Canton Officials. Neither Governor at Hong Kong nor 
Consul at Canton will be supported in any steps they may 
take, to suppress the Opium stations, against the wish 
of the Chinese O f f i c i a l s . ' ^
Uuring the first few years of the blockade, there 
was a good deal of corruption and squeeze among the 
Chinese tax officials. In order to lessen such, occurrences 
and give the Hong Kong government less grounds for com­
plaint, European officials were borrowed from the Foreign 
Inspectorate. First F.A. Morgan, and then J. Mcleavy Brown 
were lent to the Hoppo as managers of his revenue cruisers, 
junks and guardboats and to keep an account of the duties 
collected. However, the temporary transfer of these two 
to the Hoppo1s service was done unofficially, and the 
matter was clarified in 1874. Under instructipns from 
Hart, commissioner F. Kleinwhchter served notice on the 
Hoppo that'henceforth such 'borrowings** had to be made 
officially. After a great deal of negotiations the Hoppo- 
eventually agreed and T.M. Brown officially became the 
manager of the Hoppo's customs stations and revenue vessels 
on 26 May 1874. Then in July of the same year, regulations
were framed to put tide-waiters on board steamers to
78search luggage and passengers especially for opium' .
With this last arrangement, the customs blockade system 
could be said to have been fully completed.
There is no record of any returns on duties and dues 
collected at the blockade stations made by either the 
Governor-General or the Hoppo. However, it was estimated 
by Kleinv/a'chter in 1874 that the total collection was in 
the vicinity of 460,000 taels a year. This sum would be 
equivalent to 14,783 piculs of opium. By comparing this
amount with the 'access' in Annexure G of this dissertation,
79smuggling was extremely minimal after the blockade' .
Other factors can also be used to demonstrate its results. 
These are the inclusion of other levies soon after the 
blockade started, thereby proving its effectiveness
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against smugglers; the ceaseless objections, increasing 
in intensity and volume, raised by the Hong Kong govern­
ment and its merchants; and the reported cases of seizure 
made by revenue cruisers, the importance of which can be 
seen i'n the voluminous correspondence in the Foreign 
and Colonial Office archives of this period. All such 
evidence, although negative, point to the success of the 
blockade.
• Seizures and reforms of blockade proceedings
Initial years of the blockade saw some incidents 
which brought the Canton and Hong Kong governments into 
conflict and misunderstanding. The British consulate at 
Canton and the Peking legation also became involved, 
because the diplomatic corps acted both as intermediary 
and arbitrator. These incidents arose partly fiom the 
vehement objections to the blockade raised by the Colonial 
government and its mercantile community which continued 
until the blockade was lifted in 1887* They were also due 
partly to the over-zealous work of the Chinese tax collect-* 
ors and revenue cruisers as well as attempts by some 
officials to secure personal gains' and to the activities 
of persons impersonating revenue officers. However, these 
incidents were all settled amicably, and profitting from 
experiences and mistakes, the Canton authorities were able 
to tighten up security measures so that the blockade became 
more effective than eve?..
Difficulties encountered by the Canton government 
included forced exactions and extortions, arbitrary 
confiscation of vessels and goods, impersonators posing 
as tax collectors, and vessels masquerading as revenue 
junks. These malpractices came to light as a result of a 
series of complaints made by merchants to the Hong Kong
O Q  I
government
Of these complaints, the most notable and representative 
v/as the case of the seizure of the 'San Wing Hop', passage 
boat No. 108 registered in Hong Kong. The vessel plied
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regularly between Hong Kong and Cheung-sha. On 3 December 
1868 it left Hong Kong for its scheduled journey carrying 
forty passengers and a cargo of cotton, piece goods, etc..
It was halted by revenue cruisers the following day at 
a place called Chuk Chan Tan, about nine miles from Macao. 
There' the vessel, its crew and passengers were thoroughly 
searched. A small quantity of undeclared opium was found, 
and as a result, the entire cargo of the vessel was i
declared contraband and confiscated. The vessel v/as towed 
to Canton and a demand of $2,400 was made for its release.
81The master of the vessel v/as imprisoned for over a fortnight .
Representatives of the owner and part-owners of the
boat and cargo then made representations to the Hong Kong
government. The complaint was transmitted to Robertson,
who duly informed the Governor-General of the illegality
of the seizure and the confiscation. Investigation by the
Canton government showed that the vessel was seized on
the grounds of a proclamation made by the Hoppo which
required all Chinese vessels to obtain a permit from Canton
to carry foreign goods to Chinese ports and places. This
proclamation was made to prevent smuggling and was perfectly
legal according to the Treaty of Tientsin, since once
foreign goods passed into Chinese hands, the Chinese
government had every right to impose whatever regulations
it thought fit. In this particular case, however, the
Hoppo admitted that the proclamation had not been circulated
for general information and also conceded that since it
was the first seizure under the new ruling, he was quite
prepared to restore the cargo to the owner and return the fine
of $2,400 to the master of the boat. This was done in
March 1869, and at the same time the Governor-General
withdrew the Hoppo1s proclamation. MacDonnell then declared
that he was satisfied with the settlement, which, he said,
had resulted in b return of confidence among the Chinese
82traders in Hong Kong
On 6 February 1869, two months after the above-mentioned 
incident, the Governor-General, with a desire to put an end
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to possible abuses, issued a special proclamation, which
on the one hand acknowledged the presence of ’impersonators'
but on the other gave details of the jurisdiction and
actions of the revenue stations, junks and cruisers, and
also 'details of severe punishments that would be meted
83_ out to impersonators when they were caught .
Furthermore, to ensure that the revenue cruisers should
have a distinctive identity which would distinguish them
from impersonating vessels, a square flag bearing a dragon
on a yellow background became the official national flag 
84of China • After this emblem was recognized by the Treaty 
powers, it was flown on all Chinese government vessels 
after 30 March 1869^.
Another incident in March 1869 which saw prompt 
redress from the Governor-General was the att.empt by P'eng 
Yu, the person assigned by the Governor-General to map 
out the proposed tax stations, to exceed his authority 
as chief superintendent of the likin levy and establish 
a tax station in Hong Kong with a help of a certain 
Webster, a dismissed Hong Kong police inspector, and a 
certain Ho-a-loy, a former police court interpreter^.
Upon hearing of the incident, through strong representations 
made by the Hong Kong government, the Governor-General 
immediately ordered the closing down of the illegal 
station and severely reprimanded P'eng Yu^.
Prompt redress of valid complaints and grievances, 
and immediate amendments to rules and regulations for 
the better control of revenue collection marked the first 
year of the blockade. The willingness on the part of the 
Canton government to co-operate with the Canton consulate 
and to a large extent with the Hong Kong government, 
resulted not only in amicable relations between the 
governments of the two countries, but also in an expression 
of sympathy and support by the British government. This 
can be seen in the reactions to the blockade from the 
Foreign Office in London and the diplomatic corps in China.
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The Home government supported the contention, made by 
both Alcock and Robertson, that most, if not all of the 
complaints registered with the Hong Kong government were 
the result of smugglers caught in the act. With nothing 
more t6 lose, they hoped that by complaining, they mightoo
regain something
Looking at this first year from another angle, despite
the amicable and just approach adopted by the Canton
government towards the Hong Kong government, relationship
between these two authorities became extremely strained
and deteriorated rapidly. Governor MacDonnell complained
bitterly, both to the Canton government through the
intermediary of the Canton consul, and to the Colonial
Office in London. He insisted that the complaints he had
received related to only one-fifth of the total number of
actual incidents, and made the forecast that the Colony
* 89would be totally ruined if the blockade was to continue .
Support of the blockade by one branch of the British 
government and condemnation of it by another, became one 
of the most distinctive aspects of Siho-British relations 
in this period - and in special regard to the Opium Question
Reactions from Hong Kong to the blockade
The blockade prompted an almost immediate response from 
the government and mercantile community, both British 
and Chinese, of Hong Kong. It was adamant and hostile, to 
say the least.
Upon receipt of Robertson1s communications forwarding 
details of the blockade scheme, Austin, the Colonial 
Secretary, was immediately instructed by the Governor to 
condemn not only the actions of the Canton government but 
also those of Robertson. Austin complained that the addition 
al levy of 16 taels per chest on opium in fact amounted to 
a 65# increase to the Tariff duty, and that the placing of 
a cordon of revenue cruisers around Hong Kong would 
definitely affect the trade of more than 20,000 junks each 
year. The legality of the blockade was also question. 'The
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scheme...apparently strains beyond their legal limit the
provisions of existing treaties, and which even, if in
accordance with those treaties, is in its conception and
object contrary to any Customs' usages of civilized-nations,
which' contravenes the spirit of the Treaty of Tientsin,
and which are hostile and unfriendly to the interests of 
90this Colony.'' Moreover, 'a new and additional tax of 16
taels is now declared leviable on that article, and is to
be imposed in a manner more offensive, galling and injurious
to the general commerce of the Colony than probably has
ever been attempted by one friendly power towards another.
Robertson was also condemned in no uncertain terms for
allowing the blockade scheme to be kept a secret from
the Colonial government until the very last minute: 'As •
you must be well aware of the venality and extortion so
general amongst certain classes of Chinese officials, and
the great probability that the erection*of the proposed
numerous Customs Stations will lead to vexations and
harassing proceedings against all native vessels clearing
from this Port, the Governor can scarcely suppose you were
not aware of the serious importance to the interests of
this Colony^involved in the proposed measure,the maturing
of the scheme must have occupied several months and His
Excellency wishes to be informed of the reasons which
induced you to keep from the Governor of this Colony all
knowledge Of a measure calculated to affect so seriously
92the commercial interests of this place.
Apart from voicing objections against Robertson,
MacDonnell also addressed a long communique to the Colonial
Office stating not only the grievances already mentioned,
but also the possible injurious effects to the Colony, and
an emphatic denial of the existence of smuggling. Referring
to the incidents of the 'Hai Ching' and the levy of salt 
93dues'^ a few months earlier, he said that the fears he had 
expressed then were now true and this was made possible 
by the connivance with the Chinese authorities of both
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Robertson and Alcock. When Britain had the opportunity to 
dictate terms to China, she should have asked for an 
extension of territory, say twenty miles, or failing that, 
a guarantee of non-molestation for at least twenty miles 
from Hohg Kong. If that.had been the case, the blockade 
could not have been imposed. Nov/ that China had imposed 
her 1legal right* of searching Chinese vessels, ’the door 
is at once opened to endless dimensions' and would 
seriously affect the welfare of the 23,000 trading Junks 
with a cargo of over 2ft million tons that frequent Hong 
Kong^.
Referring to the right of search, in a subsequent 
despatch to the Colonial Office, MacDonnell stated that no 
distinction was made betv/een Chinese and foreign vessels, 
or for vessels going to Treaty ports or other destinations. 
Referring to the Treaty of Tientsin, he contended that 
British merchants could import opium to Treaty ports and 
was 'also entitled to hire whatever boats they please for 
the transport of goods and passengers, and it would seem, 
therefore, that a British subject would be entitled to 
hire a junk here ^Hong Kong7 and transport opium hence to 
Canton or Swatow and sell it there on payment of the 
Treaty duty.' Furthermore, the fact that some of the tax 
stations were very near Hong Kong, in Kov/loon, v/hich was 
within a mile of British territory, and at Lyeemoon Pass 
which was within a few hundred yards of British waters, 
made the actions of the Chinese government an 'illegal 
stretch of authority', which had never been exercised by 
a civilized government and contravened international law 
•as much as infringing on international usage and courtesy. 
'Already there is a most unprecedented stagnation of trade 
caused by the panic amongst the Chinese and to what extent
95it may proceed is beyond the pov/er of anyone to foretell.1
This was followed by a third despatch in which he 
stated that Alcock's reference to Hong Kong and Macao as • 
smuggling depots and that China v/as losing 1 million taels
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in revenue each year v/as very muich exaggerated. Quoting
figures and opium imports and excports, he arrived at the
conclusion that China suffered sat most only 200,000 
96taels or less' .
Ih another communique, MacDonnell insisted that
smuggling, compared with legitimate trade, was in a
proportion of 50 to 1, and accused Alcock of ignoring
the 50 and dwelling on the 1. He further complained that,
•thoroughness of search exercised by the cruisers had
resulted in not merely the stagmation but at this moment
almost the extinction of the legitimate trade in English
and other manufactures conducted! in native vessels
between this Colony and Chinese Ports on the Mainland.1
Because of this, the blockade had placed Hong Kong in a
position much worse than any of the Treaty po^ts. Moreover,
less than six months after the start of the blockade, he
had already noticed three seriouis consequences: 1) Chinese
vessels were declining to take cargo from Hong Kong to
the mainland of China; 2) a great number of honest and
well-known legitimate traders were staying in the harbour
afraid to leave it; and 5) of tbae 12 large passage boats
that plied between Hong Kong and! three native towns, 11
97had ceased to run' .
To round off his complaints perhaps, MacDonnell went
even further and said that with the blockade the Colony
had been placed at a tremendous disadvantage and there
would be more trade for Canton. He contended that the *
purpose behind the Governor-General* s action was to limit
the importance of Hong Kong as a  port and to enhance the
trading opportunities of Canton- Thus, according to his
interpretation, the blockade amounted to nothing more than
the encouragement and sanctioning of a system of outrageous
' 98squeezing and extortion committed by 'piratical cruisers-' • 
MacDonnell's complaints represented the official 
reaction from Hong Kong. However, it would be an under­
statement to say that in making these representations, he
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was very much influenced by the Hong Kong mercantile 
community and on their side. He also transmitted to the 
Colonial Office memorials from them. Two of them throw 
sufficient light on the degree of their objection.
Oh 17 July 1868, a petition was addressed to MacDonnell
by 'Barristers, Bankers, Physicians, Solicitors, Merchants,
Shipowners, Traders, Shipwrights, Innkeepers and others
interested in the prosperity of Hong Kong.' The petitioners
complained that the blockade was 'a direct and highhanded
attack upon the commerce of the Island, and which if
suffered to continue will most prejudicially affect the
qq
well-being of the Colony.'" This petition appeared in
the ’Overland China Mail' on 24- July 1868, and a few days
later on 29 July, it was followed by a public reply from
the Colonial Secretary, which stated, 'I have .now to
inform you that His Excellency lost no time in forwarding
*
that memorial by the Mail of the 24-th instant, to His 
Grace the Secretary of State for the C o l o n i e s . T h e  
intention of the Hong Kong government to support represent­
ations of the mercantile community, and making its 
objections known in the press, thereby increasing the 
gravity of the matter, clearly reflect its attempt to put 
some pressure on the Home government to remedy the 
situation.
To supplement the merchants' representation, on 8 
January 1869, a memorandum v/as drav/n up by Keswick, Gibb 
and Taylor, who were influential merchants, community 
leaders and unofficial members of the Legislative Council. 
It was also forwarded to the Colonial Office. These 
gentlemen said that if the blockade were to persevere, 'it 
would end in Hong Kong ceasing to maintain the importance 
on the coast of China to which its natural advantages 
have raised it..1.Hong Kong has become the Headquarters‘of 
the great Steam lines....has acquired an immense trade, 
and by the blind or ignorant it would seem that this trade 
is ascribed to the Colony being the seat of a huge 
smuggling organization. Because commerce had entered here
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and trade does not pass through Canton, a city some 
ninety miles distant and inconveniently situated up a 
river, it is concluded that no duties are collected from 
goods carried from this island by the native craft that 
convey'them to the many small ports along the Coast. It 
is true these goods do not pay duty at Canton but it is 
equally true that they pay at their Port of entrance into 
the Chinese Empire. The trade of this Colony is not 
supported by smuggling and the collection of duties on 
the commerce of the Colony, now attempted by the Canton 
Authorities, can only be characterized as an interference 
with the independence and rights' and privileges of the 
Colony.’101
With the adoption of such means to publicize the
extremely harmful effects the blockade would h?.ve on the
trade and future of Hong Kong, it v/as no longer considered
as a local affair. It attracted the attention and concern
of the Home government, and it was hoped that through
its intervention, the ’alleviation of grievances' would
be realized. Indeed, the issue became' part of the negotiations
1 OP
for treaty revision between 1868 and 1869 •
A summary of the arguments used points to three very 
basic reasons: 1) Although for the moment the blockade 
only affected the junk trade in opium which was entirely 
in the hands of Chinese merchants, yet it was feared that 
other merchandise, hitherto illegally transported into China 
in the same way as opium, would likewise come under the 
scrutiny of Chinese customs officials at a later date. The 
inability to smuggle or to evade the payment of duties 
• would greatly reduce the incentive of Chinese merchants to 
purchase foreign goods - including opium - from Hong Kong.
The volume of sale and transhipment of foreign merchandise 
v/ould decrease. Likewise, the junk trade in Chinese produces, 
also transported illegally to Hong Kong, would also cease;
2) Hong Kong had been able to thrive commercially because 
it acted as both entrep6t and free-port. These were partially
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dependent on the geographical position of the island in 
relation to the Chinese mainland which afforded ample 
opportunities for clandestine trade..With the blockade, 
smuggling activities would be reduced to- the minimum; 
consequently the peculiarjand advantageous position of the 
Colony that had benefitted it would disappear. The 
continued prosperity and expansion of Hong Kongfs commercial 
activities would be greatly curtailed; 3) Chinese official­
dom was noted for its corruption, and the blockade, manned 
entirely by Chinese officials and collecting all kinds 
of local dues, would result in abuse of authority and 
forced exactions. These factors 'would threaten the free 
trade nature of the Colony and provide serious impediments 
to its trade and commercial potential.
Some of these reasons were not expressed s^s arguments 
against the blockade because they would implicate the 
Colony as directly involved in the clandestine trade to 
which the merchants and MacDonnell had vehemently denied. 
Possibly because of this, the arguments actually used 
sometimes lacked cohesion and were more of emotional out­
bursts. In subsequent years, however, arguments became 
more extensive and exhaustive; they were more logical. The 
pros and cons were v/eighed carefully and reasons given 
were much more substantial.
Reactions of the British government to the blockade
The reactions to the blockade from the various depart­
ments of the British government during the initial year; 
can be conveniently divided into two parts: those dealing 
with the approval of Alcock's and Robertson’s actions; 
and those, at a later date, dealing with the consideration 
of other measures after complaints had been received from 
Hong Kong.
I
When Alcock received information concerning the blockade
from Robertson, he wrote to the Foreign Office explaining
105the reasons why he had not interfered with the scheme .
The Foreign Office, after careful study of the arguments
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104from Alcock, concurred in his decision . In the mean­
time, copies of correspondence v/ere sent to the Board of 
Trade for its opinion*1*^. However, before the reply v/as 
received, the Colonial Office had forv/arded three despatches 
from M'acDonnell voicing his objections, and wanted the 
Foreign Office to give comments, especially on the question 
of v/hether the Governor-General1 s proclamation v/as an 
infringement of the Treaty of Tientsin^^. Since this
was a legal question, copies v/ere forwarded to the Queen's
107Advocate for their opinions 1•
Before the legal advice came,' the Board of Trade bad 
replied that it concurred with Alcock's opinion, even 
after studying MacDonnell's objections. To these the 
Board believed that, 'these restrictions are solely for 
the protection of the Revenue and the suppression of a 
Contraband Trade, and they therefore see no sufficient
i
grounds for urging the Chinese Government to rescind a
108
Proclamation which they have a right by Treaty to issue.'
Legal advice from the Queen's Advocate drew the same
conclusions. The 'treaty question* raised by MacDonnell
was founded on a misapprehension on his part as to the
intentions of the Chinese government. Since the Governor-
General 's proclamation was to prevent the evasion of the
opium likin payable by Chinese traders, and which was a
different tax to the import duty, the objections raised
were 'clearly inadmissible'. Furthermore, the Law Officers
of the Crown, Who were also consulted, also expressed the 
109same views .
These could be considered as the initial reaction of 
the Home government to the blockade.. It was one of 
acceptance. It should be noted, however, that the Colonial 
Office as yet refused to give an opinion.
Governor MacHonnell continued with his complaints and 
forwarded memorials from the mercantile community. He also 
referred to the levy of duties 'in transit' at Hong Kong, 
unlav/ful seizures of Hong Kong licensed junks etc."1**^. •
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To these complaints, the Colonial Office replied that 
according to the opinions of the Law Officers, the Treaty 
of Tientsin was only applicable to British merchandise 
imported in British vessels into the Treaty ports, and had 
no application to goods imported in Chinese vessels. And 
since no British vessel had been seized by revenue cruisers, 
the question had become one of language and should not 
be pursued further. Moreover, what actions the British 
government could take could only be through friendly 
remonstrances and even these could not be pressed too 
far, since MacDonnell had admitted that smugglers from 
Hong Kong were heavily armed an'd left in fleets to fight 
against the revenue cruisers**"'^.
In the meantime, Robertson had suggested a partial
remedy. He argued that Hong Kong should be regarded as
a Treaty port in the matter of transhipment of goods,
and this would solve the problem over the levying of duties
112on goods ' m  transit1, xn Hong Kong . This proposal was
not well-received, especially by the Board of Trade, which,
said that,'Her Majesty's Government can hardly hope to
combine the advantages of retaining Hong Kong as a British
possession, and of obtaining for it the privileges of a
Chinese Port.'1 Moreover, apart from actually establishing
a Chinese customs house in Hong Kong, supervision over
the payment of dues would be impossible, and to this
recourse, Hong Kong would definitely object. The proposal
11?was not acted on .
Eventually, slightly over a year after the initiation 
of the blockade, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, 
and the Board of Trade, representing the interested 
departments of the Home government, finally agreed on a 
plan. Alcock was instructed,'to make friendly representation 
to the Chinese Government in the matter and ascertain 
whether it would be possible to establish such practical 
regulations in Hong Kong and China, or to make such new 
Treaty stipulations as that to place the intercourse
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between Hong Kong and the neighbouring Coasts on a more
definite and regular footing, so as to protect the
Chinese Revenue without unreasonably obstructing the
ordinary and daily traffic between Hong Kong and the
Mainl'and and in doing so to remove occasions of controversy
114between the different British authorities.’ The last 
part was made in special reference to the heated written 
accusations from MacDonnell concerning both Robertson's 
and Alcock's actions, for which he had already been
11Sseverely rebuked by his superior, the Colonial Office
The Colonial Office, likewise, sent a similar despatch i
to MacDonnell, which said that it would consider very
carefully 'any specific recommendations made by you or
by the Merchants of Hong Kong with the view of at once
protecting that commerce which is legitimate and discourag-
116ing that which is contraband.1
4
From the above, it is clear that the Home government 
was agreed in its attitude to the blockade. Though the 
government realized the difficulties Hong Kong had to 
face, it was unable to alleviate the' situation. Its 
attitude was, like the actions taken by the Chinese side, 
based on strict observance of Treaty stipulations and 
international lav/. Hov/ever, by asking Alcock to attempt 
to make new treaty stipulations, the British government 
involved the blockade question in the negotiations between 
Britain and China over treaty revision terms. The matter 
rested there. It was therefore clearly the intention 
of the British government not to interfere v/ith the 
blockade, but to seek diplomatic solutions in order to 
lessen the grievances of Hong Kong, some of which were 
genuine. It was to this end that the British government 
pursued its policy throughout the period under study, until 
a solution was finally agreed upon between 1885 and 1887.
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CHAPTER 3 : THE ALCOCK CONVENTION
Article XXYII of the Treaty of Tientsin provided for a 
revision of the Tariff and commercial articles after ten i 
years to be negotiated between Britain and China (in the 
case' of Prance, Russia and the United States, twelve years). 
Unlike relations between China and the Treaty powers after 
the first Anglo-Chinese war, the years after the Peking 
Convention of 1860 ware years of friendly co-operation.
China*s relations with Britain, whether diplomatic or 
commercial, had improved tremendously. On the Chinese side, 
this was partly because of the establishment of the Tsungli- 
yamen under co-operative-minded officials such as Prince 
Kung and Kuei-liang, the Superintendents of Trade for the 
Northern and Southern Ports, and the Foreign Inspectorate.
On Britain's part, she was satisfied by the therms of the 
treaties of 1858-60, and now pursued a policy of 'co-operation* 
and 'conciliation' and renouncing the use of force, which 
was effectively executed by the Ministers at Peking, first 
Bruce and then Alcock*^.
However, despite the friendliness at government levels, 
the British merchants were continuously making complaints 
and pressing for more freedom from restrictions imposed 
by the Chinese government. The broader issues concerned 
were the interpretation of Treaty stipulations, the imposition 
of likin and transit dues, and later, the customs blockade 
of Hong Kong. It was deemed necessary by both governments 
that some adjustments and modifications should be made to 
the existing treaties. It v/as in a spirit of cordiality 
and the willingness to negotiate that both governments 
prepared for treaty revision.
It is necessary to give this brief background to the
purposes behind treaty revision in order to understand not-
only the outcorrfe, but the subsequent rejection by the
British government of the Alcock Convention. Moreover,
since this dissertation is concerned solely with the Opium
2Question, we will only discuss issues connected with-it •
3.2
Preparations for Treaty Revision
In June 1867, in anticipation of British demands for 
treaty revision, especially when Alcock had just left for 
a tour of the Treaty ports, Prince Kung sent a memorial 
asking for an Imperial edict calling on all persons 
responsible for foreign affairs to express their views on 
treaty revision . He stressed that the Treaty of Tientsin 
had been concluded hurriedly and there had been no time for 
discussion. However, in the past years, the western countries 
had made .attempts’to .obtain more concessions and China 
must be prepared during the forthcoming negotiations. A
Zl
list of possible demands from Britain was compiled and the 
Tsungli-yamen had already undertaken to draw up a detailed 
report on them. An Imperial edict was issued requiring 
memorials to be submitted by November 1867^.
Memorials from leading officials, differing slightly 
in detail and emphasis but not in substapce, all advocated 
that .China should not grant anymore concessions to the 
western powers. Since the Tsungli-yamen*s directive had 
not asked for opinions on problems concerning opium, very * 
few officials ventured into this question, as it was common 
practice among Chinese officialdom that unasked for 
information was seldom volunteered. However, among the 
seventeen who replied (including some minor officials), 
three touched on the question of opium and the smuggling 
from Hong Kong.
Shen Pao-chen, formerly Governor of Kiangsi and then
Director of Shipping at the Foochow Shipyard, reporting
the opinion of Huang Wei-hsuen, a sub-prefect, stated that
the latter in conversations with missionaries had asked
why western people should import opium which is a scourge
to China. The missionaries replied that if the Chinese did
not smoke it, there would be none imported. So Huang
*
believed that if both the Chinese and British governments 
increased duty on opium, prices of the drug would greatly 
increase and this would definitely limit the number of 
smokers6 .
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Ch'ung-hou, Superintendent of Trade for the Northern
Ports and Vice-President of the Board of War, pointed out
that because the method and rules for taxation differed
from place to place, and because after payment of transit
duty,, no additional levies could be imposed on general
merchandise, tax and likin stations in the interior of China
“had suffered greatly. The only commodity they could impose
a tax upon was opium, which in likin alone yielded several
tens of thousand taels every year. In view of these factors,
there should never be a joint collection of Tariff duty and
likin on opium. Moreover, Rule V of the trade agreement
must still be insisted upon; and -there should not be too
7great an increase m  the Tariff duty on opium1.
The Superintendent of Customs at Canton, the Hoppo,
stressed two points - firstly, referring to the ’Prince 
8Albert1 affair , he asked that all foreign vessels chartered 
by Chinese that might call at un-opened ‘ports must apply to 
his office for licences, without which, the vessels would 
be confiscated;(this was to prevent smuggling activities by 
these vessels); and secondly, he stated that because • 
transport of goods, especially opium, from Hong Kong to the 
West Coast (the prefectures of Kao, Sien, Hu and K’uong) did 
not go through customs because there was none, leading to 
great losses in revenue, it was hoped that 'the British 
Minister /^would7 call upon the Governor of Hong Kong to 
issue instructions to the Consul of that place directing 
him to take stringent measures for preventing the smuggling
Q
of opium and of foreign merchandize.1 '
Having considered the opinions expressed by leading 
officials, the Tsungli-hamen compiled twenty-seven points 
for discussion with Alcock. Among them, the ones related to 
our study were as follows:
1) that the Tariff duty on opium should be increased to 60 
taels per picul and that Rule Pive should- be continued to 
apply to the drug;
2) that because of the ease by which merchants could smuggle
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goods into Kwangtung, which greatly affects China1s revenue, 
a Chinese revenue officer would be stationed in Hong Kong' 
to supervise and collect dues and taxes with regulations to 
be subsequently devised;
3. that Hong Kong would be given special treatment regarding 
native goods in transit: goods imported from Hong Kong 
which are certified native goods would have to pay the 
full Tariff duty and likin; and if native goods are to be 
shipped to Hong Kong, an export duty certificate will be 
issued, so that if they are re-imported, only half of the 
Tariff duty would be levied^.
With these proposals in mind, and with sufficient facts 
and arguments at hand, Tsungli-yamen officials entered 
into treaty revision negotiations with the British minister 
and his subordinates.
Alcock began his preparations for treaty revision
earlier than the Chinese. In the spring of .1867, he..sent __
a circular to all his consuls at the Treaty ports asking 
them to seek from the merchants their views concerning 
modifications to the commercial articles of the Treaty of 
Tientsin^. He then personally went on a tour of the Treaty 
ports, where he held meetings with mercantile bodies and 
listened to their views. At the same time, in London, the 
Foreign Office, after consultations with the Board of 
Trade..,, also sent out circular letters to the chambers of 
commerce in Britain asking for their opinions on treaty 
revision^.
What the mercantile bodies in China wanted could best 
be summarized in Alcock*s despatch to Lord Stanley: 'All 
complain of illegal taxes on trade; of monopolies and res­
trictions; of difficulties of transport and transit in the 
interior; and of deficient means of action against Chinese 
debtors or defaulters. All suggest the removal of the 
grievances and impediments to trade; and demand a right of 
residence in the interior as the necessary corollary of a 
right to travel for purposes of business and finally the
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introduction of steam carriage both on land and water, 
with telegraphic lines for rapid communication.' Yet, 
despite the similarity of their demands, each Treaty port 
tried to represent its views in as different a light as 
possible, hoping thereby that more concessions could be 
obtained from China, and that the British government might 
adopt a new China policy - a return to coercion. Alcock 
believed that this was 'the systematic violation of the 
spirit of the Treaty of Tientsin /and is7 utterly condemn­
atory of their policy and action in the past.1 He further 
noted that the Treaty of Tientsin only allowed for revision 
of the Tariff and regulations of'trade and nothing else .
These remarks are worthy of note because they formed
the basis of Alcock1s approach towards treaty revision. In
an earlier despatch to Lord Stanley, Alcock had spelt out
»
his aims in the revision: apart from asking for better 
commercial relations such as relief from ‘inland and local 
taxes, mining rights, easier accessibility into the interior 
and legislations against Chinese debtors and defaultors, 
Alcock believed that 'as regards the future I believe there 
are many things to be gained, if worked for singly and 
pursued quietly without too much pressure for a speedy 
solution..This■ will not satisfy the merchants; but I am 
well assured such a course will best secure the permanent 
interests of trade and the maintenance of friendly relations
1 lL
between the two countries.1
At about the same time, the Foreign Office had made a 
clear statement of the policy that should be pursued in 
China, thereby giving Alcock the support he needed. In a 
. despatch to Thomas Wade, who was running the affairs of the 
Peking legation while Alcock was away visiting the Treaty 
ports, Lord Stanley said, 'I am glad to see that you are 
prepared to take into account the interests, the feelings 
and to a certain extent the prejudices of the Chinese Govern­
ment and people. The true policy to be advocated is that 
which by mutual forbearance shall combine the suffrages of
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both parties in some common system which, though it may 
not be the best in the abstract, yet may have in its 
favour that it does not, without some palpable corresponding 
advantages to Chinese interests, clash with their existing 
habits and fixed opinions but enlists the goodwill of 
the majority in its favour. Her Majesty’s Government neither 
-wish nor have they the right to impose sacrifices on 
China even though they may be convinced that the inconvenience 
of such sacrifices will be only temporary, whereas the 
benefit which will result from them will be lasting...1^
The spirit of revision,- on the part of the British government, 
was one in keeping with the policy of the sixties - that of 
conciliation and co-operation.
Since the question of opium according to Rule V was to
be treated separately from the general revision of trade
conditions in the forthcoming negotiations, only two
complaints on this issue came from the various reports made
by consuls and merchants. One was from Chinkiang complaining
that the imposition of the likin was injurious to British
residents at the port because it. was used as 'the means of’
pressing unfairly on our ^British7 business, to the benefit
of certain of the native traders.'^ The Amoy mercantile
community also complained about likin and added that since
a lot of foreign imports, including opium, were imported in
native junks, these should pay the same duties as they do
in foreign bottoms, otherwise it would be very prejudicial
17to the foreign traders at the Treaty ports '.
From Hong Kong, Jardine, Matheson-and Co., on 28 November 
1867, presented a memorial to Governor MacDonnell which 
was transmitted to the Colonial Office almost immediately.
In it we see a clear exposition of the viewpoint held by 
the opium merchants.' Jardines insisted that opium, demonstrated 
clearly in the eight years after 1860, was 'not a curse, 
but a comfort and a benefit, to the hardworking Chinese..'
In view of this opinion which contrasts with previous views 
that the drug was harmful, articles IX and XXVIII of the
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Treaty of Tientsin should be applicable to opium, that is,
'those who deal in Opium shall be permitted to supply the
Inland Chinese marts with the dru[g as freely as they are
the dwellers at the ports.1 Rule Y should therefore be
rescinded because 'there exist no oust or sensible grounds
for its retention, and it must simply be regarded as a
barrier to that increased tradal intercourse between India
and this Empire which would prove so highly beneficial to
18both countries.'
There were no specific references to the blockade of 
Iiong Kong. This was because the i.ssue only came after 
mercantile opinions had been sougjht and when treaty revision 
negotiations were already underway. It was considered by 
Alcock that arrangements must be made as a response to the 
Tsungli-yamen' s request for a customs official, to be stationed 
in Hong Kong, and the blockade issue was included in the 
negotiations. *
Treaty Revision Negotiations
Preliminary negotiations in the form of meetings and
written communications between thie British Legation and the
Tsungli-yamen, with Hart as the go-between, began on 3. March
1868 and lasted until 2$ October 1869 when the Convention,
formally known as the 'Supplementary Convention to the
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation! of 26 June 1858 between
19Great Britain and China* was sigmed . The negotiations were
protracted since many issues had to be resolved and agreed
upon. The Tsungli-yamen was unwiLling to compromise over
proposals during the initial stages when the Burlingame
Mission's activities in Washington had resulted in a treaty
of friendship with the United States which prompted Prince
Kung to take a much more determined stand against China's
granting of 'new privileges or gareat facilities' to trade.
The outbreak of ’violence at Yangchow, Chinkiang and Taiwan
also diverted the attention of time Imperial government away
20from the negotiations
Of the two issues that concern us, the taxation of opium
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and the blockade of Hong Kong, negotiations between the two
parties went as follows.
As regards opium, the first concrete proposal came from
the Tsungli-yamen. It wanted the Tariff duty doubled, i.e.
from 30 to 60 taels per picul (and also that for tea and
silk), in return for which all other imports and exports
would be standardized to a uniform Tariff of 5$ ad valorem.
This proposal, in fact, was a response to Alcock’s suggestion
that there should be a reduction of Tariff rates on ten
or more items. The line of argument used by the Tsungli-yamen
was that if ’a policy of conciliation, mutual good will,
and mutual benefit, and is indisposed to do anything that.
would open old sores or develop new ones1 is pursued, Alcock
21should move his government to accept China's proposals •
To this Alcock replied that it could be true that opium,
being an 'article of luxury' would be able to bear the
increase although this might check .its in'creased import to__ .
a certain extent. However, it would be more than probable
that such an increase would meet great opposition from the
opium merchants, and there might also be difficulties in
obtaining the necessary consent from other Treaty powers.
Smuggling of the drug into China would definitely increase
and this would be another difficulty that had to be considered.
Nevertheless, he was agreeable in principle to the increase
22but' would like the Tsungli-yamen to modify its proposal 
As regards the blockade issue, Prince Kung suggested 
that Chinese officers from the customs might be allowed to 
reside at Hong Kong. In a memorandum on this subject 
submitted to,Alcock, he said that 'In consequence of the 
numerous channels into which the route from Hong Kong to 
Canton divides itself, there is great opportunity for 
smuggling; and vessels are constantly evading the payment 
of duties by talcing a circuitous course so as to avoid the 
Barrier. As great loss results to the Revenue from this 
cause, it is proposed that the Chinese Government should 
appoint officials to reside at Hong Kong for the express
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purpose of attending to the collection of duties in the
interest of the Customs revenue. Rules for regulating the
collection of duties by such officials can be subsequently 
23agreed upon.1 ^
To this suggestion, Alcock replied that he could not
accede to a Chinese official collecting China's duties on
British territory. However, he agreed that there was a
great deal of smuggling and that 'it would seem reasonable
that the Emperor of China should have the same right to
appoint a consul to reside in Hong Kong as all other Treaty
Powers have, and to enjoy the same rights and exercise the
same authority in matters connected with the trade of
Chinese subjects as any other nation in treaty with Great
Britain may claim in British Colonies.' He cautioned that
since this right had never been either claimed by China or
conceded by Britain, it would be proper to include this in
oix.the agreement that would soon be signed ••
Proposals and counter-proposals, and the reasons for 
them given by both parties,were all transmitted to the 
Foreign Office where the Home government deliberated. The 
first reaction came from the Board of Trade. Its advice was 
that formal revision could well be deferred until the 
majority of the Chinese Emperor, T'ung-chih, in 1872 or 
1873 since by then the Chinese government might be more 
disposed to extend foreign trade and relations than at 
present, and bring all the powers to simultaneous action.
In the meantime, Alcock should be instructed to accept the 
arrangements he had already made with the Tsungli-yamen. In 
regard to opium, the Board believed that the Home government 
should recognize the insecure nature of the trade, especially 
with the increased growth of opium in China itself. It 
recommended that 'so long as the conditions of that trade 
rest on a foundation so limited and insecure, and they are 
convinced that the only safe course for Her Majesty's 
Government to pursue in China, is to confine their efforts 
to the consolidation of the position already obtained by
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patient, moderate and gradual negotiation, and by bringing
to bear as much as possible, the mcoral influences derived
from the principles of international equity which regulate
and control the intercourse of civilized nations, and from
the concerted action and co-operation of all the Treaty 
25Powers.1  ^To this, the Foreign Ofiice fully concurred.
With regard to the proposal of a Chinese consul at
Hong Kong, the Foreign Office agreed with Alcock1s stand ,
and the Colonial Office, which had not yet obtained an
27opinion from Hong Kong, also concurred . The matter, however,
did not rest there.
When Alcock1 s suggestion was .cconveyed to Hong Kong,
Governor MacDonnell immediately raised objections. He
complained that it would be very convenient to China to
1 save all expense attending the maintenance of a large
»
Revenue protective service by levying its Customs duties
on goods before they had even left the place of export.1
He complained that having the 'Fremch Customs Officers
established at London Bridge and levying duties on goods
before they were clear of the Thames would represent
exactly the sort of establishment which Prince Kung wishes 
_ _ n
to form here ^Hong Kong:/.1 At a meeting of the Executive 
Council, there was an unanimous volte against such an idea, 
as in the Legislative Council. The following reasons were 
given: 1) no application had been lhad been made by the 
Chinese government on this subject and it was obvious Prince 
Kung had been forced to make the puroposal (implying that 
Alco’ck was deliberately working ageainst the interests of 
Hong Kong); 2) China was not on thee same standing as other 
Treaty powers, and she could neither demand nor expect a 
concession from Britain; 3) there was no objection to the 
concession if it were not certain *to be attended with 
serious injury to.native and foreign interests in the Colony, 
since a Chinese consul would alarm the native population, 
who felt safe and secure under the Colonial administration 
because they were out of reach of (espionage and squeeze by
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29the Canton authorities .
When the Colonial Offices received this objection, it
was immediately sent to the Foreign Office^ , but it also
wrote to MacDonnell expressing the view that 'it would be
very difficult for Her Majesty's Government to refuse to
31accede to any such application if made.'v Upon receipt of
the protest from the Hong Kong government, the Foreign
Office also began to show more reservations. In a despatch
to Alcock, it was pointed out that the existence of a
• Chinese consul in Hong Kong might lead to difficulties and
Alcock should point this out if the subject came ut> for
32discussion agam^ • These doubts were absent from previous
communications. However, the substance of the despatch
still allowed Alcock freedom of decision.
With support by the Home government for Alcock's
proposals wavering somewhat, new developments were taking
place in China. In July 1869, the Tsungli-yamen submitted
a long memorandum to Alcock stating that the opium trade
was prejudicial.to the general interests of commerce, and .
created hostility between the two nations, since most officials
and people believed that by importing opium into China,
Britain was 'wilfully working out China's ruin and has no
real friendly ’feeling for her.' The hope was expressed that
the British government would persuade India and other
countries (Persia and Turkey) to replace the cultivation of
opium with that of cotton or cereals. 'Were both nations
to rigorously prohibit the growth of the poppy, both the
traffic in and the consumption of opium might alike be put 
33an end to.'^ This despatch was most eloquently worded and 
in fact formed the basis of future demands for the stoppage
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of the opium traffic' •
Then on 23 August 1869, Alcock sent a telegram to the 
Foreign Office (unfortunately it was not received until 20 
September), saying that he no longer could defer signing 
the agreement because the Tsungli-yamen was getting impatient 
and was preparing to withdraw the concessions it had already
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35given. He wanted advice before signing it m  October-'-'.
Upon receiving this information, the Board of Trade
asked that no formal convention should be concluded at the
moment, but that the negotiations should be protracted
'until'a better understanding can be arrived at, and some
36clear advantage gained.1"^ The Colonial Office also,
referring to the question of a Chinese consul at Hong Kong,
wanted Alcock to abide by the instructions given by the 
37Foreign Office-' . In a telegram sent to Alcock on 29 September 
1869, followed by another one on 7 October, he was advised 
to protract the negotiations and not to consent, in any 
case, to a treaty of more than five years1 duration since 
this would compromise the government's position, not only 
in future negotiations, but also in similar negotiations 
between China and the other Treaty powers. However, 'should
t
you have completed any arrangement, you may be assured
38that the best view will be taken of it here.'v Unfortunately, 
the first telegram arrived at Tientsin on 2 November, the 
day that Alcock had left for a tour of the Treaty ports and 
India on his way back to Britain to explain the agreement 
which had been signed on 23 October.
If both sides had received the crucial telegrams in time, 
the Convention, in all probability, would not have been 
signed. Moreover, though we know that the agreement was doomed 
from the very beginning because of the objections raised, 
Alcock was very much in the dark and he proceeded to explain 
his agreement to the mercantile communities and governments 
concerned.
The Alcock Convention
Of direct relevance to this dissertation, articles II,
V and XII of the Alcock Convention are as follows:
Article II. Appointment of Consuls.
China having agreed that England may appoint Consuls to 
reside at every port open to trade, it is further agreed 
that China may appoint Consuls to reside at all ports in 
the British dominions. The Consuls so appointed shall
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respectively be entitled to the treatment accorded to the 
most favoured nation.
Article V. Chinese Produce shipped from Hong Kong to a 
Treaty Port.
It is agreed that Chinese produce shipped from Hong Kong to 
a Treaty port shall not be carried inland under the transit 
rule, but shall pay dues, duties, and inland charges like 
all other native produce at all barriers passed.
On the other part, China agrees to issue to native produce 
shipped by British merchants from Treaty ports to Hong Kong 
the ordinary export duty proofs, and to collect on such 
produce, on arrival at a second Treaty port, the ordinary 
coast trade (half import) duty.
Article XII. Opium.
It is agreed that opium shall pay import duty at an increased
rate. On the other part, China agrees.. .'(followed by six
concessions such as the right of trading.at Kiukiang, opening
of coal mines etc.)
In the appended Tariff, opium pays 50 taels per 100
catties,’And to be dealt with in accordance v/ith the special
rules respecting that drug.1^ '
Explanations that Alcock gave to the mercantile bodies
at the Treaty ports and Hong Kong, and to the Hong Kong,
Indian and Home governments were summarized in his confidential
40
despatch to Lord Clarendon of 28 October 1869 . As regards
opium, he argued that the increase of Tariff duty amounted 
to only 2ii°/o of the price of the drug and could in no way 
either diminish the profits of the opium merchants or 
adversely affect the sale of the drug in China. Moreover,
'in the interest of India and our Indian revenue, anything 
calculated to give the Chinese Government an interest in 
the importation of the foreign article is by so much an 
advantage to the trade, as supplying a motive for checking 
the growth of the native produce, which has recently 
extended so greatly as to threaten the whole Indian trade...1 
As regards the acquiescence to the Chinese consul at
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Hong Kong, Alcock argued that this could not be refused 
with 'any show of reason or justice.1 The inconveniences 
that Hong Kong expected were 'more or less chimerical' and 
some measures must be taken to prevent the clandestine 
trade from the Colony since it was truly a smuggling dep3t, 
causing China to lose a tremendous amount of customs revenue. 
Referring to the measures the Canton authorities had resorted 
to - the customs blockade - he remarked that 'it is much 
better, I conceive, that we should aid them, by legal and 
peaceable means, to control the smuggling proclivities 
of their own subjects sailing and trading from our Colony 
where there is a free port, than compel them to plant 
taxing stations, farmed out to unscrupulous guilds or 
companies, and arm European-built ships of war to run 'amuck' 
on all native vessels leaving the harbour of Hong Kong.'
He concluded by saying that these could not be regarded as 
concessions to China but were merely the recognition of 
international rights based on the principle of reciprocity.
Objections to the Convention
Despite Alcock's detailed and painstaking explanations 
to all concerned, there was still strong objection to his 
agreement, mainly from the mercantile communities in Asia 
and Britain. Most of the objections were on issues unconnected 
with the present dissertation , yet on the two issues 
which do concern us, objections were just as vehement. In 
reviewing the grounds of these objections, we can distinguish 
between those expressed by the British government and the 
various departments, and those aired by mercantile bodies 
in China, Hong Kong, India or Britain.
The position the Foreign Office took was quite simple 
and straight-forward. Since it was a revision of commercial 
and Tariff regulations, and had nothing basically to do 
with diplomacy or ^ politics, the Foreign Office expressed no 
opinion until it heard expressions from the others who were 
intimately connected with the revision agreement.
The Colonial Office was only concerned with the question
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of the Chinese consul issue and in stipulations with 
particular reference to Hong Kong, i.e. Article V concerning 
goods in transit. The Colonial Office waited for the opinion ■ 
from MacDonnell; but in the Minute Paper, Sir J. Rogers, 
undersepretary at the office, remarked that 'as far as I 
am able to judge in going over the papers, it appeared to
42mO that the interests of Hong Kong had been well cared for.'
The question of the Chinese consul was not touched on
since it was not within the jurisdiction of the department,
* but that of the Foreign Office.
The Board of Trade's view was that the agreement,
despite some drawbacks was, 'not only equitable, but
advantageous to our real interests in China,' especially
with regard to Article V. The question of the increase in
the Tariff on opium and that of the establishment of a
»
Chinese consul at Hong Kong were not commented on because
45
they were not the responsibilities of the..‘Board __ _
The India Office and the Indian government, though 
consulted throughout the negotiations, did not express any 
opinion until 31 January 1870 when the. India Office said 
' that,'though the Secretary of State for India is somewhat 
apprehensive that this measure may cause a present loss 
to Indian revenue, yet his Grace is of opinion that the 
Government of India can scarcely complain of an increase 
of 2ffio in the import duty on opium; especially when, as 
Alcock remarks, the direct gain to the Imperial Exchequer 
of China produced by an import duty, will supply a motive 
to the Government for checking the cultivation of the
7| 4
indigenous plant•'
Reactions to the agreement from mercantile bodies were 
not as favourable. Memorials from chambers of commerce and 
private merchants poured into the Foreign Office. The 
Foreign Office alsp arranged meetings with the chambers of 
commerce to hear their views once again. They all objected 
to the uncertain nature of China's concessions and argued 
that, '...taking the Treaty as a whole it is plain that
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the concessions it secures to the Chinese, or more correctly
speaking, the burdens it imposes on trade, are of the most
substantial character amounting in money alone to the sum
of three million Taels; whereas the counter-balancing
concessions to trade are, as far as can be judged, of compara-
tively little value.’  ^This argument, voiced by the
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, was representative of the
attitude taken by other mercantile bodies and chambers.
As regards the increase of opium Tariff duty in particular,
the Shanghai Chamber argued that this measure would operate
directly to encourage the growth of opium in China, ..
while it would deprive the Indian government a substantial
amount of revenue through the decrease of demand in Indian
opium. Moreover, the increase in Tariff duty would not
increase to any important extent China’s revenue. The present
»
Tariff duty on 30 taels represented a duty of 6.76$ ad
valorem and the proposed increase to 50._.tae.ls_ would- make it
10$ ad valorem, double the Tariff standard for all other
merchandise. The Chamber continued that it would do all it
46
could to oppose this increase
Arguing in the same sense, but more vehemently, David 
Sassoon and Co., which controlled one-third of the opium 
trade, memorialized on behalf of the Indian merchants, as 
the London Merchants Committee had on behalf of merchants 
in Britain. Sassoon and Co. argued that the opium trade 
had been stationary if not in decline, and that such an 
increase in Tariff would definitely lead to further retro­
gression which in time would not only cripple the trade but
also seriously affect the revenue of India. This would be
47
injurious to the Indian cultivator and merchant too (•
Sassoon also enclosed a communication from a ’Shanghai 
Merchant1, which apart from briefly narrating the history 
of opium taxation, in both China and India, said that the 
increase represented solely 'the success of the competition 
between India and China for the profitable cultivation of 
the poppy plant.' The increase in native opium cultivation
had been tremendous' .already and the increase of Tariff
would add another stimulant. Also, if the policy of the
British government was to suppress, or gradually discourage
the opium trade for moral reasons or otherwise, even at
the expense of encouraging cultivation in China, *it would
be an intelligent measure to increase the export duty for
the benefit of the Indian Treasury; but surely it is more
than unwise, it is unexemplified folly, to make a concession
of import duty to China without...the gain of more than
the shadow of an equivalent.' The trade not only yielded a
revenue of £4.8 million a year to the Indian government but
also maintained the balance of payments and the lucrative
freight or carrying trade in the East which gave supremacy
to British merchants. Extinction of the trade would not
only mean that £11 million had to be obtained to pay for
silk and tea, but would result in buying bullion from the
United States, which might use such an„o£>portunity-to
establish a direct United States-China trade link and directly
affect British commercial interests in China in every 
48field . The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, m  two 
memorials, also complained that the present duty on opium 
was already fully as high as it could support. With the 
increase in native opium, revenue of the Indian government 
would suffer tremendously. It was also pointed out that 
Hong Kong would be affected by the increase since opium for
49China flow entirely through the Colony in the first instance y 
Such arguments were indeed strong and persuasive.
The Hong Kong mercantile community, with added support 
from Hugh M. Matheson, chairman of the London Merchants 
Association, also voiced objection at the Chinese consul issue 
In two memorials, one based on a public meeting and the other 
from the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, it was argued that 
since China was not within the pale of modem civilization, 
reciprocity,as implied in Article II of the Convention, was 
not at all applicable. 'China' the memorial stated, 'could 
not be considered as a country entitled to all the same
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rights and privileges of civilized Nations, which are bound 
by international law; in which the life, the liberty and 
the property of all, foreigners as well as natives, are 
secure and respected; and where a recognized procedure and 
a regular legal system can be relied on by those who feel 
themselves aggrieved,1 hence the insistence on extraterrito­
riality for westerners in China. Moreover, the 120,000 or 
more Chinese residents in Hong Kong, who were honest, 
energetic and loyal colonists subject to British laws, 
would hate to see a Chinese consul because they would, once 
again, be ’exhorted and squeezed1, like their relatives 
living in China. The Chinese consul, with his underlings, 
would subject the trade of Hong Kong to a supervision 
resulting in the levying of dues for the Imperial exchequer 
in addition to those already being paid to the provincial 
officials. The wealthy Chinese population of the Colony 
would be 1 amenable to the inquisitorial powers of the 
Mandarins.1 This would definitely drive Chinese traders 
from Hong Kong, which they had so far regarded as their 
'Emporium and Mart', to some other place where no harassment 
from Chinese officials would be present. Hong Kong, being 
in itself barren and unproductive, was totally dependent 
on it being the headquarters from which the large financial 
and commercial transactions of British and foreign merchants 
in China could best be carried on, because of its nature 
as a f re e-port f Such a fact had always been regarded with 
a 'jealous displeasure' by the Chinese government and they 
v/ould love to see it destroyed through the establishment of 
a consul. Furthermore, Chinese residents required no 
consular protection 'because though amenable t£ British law, 
they can appeal to our Tribunals; with this additional 
safeguard that they have an important official in the 
Registrar General, to whom as Protector of the Chinese, 
they can always have recourse for advice and assistance.'. The 
Chinese consul's main duty would then be to spy on the 
Chinese merchants and 'report to the Mandarins of the
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adjourning Provinces, the amount that can he extorted from
them by nefarious means which our experience shows us the
provincial despots know but too well how to use.'^
Governor MacDonnell put the final touch to these arguments
by commenting on the memorials saying that, 'a Chinese
Consul here, to relieve China of her duty to protect her
revenue by an efficient establishment along her coasts,
would encourage attempts before a vessel’s departure to
secure in Hong Kong either the actual duties leviable in
‘China on goods in 'her manifest or an equivalent security in
some other form....Therefore the abuses, which would spring
from the system cannot at present be developed. There may
be and there is already much objectionable espionage, and
frequent squeezing and exactions levied from residents here
by inquisitorial and even more stringent powers exerted
over their relatives and property on the mainland.1'
Finally, in support of these arguments,* Hugh Matheson,
chairman of the London Merchants Association pointed out
that though there was some contrband trade owing to the
corruption of Chinese officials along the coast, it was
’not within our province to point out how such practices
were to be checked.1 The Chinese government could do whatever
they liked in their own territory but could not impose a
52consul on Hong Kong^ •
There was only little support for the Alcock Convention
on record. One came from the Peking correspondent of the
’Times’ who applauded the agreement, saying that the increase
in duty on opium would not diminish the consumption, especially
when the duty represented a small proportion of its price,
but would give the Chinese government ’a very material and
55legitimate increase of revenue.’^  Another came from the 
Asiatic Society which argued that since the Indian government 
was levying the equivalent of 200 taels on every chest of 
opium in India, and the opium merchants had not^omplained, 
they had little justification in complaining about the very 
minimal increase on the drug contemplated by the agreement.
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Moreover, in Europe, opium would be regarded as the 'fittest
54subject for taxation.'^ However, these were 'isolated'
support and was not taken seriously into consideration by
the Home government.
Alcock's explanations to mercantile communities naturally
fell on deaf ears though he did his best to justify the
motivations behind his agreement.
On his way back from China to Britain, Alcock also stopped
off in India, and in a meeting on 4- February 1870 with the
Indian government's executives he outlined his arguments.
He contended that the Chinese government had come to a
resolution that unless steps were taken by the British
government to check the importation of opium from India,
China would drive Indian opium out-of the market, both by
absolute prohibition of its import and by the encouragement
*
of poppy cultivation and the manufacture of the indigenous 
drug. Alcock believed that the Chinese government was able 
to carry these measures into effect, and believed therefore 
that a compromise with it was the best solution - one which 
would prove favourable to the interests of the Indian govern­
ment but would not force the Chinese government to have 
recourse to the extreme measures it avowedly was contemplating.
he also gave'accounts of the rapid growth of native opium
55to prove his point
- The Indian government, as reflected in a memorandum 
on the meeting by' W.R. Mansfield, Commander-in-chief, 
doubted that the Chinese government possessed the power to 
effect reforms it had in mind, and advised that the Indian 
government's policy should be the same as before and not 
be swayed by the Chinese government's so-called resolutions 
to prohibit poppy cultivation. He argued that the Chinese 
government had adopted a policy hostile to British interests 
and the Indian government should look within itself to find 
ways and means to counter the Chinese resolutions^.
Subsequently, in a conference presided over by the 
Viceroy of India on 19 March 1870, the following resolutions
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were adopted: 1) that the Indian government was not in a
position to protest against the increase of Tariff duty;
2) that it might be practical to increase the production of
Indian opium; 3) that by the introduction of poppy cultivation
in new districts such as the Bombay and Madras Presidencies,
the Indian opium revenue would increase^. The resolutions
were communicated to the India Office in May, in which the
Indian government commented that,'we desire only to remark
that the natural and probable consequences of increasing
the import duty on opium imported into China would be
unfavourable to the important revenue that British India
derives from the export of that drug...we feel that a
judgment on the probable operation of the Convention depends
entirely on the policy which the Chinese Government really
intend ultimately to adopt with regard to their home-growth.
of opium. If, on the one hand, the Ministers of the
Imperial Government give up or delay the adoption of the
policy they threaten, by reason of the concessions made by
Sir Rutherford Alcock, then there is no doubt that a great
advantage has been obtained; but if, on .the other hand, the
Chinese Government are either not in earnest in the policy
which they shadowed out to Her Majesty's Minister, or are
unable to carry "it into operation, then the imposition of
the additional duty must fall heavily on our trade without
58any countervailing advantages.1^
From the above, it can be gathered that though the 
Indian government was rather displeased at the increase of 
the Tariff duty on opium, it did not voice its objection in 
strong terms, and allowed the final decision to rest with 
the Home government. We must note, however, that the Indian 
government was extremely distrustful, not only of the 
Chinese government's intentions, but also the ability of 
the diplomatic corp§ in China to fully understand the fine 
situation of the opium question in China. These views were 
reflected more fully after the Chefoo Convention was signed 
and more vehement objections were raised.
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On the receipt of such violent objections, the Board
of Trade advised the Foreign Office that ratifications
should be postponed until Alcock had arrived back in
Britain and explained his actions fully. To this the Foreign
59Office concurred^ .
When Alcock arrived in London, he had meetings with 
members of the Foreign Office and then on 3 Hay 1870, 
submitted his final memorandum in which he said that the 
Chinese government had the right as Britain ’to prefer 
claims for the withdrawal or limitation of privileges’ and 
that by the very moderate increase of 3 to 5^ on opium duty, 
China had abandoned her demand for total prohibition of its 
importation which would have affected the merchants much 
more. On the question of the Chinese consul, he agreed that 
some of the fears and allegations made by the Colonial
t
government and the merchantile community were true; but he 
added that China had lost some £500,000 in revenue because 
of Hong Kong's position (its proximity to one of the great 
waterways of China - the Hsi Hiver), and to choose between 
a consul and the harmful effects of China exercising her 
jurisdiction in her own waters immediately outside of the 
Colony as evidenced by the outcry when the blockade started,
60meant simply having to choose between the lesser of two evils
However, despite these last-minute pleas . from Alcock,
the*Board of Trade advised the Foreign Office that because
of the general concensus of mercantile opinion the agreement
should not be ratified. In view, of the fact that most of
the provisions were satisfactory, the British minister in
China should be asked to carry out such provisions if the
. Chinese government was agreeable, since they would not
require a new treaty to put them into effect. The Board of
Trade also expressed regret that the idea of a Chinese consul
in Hong Kong should be rejected since this would improve
61relations between the Colony and China
In accordance with these suggestions, the Foreign Office, 
in a general circular of 25 July 1870 to mercantile bodies,
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formally rejected the Alcock Convention. However, its
expression of regret that the mercantile communities had
"been unable to see the benefits of the agreement, showed
that though the government had bowed to mercantile pressure,
it still agreed with Alcock that the agreement was a step
in the right direction - 1 It was hoped that it might
secure, at an inconsiderable sacrifice on the part of
rs England, great immediate and still greater prospective,
62advantages.1
The American government, although not directly concerned
•with the opium trade and her treaty revision with China
'which was not yet due, received some very interesting comments
.from its charg^ d1Affaires in China, Dr. S. Wells Williams.
Williams acknowledged that of the 82,000 chests of Indian
•opium destined for China, a quarter of it was smuggled into
the country. He went further to say that, 'the Canton
.authorities once endeavoured to come to an.understanding
'■with those of Hong Kong in respect to some arrangement to
.•restrain the smuggling going on in the neighbourhood v/aters;
lbut the reception which their agent received was so much
.'like that which Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts received when he
^went to Charleston to inquire into the position of colored
.-sailors, that thby have never ventured to send another.'
(Observing the increase in opium Tariff duty, williams
(commented that though the mercantile bodies were violently
(Objecting to its introduction, it was justifiable in that
(China could increase her revenue,which was low in comparison
with the amount the Indian government derived from opium.
IHe believed that the Tariff increase might compel the Indian
{government to abolish the opium monopoly in India and allow
'the thousands of acres of fertile land to be used to grow
65jproduces 'beneficial to all.1  ^When ratification was refused,
Williams expressed rqgret and commented that western governments
ishould continue with peaceful negotiations and avoid the 
64-mse of force
Reactions from the French and Russian ministers to China
i
! .
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were the reverse. At an early stage, in August 1868, they
both expressed that they reserved their countries right
of revision , implying that they would not ask their
governments to concede to the terms Alcock might have been
able to pbtain from China, but would negotiate independently
when time for their revisions came. This attitude did not
66change when the agreement was signed .
China's reaction was surprisingly mild. A memorial by
the Tsungli-yamen gave an account of the negotiations which'
led to the agreement and its non-ratification by the British
government owing to mercantile opposition. The Tsungli-yamen
added that when Wade came to inform it of this decision, he
had suggested that some of the stipulations agreed to could
be put into effect on a trial basis and that formal revision.
could wait until the time due for revision with the other
major Treaty powers. The Tsungli-yamen believed t’hat France
was primarily interested in religious matters and would
have followed Britain's steps regarding commercial matters.
If some, of the proposals, which would be beneficial to the
western merchants, were introduced, even on a trial basis,
this would lead to serious consequences. 'We would have
fallen into their trap and in future would find it increasingly
difficult to oppose them.' In view of the intentions of
the British, the officials connected with foreign trade and
all customs personnel should be forewarned of such intentions
and to repel them. An imperial edict to this effect was
66accordingly proclaimed • China was not overly displeased
with the non-ratification, possibly because the commercial
regulations contained in the 1858 agreement w-erdjnore to her
liking;and with the non-ratification, these were automatically
67renewed for another ten years .
Summary
In a communique • given to M. de Rehfues, Doyen of 
foreign representatives at Peking, Alcock gave a very 
precise and comprehensive exposition of the reasons and 
approaches he had adopted towards treaty revision; 'the 
most prudent course would be to accept the concessions which
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have been obtained from the Chinese Government by fair
argument and amicable representation, and to wait, as
regards all other matters, the development of which in
the natural course of things may be looked for, and which
the experience of late years gives good reason to expect
will attend our future trade with China. Such being the
line of policy laid down for my guidance, I have both
accepted and made concessions of more or less importance,
keeping in.view the material condition of the Empire, the
actual situation of the Government and the true interests
of both countries....1 am persuaded that on no other basis
can permanent relations of amity and commerce be maintained.
There must be reciprocity of benefits as well as a spirit
of fairness and desire for mutual accord....! think, however,
a simple enumeration of the concessions made on both sides
»
will show that there is a large balance of advantage in
favour of foreign nations and their commerce... I feel, sure
that many existing obstacles will be removed by their aid,
and increased facilities afforded for its steady development.1
Alcock had spelt out in clear terms what his agreement was
68supposed to achieve, •
The ferocity of protests from the mercantile communities
was unexpected^ and forced by such opposition, the British
government had to reject the agreement - one that was
negotiated on grounds of understanding a mutual willingness
for equal concessions. China's rejection of some of the
stipulations to be put into effect on a trial basis meant
that nothing was achieved. The problems that had arisen
after 1860 remained unsolved. However, ill-feeling had been
generated. The Tsungli-yamen had pointed out the slyness
of the British and cautioned that the generation of some
69degree of animosity was inevitable . Alcock, for his
part, had expressed in plain terms that the concessions
Britain gave to China were the lesser of two evils and
warned that non-ratification would lead to serious consequences,
70and would mean having to accept the greaterof the two evils' .
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Nevertheless, during the two years after the non-ratification, 
new personalities had emerged on the scene. They had noted 
the reasons for the agreement's failure and took it as a 
forewarning of the type of negotiations they had to conduct 
with China. Alcock, possibly in disgust with the outcome 
of his agreement, had resigned from the diplomatic service.
As British Minister to China, his place was taken over by 
Thomas Wade, who had acted as interpreter to Lord Elgin and 
had been the charge' d'Affaires after Alcock had left China 
* in late 1869. In Hong Kong, Mac .Donnell had retired in 1872, 
and he was succeeded as governor by A.E. Kennedy, a person 
moderate in temperament and quite -unprepared to fight
blindly for the cause of the mercantile community as his
71 . . .predecessor had done' • Though the Chinese personalities
remained the same, yet they had become more well-versed in
i
diplomatic negotiations and knew how to seek other avenues 
for satisfactory results. We might say that--though the 
problems remained, the experience gained from these years, 
plus the introduction of new personalities on the scene, 
provided both China and Britain with a different approach 
to solve the problems that laid ahead.
4.1
CHAPTER 4 : NEGOTIATIONS ON THE OPIUM QUESTION TO 1876.
In the short span of time between the non-ratification 
of the Alcock Convention and the signing of the Chefoo 
Convention, i.e. between 1870 and 1876, two aspects of the 
Opium Question - the taxation of opium and the blockade 
of Hong Kong - took on new characteristics and involved 
new issues. In the former, the rapid assertion of native 
opium (the third aspect of the Opium Question) in the 
China market greatly altered the approach by the two 
governments concerned v/ith the problem. In the latter, 
continuation of the blockade with the introduction of new 
personalities also altered the picture. Por the sake of 
clarity, discussion of these issues.will be done separately, 
but it is to be noted that they were happening side by 
side and very much related to each other.
Growing Importance of Native Opium
In chapters 1 and 3 of this dissertation, we have 
briefly alluded to the origin and growth of native opium 
and its impact on Alcock's agreement to the increase in 
Tariff duty on foreign opium. In the following sections 
these will be elaborated.
Information has been derived mainly from reports 
submitted by the British diplomatic staff in China and 
the Foreign Inspectorate, especially after 1869, when the 
Indian government requested the British minister at 
Peking to call on his consuls to provide as accurate and 
as detailed information as possible on the cultivation of 
the poppy and its markets in China. From that date on, 
consuls at the Treaty ports gathered as much data as 
possible from whatever source they could obtain information 
from. These included reports compiled by themselves and 
their subordinates on journeys made to the interior of 
China, reports made by various chambers of commerce in 
fact-finding missions, and heresay evidence from both 
European and Chinese merchants involved in the opium trade. 
Naturally, information regarding native opium trade and 
poppy cultivation in the immediate vicinity of the consular
4.2
districts contained a greater degree of accuracy than 
those concerning the interior of China.
The Foreign Inspectorate, under instructions from the 
Inspector Gjieral, also made investigations and surveys.
These were contained in the annual and decennial trade 
returns compiled from reports submitted by the commissioners, 
and in confidential ’Special Series’ publications from 
time to time. Since the growth of native opium was forbidden, 
by Imperial decree, until the last decade of the nineteenth 
‘century, the Chinese authorities, both Imperial and provincial, 
did not make any'similar surveys. Thus, apart from what 
one can read from the anti-poppy cultivation edicts and 
memorials, there are.no other sources of information.
Difficulty is encountered in using these documents
since, on the one hand, they do not contain as much information
«
as one would hope for, and on the other, some reports 
were contradictory. None of them can be vei'ified statis­
tically. However, apart from being the only sources 
available to the researcher, they do provide an overall 
picture of the development of native opium in China.
In 1864, aware of the fact that native opium was of 
growing importance, Hart issued a special circular to his 
commissioners at the Treaty ports asking for information 
concerning the drug - its use, the amount consumed, the 
price, where it came from, whether any was exported and 
its effect on foreign opium*1'. Of the replies that came back 
from twelve Treaty ports, half of them (Newchwang, Kiukiang, 
Chinkiang, Ningpo, Foochow and Swatow) said that native 
opium was not in use. Tientsin and Chefoo reported that it 
was not widely used. Of the other four, Hankow said that 
the foreign drug was unknown before the port was opened 
and smokers relied solely on the native drug. Shanghai 
reported that an estimated 500 piculs were consumed but• 
was smoked by the poorer people who could not afford the 
foreign variety. In Amoy, the same amount was consumed by 
the poorer people while Canton reported a consumption of
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15,000 piculs. With regard to the other points of information, 
all reports agreed that the native drug came from inland 
provinces - Shansi, Shensi, Szechuan, Yunnan, Hunan and 
Kweichow - the first three providing the greater proportion.
It was cheaper - roughly about half the price of the 
foreign variety but of an inferior quality. All agreed 
that native opium had not diminished the demand for the »
foreign drug.
In subsequent years, almost all annual commercial 
•reports made by the British consuls and the Foreign 
Inspectorate’s commissioners contained details on native 
opium, and it is on the information in them that the 
following paragraphs are based. .
On the whole, the decade of the eighteen-sixties was 
marked by the increase/in the production of native opium, 
chiefly in the inland provinces. In 1864, it was estimated 
that one-third of Yunnan and two-thirds of Szechuan were 
already devoted entirely to the cultivation of the poppy. 
Other western provinces - Kweichow, Kansu and Shensi - 
had also extended its cultivation. Enough opium was 
produced annually, not only for local consumption, but 
also for export to other areas including the coastal
provinces which'had hitherto depended solely on the foreign
2drug . Surveys made by consuls showed that native opium
from Yunnan, Szechuan and Kweichow dominated this new
export market . Moreover, these western provinces had
"become entirely self-sufficient and, in fact, smokers had
now no taste for foreign opium at those provinces. This
is illustrated by the Jung Bahadoor mission. Bahadoor was
ruler of a small kingdom bordering on Tibet, who between
1864-65 came to China on a tribute mission. Bearing in mind
the profit to be made from selling opium, at great expenses,
Ihe carried with him f200 chests of Indian opium, which he
hoped to sell en route to Peking. He could not find even
one buyer, and at the end of the mission, at great loss,
4lie had to carry the entire cargo back to his kingdom .
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Jung Bahadoor's experience is a case in point, but this 
total exclusion of foreign opium from the western provinces 
is always reflected in reports made by the Hankow consul 
and commissioner there.
Hankow, in fact, had become the dividing line between 
the consumers of native and foreign opium. Trade returns 
indicated that whilst there was an increase in the export 
of Szechuan opium to the coastal areas - most of it was 
transhipped at Hankow - import of foreign opium had .been 
static after 1855; but since 1866, it had been steadily
5
declining . The same phenomenon can be seen in practically
all the other Treaty ports. To quote a few examples, in
1865, W.B. Dennys, acting Consul at Tientsin, reported that
the quantity of Indian opium imported was dependent entirely
on the production of native opium in Shensi^. In 1865,
»
W.H. Lay, Consul at Chefoo, reported that an increase in 
the Indian opium import was solely because* of the prohibition 
of poppy cultivation in Shansi, together with the imposition
7
of a heavy duty on native opium'• The report for 1866
8 •said the same, and a similar one came from Shanghai .
The last years of the sixties saw not merely the
continuance but the increase of such a phenomenon. W.E. King,
Consul at Newchwang, reported in 1868 that about 1,000
piculs a year was imported into the port in addition to
500 piculs grown in the district of Yung-ping in nearby
Chihli province^. In 1869, the consul of Kiukiang reported
that there had been a decrease in the import of the foreign
drug since 1866 and this was primarily due to the fact
that smoking of native opium was on the increase. Szechuan
opium, coming down from Hankow, was gradually displacing
Indian opium. Moreover, poppy was grov/n in the south of
the province (Kiangsi) and sold in neighbouring Honan and
and Fukien‘S. In tfre same year, Consul Robertson reported
from Canton that cultivation of poppy seeds from Yunnan
had started in Kwangtung^. The same reports came from
12Tientsin, Shanghai and Hankow
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In 1870, J. Markham, the consul at Shanghai, remarked 
that competition from native opium was serious, but 
production on a large scale seemed to be confined to 
Yunnan, Szechuan, Shensi and Kweichow - with 10, 60 and 
30 percent respectively (Kweichow’s production was in­
significant compared with the other three). He also estimated 
that the total production of native opium was about 30,000 
piculs in 1866, 60,000 in 1867, 80,000 in 1868, and 60,000 
and 70,000 respectively for 1869 and. 1870, but added that 
•• the last two years had seen reductions because of disastrous 
floods. He also estimated that half of the Yunnan produce 
was for export to Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Kweichow, and 
75$ of Szechuan opium was for export - 4*0$ to the northern 
provinces, and 35$ to the Yangtze provinces^. Robertson, 
quoting Chinese sources of information, reported that the
western provinces - Yunnan, Szechuan, Kweichow and Kansu -
14-produced between 15,000 to 18,000 piculs for 1865
When compared to the survey conducted by the Foreign 
Inspectorate in 1864* - for the year 1863 - of the six 
Treaty ports that reported no consumption of native opium, 
three of them - Foochow, Kiukiang and Newchwang, situated 
on the coast, in the interior and in the north respectively - 
were now receiving it in abundance.
During the sixties then, increased popularity of native
opium led to the extension of poppy cultivation to provinces
other than the original ones in western China. By summing
up the information contained in the consular and Foreign
ISInspectorate's reports , we can see that in the early 
sixties, cultivation had reached Hunan, Honan, Shensi and 
Shansi. The Manchurian provinces, including S.E. Mongolia, 
began cultivation around 1864-, followed closely by Hupeh, 
Shantung and Chihli around 1868. Kwangtung joined about this 
time but cultivation ceased in 1872 and was not resumed.
The Yangtze provinces, notably Chekiang, began cultivation 
in the early seventies. Fukien, which in the past had 
cultivated the poppy only for ornamental purposes, now 
began to grow it for smoking purposes. Thus, by the
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beginning of the seventies, it was certain that of the
eighteen provinces of China, at least eleven were engaged
in poppy cultivation on a grand and commercial scale. The
other provinces also grew some opium, but they were
insignificant compared to the ones already mentioned^.
The first half of the seventies saw an immense increase
in the production of native opium, pointed out by reports
from Treaty ports. This phenomenon came despite an Imperial
edict prohibiting poppy cultivation owing to a partial
17food-crop failure in 1871 because of the cold weather r.
In 1872, the consul at Hankow remarked that poppy 
cultivation in Kweichow was so extensive that no space was 
left for the production of cereals and the Imperial edict 
on prohibition was enforced to a certain extent because of
it. Moreover, the quality of native opium had improved
18 • and could rival the Malwa variety • Medhurst, the consul
at Shanghai, also noted that the imports of .Indian opium
had been static for the past five years and this was
entirely due to the competition of native opium, the
production of which had more than quadrupled in the same
period^. This was repeated in his report for the following 
20year - 1875 • In 1874, T. Adkins, the consul at Newchwang,
reported that 'only one-fifth of the opium used by Chinamen
is foreign, i.e. 80$ is native, and as the quality of.the.
native drug improves, the disproportion will increase.1
Four^fifth of the arable land in the Manchurian province of
21Kirin was taken up by poppy cultivation
Together with the increase in production, provinces
which had hitherto only imported foreign opium also began
their own cultivation of the poppy. In Manchuria, cultivation
was on the increase and was gradually extending from the
22north to places near Newchwang . In 1874, the consul at
Ningpo reported a 'startling increase* of cultivation in
Chekiang, especially in the area lying between the 28 and
.30 degrees latitude and 118 and 122 degrees longtitude. A
retired governor and some serving officials were involved
23in the cultivation . Shantung, which had hitherto never
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grown any, had started cultivation of the opium poppy .
In the following year, poppy cultivation had started in
several districts in Anhwei province, and the amount produced
was very likely to affect the consumption of Bengal opium
25in that province .
While the Chefoo Convention was being negotiated, the 
consul at Shanghai remarked that native opium was a serious 
competitor to the foreign drug and, 'if it had not been 
that the exchange market had been influenced by circum­
stances entirely independent of the opium trade, the latter 
would have suffered a tremendous loss.1 In his 'General Trade 
Beport for 1876', I.W. Fraser, charg^ d'Affaires in the 
absence of Wade, said that native opium from Yunnan, Szechuan, 
Shensi, Kweichow, west, north-west and central China had 
begun to be shipped from Hankow to Shanghai and other native 
ports. Shipments of Szechuan opium from Hankow to’ native 
ports were 110.89 piculs in 1868, 433.90 in* 1869, 22.03 in 
1870, 10.57 in 1871, 323.42 in 1872, 155-14 in 1873, 109.81 
in 1874 and 893-50 in 1875^. Even the amount of native 
opium that paid duty at the Foreign Inspectorate's office 
at Hankow and was destined for Shanghai had also rapidly 
increased. In 1871 it was only 10 piculs, in 1875 the
amount had increased to 893 piculs, and in 1876 it had
28reached 1,696 piculs . The estimate for the consumption •
of native opium in Shanghai was between 2,500 and 3,000 
.............. ?Q.........
piculs for 1874 . This now only shows the extent of the
clandestine trade, but also the availability of native
opium from sources other than the western provinces of
50which Hankow was the chief exporter^ •
By 1876 then, it is a certain fact that, on the one 
hand, the production in native opium had greatly increased 
- double that of a decade ago would be a conservative 
estimate. It had also improved in quality, and despite 
the fact that it was used in the coastal provinces for 
adulteration with the foreign opium (especially the Indian 
varieties), rather than smoking it by itself, the interior 
provinces had completely done away with foreign opium.
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Even in the Treaty ports, as Fraser observed in his report
for 1876, nine of them showed a decrease in the import of
foreign opium while five showed an increase, with the
aggregate total of a surplus of 1,945 piculs. This,
compared, with the total import of slightly under 70,000
31piculs for the year, represented a very small increase^ .
Comparisons between Native and Indian Opium
The increased growth and consumption of native opium
greatly affected the market of Indian opium in China. This
was due to the competitive price and the comparatively
satisfactory quality of native opium. A comparison of the
following would give us a clearer understanding of the
nature of the competition between the two.
Confining ourselves in this section to the years
before the conclusion of the Chefoo Convention in late 1876,
since this is taken as a dividing point, we can look at
comparisons under three headings: 1) their‘respective prices,
2) the taxes levied on each which affected the difference
in price, and 5) their respective qualities.
1) Respective prices. One point that must be noted is that
for both native and Indian opium, the prices they fetched
varied from place to place and year to year. This was due
to the amount produced (including frequent opium crop
failures in China - the Indian drug was seldom affected by
crop failures because there was always sufficient quantities
in reserve at Calcutta), amount imported, the quality, and
the exchange rate, as well as the duties on them.
The first report of the price of native opium as compared
with Indian opium came in 1862 from Minister Bruce, who
said that the average price of Indian opium for that year
was 800 taels per picul while that of native opium was
400 taels per picul. However, owing to the shortage, the
price of the native* variety sometimes went as high as 
32650 taels-' • This observation can be seen in most of the 
reports from both the consuls and commissioners in sub­
sequent years. In the special report on native opium
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of 1864 compiled by the Foreign Inspectorate, the Newchwang
commissioner reported that native opium sold at half the
price of Indian opium, i.e. at 300 taels per picul. Ningpo
and Amoy reported the same rate. However, Canton reported
that native opium was selling for $380 to $460 while
Malwa fetched $670 and Patna $530 (native opium would be
selling at two-thirds the price of Indian opium). Hankow
reported that native opium was 30$ cheaper than the Indian
drug; Chinkiang estimated their respective prices at 300
taels and 500 taels while Shanghai*s prices were 373 taels
for native opium as against 530 taels for Malwa and 500 
33taels for Patna^. . .
Prices in subsequent years dropped if there was a good 
harvest, and rose if there was a shortage. The ratio, 
between the two types, however, remained about the same - 
the price of native opium varying from half to one-third 
of the price of the Indian drug. The following is a 
selected list of prices fetched at some of the Treaty ports^:
1869 - Foochow: native opium (abbreviated as n-o) $450 per
picul (all prices quoted are per.picul) or less by 
$250 compared to Patna at $710, Malwa at 7251 
Benares at $700 and Persian at $600;
Tientsin: n-o (Kansu type) 420 taels, Malwa 520 taels 
(price differences varying from 125 to 200 taels);- 
- Shanghai: n-o 250 taels, Malwa 482 to 600 taels and 
Patna 395 to 560 taels;
1870 - Shanghai: n-o 150 taels;
1872 - Hankow: n-o 360 taels, Malwa 460 taels;
Shanghai: n-o 250 to 300 taels, Malwa 425 to 475 taels,
i
and Bengal (both Patna and Benares) 425 to 510 taels;
1873 - Foochow: n-o$300 to 310 and Malwa $642.50 to 677*50;
Tientsin: n-o 350 taels and Malwa 468 taels;
1874 - Ningpo: n-o $400 and Indian opium $600;
Tientsin: n-o great variations - Shantung 220 taels 
(fair crop), Chihli 320 (small crop), Shansi 510 (fair 
crop), Honan 220 (very large crop), Kwangtung 220 
(very large crop), Kansu 230 (fair crop), Szechuan 170 
(large crop), and Yunnan 110 (large crop), Patna 450,
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Benares 437 and. Malwa 408;
1875 - Newchwang: n-o 280 taels and Malwa 460 to 465 taels;
Shanghai: n-o 260 to 270 taels, Malwa 410 to 445 taels,
Patna 415 to 445 taels and Benares 410 to 432 taels;
1876 - Shanghai: n-o 250 taels, Malwa 425 taels, Patna 430
taels, Benares 415 taels and Persian 360 taels.
2) Taxes. Rule V of the Commercial agreement of 1858
subjected foreign opium to a Tariff duty of 30 taels per
100 catties (or 1 picul) after which . Chinese authorities,
whether Imperial or provincial, had the right to levy
whatever kind and amount of taxes or dues they pleased.
Native opium, because it was produced in China, paid no
Tariff duty. This point is to be borne in mind when comparing
the levy of duties between the two types.
Dues (apart from the Tariff duty) levied on foreign
opium, which the opium merchants called •octroi’, varied
«
from place to 'place both in the total amount collected and
the different types of dues. But they were lumped together
under the term likin and only in specific cases were the
different types of dues and the amount collected for each
spelled out-' .
With regard to the dues levied on native opium, one
general factor must first be pointed out. Because of the
ease with which it could be smuggled from place to place
in small quantities, not all native opium paid the taxes
or dues it was required to pay. Moreover, as a general rule,
apart from the land tax, which was applicable to all crops
cultivated and not to the poppy in particular (though in
some provinces special land levies were introduced on .land
used for poppy cultivation), the provincial governments
always tried as best as possible to levy on native opium
half the likin imposed on foreign opium. Exceptions to the
rule, however, can be seen: in 1868 at Newchwang, a levy of
18.6 taels per picul was made on native opium at trading
36centres, the same as that levied on Indian opium-' . But m  
no case did the levy on native opium surpass that of the 
foreign variety.
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The following is a selected list of likin, used as a 
collective term for all dues, levied on native and foreign 
opium until 1876^:
1868 - levies on foreign opium for this year is compiled 
from Commissioner hick's report (see note 37)*
Port • Amount of Native Charges per picul
at the port one way to prin­
ciple market
total
Newchwang 18.6.0.0 10.1.9.7 28.7*9*7
Tientsin 17.0.0.0 36.0.0.0 to Peking 53*0.0.0
u 17*0.0.0 to Shensi 34.0.0.0
Chefoo 18.6.0.0 — 18.6.0.0
Hankow 13*9*2.0 16.5*6.4 30.4.8.4
Kiukiang 34.0.0.0 16*9*6.0 50.9*6.0
Chinkiang 38.4.0.0 24.0.0.0 62.4.0.0
Shanghai 37*2.8.7 — 57*2.8.7
Ningpo 34.0.0.0 — 34.0.0.0
Foochow 84.6.4.0 20.8.6.0 105*5*0.0
Tamsui 32.1.3*6 — 32.1.3*6
Takow 45*3*4.0 — 45*3*4.0
Amoy 90.2.9*0 — 90.2.9*0
Swatow 11.0*5*0 3.7*1.0 14.7*6.0
Canton 23.0.0.0 25*3*4.0 48.3*4.0
(the totals exclude 
are in taels, i.e.
the Tariff duty, and all returns 
tael-mace-candareen-cash)
1869 Foochow (CCR): foreign opium $163*38 per picul (this 
included Tariff duty), no mention of n-o;
Tientsin (CCR): foreign opium 20 taels per picul, and 
n-o 20 taels per 150 catties (or 1.5 piculs);
Shanghai (CCR): half likin on n-o, i.e. 22.50 taels 
(half import and whole export duty, but before October 
1868 the total levy was 45 taels per picul);
Hankow (CCR): n-o (Szechuan) 3 mace per picul at 
place of origin (likin, grower's land tax and squeeze) 
then likin of 9,600 cash per picul at Kwei barrier, at 
Iphang a transit duty of 39 taels per picul but in 
actual fact only 15 taels 6 mace per picul (because 
100 catties were only 'weighed' as 40 catties) - so
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a total of about 25 taels per picul before it 
reached the place of consumption;
1871 - Chefoo (FI): likin on foreign opium increased from 
and 21.28 taels to 35*74 taels because of additional
1872 revenue required to relief distress caused by floods;
t
Foochow (FI): foreign opium likin of 84 taels and 
inland tax of 34 taels;
Swatow (FI): foreign opium likin of 34 taels per picui 
and tieh-hsing of 24 taels;
1873 - Canton (CCR): foreign opium likin of 13 to 15 taels;
Newchwang (CCR): n-o likin one-third of foreign opium; 
Tientsin (CCR): n-o likin half of foreign opium; 
Shanghai (CCR): foreign opium 45*26 taels per picul 
made up of charges on collection, extra charges for . 
defence and, wharfage and' likin;
Chefoo (FI): foreign opium likin of 34.26 taels;
Amoy (FI): foreign opium likin of 112*4.7.2 taels 
which was twice as much than at Swatow;
Foochow (FI): foreign opium likin of 114.6.4.0 taels;
1874 - Tientsin (CCR): n-o likin of 38.40 taels but
to 19*20 taels during the year, likewise likin on 
foreign opium was reduced from 32.56 to 31*55 taels; 
Chefoo (FI): foreign opium likin of 32.20 taels;
Canton (CCR): foreign opium likin, including Tariff 
.duty, of 61.6.4.0 taels;
1875 - Tientsin (CCR): foreign opium likin of 64 taels, and
n-o half of that;
Shanghai (CCR): n-o likin half of Tariff duty;
Kiukiang (FI): foreign opium levies reduced from 
30.7*2.0 haikuan taels to 15*3*6.0 haikuen taels; 
Chinkiang (FI): foreign opium levies reduced from 
. 38.4.0.0 haikuan taels to 30.7*2.0 and then in 
October further reduced to 15*3*6*0 to be on a parI
with Kiukiang;
1876 - Hankow (CCR): n-o half duty of 15 taels and foreign
opium 30 taels;
Ningpo (CCR): n-o likin of 32 taels per picul;
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Shanghai (CCR): n-o half the likin levied on foreign 
opium which was 82.92 taels (including Tariff duty- 
levied at Soochow);
Tientsin (PI): foreign opium likin estimated at 75 
haikuan taels per picul (Commissioner A.M. de Bem- 
ieres also remarked that at some other Treaty ports 
likin only amounted to 18 haikuan taels);
Swatow (PI): foreign opium likin raised by 50$ on 
17 October to 21.5 taels;
Kiungchow (PI): foreign opium likin of 23 taels and- 
contribution to defence fund of 2 taels.
In comparing the likin on foreign opium in 1868 with 
that in 1876, there is a degree of similarity. One thing 
certain is that the amount of levy imposed on native opium 
represented about half of that levied on the foreign variety.
The native opium could afford to be sold cheaper - from
half to one-third less in price than the Indian variety -
and that it was improving in quality meant that by 1876,
at the latest, it had become a serious competitor to foreign
38opium, especially Malwa^ • It was an outcome which had 
not been envisaged in the Poreign Inspectorate’s special 
survey of 1864.
3) Qualities. Concerning the quality of native opium, as 
compared to the Indian varieties, the Indian government 
had made very detailed analysis as early as mid-1861. The 
report which was issued then, apart from supplying 
statistics of morphia obtained from opium extracts and 
other technical details, commented that though Chinese 
opium was inferior, 'it is pure unadulterated opium of 
a good quality.1 In 1870, another detailed analysis was 
made, comparing samples of the various types of Chinese 
opium - from Szechuan, Yunnan, Kweichow, Kansu, etc. - 
with Benares and Patna (or Behar) opium, and it was revealed 
that Chinese opium was not at all inferior^ .
In 1874, Medhurst, the Shanghai consul, gave a detailed 
analysis of the actual differences in quality from the
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viewpoints of opium smokers in China. ’Bengal opium, which 
is prepared with greater care, though having strong narcotic 
properties, is free from many of the objections which the 
Chinese have attached to the others. Malwa is of a stronger 
flavour, ,more coarse and biting to the taste; it is said 
to have a tendency to induce an unhealthy condition of 
the skin, and is altogether more pungent and stimulating.
It produces heart-burn in those unaccustomed to its use, 
and is irritating to the nervous system. Native opium, 
again, possesses all these bad qualities of the Malwa drug, 
with others of its own. It is said to be coarser and more 
fiery than the Indian; its flavour -is inferior, and it 
produces disagreeable and troublesome eruptions of the 
skin, and it is moreover constantly adulterated to a great 
extent with seaweed, oil, &c. To remedy these defects it
i
is said that the smoker is compelled to have occasional 
recourse to the foreign drug. The difference between-the 
foreign and native sorts is so marked that the Chinese say 
that no man can exchange the use of even the inferior 
foreign drug for that of the best quality native product.'^
Chinese government's reactions
The policy or policies adopted by the Chinese government
towards the growth and taxation of its own opium was very
much dependent on the attitudes of the provincial
authorities, and the Imperial government very seldom 
. . zli
initiated any policy of its own .
Control over the provinces by the Imperial government 
had always been lax and a great deal of autonomy was 
exercised by the provincial governments. Due to the desire 
to secure more revenue for the provinces, cultivation of 
the poppy was encouraged rather than discouraged* As 
Alcock pointed out to Lord Stanley in early 1869, 'the 
greed and corruption' of the officials all through the 
provinces are stronger than any Government Edict; and 
opium will still be cultivated whatever the prejudice to 
the supply of food for the population, until the rice
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gets to famine prices - and insurrection of starving
people again begin the terrible circle of ruin and
desolution. With corruption and imbecility among the
ruling classes rendering all effective or honest
government impossible...greed and misrule thus going
hand in hand to depopulate the land and plunge the whole
42empire into anarchy and irreparable confusion.1 Thus, 
the policy the Imperial government adopted was one of 
laissez-faire.
Fully aware of the consequences to the national morale 
and the need for foodstuffs, prohibition edicts were only 
proclaimed after special memorials were submitted by 
high-ranking officials calling for prohibition of poppy 
cultivation because of famine conditions or other reasons. 
However, though these edicts were applicable to all the 
provinces, it was the rule rather than the exception that 
only in the province or provinces directly* concerned, with 
the memorial was prohibition more or less effective. Thus, 
throughout this period we have the following attempts at 
suppression.
In 1864, because of the increased growth of the poppy 
in Shansi, which led to a food shortage and an increase
in the price of foodstuffs, an Imperial edict was issued .
43ordering all provinces to suppress the cultivation .
In 1868, as a response to a memorial by censor Yu 
Po-ch'iian, who requested that poppy cultivation must be 
strictly prohibited as it would greatly prejudice the 
people's means of subsistence, an Imperial edict called 
attention to the fact that poppy cultivation had spread 
from Kansu to Shensi and Shansi and was not gradually 
extending to Kiangsu, Honan, Shantung and other provinces. 
'The common people in their desire for gain forget what 
harm may ensue; they simply regard what is immediate before 
their eyes; and it is to be feared that rich and fertile 
lands will be entirely appropriated to the production of 
this worthless article, a result which would be attended 
with grave consequences to the popular welfare.' All high-
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ranking officials were to suppress the cultivation in
their provinces, and any official found guilty of negligence
44m  carrying out this edict would be severely punished
In August 1872, an Imperial edict was issued as a
result of a memorial from censor Yuan Ch'eng-yeh concerning
the extended growth of the poppy in Shansi and suggested
that prohibition had not been effective in entirely
eliminating the evil and that all opium dens should be 
46closed
The Peking Gazette of 19 December 1872 published an 
Imperial edict which was in response to a memorial from 
Tso Tsung-t'ang requesting that cultivation should be 
prohibited at Shensi and Kansu. The edict again stated 
that poppy plants must be uprooted on first budding, that 
local officials levying land charges on poppy areas
t
should be punished, and that native opium coming from
46other provinces should be confiscated .
On 6 June 1874, as a response to another memorial 
from Tso Tsung-t'ang, Governor-General of Kansu and Shensi, 
denouncing four chief magistrates of districts in Kansu 
in their involvement over poppy cultivation, another 
Imperial edict was issued^.
There was a lapse of over two years in which no 
prohibition edicts appeared. Then on 26 September 1876, 
an edict appeared in the Peking Gazette. Once again, it 
was in response to a memorial, this time from Pao Yuan-shen, 
Governor of Shansi, in which he requested that cultivation 
of the poppy plant must be thoroughly prohibited and 
regulations should be established for the reward or 
punishment of officials connected with this matter. The 
edict called attention to the great detriment to the food 
supply caused by poppy cultivation. It also mentioned that 
district authorities were inactive in enforcing the 
prohibition, looking upon it as a mere matter of routine, 
and there were even cases in which they accepted a fee 
for relaxing the interdict, which they turned to account 
for their own selfish purposes, with abuses innumerable as
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the result. Govemor-Generals and Governors of all provinces
were commanded to enforce the interdict and to denounce 
48offenders . As usual, no action was taken by the provincial 
officials.
From the scarcity of edicts and the basic repetition 
of the contents and the confinement to certain provinces, 
it" is clear that though prohibition might have been carried 
out, it was only for a limited time and of very limited 
success. -The inability of the Imperial government to impose 
‘its will on the provinces is amply reflected here.
At the same time that these officials were memorializing 
for prohibition, another group of .officials were busy 
encouraging poppy cultivation and seeking Imperial sanction 
for their actions. In March 1874, possibly as a response 
to Tso's memorial, Prince Ch'un requested that the Imperial
v
government adopt a realistic attitude towards the Opium 
Question. He had discussions with Li Hung-chang, then 
Governor-General of Chihli, in early 1875 concerning this, 
and had come to the conclusion that Indian opium was 
extremely detrimental to the nation*s wealth and health and 
that its importation should be stopped first. After this 
had been accomplished, it would not be too late then to 
suppress poppy cultivation in China. He based this argument 
on the principle that 'to chop wood, it must be chopped 
at the root, and to stop a riverflow, it must be plugged
ZlO
at the source.1 x
An Imperial edict to the Grand Council ordered that
50Li should submit details of his proposal for consideration^ 
This prompted a memorial from Li in December 1874 in which 
he pointed out that there was a yearly import of over
70,000 piculs of foreign opium which amounted to over 
thirty million taels of silver. The British government, 
fully realizing the evil effects of the drug, had made no 
attempt to stop its cultivation in India, but had repeatedly 
called on China to stop her own production. This was 
obviously motivated by profit considerations at the expense 
of China. Li believed that the only way to prevent the
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outflow of silver and to reduce the importation of the 
Indian drug was to legitimize and to encourage the growth 
of native opium. While, on the other hand, more dues 
should be levied on the foreign drug, so if the foreign 
opium merchants could not make any profit from its sale, 
its importation would cease. After that, gradual suppression 
of the native drug could be effected. This would not only 
exterminate the evil of opium smoking, but would also 
conserve China's wealth. He further advocated the joint 
collection of Tariff duty and likin in order to avoid 
smuggling; the revenue could be used for coastal defences^.
Earlier in June 1874, Mayers, Chinese secretary at the 
British legation, had a conversation with Li Hung-chang 
in which the latter complained about the foreign opium 
import. Mayers rejoindered by saying that if the drug was
i
so obnoxious, the Chinese government should start by 
effectively prohobiting poppy cultivation in‘the empire.
To this, Li replied that as long as foreigners were allowed
to bring opium into China, his government 'could not
52well bear hard upon its own people m  the. matter.1^
That Prince Ch'un and Li Hung-chang were not censured 
for their suggestions, though no opinion came from the 
Imperial government, is proof of the fact that the Imperial 
government possessed no definite policy towards native 
opium. If there was enough pressure to legalize cultiva­
tion, the Imperial government just might do so. Cultiva­
tion was very widespread throughout Chihli, Li Hung-chang's • 
area of jurisdiction, and no attempt had been made to 
stop it.
As regards the taxation of native opium, there is 
very little information on the policies adopted either 
by the Imperial or provincial governments. This was 
because officially native opium was contraband and could 
be neither taxed nor grown. However, from consular and 
and Foreign Inspectorate's sources, it is clear that 
taxes were levied by the provincial authorities without 
them putting anything in writing. The same was true for
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the Imperial government. It remained completely silent
on the matter.
Of the known cases, in 1859 Prince Wei memorialized
that native opium should he taxed on the same basis as
Indian opium. In August the same year, an Imperial
proclamation ordered that both Tariff duty and likin
should be levied on native opium at Yunnan, and the
Tariff duty sent to the Board of Revenue; the likin was
to be used for expenses in the suppression of rebellious
55elements in that province-'. This was the last official
government pronouncement from the capital that allowed
poppy cultivation. Subsequent years .saw a reversal of
policy and prohibition edicts were issued. These were
ineffective and taxes were continually levied on native
opium at approximately half that on foreign opium. The
Imperial government was tolerant towards it since by
prohibiting this, the provincial governments*would have
demanded much more subsidy from the Imperial government.
It became a matter of realism that a laissez-faire
attitude - if it can be considered a policy- was adopted
54throughout our period of study*' •
British government reactions
In reviewing reactions from the British government to 
the increased growth of opium in China, the department 
most immediately concerned was the India Office, which 
represented the interests of the Indian government. The 
main concern of the Indian government, and for that 
matter, the India Office, was in the annual revenue it- 
derived and could derive from the opium trade with China. 
The opium revenue amounted to one-seventh to one-sixth 
of the entire revenue of India and it was budgetted into 
the estimate for each financial year-^. The dependence on 
this revenue was very pronounced and thereby the reaction 
of the Indian government to native opium was a concerned, 
apprehensive and sensitive one.
After foreign opium was legalized in 1860, the initial 
reaction from the Indian government was to enquire about
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the 1 sources of supply and the cause of price being 
maintained here /Tndia7 at a higher rate than the price 
in China would appear to warrant.' • However, things 
stayed as they were for the following years until early 
1869 when with more information obtained concerning 
production and increase of native opium, the Indian 
government requested more information. This was also due 
to the commencement of treaty revision. In a letter 
transmitted to Alcock from the Indian government - going 
* through the proper channels of first the India Office 
and then the Foreign Office - the Financial department of 
the Indian government wanted information from the 
consular corps to be included in their quarterly reports 
concerning ' a careful resume of the most recent inform­
ation that they can gather in respect of the country round
9
them concerning the growth of the poppy, the quality of
the produce, the price, and its favor with* consumers,
etc..1 It also wanted yearly samples of genuine indigenous
opium and occasional estimates of the lowest price at
which native opium could be sold at a profit. The Indian
government was willing to bear all charges so incurred
and to treat the matter as confidential. These were due
to the fact that such information was essential ’because
of the opium revenue and private interest' and that
official reports were better than private sources of
57
information which might be exaggerated^(.
As a result of the information gathered, after discussions 
with Alcock after he had signed his agreement, and in
58
private council meetings of the Indian administration*' ,
many opinions were expressed. It was made very clear that
conflict between Indian and native opium for markets in
China existed, and in order to make Indian opium more
competitive, cuts must be made in the price and the Indian
government would have to seek other sources of revenue to
59compensate for the consequent loss*". Having discussed 
such problems fully, in a full meeting of the Viceroy-in- 
Council on 19 March 1870, resolutions to increase poppy
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cultivation in India were adopted^.
In the following year, a special memorandum was written
by the Financial department of the Indian government,
which traced in detail the history of native opium, its
growth and popularity, the competition it had afforded
Indian opium, a comparison of the price of the two types,
and finally the comparative qualities of the two^.
The mere fact that such a report was drawn'up in such
great detail, though it lacked in specific comments
'about the consequences of competition and what steps the
Indian government should take to remedy them, shows the
extent to which the government was worried about the
competition from native opium. However, the report,
inconclusive though it was, did suggest that at the moment,
native opium was not as serious a competitor as most
62believed it to be
As a summary, it would be true to say that though the 
Indian government was worried, it was not exceedingly so - 
but only for the moment. In noting the concern of the 
Indian government over the competition .from native opium, 
it is worth while to record some reports made by the 
consular staff in China, who from 1869, under a directive 
from Alcock after the urgent request from the Indian govern­
ment, made detailed observations of the seriousness of 
the competition
1868 to 1869: W.M. Cooper, an interpreter, drew up 
a memorandum on native opium in December 1868 in which 
he reported that ’the present extensive cultivation of 
the drug in Szechuan, and the revival of cultivation in 
Yunnan during the last four or five years may probably 
account for the sudden decrease in demand for the Indian 
drug in Western China.... I believe that I am rightly
informed that the people dislike the Indian drug on account
64of its great strength.1
T.T. Cooper, who undertook a journey in late 1868 in 
search of an overland route from China to British Burma, 
made a report which also included his observations on 
native opium. In his report, he wrote, ’what effect any
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serious decrease in the importation of the drug which
would have on foreign trade....A few years ago such a
suggestion would have been received with a sensation
approaching to horror. The importation of opium being
the only practical means of equalizing the exchanges,
then largely in favour of China; now, however, the
partial opening of the country has already to a large
extent rendered our trade independent of the drug....it
now seems that our increased imports of foreign piece
‘goods are likely to be balanced by a corresponding decrease
in the opium.trade. This is a result which few will
regret; its effect will doubtless -be to improve the
rate of exchange in favour of importers and enable a
still increasing quantity of foreign manufactures to
6Senter into consumption m  China.1 ^
i
1870: In an extract from the 'Spectator1 which was
with the budget estimate of the Indian government for
the year, it commented that 'when we come to look into it,
the prime cause of change is the necessity of putting a
lower figure on the yield of opium. We received from
that source £8,453,000 in 1868-69, and only £6,922,000
is estimated now; but so far the latter sum being an
under estimate^ no one can read the Budget without
66suspicion that opium is more risky than even.1
1872: Referring to an Imperial edict prohibiting 
native opium, Wade, in his despatch to the Indian govern­
ment said that, 'Thus, for the present at least, its 
treatment of the question may be regarded as favorable to 
Indian trade,' but added that, 'but the Decree may be 
little more than one of those declarations it feels called
upon to make against opium, whenever the use of the drug
67is publicly forced upon its attention.1 f
In a commercial report detailing the general features 
of the China trade made by Malet, statistician at the 
Peking legation, he wrote that, 'the value of Foreign 
Opium had decreased in 1872, and there is reason to suppose 
that native grown opium continues its rivalry with
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.68increasing success.'
1874: While commenting on the punishment meted out
to four magistrates of Kansu because of the memorial by
Tso Tsung-t'ang, Wade pointed out that7'Tso's denunciation
of these, magistrates is possibly due...to corrupt motives..
Still there can be no doubt that the moral convictions of
Chinese in general are outraged by the practice of opium
smoking. I look therefore for a reaction one day against
the opium traffic, although the interest of the Central
■Government in the duties on foreign trade, of which the
collection on opium forms so large an item, will for some
69time to come protect it.1 J
1875: In Consul Robertson's commercial report from 
Canton, he stated that 'there is no doubt that the 
importation of Indian Opium has not increased in the ratio 
that might have been expected; on the contrary, it has 
been stationary, whilst on the other hand the native 
production has to a very large extent, showing that if 
the supply from India failed or was cut off entirely,
70its loss would m  time be supplied from.native sources.'f
In assessing these reports, the most obvious fact that 
emerges is that the import of Indian opium had become 
static - and this was not because of the lack of money to 
purchase it, or because famine or anything else, but 
almost entirely due to the competition of native opium, 
which had increased in quantity and improved in quality. 
This assessment of the Indian opium market in China was to 
play a great part in the negotiations for the Chefoo 
Convention. That the Indian government expressed more 
concern and opinions on the agreement than it had about 
the Alcock Convention is a clear indication of the anxiety 
and worry over competition from native opium.
Continuation of the Customs blockade of Hong Kong
The interim years between the two Conventions, i.e.
1870 to 1876, saw the continuation of the customs blockade. 
It had, however, grown in magnitude and intensity because, 
apart from the levy of opium likin by the Governor-General,
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the Hoppo had also instigated the levy of native dues,
while the salt monopolist likewise had begun collection
of the salt gabelle. The nature of smuggling activities
from Hong Kong has also greatly changed. Goods smuggled
into Horfg Kong were Chinese produces, which attempted to
evade the export duty and other dues - such as sugari tea,
crockery-ware; while those smuggled out of Hong Kong were
mostly opium, salt, saltpetre, arms and other materials
of war - namely contraband, apart from the first two which
71were subject to Tariff duties and other levies' . Because
of the effectiveness of the blockade - with its revenue
stations and cruisers effectively 'cordoning Hong Kong -
apart from the few who dared to take the risk of total
72confiscation, most had turned legitimate' . Thus, the
complaints that issued from the Hong Kong mercantile
community during this period concentrated on the adverse
effects the blockade had on the junk tradel.pf_.the Colony
(the Foreign Inspectorate was responsible for the steamer
trade), which was entirely in the hands of Chinese merchants.
The nature of the blockade, as well as the nature of the
response from Hong Kong, had altered from the initial year
of the blockade.
Of the over three hundred cases of 'illegal1 seizures
complained of by the Hong Kong merchants, only a handful
73raised some serious controversy' . A brief look at some of
them will show the extent to which complaints over the
blockade had changed in nature.
Between 1 July 1872 and 30 March 1874, there were
altogether eighteen cases of seizure of trading junks
•either by the Canton native customs or the Salt Commissioner,
74brought to the attention of Consul Robertson' • Settlements 
were attempted through a mixed court at Canton consisting 
of representatives* of the Canton government and the 
British consulate at Canton, appointed by the Governor- 
General and Robertson, respectively. In some more serious 
cases, Robertson himself would be present to ensure that 
whatever verdict was decided upon, he would have first-hand
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information on how it was arrived at, and thereby, could 
answer the expected objections from the Hong Kong govern­
ment competently. The Governor-General, on his part, 
would also look into some cases personally.
A b^ief summation of eleven of the eighteen cases of 
seizure will throw sufficient light on the operation of 
the blockade and the reactions to it:
Case one- November 1872: A junk belonging to Kue Cheong-tai 
was seized for attempting to smuggle opium. The complaint,
• made through the Hong Kong government, was that the master 
of the vessel did not know of the existence of a cargo of 
opium. However, upon investigation, the opium was found 
to have been stowed in the cargo that it was evident the 
master must have been cognizant of the concealment. The 
verdict was the confiscation of the opium and a nominal 
fine; the vessel was released.
Case two - November 1872: A junk, 'Kum Shun-wo', was seized —  
and was found to contain both opium and fifty bags of 
sulphur, which was contraband. Evidence showed that these 
were carefully concealed among the cargo and the intent 
to smuggle was indisputable. A heavier fine was imposed 
and the junk was detained at Canton for a much longer 
period before it was released.
Case three - June 1873: The junk, 'Tsit Lung-shing1, was 
seized and complaint came from Ta-li company in Hong Kong, 
which insisted that the junk was seized by a Chinese 
customs cruiser in Pak-sha-wan (bay) which was in Hong Kong 
waters. The truth of the matter was determined by the 
mixed court composed of Gardner, Acting vice-Consul and 
interpreter at Canton, Yeh Tze-chu, the Chinese customs 
treasurer, and Pu Peng-chi, magistrate of the Nanhai district 
The junk, loaded with rice and saltpetre, the latter being 
contraband, had waited in Sy-wan (bay) in Colonial waters 
for several days seeking the right opportunity to run the 
blockade. A revenue cruiser, commanded by a German, 
Vanderlearh,.had information concerning the junk and laid 
in waiting behind Pai-tu island. On 12 June, the junk tried
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to run, but was seized by the cruiser. Thus, it was proved 
that the seizure was effected in Chinese waters and the 
junk was not at anchor at the time of capture. The mixed 
court returned a verdict of 'guilty1.
Case four - June 1873: The junk, 'Kum Chun-fat', with 338 
bags of contraband saltpetre and other cargoes, tried to 
run the blockade on the night of 13 June, but was hailed 
by a customs cruiser off Pai-tu island. She then ran back 
towards Hong Kong waters but was caught beforehand. However, 
because the distance from Pai-tu island to the Hong Kong 
shore was only a mile, and since the Governor-General had 
ordered that no seizures should be made nearer the Hong 
Kong shore than Tai-tu island, Slope island and Lantao, 
the master of the junk was given the benefit of the doubt. 
Case five - July 1873: The junk, 'Ng hop-sing', was seized 
many miles away from Hong Kong while trying to reach the 
Colony from Swatow with a cargo of sugar that had not paid 
duty at the port of export. The owners claimed that the 
junk had come from Tamsui in Taiwan and was seized in Hong 
Kong waters. The owner eventually confessed that he had 
tried to smuggle the sugar into the Colony and he was fined. 
Case six - September 1873: The owner of Pilot boat No. 317* 
registered in Hong Kong, alleged that his boat was seized 
by salt revenue cruisers in Hong Kong waters and suffered 
extortion by revenue officers. However, the complainant 
refused to go to Canton to testify before the mixed court 
and the case was decided against him.
Case seven - September 1873: The junk, 'Yun a hang', was 
seized with 80 balls of opium which possessed forged 
'Grand Chops'^, 31 balls which had no 'chops' and a small 
amount that had the true 'chops'. The complainants once 
again refused to go to Canton to testify and the mixed 
court gave the verdict that the owners had tried to us.e 
the real 'grand chops' to cover up for the forged ones.
The cargo was confiscated.
Case eight.- November 1873: The junk, 'Chin Chen-fang', was 
seized because some of the cargo were not declared on the
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manifest, and a parcel of opium was also found. However, 
because no proof of any attempt to smuggle the goods was 
given by the revenue officers who seized it, the opium was 
returned and the owner of the junk fined a nominal sum for 
declaring a false manifest.
Case nine - December 1873: The junk, 'Sing Kut-li', was
seized but some of the shippers who had their cargoes, in
the vessel declared themselves innocent. A Chinese woman
who spoke good English came to Canton to argue on their
‘behalf. However, she could not give the port clearance and
duty receipts and also inadvertantly gave a letter to
Gardner, the contents of which proved that the vessel
attempted to smuggle the cargo and the petition was made
to the Hong Kong government 'on the chance of obtaining
more favourable terms, through its intervention, from the
»
Chinese authorities.' The mixed court, naturally, found
the owners guilty and confiscated their cargoes.  ... .....
Case ten - January 1874: The junk,'Kum-hop-feng', was 
seized for attempted amuggling and after a fine had been 
imposed and received, the vessel was returned to the owner. 
It was, however, taken by pirates and the owner tried to 
hold the Chinese government responsible. It was declared 
that the claim ‘Was not tenable.
Case eleven - January 1874: The junk,*'Kum Hop-sing', while 
on a voyage from Tamsui in Formosa to Hong Kong, carrying 
a cargo of tea and sundries, was seized near the Colony on 
19 January. The master could only show receipts for likin 
but no receipts for other dues such as the export duty.
It was contended that Formosa did not have an office 
issuing export duty receipts and so it was not paid and 
the seizure was illegal. Moreover, it was also asserted 
that the junk was seized in Hong Kong waters. The Canton 
authorities, however, contended that there existed 
regulations which required such vessels to go to the nearest 
port that had a customs establishment and pay the duties 
on her cargo and receive a port clearance before going to 
Hong Kong. Owners of junks had known of such regulations
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for years and the 'Kum Hop-sing', in not complying with 
them, showed her attempt to smuggle. Robertson wanted the 
complainants to come to Canton and to argue their case 
themselves, but they refused. Consequently, after careful 
discussipn with the Hoppo, the verdict reached was an 
attempted case of smuggling. However, when this was 
communicated to the Hong Kong government, the latter 
deemed it unsatisfactory. Robertson, in order to avoid 
more complications,- offered to reopen the case and try it 
*by a mixed court. The defendents still refused to testify 
at Canton on the grounds of possible intimidation by the 
Chinese authorities despite Robertson’s assurance that 
they would be protected during the hearing. Nothing 
further was done in the matter^.
Between late 1874 and mid-1875, there were three more
cases of seizure on the same pattern as the eighteen
77before this date'': •
Case one - On 24 December 1874, the junk 'Sau Tung Li' 
was seized by a customs cruiser officered by two Europeans. 
It was carrying sugar from Shum Chuan, in the Canton River, 
to Hong Kong, but the cargo had not paid any duty. The 
sugar was confiscated and the vessel released after four 
days. The owner', however, contended that he had a special 
licence and that he had not paid duty for seven or eight 
years while on this route. Robertson replied that sugar 
was a dutiable article and the fact that the owner had 
not paid any such duty for so longer proved beyond any 
doubt that he was accustomed to smuggling.
Case two - on 26 February 1875,a fishing boat, No. 2138 H 
registered in Hong Kong, was searched in Colonial waters 
near Stonecutter’s island by a mandarin junk flying the 
Chinese flag. A small quantity of fish was taken away 
after the search. Representations were made to the Canton 
authorities and the Governor-General replied that, upon 
investigation, the search was not made in Hong Kong waters 
and no 'squeeze' was involved. The matter rested there 
because the loss sustained by the complainant was very small
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and the Colonial government did not pursue it further.
Case three - On 26 March 1875i the junk ’Wing Chung Lung*,
with a cargo of cotton was seized as Yung-shu wan. The
junk, together with her cargo and manifest were sent up to
Canton. The owner, Kwong-Tsy-Sau, contended that the junk
was making a return trip to Liu-chan and was sailing for
Cheung Chau in order to pay the regular duty. However, bad
weather had blown the junk off-course and the seizure was
therefore premature. He further contended that Yung-shu
* wan was within Hong Kong waters. The Registrar-General,
in forwarding the complaint to Robertson, added that two
sailors of the junk had been imprisoned and tortured. A
mixed court was subsequently convened and it was ascertained
that though the owner had given $30 to the master of the
junk for him to pay the duty,' the master had attempted to 
* » 
evade payment in order to embezzle the money. Moreover,
the weather on the day in question was fine and the junk, __
in fact, was not seized at Yun-shu wan, but to the south
of Cheung Chau, which showed that it had already bypassed
the duty station. In their statements,.the two imprisoned
sailors . testified that they had not been tortured; they
had been treated exceedingly well by their jailors. Since
the owner of the cargo was a respectable merchant and had
not attempted to smuggle his cargo, it was returned to
him but the junk was confiscated.
In reviewing the above cases of seizure, one can discern 
some common factors which showed not only the nature of 
the blockade but the reactions it obtained from Hong. Kong. 
All the cases referred to the Canton consul by the Hong 
Kong government, apart from the few in which the benefit 
of the doubt was given to the complainant, were found to 
contain inaccurate statements made on purpose in order to 
try and obtain an acquittal. Moreover, the illegality of 
seizures as a rule were based either on seizures effected . 
in Hong Kong waters, or on a different interpretation of 
how and where duties should be paid and collected. When 
asked to testify in Canton at the mixed courts, the
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complainants would seldom present themselves. The excuse 
given was always the fear of imprisonment and torture by 
the Canton authorities. Though this fear was dismissed 
by Robertson as groundless, the Hong Kong government was 
very muph taken in by such a belief, and more than once 
expressed its concern on behalf of the complainants. .
The setting up of the mixed court to arrive at a fair 
judgment is indeed a notable achievement on the part of 
both the Canton government and the British consulate. It 
‘ restricted the grievances and complaints made by the Hong 
Kong mercantile community to solutions to be arrived at 
between the Chinese and British authorities at Canton, 
thereby preventing them from being enlarged out of proportion. 
Quick and effective redress of grievances by the Canton 
government on debatable cases, i.e. giving the benefit of 
the doubt to the complainant,'and the meting ou£ of 
punishments strictly according to the seriousness of the 
offences, all paved the way for a cordial relationship 
between the Canton government and the Canton consulate.
Thus, throughout this period, though complaints were loud 
and often, and despite the support the Colonial government 
gave to its merchants, relationship between the Chinese 
and British authorities at Canton and Peking (concerning 
these matters which were always relayed to the capital) 
were indeed amicable.
However, the fact that Robertson appeared to side with 
the Canton government brought serious issues between 
himself and the Hong Kong government. Complaints about his 
actions and policies were many and serious. Robertson came 
to be regarded more as a thorn in the side of Hong Kong 
than of China, and the desire for his removal from the 
Canton consulate was more than hinted at by the Colonial 
government. ,
The Blockade Commission of 1875-74
Apart from petitions concerning ’illegal* seizures 
made to the Hong Kong government, the mercantile community 
as a body also made efforts to convince the British
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government that remedies should be sought for.
This began with the formation of a special commission 
by Governor Kennedy to investigate the; complaints made 
of 'the'action of the Chinese Maritime Customs in the 
neighbourhood of the Colony of Hong Kong and the detriment 
of Trade arising out of alleged abuses of such action1 on 15 
December 1875* P* Ryrie, member of the Legislative Council, 
H.G. Thomsett, Harbour Master, and M.S. Tonnochy, acting
Registrar-General, were appointed as members of the
• . 78commission' •
After detailed investigation of ..the complaints, after 
consulting government documents and interviewing Chinese 
witnesses, the commission presented its report on 28 April 
1874. The following points were stressed:
1)Chinese witnesses, though acknowledging the existence of
t
the blockade, the injustices they suffered and the influence 
it had on the- junk trade, were unwilling to testify 
because of the fear of the Canton authorities. On the other 
hand, those whc^ trade involved places other than the 
Canton area, were very willing to give .testimony.
2) Whenever complaints were forwarded to the Canton consulate 
asking for redress, they were never satisfactorily dealt with
3) Hong Kong was a free-port, and therefore, no goods 
exported from it could be regarded as contraband, and the 
question of smuggling did not arise until goods endeavour
to enter.a Chinese port or to be landed on Chinese territory, 
without paying duty. Therefore a customs cordon around Hong 
Kong • to levy dues on junks leaving the Colony for places 
outside the jurisdiction of the Canton authorities was 
unjustifiable. There were many cases in which junks destined 
for, say Hainan or Fukien which were outside the jurisdic­
tion of the Canton authorities, had been taxed by the Canton 
customs; and upon arrival at their destinations, they had 
to pay the duties again to the customs there. The same 
applied to junks arriving from areas outside the jurisdic- '
tion of the Canton customs. The 'Kum Hop-sing* case was
79given as the example.
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The commission asked the following important question:
'What right has the Hoppo of the Canton District to levy 
export duties on goods which have come from parts of China 
not in his jurisdiction, and which are allowed by the 
Hoppos of those places to leave for Hong Kong free of 
export duty?'
4) The authority of the Hoppo was also questioned, 
because the commission believed that he was a tax farmer, 
in the sense that he paid a certain sum for the privileges 
of collecting import and export duties on goods conveyed 
by native junks. In the pursuit of such collections, he 
disregarded completely the treaty-or international rights 
of Hong Kong.
5) The employment of Europeans to staff the revenue cruisers
was illegal, because according to treaty, no British
*
subject could be legally employed by an individual Chinese, 
and especially for the purpose of helping *in the collection 
of revenue. This matter should be immediately brought to 
the attention of the Home government. Moreover, native 
traders of Hong Kong complained bitterly of these 
Europeans, and 'a feeling of bitterness is engendered 
in the minds of the trading class against foreigners, 
which it is politic to avoid.1
6) There was also evidence of the establishment of Chinese 
customs agencies in Hong Kong, which collected duties
for the Hoppo. This was totally illegal.
7) The commission also noted the detrimental effects of 
the blockade. It cited instances in which junks had not 
been able to go to Hainan for three months; other owners 
had claimed that no imports and exports had gone to and 
come from the small ports along the south China coast 
for the past months.
8) As to the steps,that should be taken to obtain redress, 
the commission recommended that, 'Her Majesty's Government 
should endeavour, by diplomatic action, to prevail on the 
Government of China to remove altogether the Customs Stations 
and cruizers from the neighbourhood of this Island, and
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to arrange that duties be collected only at those ports 
or places at which there exists an export and import 
trade. Junks going to, or coming from, distant ports, 
such as Formosa, and clearly shown by their papers to be 
bound from or to Hong Kong, should not be interfered with, 
or molested at sea....Should the Chinese Government refuse 
to remove the stations and cruisers altogether, it might 
be urged upon them to remove them to a greater distance 
than they are at present, say, not nearer, in any case, 
than ten miles from any of the entrances to the harbor... 
if amelioration of the present state of affairs could not 
be obtained by diplomacy, but failing that, they would 
suggest to His Excellency the Governor, that as the 
Chinese urge their right to protect their revenue in the 
manner they are pursuing, it is equally right o,f this 
Government to protect its trade;...in the furtherance of 
this, armed steam launches stationed at tiie outlets of 
the Harbor might conveniently be employed, to see that
OA
leaving and incoming Junks are not molested.1
Governor Kennedy, on receiving this report, and on
comparing it with a point by point reply made by Robertson
which proved the falsities of the allegations made by 
'•  0 - 1
the commission , decided that this report could not be 
made public or furnished to the Hong Kong Chamber of 
Commerce before instructions were received from the 
Colonial Office. He advised the Chamber of Commerce,
however, that he was prepared to forward any petition
82to the Home government, if they so desired. .
This prompted a petition to Queen Victoria signed by 
* eighteen of the principle hongs (Chinese business houses) 
of Hong Kong on 1 August 1874. The petition relied on 
Elliott’s proclamation of 1841 which invited Chinese 
merchants to resort to the Colony for the purposes of 
trade and commerce by affording them ’full protection from 
interference on the -part of the Chinese Authorities.’ It 
also pointed Out that during the past five years, i.e. from 
1868 to 1874, ’actuated...by avarice and Jealousy, and
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presuming on the peaceful and forbearing policy of late 
years adopted by your Majesty's Government towards the 
Chinese authorities, have entered upon a course of open 
hostility to the trade of the Colony, by causing trading 
junks proceeding to Hong Kong to be overhauled and 
seized by Chinese war vessels; ostensibly for the purpose 
of collecting or protecting the Imperial revenue; but 
really, as your Petitioners know, to injure the trade of 
the port and enrich themselves with the plunder so acquired.'
* It was alleged that between 1872 and 1874, there were more .
than three hundred illegal seizures, all committed in
Hong Kong waters and made upon groundless charges. The
facts of the 'Kum Hop-sing* case were reiterated in detail
showing the illegality of the seizure. Owing to the
harassment of the blockade, t'he junk trade in Hong Kong
had suffered greatly because many merchants had’deferred
from consigning their vessels and cargoes «to Hong Kong
owing to their liability to be seized and confiscated.
Therefore, the petitioners hoped that the Queen would
direct the Governor of Hong Kong tortake more effective
85measures to remedy such grievances .
In forwarding this petition to the Colonial Office,
Kennedy observed that since Hong Kong, being a free-port,
was in such close juxtaposition with Chinese territory,
complaints were bound to occur. He believed that the
petitioners might have grounds for complaint but also
pointed to their refusal to allow the 'Kum Hop-sing* case 
84re-opened . He also enclosed a letter from Messrs.
Caldwell and Brereton, solicitors to the owner of the 
'Kum Hop-sing', in which they stated that this junk 'was 
only one of numerous other junks which have been in the 
like manner wrongfully seized in British waters during the 
past few years,' apd that;'we do not believe we shall ever 
have sufficient protection for Chinese Vessels, frequenting 
this Port until the Governor is armed with sufficient 
powers to put an effectual stop to such outrages in future; 
this we know to be the opinion of the Chinese Merchants of
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the Colony who ought to understand such matters.
Robertson, while transmitting the petition to Wade, 
also commented that this course of action was taken 
because it would bring forward the whole question of 
Chinese, government *s interference with the freedom of the 
junk trade with Hong Kong, which meant freedom of smuggling. 
He also observed that the integrity of the petition was 
doubtful since 'the better and more solid class of Chinese 
Traders resident in the Colony have refused to sign or 
have anything to do with it.'^
That this petition should be followed almost immediately 
by another, which resulted from a*public meeting, points 
to the fact that it was a 'conspiracy' to bring the 
attention of the Home government to their grievances and 
to afford them remedies when they failed to obtain them 
through their governor. Moreover, this petition might well 
have been written under the urging and direction of the 
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce.
A public meeting in Hong Kong, chaired by a prominent 
merchant, H. Lowcock, condemned the existence of the 
blockade, which had led to a great diminution of the junk 
trade and the consequent withdrawal of general, businesses 
from the Colony. It also condemned the illegality of the 
blockade and the seizures as contravening not only Elliott's 
proclamation of 1841 but also that of the spirit of the 
Treaties of 1858 and 1860. Moreover, it complained of the 
complicity of the British government in allowing the 
existence of the blockade and expressed support for the 
petition drawn up by the 'Chinese Merchants'. The meeting 
asked that a memorial should be drawn based on the decisions 
arrived at and to request the Governor to forward it to 
the Home government^.
Upon the receipt of the petition and the memorial, the 
Colonial Office reviewed them and expressed the opinion 
that although seizures, if made in Chinese waters, were 
legitimate, something should be done to alleviate the 
grievances issuing from Hong Kong. In a communique to the
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Foreign Office, the Colonial Office expressed the hope 
that the Chinese government should be urged to adopt 
measures to prevent the levying of unauthorized duties, 
and to render the collection of their customs revenue in 
the immediate vicinity of Hong Kong as little vexatious as 
possible to the Colonial government and to the great 
number of junks' frequenting its waters for the purposes 
of lawful trade^.
In a directive to Kennedy and his government, the 
* Colonial Office expressed itself as follows: ’The right of 
Chinese Government to search its national vessels on the 
high seas or within its own territorial waters, cannot be 
disputed.' This could be compared to the Spanish revenue 
cruisers blockading Gibraltar for the seizure of smugglers. 
Therefore, * the exercise by the Chinese Government of the
i
right of search complained of, in close proximity to Hong 
Kong, for the purpose of defeating attempts on the part of 
Chinese subjects to defraud the revenue of their country, 
does not affect' the freedom of the port ^/Hong Kong7, and 
affords no valid grounds for diplomatic remonstrance.* 
However, in order to reduce harassment and grievances to 
a minimum, the Minister at Peking had been directed to ask 
the Chinese government to instruct the Canton authorities 
to be as little vexatious as possible in the collection 
of revenue. In a statement which had never before been 
expressed, the Colonial Office refused to support the 
claims made by the mercantile and public bodies in Hong 
Kong. The Colonial Office went as far as to say that, 
considering the juxtaposition of Hong Kong to the mainland 
of China, the establishment of a Chinese consul in the
89Colony, though rejected before, would be the best solution y
Attempted solutions to the blockade
Incessant complaints had called upon the urgency of 
reaching a solution with the Chinese government, and many 
attempts were made, as well many possibilities suggested.
As early as December 1868, while treaty revision
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negotiations were taking place, Wade had written a long 
memorandum concerning Hong Kong. In it he admitted the 
existence of smuggling opportunities to and from Hong Kong 
and the utilization of these by many persons. He commented 
that when China gave Hong Kong to Britain, in the Supplemen­
tary Treaty of the Bogue, in Rule XV, Pottinger had 
agreed that the Canton consul would henceforth stand 
security for foreign merchants in place of the abolished 
co-hong. Though this only meant that the consul would hold 
* the ships* papers, Chinese authorities as late as 1867 were 
under the belief that the consul sould be exactly like 
the co-hong in regard to the latter*s previous duties and 
obligations to the Chinese government. Wade acknowledged 
that this was a pardonable misunderstanding and it was up 
to the British government to afford China ample protection 
against attempts to defraud the Imperial revenue. Thinking 
along these lines, he suggested three possible alternatives:
1) the establishment of an office of surveillance on the 
lines advocated by Pottinger; 2) the establishment of an 
office of the Foreign Inspectorate in Hong Kong; and 3) 
the re-annexation of Hong Kong by the Imperial government. 
Wade supported the last alternative stressing that this 
would mean relinquishing nothing but a territorial 
sovereignty which was, in fact, more of a burden than a
blessing. Moreover, surrendering Hong Kong, at that moment,
90would have important political benefits .. However’, this 
was not acted upon since the Alcock Convention had already 
introduced the idea of a Chinese consul, and the non­
ratification meant an end to any other alternatives that 
had been suggested during that period.
Then in 1871, the Tsungli-yamen suggested that the
best solution would be to collect duties on opium either
in Hong Kong or in,India. However, since this was considered
91totally infeasible, the idea was dropped' .
This, however, prompted Wade to suggest another 
alternative. In response to a suggestion made by T. Dick, 
Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai, Wade suggested that
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a branch of the Foreign Inspectorate could, be established
at Hong Kong which would sell certificates clearing junk
traders at the customs stations. This would not only remove
the blockade which was greatly hampering the development
of the lucrative junk trade of the Colony, but would also
afford a bargaining position in regard to concessions
from China, such as allowing steamers to trade at any place
92along the coast and up rivers' .
This was well received by both the Foreign and Colonial
‘Offices; and even in Hong Kong, the Registrar-General
also approved of the scheme. However, Whitfield, Administrator
in the absence of the governor, considered that the
blockade had not affected Hong Kong, that ho .complaints
had been received and it was therefore unnecessary to grant
93such favours to the Chinese government. MacDonnell, then 
in London, vehemently objected to the proposal. Basing
94his arguments from a letter from David Sassoon and Co. , 
which dealt with over half of the opium trade, he contended 
that it was beyond the powers of the Chinese government 
to seriously affect the trade of Hong Kong. Moreover, the 
the British and Colonial governments were under no obligation 
to help the Chinese government in the collection of their 
revenue, when they were incapable of doing it themselves.
The degree of smuggling, especially in opium, had been 
greatly exaggerated. Thus, by agreeing to Wade's proposal, 
MacDonnell concluded, it would mean the exercise of 
strict surveillance over Hong Kong by the Chinese customs 
and all the trade would be simply transferred to Singapore 
or Saigon where thereAno Chinese revenue stations and 
cruisers*^. When the Colonial Office received these object­
ions, it altered its previous decision and the proposal 
was rejected*^.
From then until mid-1874, neither side took any 
initiative in making proposals. However, when the report 
from the Commission appointed by Kennedy was. circulated 
within the British government's departments, a new series 
of proposals came.
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In June 1874, in order to prevent increasing fraud
over the securing of the 'Grand Chop', Consul Robertson,
after several consultations with the Govemor-Qeneral and
the Hoppo, obtained the establishment of two conveniently-
located customs stations - one at Changchow and the other
at Fat-tow chow. This would supercede the regulation that
compelled all junks to proceed to Canton first to obtain
the 'Grand Chop1 and then proceed to Hong Kong. With these
two stations, at which the 'Grand Chop' could be obtained,
it was hoped that this would reduce the number of honest
traders that would be seized. It would also greatly reduce
the number of complaints concerning 'illegal' seizures,
since the seized junk would have to show why they had not
cleared themselves at these new stations en-route and
97 •obtained the 'Grand Chop'".
In the following month, Wade once- more reiterated his
suggestion made three years ago - the establishment of an
office of the Foreign Inspectorate in Hong Kong. By
yielding on this point, he contended that the prosperity
of the junk trade would be assured and the cordon of
revenue stations and cruisers would be definitely decreased
if not entirely removed. Robertson was instructed to
present this proposal to Governor Kennedy, who agreed
that this would be the best solution to the existing
complaints. However, the final outcome, he mentioned, had
to wait until the Legislative Council had debated and the
98Home government had expressed its opinion' .
In August 1874, to prevent further smuggling and to
regulate actions taken against or for complainants, Robertson
obtained the approval of the Governor-General to set up a
’Governor-General’s Commission' to,look into complaints.
The Hoppo would no longer be involved and an honest verdict
would be ensured..However, if the petitioner refused to
appear in person to be examined, this would be considered
99as an admission of guilt".
In the same month, Governor Kennedy also offered some 
suggestions which would lessen and regulate the complaints
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and would eventually pave the way for the establishment of 
an office of the Foreign Inspectorate in Hong Kong. These 
were three in number: ’First: The suppression of all 
Revenue Cruisers except those under the immediate authority 
of the, Hoppo who is an officer holding his appointment 
direct from the Emperor. Second: A clear understanding of 
the Tariff and publication of the Chinese Customs Regulations, 
together with the ports and stations at which duties are 
leviable and payable. Third: The appointment of a joint 
Board to sit at Hong Kong or Chinese Kowloong, to invest­
igate cases of alleged illegal seizure, with publication 
of the decision in each case.* Even Lord Clarendon, head 
of the Colonial Office, believed that these measures would 
relieve much of the tension and could lead to the proposed
establishment of an office of the Foreign Inspectorate in
T, 100 Hong Kong
Conditions remained tranquil, and in ‘March 18759 
Robertson was able to obtain from the Governor-General 
the installation of an officer of the Foreign Inspectorate
»
to supervise the revenue steam-cruisers. Such an arrange­
ment ensured that no illegalities were committed and
Robertson remarked that since this establishment no
101complaint had been forthcoming
However, the passage of time saw no decisions taken'
to solve the blockade issue and, in October 1875» Robertson
suggested to the Foreign Office that the grievances
arising out of the blockade could only be permanently
solved by a total reform of the Imperial fiscal system.
However, for the immediate grievances and a partial remedy,
an English officer from the Canton office of the Foreign
Inspectorate could be appointed as Chinese consul to Hong
Kong. The Hong Kong government then could discuss with
him cases of seizure, injustices, etc.. Moreover, licences
under the seal of Hong Kong and the Hoppo couldjbe issued
as bona-fides or as ’identification'. The Governor-General'
102was also in agreement . However, similar to other proposals, 
this was not acted upon*^^.
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Robertson, using what influence and power of persuasion
he had over the Governor-General, managed in May 1876, to
obtain a proclamation which he considered as only a start,
but one that could lead to further changes which would
remove or lessen the evils complained of. The proclamation-
read in part as follows: 'Wherefore it is notified to all
Customs employees, merchants, shippers and owners and
captains of passage junks that hereafter when passage boats
bare examined and found to contain smuggled goods,, if the
passage boat cap^tains and other passengers and shippers
have no guilty knowledge of the affair, only the goods
shipped in the name of the guilty 'parties are to be
confiscated, and only the guilty parties arrested and
punished; the goods, belonging to the passage boat and
104other shippers are not to be muddled with.'
At this time, negotiations for the Margary affair were
4
well underway, and the blockade question was taken over 
by Wade in Peking.
Summary
During these years we see the emergence of two notable 
factors. Firstly, it was the first time that the Governor 
of Hong Kong, in the person of Kennedy, was in agreement 
not only with the Canton consul but the Peking minister, 
and expressed doubt, if not disbelief, at the attitude, 
reasons given, and complaints from the mercantile bodies.
The Home government was still very much in the background 
and did not offer any proposal apart from assessing the 
ones proposed. Such a change, of course, must be attributed 
to the unbiased thinking of Kennedy, whereas his predecessor, 
MacDonnell, had-always blindly sided/with the merchants 
and accepted piecemeal everything they said.
The mixed court set up by Robertson, the Governor-GeneralI
and the Hoppo had created a set of precedents which, in 
fact, were incorporated into the changes that were effected 
in the blockade system in 1874 and 1875* Thus, though no 
overall plan was adopted, the complaints concerning illegal
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seizures and the like, had greatly diminished. This points 
to the fact that those seized were smugglers and not 
innocent merchants. A modus vivendi had been worked out, 
while the final solution lay with the governments and 
not with the local people.
Another point of minor importance that should also be
noted was the confusion over the status of the Hoppo,
the foreign staff of the cruisers, the amount of dues
that should be levied,etc.. However, though the mercantile
community in Hong Kong still stuck to their original
arguments, the Hong Kong government, and by extension,
the Home government, were much more aware of the true
nature of things, thanks to the detailed explanations by 
105Robertson , and were able to adopt a correct and just 
attitude - instead of the partial and very biased ones
t
adopted by MacDonnell.
It is, therefore, due to the efforts 'and contribution 
of Robertson, the understanding of Kennedy, as well as 
Wade and the various departments of the Home government, 
that the modus vivendi could operate,, and that the issues 
could be judged and accepted in their proper perspective.
Though the blockade only affected Hong Kong and could 
be considered' as comparatively insignificant in the 
context of the entire China trade and Sino-British diplomatic 
intercourse, the attempted solutions, as well as "'the way. 
in which some of these solutions were reached, showed 
clearly a policy of co-operation and understanding, if 
not conciliation - which reflected the atmosphere in the 
larger arena.
5.1
CHAPTER 3: THE CHEFOO CONVENTION,
On 21 February 1875» Augustus Margary was murdered in 
Yunnan province. He was leading a British trade mission 
from British Burma that was to find out the feasibility 
of an overland trade route through central China. Thomas 
Wade, British minister at Peking, heard of Margary's 
death on 11 March, and he immediately seized this as the 
pretext to obtain concessions from China. On 19 March, 
he presented a list of demands to the Tsungli-yamen. Of 
the six demands, three were connected with Margary’s 
death: a commission to investigate the death of Margary, 
the Indian government to be allowed to send another 
expedition through central China, and an indemnity of
150,000 taels; the other three were totally 'irrelevant' 
to the incident: the granting of audiences to1foreign 
representatives by the Emperor, arrangements to give 
effect to treaty stipulations regarding transit dues, and 
the settlement of all outstanding claims arising from 
Chinese official actions in the past^ *.
Though irrelevant to the outstanding issue, the demands
represented an attempt by Wade to try and obtain satisfaction
on questions- that had been left unsolved after the treaties
of 1858-60. The non-ratification of the Chefoo Convention
meant that conditions of Sino-British relations, whether
diplomatic or commercial, stayed the way they were; and
between 1871 and 1872, in concert with representatives
from the other Treaty powers, Wade had been singularly
unsuccessful in coming to any agreement with the Chinese
government on the problems of transit dues and some other 
2related issues . We have seen, m  relation to the Opium
Question, attempts made to settle the taxation of foreign
opium, the blockade of Hong Kong, and the growth of native
»
opium had all resulted in nothing. Thus, similar to the 
Arrow affair of 18571 bh.e death of Margary was eagerly 
seized upon as an excuse to remedy the political and 
commercial relations with China.
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Demands and Negotiations
The initial demands made by Wade were general in 
nature, but these were expanded to include items of 
minute detail. Negotiations were conducted first with the 
Tsungli-yamen, but from September 1875> Li Hung-chang, 
Governor-General of Chihli, Grand Secretary and Chief 
Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports, was 
commissioned to negotiate with Wade .
From this date until the signing of the agreement 
‘at Chefoo on 19 September 1876 , Wade conducted his side 
of the negotiations in a very harsh manner and continuously 
threatened Li with the breaking-off of diplomatic 
relations. Bargaining was reduced to the minimum* In 
the end, with such diplomatic coercion, Wade was able 
to obtain for Britain and her merchants what he thought 
was the most he could get from China. However, knowing 
full well that co-operation from the Chinese government 
was needed to put treaty stipulations into effect, and 
still very much aware of the fact that Britain or any 
other foreign power had nothing to offer China in return 
for further trade concessions, Wade was not insistent on 
some of his demands, and even conceded to a few of China's 
requests, such 'as the new regulations for the taxation of 
opium.
The influence of Robert Hart, Inspector General of the 
Foreign Inspectorate, as the go-between should not be 
under-estimated. Though it is not too clear how much 
influence he did exercise on the outcome of the negotiations, 
the memorandum that he was asked to draw up by the 
Tsungli-yamen in early October 1875 was very much taken 
into account by Wade, the Tsungli-yamen and by Li Hung-chang. 
The Chefoo Convention - the commercial articles - followed 
rather faithfully t]ie suggestions he had made.
In the Tsungli-yamen*s instructions to Hart, it wanted 
his proposals to have no injurious effect on China and 
be worked out effectively at the custom-houses and tax 
barriers. Hart, in reply, pointed out that dates for
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treaty revision with other Treaty powers would soon be 
arriving, and it would be best to 'deal with the subject 
as affecting, and affected by, all.' Guiding principles 
would be the establishment of a new set of regulations 
that would, on the one hand, remove whatever was injurious 
to the rightful interests of foreign trade, and on the 
other, suppress such abuses as affect Chinese trade and 
revenue unfairly.
In very precise terms, Hart spelt out what the foreign- 
*ers wanted from China, and what the Chinese reaction would 
be: 'the end now sought for is freedom for every kind of 
trading or industrial operation, and with that freedom 
is claimed ample protection for all concomitant rights. 
Resolve this generalization into its components, and it 
means that the foreigner wants unrestricted access to
9
whatever place interest suggests - taxation according to 
a fair, fixed and uniform tariff - improved means of loco­
motion and transit - right to use all appliances suited 
for the development of local resources and new industries - 
and foreign, as distinguished from Chinese, treatment for 
person and property. On the Chinese side the obj'ect hitherto, 
and still, kept in view has been, and is, self preservation: 
change is not welcome - change is always suspected and 
subjected to counteracting influences on every side - 
change is only recognised as a native growth when it takes 
root and spreads imperceptibly and healthily among the 
people of a locality - change is rarely accepted on 
foreign suggestion except when imposed by foreign force.' 
Thus, one's aim was progressive and the other conservative.
With regard to opium, the foreigner complained that 
his business was harassed and interfered with the survei­
llance exercised and arrests made at his very door by 
likin officers; whi],e China contended that it was necessary 
since the native smugglers had the sympathy and aid of the 
foreigner, and also complained that the foreigner carried 
opium inland for Chinese to prevent the collection of likin. 
Complaints from both parties were due mostly to two systems
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of taxation: the foreign and the native tariffs. Hart
then gave his proposal for what he considered was the
best solution to the taxation of foreign opium. 'That,
on the one hand, the Treaty Powers shall consent that
Opium shall pay an Import duty of One hundred and twenty
taels per pecul to the Maritime Customs on arrival at a
treaty port, and that away from the port, i.e., at a
distance of Thirty li /slightly over 10# miles7 from the
Custom House, it shall be regarded as a Chinese commodity,
and be subject to local, territorial and special taxation,
whenever, wherever, and with whomsoever found; and that,
on the other, China shall consent that no other charge
5
shall be levied at the port.'*'
In a supplementary despatch to the Tsungli-yamen of 
8 February 1876, Hart gave statistics on the increase in
i
revenue his proposal would give China. For the year 1874*, 
the Foreign Inspectorate collected, in round, figures, a 
total of 11,500,000 taels including opium import duty of
2,100,000 taels. If his proposals for increasing the 
Tariff duty on some staple imports and exports were 
realized, taking the same year, the revenue, excluding 
opium, should reach 10,620,000 taels. Opium revenue, 
calculated on 7^,000 piculs with the proposed import duty 
of 120 taels per picul, would reach 8,400,000 taels. The 
total would be nearly 20 million taels. The Board of 
Revenue had reported that the total inland likin collected 
amounted to about 10 million taels, which when added to 
the 11# million taels of import and export duties actually 
collected by the Foreign Inspectorate, would result in 
a.bout 22 million taels. Hart deducted that the Foreign 
Inspectorate, within a few years, would be able to collect 
this sum at the Treaty ports alone. This argument, of course, 
greatly reinforced his proposals to the Tsungli-yamen.
The Chefoo Convention was divided into three 'Sections', 
and of concern to us is Section III, articles 3» 6 and 7: 
'Importation of Opium. Li-kin Duty.
3. On Opium, Sir Thomas Wade will move his Government to
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sanction an arrangement different from that affecting other 
imports. British merchants, when Opium is hrought into port, 
will be obliged to have it taken cognizance of by the 
Customs, and deposited in bond, either in a warehouse or 
a receiving hulk, until such time as there is a sale for 
it. The importer will then pay the Tariff duty upon it, 
and the purchasers the li-kin, in order to the prevention 
of the evasion of the duty. The amount of li-kin to be 
collected will be decided by the different Provincial 
'Governments, according to the circumstances of each.*^
'Import and Li-kin Duties.
6..... The date for giving the effect to the stipulations
affecting exemption of imports from li-kin taxation within 
the foreign settlements, and the collection of li-kin 
upon Opium by the Customs Inspectorate at the same time
t
as the Tariff duty upon it, will be fixed as soon as the 
British Government has arrived at an understanding on the 
subject with other foreign Governments.
'Interference of Canton Customs Revenue Cruizers with 
Junk Trade of Hong Kong.
7. The Governor of Hong Kong having long complained of the 
interference of the Canton Customs Revenue cruizers with 
the junk trade of that Colony, the Chinese Government 
agrees to the appointment of a Commission, to consist of 
a British Consul, an officer of the Government of Hong Kong,
and a Chinese official of equal rank, in order to the
establishment of some system that shall enable the Chinese 
Government to protect its revenue without prejudice too
the interests of the Colony.'
It was hoped that this new set of commercial regulations 
would bring about improved relations and reduce to the 
minimum complaints from both British and Chinese merchants. 
It is to be noted ^lso that China was to carry out her part
of the stipulations within six months of the date of
signature and without waiting for a formal ratification.
This was embodied in article 6 of section iii.
In agreeing to these clauses, China, of course, had
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little choice, but she was also satisfied. Hart, in his 
two memorandums, had brought out the issues at stake and 
the points of contention. Li Hung-chang and the Tsungli- 
yamen had accepted his proposals in principle and were 
happy to, see that most of these were contained -in the 
agreement. Li, after signing the agreement, commented 
that if opium duties were to be levied in such a way, it 
would definitely avoid smuggling and the revenue of China 
would increase. He also pointed out that settlement of
q
■the blockade issue would likewise be beneficial to China . 
The Tsungli-yamen, for its part, was not slow in attempting 
to put the new opium regulations into operation. In a 
note addressed to the foreign representatives on 28 Sept­
ember 1876, it informed them of such an arrangement^.
Wade, for his part, explained his thinking and
11 . 'motivation • With regard to opium, he reasoned that when
Elgin negotiated the Treaty of 1858, he had4 opposed the 
expansion of the opium trade and definitely did not include 
opium in his 'port-area' exemption from Chinese dues for 
other imports. Thus, complaints from merchants had been 
groundless. As early as 184-6-49, he had conducted a 
survey into the growth of native opium and concluded that 
ten out of eighteen provinces were producing the drug. 
Recent consular reports had shown that native opium growth 
was greatly on the increase and he concluded that 'it is 
from this direction that the Government of India should 
look for danger.1. Thus, introduction of the opium clause 
of the Chefoo Convention was the best temporary solution to 
the problem. Collection of dues by the native customs and 
provincial-governments were irksome and inconvenient, and 
had led to many conflicts. However, by placing the collect­
ion in the hands of the Foreign Inspectorate, a lot of 
these conflicts woul,d be avoided. Wade contended that the 
revenue of the Indian government would not suffer, though 
the profit of the importer might, to a certain extent, 
since he could no longer sell the opium to the native buyer 
without first having to pay the likin. Wade further argued
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that by allowing the provincial governments to ascertain 
the amount of likin that should be collected in each and every 
Treaty port, they would only impose whatever likin they 
believed the local market would endure before attempting 
smuggling* Thus, there would be no basic changes in likin 
rates except that the method of collection would be 
standardized and conflicts lessened.
With regard to Hong Kong, Wade contended that though 
the blockade was irksome and 'worrying1 to the junk trade, 
it was perfectly legal. When Hong Kong was acquired in 
184-2, articles XIII,XIV and XVI of the Supplementary Treaty 
of 184-3 ensured the protection of Chinese revenue.
However, since these were abrogated by article I of the 
Treaty of Tientsin and no substitute clauses were introduced, 
it also became the duty of the British government to find 
a means to solving the problem, 'a change of proceeding* 
that would be acceptable both to the Hong Kong and Chinese 
governments. Wade admitted that the three customs stations 
and the revenue cruisers, because some were manned exclusively 
by Chinese," could have demanded dues in excess of what was 
just. Thus, with a view to alleviating the situation, he 
had introduced the commission idea. He also hoped that 'the 
Chinese Government should consent to extinguish the three 
Custom-houses that now keep watch around Hong Kong, and 
to substitute for these a branch of the Canton Inspectorate, 
to be located at some spot conveniently near the Colony; 
to agree that at this branch office there should be 
levied the Tariff duty on imports proceeding in Chinese 
bottoms to a Treaty port, and the Tariff duty and half 
Tariff duty on imports proceeding to any point on the 
coast, or up rivers, not open by Treaty. On Opium, which 
article cannot by Treaty be franked and certified like 
other imports, the s^me office should be authorized, when 
levying the import duty, to levy the likin that would be 
levied were it sold at Canton. Every junk arriving at 
Hong Kong or leaving the harbour should be obliged to 
call at the office of the branch Inspectorate to receive
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a clearance, and the Colony should engage so to assist
in giving effect to this part of the arrangement, that
disputes about limits of jurisdiction might be avoided.1
In an earlier memorandum dated 28 February 1877 , Wade
also expressed himself fully on the blockade question.
He insisted that when Hong Kong was ceded to Britain,
the latter had accepted a moral obligation to assist the
Chinese government in securing itself against the loss of
revenue through clandestine trade. Though the establishment
’of the blockade did distress the junk trade, the Canton
government *had an undoubted right to see that Chinese
junks carrying Chinese produce into Hong Kong have duly
cleared from the Chinese port of export, and a right
equally good to see that imports, leaving Hong Kong, pay
12what is due to the Chinese Government as import duty.*
To this proposal, both Li Hung-chang and Hart did not object.
In May 1879, Wade reiterated his contention that
*the sole object of the proposed simultaneous collection
of likin and tariff duty, is the prevention of smuggling;
the security, that is to say, of the revenue to which the
Government is entitled when the drug passes out of foreign
hands.* He also argued that collection of the joint duties
by the Foreign"Inspectorate would not diminish in any
degree the sale of Indian opium in China since Indian opium
was a requirement of the Chinese people and the revenue
derivable from it was sorely needed by the Chinese govem- 
13ment ^•
British government reactions (to the opium clause)
The day before the signing of the Convention, Wade
telegraphed to the Foreign Office outlining the text. He
also brought notice to his superior that * opium will be
hardly if at all more heavily taxed than at present; but
14-smuggling will be stopped.1
This telegram was received by the Foreign Office on the 
same day, and after much discussion, the following telegram. , 
was sent to Wade: * the arrangement concluded with Li 
appears to be a satisfactory one but that Her Majesty*s
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Government cannot form an opinion on all the details of
it without further explanation from him and that he should
15come home to furnish it.'  ^This was because the Foreign
Office believed that the India Office should be consulted
before a final decision could be arrived at. Nonetheless,
Wade went ahead and signed the Chefoo Convention.
On 17 October 1876, Wade reported from Peking that
he had received a telegram from the Indian government
16asking for information concerning the opium clause • He
explained that under the new agreement, opium would not
be taxed more than previously, and added that no dues
could be levied on it in the 'port-area', i.e. the area
occupied by the foreign settlements at the Treaty port.
He also mentioned that with the opening of four consular
ports and five ports of call along the Yangtze, opium
could be shipped there as any other import and'enjoy the
17benefit of more direct markets along the river '•
This short explanation was obviously considered as 
unsatisfactory and insufficient. The India Office commented 
that it did not quite know 'whether it is meant that 
this arrangement should supercede all treaty revision for 
a term of years. If so...the Foreign Office will do well 
to consult commercial bodies and traders individually as 
to effect of stipulations.’ The India Office would express 
its opinion after Wade had returned to Britain and had
1 o
explained his reasons and motivation in person • The 
Indian government also appealed to Fraser, Britain's
/ I Q
charge d'Affaires, for explanation of the opium clause , 
and then telegramed the India Office to say that they had 
not, as yet, received any particular from Wade and 
therefore could not offer any opinion. The India Office 
was very surprised because it was thought that some 
information would have been received by the Indian
20government and a general expression of opinion stated 
The time was early March 1877- However, the India Office 
had received an assurance from the Foreign Office at an 
earlier date that no action would be taken without first
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21consulting it , and decided to. wait for Wade's written 
explanations.
Wade's memorandum on the Chefoo Convention was finally 
completed on 14 July 1877, nine months after the agreement 
was signed. But after reading it, the India Office wanted 
this document to be treated as confidential and not to be 
laid before parliament. Lord Salisbury, head of the India 
Office, explained that the Indian government had to be
consulted before the Home government could express an
oo
* opinion . In another communique', the India Office relayed
the complaint from the Indian government that Wade had not
afforded sufficient explanation concerning his negotiations
25over the opium clause . The Foreign Office complied and 
replied that in view of the 'inexpediencey of presenting 
Wade’s report to Parliament which might prejudice the
9
Indian Government, this will not now be done....Only the
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first two sections of the Convention will be submitted.'
It was not until the end of 1877 that the Indian
government received the text of Wade's memorandum. After
studying it, the objection raised was still that the
Chinese government would attempt to levy prohibitive
likin on Indian opium - 'the Indian Government would raise
no objection to the new arrangements save that the rate
of local duty to be levied by the Customs Inspectorate
with British sanction should be settled beforehand and
25restricted to about the rates now obtained by China.' ■
This opinion, in fact, was a repeat of its original 
objection after receipt of the text of the opium clause 
in late 1876.
In the subsequent months, the Indian government's 
views became clearer and more definite. Finally in late 
1878, it expressed support for two proposals that had 
been submitted: 1) ,that an attempt should be made to 
obtain the removal of the prohibition at present in 
force against England or other foreign merchants accompany­
ing or selling their opium in the interior of China; and
2) that the transit dues on opium should be defined, and
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26not left to the caprice of the Chinese authorities 
This was the result of memorials submitted by both 
Sassoon and Co. and the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, which, 
contended that, ’now that the. cultivation of opium is 
extending so rapidly in China, an endeavour should be 
made to relieve the Indian drug of some of the disadvantages 
under which it labours at present. Opium should be placed 
in the same category with all other articles of import, 
and Government should insist on an alteration being made 
’in the first Clause of the fifth rule attached to the 
Treaty of Tientsin. There can be no reason why English 
or other Foreign traders should be-forbidden to accompany 
or to sell opium in the interior of China when provided 
with a proper passport, and it is certainly a disadvantage 
to opium merchants that the transit dues on this
i
important article of trade is left to be fixed or enhanced
at the caprice of the Chinese Government. The Indian
Government should do its best to obtain the removal of
the special restrictions by which opium is distinguished
from every other article of commerce in.China, in effecting
this it would be benefitting itself and the merchants
27connected with the trade.* (
Such objections were made partly for fear of the future
of the opium trade; but they also reflect the apparent
lack of concern on the part of the diplomatic corps in
China, led by Wade, for the interests of the Indian
government, since a lot of requests for information were
28completely disregarded • Thus, when Wade tried to explain
his reasons .personally to the Indian government in
February 1879, on his way back to China from Britain,
his explanation was not commented upon, but just noted .
?Q
and sent back to the India Office for 'information* .
When this despatch was transmitted to the Foreign 
Office, Lord Salisbury put in his own comments, observing 
that Wade's 'idea of securing to the Chinese the means of 
levying likin on opium, by putting it in bond on arrival, 
and.yet allowing the Chinese to fix the amount of likin
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at their discretion is simply putting one’s head in the
lion’s mouth. It is plausible enough to say that the
competition of smugglers will keep the amount of likin
down - but I doubt it in practice - especially as this
practical check on the Chinese Government will disappear
if we stop (as is proposed) opium smuggling from 
50Hong Kong.'^
In the meantime, having obtained opinions from other
departments and mercantile communities, the Foreign
Office sent a final communique to the India Office to
ascertain whether the Indian government was still objecting
to the two clauses in section III of the Chefoo Convention:
the levy of likin on opium and the definition of the
'port-area' for other merchandise. It suggested that
article six of section III concerning the date giving
*
effect to stipulations of the agreement might be used as
. . . 51grounds for non-ratification^ •
Finally, on 24- June 1878, the British government
ratified the Chefoo Convention with the exception of the
two provisions in section III, i.e. that,'6f the levy of
likin on opium in the custom-houses before delivery to
the purchaser, and that of the definition of the ’port-
52area’ within which likin might not be levied^ . Wade, 
at the same time, was assigned the task of continuing 
negotiations with the Chinese government concerning.:;, 
these two points so settlements might be arrived at.
Mercantile reactions (to the opium clause)
Distinctly unlike the mercantile reaction to the
Alcock Convention, which could be taken as one of total
condemnation and disapproval, reaction to the Chefoo
Convention was very much varied. Two themes tend to
stand out: mercantile firms dealing with opium were very
much against the agreement, whole those interested in
. 55other imports and exports very much supported it^ .
Of the memorials submitted to the.Foreign Office 
urging for non-ratification, those from David Sassoon and
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Co. and the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, were 
most forceful and enlightening in the arguments they used 
to object to the opium clause. Sassoon and Co., basing 
their authority on the claim that they conducted two-thirds 
of the opium trade to China, contended that the Chinese 
government all along had been unable to control the likin 
levied by the provincial governments in that a portion 
of the amount collected was to be remitted to Peking 
and this had very seldom been done. With the introduction 
of the opium clause, the Imperial government would be 
assured of the total collection of likin. However, the 
provincial governments would not take to such a loss 
peacefully and would definitely continue to exact their 
own ’squeeze* when opium came into their domains. Thus, 
the likin might disappear, but they would introduce new
~ t
ones at the barriers outside the treaty ports. Further
arguing that opium imports had been static dn the past
years, the introduction of such a system would not make
the Chinese cultivate less opium, but would, through
heavier taxation, crush the trade in Indian opium. Such
would be the consequence not only for the opium merchants,
but would equally affect seriously the financial prospects
34-of the Indian empire' •
The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce pointed out
that though the Chinese government in theory could impose
whatever amount of levy on opium they wished, the higher
the levies, the greater premium upon evasion. If the
opium clause was introduced, though it would enable the
Chinese government to prevent evasion, it would, in effect,
mean placing a very measure of control over the Indian
revenue in the hands of the Chinese. This would eventually
lead to the extinction of the Indian trade in opium. The
chamber asked the Home government whether it wanted to
35promote such a result' '.
Of the chambers of commerce which supported and asked 
for immediate ratification, there were those from Liverpool,
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Manchester and Glasgow - these could be regarded as the
most influential mercantile bodies in Britain . However,
Halifax came out in support of non-ratification arguing
that more concessions should be obtained from China and
more specific arrangements made so that China could have
no loop-holes to take advantage of, especially with regard 
37to opiunr '•
A new force in Britain
The Chefoo Convention brought about the rise of a new 
force in Britain. This was the Anglo-Oriental Society for 
the Suppression of the Opium Trade (or Anti-opium Society, 
in short) founded in 1874- and financially supported by 
Edward Pease, a Yorkshire quaker. It became a centre for 
other societies, such as missionary organizations, to 
rally for the end of the opium trade both in India and China. 
The Chefoo Convention gave the society an opportunity to
i
voice their ideas.
Soon after the terms of the agreement were made known, 
on 24- November 1876, the society memorialized to the 
Foreign Office saying that something should be done to the 
charge that through military superiority the British 
government was upholding a trade that was seriously 
injurious to the welfare of China and in violation of 
the plainest dictates of justice and humanity. It believed
that the opium clause was a step in the right direction
■ • . 38 ................
and the agreement should be ratified^ .
The Church Missionary Society, though making no 
reference to the Chefoo agreement, urged the Home govern­
ment to rescind the right of import of opium into China 
in the treaty of 1858, pleading that it was only for the 
benefit of the Indian government, but extremely detrimental
to an improvement in Anglo-Chinese relations, whether
39commercial or culturhl-' .
Towards the end of 1877, the Anti-opium Society once 
again pleaded that the opium clause should be ratified.
In november 1877, at a public meeting in London, a memorial 
was submitted by Lord Shaftesbury and 54-3 others,
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the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Mayor of London, the
Dean of Westminster, members of parliament, doctors,
professors etc.. This memorial stated that non-ratification
of the Alcock Convention was already regrettable. The
opium clause in the Chefoo Convention must be ratified,
despite objection from the Indian government, since the
Chinese had already carried out their part of the
stipulations of the agreement, and refusal on the part of
Britain would be 'bad faith1 and the end to any 'equitable
‘compromise'(using Wade's words), since Britain had
AOalready imposed two treaties on China
For the moment, apart from acknowledging receipt of 
such memorials, the Foreign Office was not moved by the 
pleas and reasoning. At a later period, however, with 
increasing support from members of parliament and powerful
t
public figures, the influence of the society increased 
and its voice was heeded much more.
British government reactions (to the blockade)
The appointment of a commission to work out a
solution to the blockade issue saw little opposition
from anywhere. On 29 November 1876, Wade wrote to Governor
Kennedy informing him that Hong Kong's interests had not
been neglected in his negotiations with China, and
proposed that Robertson be appointed as the consular
representative since he had always had Hong Kong's
interests at heart. Wade would also write to Liu K'un-i,
Governor-General of Liang-kwang, asking him to appoint a
41Chinese counterpart . In his report to the Foreign Office
on the subject, Wade explained his reasons and suggested
that with the consent of the Hong Kong government, a
branch of the Foreign Inspectorate should be established
in a hulk in the harbour or a station upon the shore of
42China to the north 'of Hong Kong
The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, at its 
annual meeting on 12 February 1877, welcomed the idea of 
a commission, but wanted it to be understood that it would
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only be a 'Committee to arbitrate and decide between two
disputants, ourselves as merchants of this Colony on the
one hand, and the Chinese Customs on the other.' The
appointment of Robertson to the commission was vehemently
objected to because he had been an 'apologist' for China
4-3with definite prejudices against Hong Kong .
Despite these objections, both Robertson and Kennedy 
had prepared memoranda in January as a basis for settlement 
of the blockade issue. Robertson's proposal was that a 
* new customs station should be established on Chinese 
Kowloon under the supervision of a foreigner who would 
be responsible to the Canton native customs. Junks carrying 
cargoes to and from Hong Kong had to call at this new 
station with their manifests and pay the necessary dues 
and duties and be issued with clearance papers and customs 
receipts. A tariff of the levies, together with punishments 
for breach of customs regulations, would be published 
for general information. The three stations around Hong 
Kong - at Capsuimoon, Fat-tow chow and Cheungchow (known 
as 'Throat Gate stations' in Hong Kong) - would become 
examination stations to determine whether cargoes correspond 
ed with manifests. All revenue vessels, flying a"special 
flag, would be under the jurisdiction of the new customs 
station at Kowloon. In cases of complaints resulting from 
seizures, the Hong Kong government would have the right 
to appoint one of its officials to the Kowloon station 
to investigate the complaints jointly with the customs 
officials there. Kennedy's proposal was almost identical 
to Robertson's except that the three Throat Gate stations
were to collect the dues and duties instead of the proposed
!\}\
station at Kowloon, to which he rejected . Both these 
proposals were approved by the Colonial Office in 
substance as a possible solution to the blockade^.
Then in August 1877* Robertson revised his proposal 
and framed a 'Draft of suggested Regulations for Chinese 
Junks trading with the Colony of Hong Kong' which omitted 
the Kowloon station altogether. Instead, as contained in
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Kennedy's proposal, the three stations around Hong Kong 
would collect the dues and duties; but the difference lay 
in the co-operation required from Hong Kong. After payment 
of the levies at the stations, junks going to Hong Kong 
would be issued with clearance certificates which had to 
be surrendered to the Harbour Master of the Colony.
Failure to do so would result in the junks being forced to 
leave the harbour or Hong Kong waters which would leave 
them to be seized by Chinese revenue vessels. For junks 
'leaving Hong Kong, they would be issued with certificates 
(the nature of which was to be fixed after consultations 
with the Colonial government) from the Harbour Master, 
which would be surrendered at the stations when they call 
there to pay the levies. Junks without them would be 
liable to seizure by the Chinese customs officials. A 
joint court to investigate complaints would be set up in 
Canton and an official from the Colonial government be 
given participation and representation. This proposal was 
agreeable to the new Governor, P. Hennessy, who believed 
that Hong Kong's co-operation, sought in the proposal, 
would be possible through the enforcement of Ordinance 
No. 6 of 1866^.
Wade, commenting on this proposal, believed that a
new customs station at Kowloon would still be the best
idea. That Robertson had abandoned this earlier suggestion
of his and that of a European supervisor there, was in all
probability due to opposition from the Canton government,
which had always been jealous and distrustful of the
Foreign Inspectorate's involvement in their customs 
47
collections 1.
The Foreign Office, however, failed to see the relevance
of the Ordinance (No. 6 of 1866) to Robertson's proposal
but still expressed belief that a solution to the blockade
issue was near, especially with the cessation of complaints
from Hong Kong which, the Foreign Office thought, was due
to the restraint of 'lawless measures' adopted by the
48
Chinese customs officials previously .
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In March 1878, further to his proposal, Robertson 
forwarded a code of regulations to the Foreign Office.
He hoped that it would be approved by the forthcoming 
commission since it had already received the tacit approval 
of Hennessy, who had apologized that he was not in a 
position at that moment to give a formal answer. What this 
code of regulations embodied was the restriction of the 
duties of revenue cruisers and the prevention of abuses 
and harassments to the junk trade. The revenue cruisers 
'would be stationed at fixed places and patrol fixed areas. 
They would be issued with individual (different) wooden 
seals so that after a junk had been examined and the seal 
stamped on its papers or manifest, it would not be searched 
or harassed by other revenue vessels. Arrests or seizures 
were to be made only when proof of smuggling had been
t
ascertained and the officers on board the revenue cruisers 
were not allowed to take the responsibility of fines and 
punishments in their own hands, but had to report to the 
Canton customs authorities and follow their ensuing 
directives. In cases where only small quantities of un­
declared goods were concealed in full cargoes or where 
passengers on board junks attempted to smuggle items of 
trifle value, the junks should not be detained but reports 
of such findings had to be submitted to.the customs 
authorities for their decisions. Complaints would be met 
by a joint court at Canton and a tariff of dues and duties 
collected at the three stations around Hong Kong would be 
published by the customs authorities .
However, since the commission never met during this 
period, this proposed code of regulations was never made 
public. Nevertheless, from evidence of the cessation of 
complaints, it was more than possible that this code, or 
parts of it, were put into effect by the Canton customs 
authorities. Governor Hennessy, for his part, also enforced 
Ordinance No. 6 of 1866 in May 1877* Although objections 
were raised by the Registrar-General, who was also the
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'Protector of Chinese', and the Hanrbour Master since they
contended that enforcement of the (Ordinance would endanger
the junk trade. Yet, in January 18778, Hennessy reported
that the legal junk trade had increased and illicit traffic
50in opium,had been checked •
Despite attempts by both the Clanton consul and the
Hong Kong government to reach a soHution to the blockade
question, it never materialized. Neither did the commission
meet. This was due to a number of if actors. Robertson was
transferred to the consulate at Shanghai by a notification
from the Foreign Office in December? 1877 and was told
specifically not to involve himselif further in the blockade 
51issue^ . His successors, first H.P.. Hance and then A.R.
Hewlett, were not of his 'calibre' in that they did not
possess much initiative and were, iin fact, more pro-Hong
»
Kong than pro-China. Possibly, thejy were appointed because 
of such sj,'affiliation' - which wouUd greatly lessen the 
friction between the Canton consulate and the Colonial 
government.
In the Canton government, a nevw Hoppo had arrived in
1876. He was not as eager and avariicious as his predecessor
and there was consequently an improvement in relations
between his office and the ColoniaU government. The new
Governor-General, Liu K'un-i, was most unwilling to allow
any interference in the collection of dues by the Foreign
Inspectorate, and hence had little incentive to see a
52meeting of the commission-^ •„ In acttual fact, he never 
appointed a Chinese official representative to the commission.
On the part of the Hong Kong government, Hennessy 
reported that 'distresses' of the jjunk trade had greatly 
decreased and that the Harbour Mastter had been able to 
report in March 1878 that, 'grievances which at one time 
were continually cropping up have din a great measure if 
not entirely ceased; and the honestfc trade does not now seem 
to be interfered with more than is necessary to protect 
the Chinese revenue.' Hennessy considered that this was
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due to Robertson’s 'indefatigable exertions’ and should
55be congratulated^ .
Thus, although Prince Kung at Peking was pressing for
54an early convening of the commission, it was of no avail^ • 
Back in London, the. Colonial Office suggested in March 
1878 that Wade should be asked to a joint meeting between 
the two departments so that a solution to the blockade 
question might be found. The Foreign Office, in turn, 
suggested that the meeting should wait until the arriyal 
of Hart and Robertson so that a better understanding of 
the blockade question could be obtained from their 
explanations and a more comprehensive solution could be 
achieved. A meeting was, in fact, held in the Poreign Office 
the day the suggestion came from the Colonial Office. It 
was between Wade, J. Pauncefote (undersecretary), and
i
Lord Tenterden (the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).
A memorandum was drawn up after the meeting for the
55benefit of the Colonial Office^ . However, the meeting
suggested by the latter never took place; and in late
February 1879* the Colonial Office noted that since Hart
and Wade had already left London, the government should,
nevertheless, formulate a line of action should there be
a recurrence of hostilities between the Hong Kong and
Canton governments. It believed that an extension of a
branch of the Poreign Inspectorate in Hong Kong would
56be the best solution^ .
The Poreign Office took this opportunity to terminate 
the idea of a commission when it replied that since 
grievances from Hong Kong had ceased entirely, it would 
be impolitic to revive the blockade question. It went on 
to say that if complaints should arise again, 'the 
matter can be settled by the adoption of a few Rules such 
as the Cantonese authorities have virtually agreed to 
without the necessity of a Commission of Enquiry, and 
especially without the intervention of the Poreign 
Inspectorate whose establishment in the Colony would be
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the signal for loud remonstrance.* The maxim of *quieta
non movere1 was particularly applicable to the prevailing 
57situation^ . The Colonial Office concurred with this 
view and the commission became redundant even before it 
got off the ground^.
Chinese government reactions
In accordance with the stipulation that required China
to carry out her part of the Chefoo Convention within six
.months after the signing of the agreement, the Chinese
government made active preparations. On 9 January 1877,
Li Hung-chang, in his position as the Chief Superintendent
of Trade for the Northern Ports, informed the Tsungli-yamen
that Shanghai would be putting into effect the 'exemption
of li-kin in the port-area1 arrangement on 13 February 1877*
Other Treaty ports had to decide on the definition of
the 'port-area' before similar arrangements could be
operational. Detailed arrangements were also being made
for imported goods that would have arrived before that
date at Shanghai, i.e. what sort and amount of duties these
had to pay etc.. The working of the opium clause, however,
had not been planned pending agreements to be reached
between Britain and other Treaty powers concerning this 
59clause^ .
Then on 17 January, Shen Pao-chen, Chief Superintendent
of Trade for the Southern Ports, reported that preparations
at Shanghai were near completion. He had also issued
instructions to the local authorities at the other Treaty
ports that they should ascertain how encompassing their
'port-areas' would be, based either on the areas covered
by existing foreign settlements, such as those at Shanghai,
or if none existed, then on areas occupied by foreign
residents at that moment. Preparations for the opening of
the consular ports and ports of call along the Yangtze were
also being made and they would be opened between March 
60and April . On 24 March, Shen reported to the Tsungli-yamen 
again observing that it had been a month since operations'
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started at Shanghai and everything was functioning 
smoothly^.
In less than six months, China had dutifully carried 
out her part of the agreement, which also included the 
sending of Kuo Sung-t'ao to Britain on a mission of 
apology. She now waited patiently for Britain to ratify 
the agreement and carry out her part of the bargain.
At the same time, however, China was anxious over 
the opium clause and the convening of the commission.„ 
Prince Kung pressed Fraser for this , and approached 
the American minister to urge his government to agree to 
the opium clause. Seward, the American minister, in his 
despatch to the State Department , commented that the 
Chinese government had every right to do anything it liked 
with opium after it had reached the hands of Chinese 
dealers, and even Fraser had ‘assented to the justice of 
my view.* In the reply to Prince Kung, Sewdrd.pointed out 
that the representatives of Russia, Germany, Spain and 
France had been approached by him but they had all refused 
to ..express an opinion although Seward believed that they 
must have advised their governments of China's rights .
China's patience was, in a sense, rewarded by a 
translation (by the Tung-wen-kuan) of a newspaper cutting 
(the Times,of 31 May 1878) which reported that at a recent 
meeting of parliament, a question was tabled asking if 
the Chefoo Convention had been ratified, to which the 
government spokesman replied that a decision would be made 
soorif*/ But a month later came the British government's 
decision to ratify the agreement with exception of the 
.two stipulations which had been noted^. These two clauses, 
especially the one on the taxation of opium, were of 
direct concern to China's interests.
Reaction to the partial ratification, however, was 
surprisingly mild. There is no evidence from either Chinese 
or English sources that suggest. that China protested or 
complained against Britain's decision, nor did she adopt
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any 'retaliatory1 measures. This could be due to the 
troubles she was having at that time with Japan over 
Formosa and the Ryukyu islands, and with Russia over Hi, 
both of which had led to an emphatic 'dialogue' between 
Li Hung-*chang and Tso Tsung-t' ang, one advocating the 
importance of naval power and the other arguing for the 
importance of land power. Such a confrontation between 
two of China's leading officials, with unforeseeable 
consequences, was of more immediate concern to the 
'imperial government.
Nevertheless, Britain's refusal to agree to something 
that would be of benefit to China -meant that she now 
possessed the 'trump cards'. China had signed five treaties 
with Britain, including the Chefoo Convention. The first 
three , the Nanking, Tientsin and Peking treaties, were 
the results of her military defeats and there was little 
negotiation involved. The fourth, the Alcock Convention, 
involved both negotiation and compromise, but it had been 
rejected by Britain. The last, the Chefoo Convention, 
had been secured for Britain through some coercion on the 
part of Wade, but this had also been rejected although 
China's concessions had been enforced, and were retained 
by Britain. This rejection showed the ugly side of 
Britain's 'China policy' - the selfish and the mean 
aspects - despite the outward promotion of a policy of 
peace, friendship and co-operation with China. The British 
government became vulnerable to attacks, and at a later 
stage, China was to utilize this vulnerability to her 
fullest advantage in the solution of the Opium Question.
Summary
The official reason given by Britain for only partial 
ratification of the Chefoo Convention was that it could 
not obtain the condent of other Treaty powers to the two 
stipulations. This was almost identical to the refusal to 
ratify the Alcock Convention, when the blame was put on 
France for her refusal to abide by the increase in silk
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Tariff duty. In this sense, the official reason could be 
true if we were to consider the frustrations felt by the 
foreign representatives at Peking when they negotiated 
with the Tsungli-yamen for an agreement to likin dues 
between,1871 and 1872. However, the Poreign Office during 
the period between the signing of the agreement and the 
official pronouncement of partial ratification, did not 
make any serious attempt to persuade other Treaty powers 
to accept the agreement. It also did not take into 
consideration mercantile opinions which, on the whole, 
favoured ratification. This attitude was completely 
different from that adopted for the Alcock Convention.
As far as the British government was concerned, every­
thing depended on the stand of the Indian government. When 
that government refused to be convinced by Wade's arguments 
for his opium clause, the Home government conceded to 
its views. However, it should be noted that throughout 
this period of uncertainty, the Indian government never 
spelt out clearly its objections to the opium clause and 
never asked for non-ratification. All it did was to express 
doubt as to the correctness of Wade's arguments, which, 
because they relied on the 'future', could neither be 
proven nor refuted. The Home government took these doubts 
as sufficient grounds for non-ratification. This, in 
fact, enabled the Indian government to declare in later 
years, and in no uncertain terms, that it was not 
responsible for the decision taken by the British government 
not to ratify the opium clause
In many respects, Wade's arguments and the reactions 
to them were similar to Alcock's, although they set out 
from two different standpoints and the reactions stemmed 
from two different concerns. Alcock had aimed at a quid 
pro quo; but Wade vas much more adamant, though he did 
realize that he could not ask for the impossible since 
China would be unable to carry them out. It would be 
possible to regard this as the only concession on his
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part to China, Thus, to him, the two clauses that were 
not ratified were not in any way detrimental to British 
trade with China, whether in opium or other merchandise. 
They were not concessions to China. The reverse was true 
because/China could no longer find any loop-holes as 
she had with the Treaty of Tientsin and the commercial 
arrangements appended to it. Moreover, the added concess­
ions he had obtained from China, such as the opening of 
the ports along the Yangtze, would have more than counter- 
* balanced the loss incurred by Britain by agreeing to 
the two clauses, if there was to be any such loss. To 
Wade, losses to trade were unforeseeable - only expansion 
and the lessening of grievances so long complained of 
by merchants in China, especially towards the levy of likin.
His arguments, nonetheless, did not carry sufficient 
conviction, a factor desparately required by the Indian 
government, which was very frightened - more by the 
uncertainty than the reality. Wade’s forgetfulness or 
unwillingness on his part to consult and inform the 
Indian government of the course of negotiations at Chefoo 
had led to the latter*s anger and frustration, and 
heightened its uncertainty over the opium clause. This 
was to be partly responsible for sealing the fate of the 
agreement^.
Nevertheless, partial ratification of the Chefoo 
Convention put Anglo-Chinese relations on a new footing, 
one entirely different in approach and substance from 
that first envisaged after China’s first defeat in 1842, 
and also possibly after her second defeat between 1857 
and 1860. Negotiations for settlement of the Opium Question 
took on an entirely new light during the next decade.
6.1
CHAPTER 6 : NATIVE OPIUM AND THE ANOTI-OPIUM SOCIETY.
Failure by the British governmemt to ratify in toto 
the Chefoo Convention resulted in a new phase in the 
negotiations for solutions to the Opium Question. By 
ratifying stipulations in the agreement that were 
beneficial to British interests, botfch governmental and 
mercantile, and by rejecting the two stipulations that 
would involve a give-and-take relationship with China, 
the British government had placed itbself in sin awkward 
position. Not only did it become vulnerable to attacks 
from the Chinese government, but also from the various 
organizations in Britain. For the first time, the govern­
ment was on the defensive in regard to its China policy.
It had to take the initiative in remewing negotiations 
for settlement of the Opium Questiom. ,
The Chinese government, during it his period, i.e. from
«
the date of partial ratification to the beginning of 
final negotiations in 1884, adopted a passive role. Its 
actions were based on the argument tfchat China had fulfilled 
her obligations stipulated in the Chief00 Convention, and 
it was up to Britain to execute her part of the agreement.
To this policy, Britain had no valid, answer. All it could 
do was to make proposals which would benefit China more 
in the long run, since the latter head the right of 
acceptance and rejection. It thus beecame a situation 
whereby China held all the trump cairds and could deal 
them out, one by one, whenever she tthought it necessary.
This must be borne in mind when we survey the years 
after 1878.
For the sake of clarity, rather than continuity, in 
our discussion of this period, I hawe divided it under 
two broad headings: 1) the various ^aspects of the Opium 
Question that brought forward a tot;al of eleven proposals 
to settle it. These aspects were thee continued cultivation 
of the poppy in China which increasingly worried the 
Indian government; the attempts at iprohibiting the cultiva­
tion made by the Chinese Imperial amd provincial governments
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the activities of the Anti-opium Society and mercantile 
bodies; and the proposals made by ttne British and Chinese 
governments and private persons to esffect a permanent solution 
of the taxation of foreign opium. 2))In regard to the 
blockade }.ssue, this period was markced by attempts on 
the part of Consul Robertson (and hiis successors) , the 
Canton and Hong Kong governments to work out a favourable 
settlement. However, because the isssue had become a 
Sino-British, and not merely a Canton- Hong Kong one, 
nO solution could be found as long ais the over-riding 
issue of the taxation of foreign opiLum was not settled.
Thus, though the two issues seemed separated from each 
other, solution of one depended veryr much on the settle­
ment of the other. Nevertheless, beginnings were made 
and experiments were tried during thiese years, and they 
formed the prelude to the final settlements in 1885 and 
1887 respectively, for the taxation of opium* and blockade 
issues.
In this chapter, we will deal wiith the continued and 
increasing growth of native opium, aind the activities of 
the Anti-opium Society. The next chaipter will deal with 
the negotiations over the taxation 0)f opium., and the 
blockade issue.
Expansion of native opium growth and! trade
By the time of the conclusion ofT the Chefoo Convention, 
it had already been established that; the increase in 
the production of native opium had b)ecome a serious 
threat to the continued import, if mot expansion, of 
foreign opium. This trend was contimued at a much more 
accelerated rate during this period..
Basing ourselves once again on oonsular commercial 
reports and returns and reports of t;he Foreign Inspectorate, 
we can trace the rapid development 0)f native opium 
production.
In his Canton Trade Report for 1.876, Commissioner 
Bredon thought it appropriate to inc;lude an assessment 
of the influence of native opium in ‘Canton. He observed
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that Chinese opium dealers believed that the production
of native opium in the south-western provinces for the
year amounted to 25,000 to $2,000 piculs, whereas
between 1864--66, the annual yield was between 15,000 to
18,000 piculs. In Canton itself, 80$ of opium dens were
using native opium, the remaining ones confining their
trade to the foreign drug only^. Robertson thought it
fitting to include Bredon's report in his own commercial
report, but added his own remarks. He commented that
’native'opium production was definitely on the increase
and it was improving in quality. Some opium merchants had
assured him that a comparison with Malwa would show little
difference, and also told him that of the eighteen provinces
2of China, at least eight were producing it m  quantity •
The consul at Hankow noted the same thing. He remarked
t.
on .the startling increase in the quantity exported to
Shanghai, which had risen from 10 piculs in 1871 to 1,696
piculs in 1876 (the amount that paid duty at the Foreign
Inspectorate's office). Moreover, the continuous falling.
off in the amount of foreign opium imported, coupled with
an increase in the number of smokers, obviously pointed
z
to an increased consumption of native opium . The severity 
of competition between the two types at Shanghai, the 
noticeable competition between native opium from Anhwei 
and Bengal opium at Kiukiang, and the increased consumption 
of native opium to 2,000 piculs plus at Ningpo all pointed 
to the same conclusions •
In 1877, crop failure chiefly in Shansi resulted in 
. a slight increase in the import of foreign opium. However, 
reports from Treaty ports still illustrated the same 
trend as the previous year. In the General Trade Report 
of the Foreign Inspectorate for the year, a survey showed 
that cultivation wq.s present in all the provinces of 
China except Kwangsi, with Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi,
Chihli and Kwangtung producing less than the others^ A 
few new factors were also present*. Tamsui, which had 
previously no record of native opium consumption, now .
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reported that this was increasing . Even in Peking, three- 
tenth of the opium consumed was native grown, coming 
from as far as Yunnan and Szechuan^. In Newchwang, 80$ 
of the consumption was native opium, and the Consul,o
Adkins, remarked that the proportion was increasing .
The acting-consul at Chefoo also reported that 1,000
chests of native opium had been consumed in districts
which had previously used Indian opium supplied from his 
9port . The Nmgpo commissioner, who seldom made studies 
of native opium production, had to conclude that in his 
province, Chekiang, production should be about 16,000 
piculs a year, though he conceded that perhaps 10,000 to
12.000 piculs might be more accurate^.
Famine in Shansi, which also affected neighbouring
provinces, reduced the output of native opium for,1878,
and there was an increased demand for Indian opium.
However, native opium from Szechuan was rushed north to
Chihli through Hankow to replace the loss of supply from
the northern provinces of Shansi, Shensi and Honan1 .^
Cultivation was increased in south-east Mongolia and
12Manchuria as a result of the famine . In reports from
the Treaty port. , E.D. Sassoon and Co., the only foreign
opium firm in Newchwang, had closed down because the
15trade was entirely m  Chinese hands . Demand for Indian 
opium at the port was completely regulated by the amount
........................... 1 4 ........................................
of native opium imported
In some reports, native opium production figures were 
given. One estimate put the production of Szechuan at
50.000 piculs, Yunnan at 15,000 piculs and just at two 
prefectures in Chekiang (that of Taichow and Wenchow) it
15was 4,200 piculs but by 1879 the production should double 
By quoting returns of the amount consumed locally,, the 
consul at Hankow concluded that both production and 
consumption had increased^.
Continued famine conditions and the inability by 
unaffected provinces to supply food relief promptly resulted 
in strict prohibitions of poppy cultivation^. Its strict
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enforcement resulted in a decrease in the total output of
native opium. Exception to the rule was Anhwei where,
according to the report from Ichang, production not only
continued but increased. The district of Patung alone
IBproduced,2,000 piculs . The year also saw the disappearance 
of extreme famine conditions and local officials were 
anxious to obtain their squeeze from tacit permission 
given to peasants to cultivate the poppy. Thus, some 
reports estimated that there would be an increased output 
'for 188019.
Such predictions were proven correct, though Yunnan,
the largest native opium producing.province, suffered a
partial crop failure. Reports from practically all Treaty
ports emphasized the increased production as well as the
improvement in quality. Because of the prevalence of
native opium from Szechuan, Ichang reported a total
absence of Indian opium. In the opium dens,* only a maximum
20of 10 piculs of the foreign variety was used • Shanghai
observed that there was an increase of over 600 piculs
of native opium imported into the port,.and the lack of
demand for Indian opium from north China meant that the'
21native drug must be extensively used there . At Wuhu,
native opium was imported for the first time because of
. 22local demand for it
The year 1881, according to reports, was a very good
year for native opium, as regards both production and
quality. Yunnan had a good crop and Szechuan opium was
improving rapidly in quality so that native opium could
now compete directly with Indian opium, both in consideration
of price and quality; it had already successfully stopped
2 3the importation of Persian opium Kiukiang, Chmkiang
and Newchwang all reported an increase in the consumption
of native opium. The consul at Kiukiang estimated that
consumption at the port was in the ratio of 50 chests of
native opium to 70 chests of foreign opium, but the
24former was increasing
W.D. Spence, the consul at Ichang, estimated that 
Szechuan was producing at least 177*000 piculs of which
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54,000 piculs were consumed locally. Yunnan should be
producing 35,000 piculs, Kweichow 10,000 piculs and
Hupei 2,000 piculs making a total of 224,000 piculs, or
2ii times that of the foreign opium import*^. His estimate
did not include production figures from other provinces,
and, though it sounded somewhat unbelievable, the fact
that he was able to arrive at that figure, after careful
deduction from available sources (such as the amount of
land under cultivation), showed he could not have been
too far wrong, and that native opium production had increased
tremendously.
Between mid-April and late-June. of 1882, A. Hosie,
a student interpreter in the consular service, made an
extensive tour through Szechuan, Kweichow and Yunnan. The
report he wrote is most enlightening. He commented that
the valley behind the hills of Chungking, capital' of
Szechuan, was filled with fields cultivating poppy. Only
tiny plots were reserved for food staple, crops such as
wheat, barley and rape. In a long and narrow valley called
Ch'u-mi-p'u in Kweichow, about 5 square .miles, it was
one mass of opium flowers. And these sights were repeated
throughout his journey. Neither did he observe any
official proclamations at prohibition nor was there any
26official interference
By this time, effective official suppression had 
almost completely stopped and increased cultivation was 
witnessed practically in all the provinces. Shansi, in 
which the famine of 1877-78 brought about prohibition,
27was reported to be totally devoted to poppy cultivation '• 
Wuhu reported that the two Sassoon firms were forced to
p o
close owing to a lack of business , and Chefoo also 
reported that the decline in foreign opium import had 
forced two foreign ^nd twenty native firms to terminate 
their businesses^. Chinkiang estimated that the demand
for Indian opium would be ten times more if it had not
. . . . 30been for the successful competition from native opiunr .
Apart from such observations, most of the other ports
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reported that opium crops were good, especially the drug 
51from Szechuarr . Shanghai reported that foreign opium 
import had been drastically reduced from 54,302 piculs 
to 44,883 piculs and this was entirely due to the competi­
tion from native opium which was even replacing Indian
opium along the coastal areas, which had traditionally '
•32refused to smoke any native opiunr • Likewise, in the 
northern ports, native opium crop from the previous year 
was so plentiful that foreign opium was practically driven 
* out of the market completely. Even Malwa, which had always 
commanded a ready sale, found no buyers despite a reduction 
of 9 to 24$ in its retail price. ^ During that year, 
production from the three largest producers - Yunnan, 
Kweichow and Szechuan - was estimated at 225,915 piculs
by Hosie, less than half of which was exported to other
33 'provinces and nearby Burma^ .
The following year saw the continuation of the same
trend of development. Tientsin, Chefoo and Newchwang,
the three northern Treaty ports, reported ample supply
of native opium. This was despite the cessation of
cultivation in Shansi, since yields from Kansu Shensi
and Chihli were plentiful, whilst those from Honan and
34Yunnan were fully up to average^ • In Chefoo, E. D. Sassoon
and Co., the only foreign opium firm still in operation,
was forced to close and the opium trade went entirely
35into Chinese hands^ . At Newchwang, the amount of native
opium that arrived was estimated to be five or six times
that of the previous year, which in itself was not a bad
year either^.
Reports from ports along the Yangtze also confirmed
an increasing domination of the opium market by native
opium. Ichang reported that it had started trading in the
export of Szechuan.opium, while Kiukiang reported that-
Szechuan opium was now consumed in the port wholly un-
37adulterated and was dominating the market*^Both Wuhu
38and Wenchow supported this observation*^ • An indication 
of this rapid acceleration in production and popularity
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is the report from Tamsui that cultivation of the poppy,
xq
though on a small scale, had started m  Formosa^ .
The following observation made by the consul at
Chinkiang, E.L. Oxenham, is illustrative of the trend:
'A regular seesaw has been established in the trade....If
Chinese opium is cheap and abundant, the import of Indian
opium must be diminished or its price fall. If, on the
other hand, the price of the native opium is artificially
raised by prohibition or taxation, or naturally by a
‘poor crop, the void is instantly supplied by Indian opium. |Z|'°
The year 1884 saw once again a continuation of the
trend, although the production was* slightly less than the
previous years owing to some official prohibition and
41partial crop failures . In his summation of reports from 
consuls, 0*Conor, charge a1Affaires, expressed the trend
i
aptly: 1 Opium, taking all kinds together, remains 
stationary. Malwa and Patna show an increase with Benares 
and Persian a decrease. Persian seems to have fallen out 
of favour at all the ports. The native opium crop was a 
large one everywhere, and taxation seems to be the only
42hindrance now offered to the production of native opium.1 ■
Forecast for the crop of 1885 was believed to be much 
43better . It is interesting to note that most of the
consuls now make a habit of forecasting the native opium
crop for the following year.
1885 was the year when the Additional Article to the
Chefoo Convention was signed, thereby solving the question
over the taxation of Indian opium. However, before it was
signed,in...July, an Imperial edict was issued in May which
called on all likin offices to collect 86 taels per picul
on foreign opium, and the likin on native opium was
44simultaneously raised to half of that sum . This was 
accompanied by a repewed, though half-hearted attempt- 
at prohibiting the cultivation of the poppy throughout 
China. As a result, production was slightly less, but it 
did not effectively interfere with the demand. In Chinkiang, 
for example, 3*000 piculs of Honan opium, came into the port
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for the first time and this variety was well-received by 
4-5the smokers In other places such as Newchwang, lack of 
supply of native opium because of partial crop failure
in the north owing to heavy rain, led to a respite given
4. t • 46to Indian opium
The last two years of the period covered by this
dissertation - 1886 and 1887 - saw the continued increase
in the production of native opium; moreover, its quality
had equalled, and sometimes even surpassed, that of the 
4-7Indian variety '•
By way of a summary, three special publications of 
the Foreign Inspectorate on this aspect of the Opium 
Question may be mentioned. These were: 1) Special Series:
No. 4- Opium (1881); 2) Special Series: No. 9 Native Opium 
1887; and 3) Statistical Series: No. 6 Decennial Reports 
on the Trade, etc. 1882-1891 (first issue).
In reply to the Inspector General's Circular No. 62 
of 10 July 1879 (Second Series) entitled 'Opium: inquiries 
concerning consumption of:', replies from commissioners 
at the Treaty ports included the following summaries:
Francis W. White, the commissioner at Ningpo, estimated 
the production of native opium at 98,000 piculs distributed 
as follows: Szechuan 4-3,000, Yunnan 17,000, Kweichow 12,000, 
Honan 5,000, Shensi 5,000, Shansi 4-,000, Chihli 3,000, 
Chekiang 3,000, Hupeh 2,000, Hunan 1,000 and Shantung 1,000.
E.T. Kolwill, assistant-in-charge at Kiukiang, estimated 
the total at 77,000 distributed as follows: Szechuan 30,000, 
Yunnan 12,000, Kweichow 10,000, Honan 7,000, Chekiang 3,000, 
Hupeh 3,000, Kiangsu 2,500, Manchuria 5,000 and other 
provinces 4-,000.
E.B. Drew, the commissioner at Ningpo, estimated the 
total at 265,000 distributed as follows: Szechuan 60,000 
to 100,000, Yunnan, 80,000, Kweichow 15,000, Chekiang 
10,000, Shantung 300, and another 100,000 from Kansu,
Shensi, Shansi, Honan, Mongolia and Manchuria. His estimates 
were based mostly on reports made by others.
As can be noticed, there was a great diversity in the
i
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estimates, especially comparing Drew's with either White's 
or Holwill's. However, if Drew's estimate was to be relied 
upon, then Hosie's personal observation and estimate in 
1882 of a total production of 226,915 piculs in the 
western# provinces alone was no exaggeration. As the 
publications warn, these figures were very unreliable, 
nevertheless, they can be taken as a general estimate.
The conclusion that can be drawn is that by 1879, the 
production of native opium had equalled, if not exceeded, 
that of the total import of foreign opium, which had 
remained almost stationary at 70,000 piculs a year since 
1872. Coupled with the fact that from accurate reports 
more native opium was consumed - due to its cheapness and 
improved qualities - and the number of smokers had 
increased during this period, this can only point to the
• 'incrtAJld
obvious fact that native opium production had continuously h 
during this period. A further proof can be found in the 
intensified promulgation of Imperial edicts on prohibition 
of the cultivation of the poppy.
In reply to the Inspector General's Circulars Nos. 372 
and 375 of 1887, nineteen commissioners replied and they 
all acknowledged that native opium was in use in their ports. 
Only Foochow and Takow said that a little was used while 
Newchwang, Tientsin, Chefoo, Hankow and Wenchow reported 
that this was chiefly smoked. Ichang reported that native 
opium was almost exclusively used. The other ports - 
Kiukiang, Wuhu, Chinkiang, Shanghai, Ningpo, Tamsui, Amoy, 
Swatow, Canton, Kiungchow and Pakhoi all reported an 
equal consumption ratio of native and foreign opium. The 
commissioner at Tientsin, Detring, gave an estimate for 
North China which consumed nine chests of native opium to 
ten of the foreign variety, while in Tientsin, there were 
seven native opium, smokers to three foreign opium smokers.
In a special table compiled In this publication, which 
took into account all the reports mentioned above, the 
total production of native opium for 1887 exceeded 100,000 
^piculs. This was a conservative estimate since the total
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was only from the Treaty port provinces. The actual total, 
therefore, should be much higher than this figure.
Finally, in the Decennial Report (for the years 1882 
to 1891), 23 commissioners replied to the Inspector 
General's Circular No. 524- of 1890, and the following 
comments were made (summaries of some replies):
Newchwang reported a continued decrease of Indian opium 
and said that it was unlikely this drug could compete with 
native opium. Indian opium was only smoked in South China 
by people who had formed the habit of smoking o this 
variety. Native opium was grown extensively in the three 
Manchurian provinces which not only was producing an 
amount sufficient for local consumption but also for export.
Chefoo reported that Indian opium was rapidly on the 
decline with native opium fast replacing it. Furthermore, 
up to 1882, Shantung was unable to produce native opium
of a quality equal to that of the Indian_.drug... But_xapid__
strides had since been made and its improvement in quality 
had increased its popularity. Shantung was producing 
28,4-00 piculs a year in 1891.
ChriJJkiang reported that before 1887 native opium was 
seldom used but by 1891 there was so much consumed that 
it could have already exceeded the total consumption of 
Indian opium.
Shanghai reported that in the ten years from 1882 to 
1891, foreign opium import fell by 15$ to 16$ and the 
price fell by 30$, and these were directly due to the 
successful challenge from native opium.
Thus, by looking at these reports and estimates of 
the production and consumption of native opium, it was 
a fact that foreign opium (of whicljjihe Indian drug occupied 
more than 90$) was being rapidly superceded in China by 
domestic production.
Attempts at prohibition
The period under survey was marked by renewed but more 
intensive efforts at the suppression of poppy cultivation
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in China. They were the results of two basic factors:
1) the intensity in cultivation (the amount of cultivatable 
land that was now devoted to the growing of the poppy)
had led to a deficiency in food crops, especially during 
times of famine or drought, and because of memorials 
from concerned officials calling for prohibition, the 
Imperial government as well as the provincial governments 
were forced to take action towards prohibition;
2) failure by the British government to ratify in toto 
the Chefoo Convention had led to further negotiations 
to solve the Opium Question as well as the rise to 
prominence of the Anti-opium Society in Britain - and 
China used prohibition as a diplomatic weapon to obtain 
the best possible solution.
The process of prohibition may be said to havel
started again with three memorials from Kuo Sung-t'ao,
Chinese minister to Britain. The first memorial was dated 
4822 March 1877 ■> m  which Kuo and the assistant envoy
traced the history of opium smoking, and the development* 
of poppy cultivation in China. Then it observed that, 
ffor ten or twenty years past, agriculture had been 
abandoned for the growth of the poppy-plant, in a yearly 
increasing degree, whilst the importation by Europeans 
into China has also gone on upon a progressive scale. It 
has been plainly evident that the larger the extent of 
the cultivation the greater is the number of those who 
indulge in the use of the drug; so that it would seem as 
though the entire population of China were about to lose 
their accustomed ways of livelihood, and with shrivelled 
necks and sallow visages, gasping painfully for breath, 
to become no better than an utter wreck /sic7-* Bearing 
such consequences in mind, and spurred on by the visit 
of a deputation fj;om the Anti-opium Society of Britain 
which, 'evinced in this outward manifestation the upright 
sentiments with which they were actuated,' Kuo felt that 
steps to prohibit the smoking and growth of opium must
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be taken. He mapped out a plan in which the first step 
was to compel the officials and the literati to give up 
their addiction within a three year period. If the habit 
had not been given up at the end of this period, 
punishments such as the loss of official ranks, would 
be meted out. 'The object with which it is sought to 
secure that, within the term of three years, there shall 
be no opium smokers left within the educational associat­
ions of the country, is that of stimulating in a right 
direction the popular resolve, and inspiring a firm 
determination, which, after all, consists simply in 
appealing to the sentiment of seLf-respect.' Having
accomplished this most important task, the populace could
il q
be educated both not to smoke and not to cultivate opium .
This was followed by a second memorial, received by
the Imperial court in mid-May 1877» which though basically
repeating the same arguments as in the previous one,
added that while discussing the Opium Question with
British officials, he felt greatly ashamed of his fellow
countrymen smoking it, knowing very well the hazards
involved..Thus, he had to reiterate his suggestion of a
three-year period for officials and literati to give up
the addiction. He also said that although the British
government derived several hundred million taels from
taxation and levies on opium in India every year, yet '
the Indian population was strictly prohibited from
smoking the drug. Even Siam and Japan, formerly tributary
states of China, had successfully carried out its
SOprohibition. China, therefore, must do likewise-' .
Though the first memorial was very much publicized 
in Britain by the Anti-opium Society, yet it received no 
reaction or acknowledgment from the Imperial government. 
Thus, on 19 September 1877> Kuo memorialized for the third 
time. Apart from once more outlining the facts that opium 
had plagued China for fifty to sixty years and that 40# 
to 50# of the population were now addicts, thereby doing 
great harm to the country, he outlined six proposals based
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on the Confucian precept of ’rewarding and encouraging
man's sense of shame so as to bring out his natural
goodness': 1) cleanse the habit of opium smoking at the
schools of learning; 2) strict prohibition of poppy
cultivation; 3) strict interdict against cheating and
exhortion so as to relieve the worries of officials (so
that they could carry out their duties properly); 4) appoint
ment of officials and gentry to supervise the prohibitions
(such as to investigate vices and conduct anti-opium
societies along the lines of the one newly-established in
Kwangtung); 5) framing of strict and precise rules and
regulations so that offenders would realize the severity
of punishments (for example, opium dealers would have to
pay five times the usual amount of likin levied on the drug
and this rule was never to be abolished, and the forcing
of poppy cultivators to grow food crops instead under the
rule of confiscation of their lands as penalty); and 6)
51forced closing of all opium-dens^ .
In response to this memorial, an Imperial edict was
issued which said that what Kuo Sung-t'ao had said was
very correct and that prohibition had become a dead letter.
All provincial . military and civil officials were
ordered to deliberate and report their findings and 
52suggestions^ • Reactions to this edict seemed to be
confined to the capital, where rumours circulated that
the British government had agreed to forbid opium to be
shipped to China from British dominions (which would
include India). However, Mayers, translator at the Peking
legation, interpreted this as due to Kuo Sung-t'ao's
'proceedings in foreign ports', to the crop failure at
Shansi and elsewhere, and a falling off in the opium
. 53supply from India^ .
Possibly as a .response by fellow officials to Kuo's 
memorials, the last months of 1877 saw the punishment of 
minor officials for committing offences such as collecting 
likin on native opium or smoking the drug. It also saw a
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series of Imperial decrees enjoining the suppression
of poppy cultivation in the provinces. On 1 October. 1877y
the Peking Gazette published a memorial from Li Pei-ching,
Governor of Kweichow, in which he denounced a certain
Tu Ta-ting, expectant sub-prefect and magistrate of a
district in the province, for misappropriating taxes he
had collected on native opium. Fraser, in transmitting
this information to the Foreign Office, observed that
this was the first instance of a denunciation of a local
official after the Imperial edict of 1876, which had
54never been rescinded^.
Two weeks later, following a memorial from censor
Liu Nan-p'u denouncing the continued cultivation of the
poppy in Shansi, the Governor of the province, Tseng
Kuo-ch'uan, was ordered to institute an enquiry.with all
due diligence and to effect the prohibition without
exception. Fraser once more commented that since these
decrees were obviously never observed, 'one can only
suppose that...usage requires a Decree....It is probably,
by this time, a matter of tradition, generally received
in the provinces, that prohibitions of poppy cultivation
are mere forms, which public morality requires to be
drawn up whilst ’private interest forbids them to be 
55acted upon.'^
In December 1877 * Shen Pao-chen, Governor-General of 
Liang-kiang, submitted a long memorial denouncing five 
of his subordinates who had committed the offence of 
smoking opium. This was the first memorial in response 
to the edict calling on replies after Kuo's memorials.
•In this one, Shen, making full use of recondite classical 
phraseology, said that he had impeached these officials 
as a warning to their fellows so that 1 it may be possible 
to remove grounds for complaint on the part of the 
lower orders, and to stimulate measures to active moral 
. reform.' He argued that the evils of opium smoking were 
known to everyone, but it had become so prevalent that, ,
5
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though a deadly poison, it now constituted an ordinary 
article of daily consumption, such as tea or rice. The1 
common people looked towards the officials and literati 
for an example but they had become addicts themselves.
It was like a man’s entire body attacked by disease, and 
the. only way to administer remedies was to deal with the 
'inner organs that the extremities may be gradually 
restored.’ The’inner organs' meant the officials and 
literati - hence the impeachment of some of his sub­
ordinates. As a result, these officials, who were of 
relatively high rank (intendants, magistrates and expectant 
taotais), were stripped of their rank and denounced in 
public^.
Following Shen's impeachment of his subordinates, a
few other magistrates were similarly denounced a§ hope-
57lessly addicted to opium smoking^ . Some reports, called
«
for by the edict in response to Kuo's memorials, had also
come back by February 1878. Mayers, after assessing the
materials contained in these reports, summarized them as
follows: 'the general tenor is adverse to any immediate
possibility of action. It is thought that before the
masses are interfered with, the attempt to root out the
practice of opium smoking among the official class must
be made, and that the growth of the poppy plant is too
58widely spread to admit of its abrupt prohibition.'x 
This assessment is quite accurate considering the increasing 
number of minor officials denounced on the one hand, and 
on the other, the continued cultivation of the poppy as 
indicated in consular and Foreign Inspectorate's trade 
reports. Mayers also noticed that district magistrates 
customarily made two proclamations every year, 'the first 
is put forth at the time when the early revenue collect­
ion is made, before’the plants are fully developed, and 
the second when the juice is nearly ready for gathering..
By this occasion it is easy to represent that to destroy 
the crop would entail a loss of the second half year's
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revenue and the farmers are left unmolested in consideration
150
of fees paid to the Magistracy underlings.'^' Thus,
despite honest attempts by the Imperial and some provincial
governments to prohibit the cultivation, it was almost
impossible to enforce.
Between 1877 an<3- 1878 j because of the drought in
Shansi, famine broke out in the province. Owing to the
fact that practically all the cultivatable fields were
used for poppy growing, there was a scarcity of food
everywhere. Famine relief operations were handicapped
because neighbouring provinces were unable to provide
efficient assistance since they themselves had too much
land devoted to poppy cultivation and did not have
sufficient reserves of grain. An Imperial edict was issued,
SObut this time, directing its special attention tq Shansi •
The response from other areas was almost immediate.
Under directions from the Governor-General,' the taotai of
the Newchwang district issued a special proclamation
forbidding the cultivation of the poppy, The reason given
was that Manchuria, being a corn-growing area, should
not sacrifice its wheat production, especially since
neighbouring provinces were then devastated by famine 
61conditions • Though -it was first envisaged that the
proclamation would, like others of the same nature, have
no effect, a tour of the consular district a few days
later showed that it had been effectively carried out,
at least in areas easily accessible to provincial officials.
The vicinity of Mukden and Newchwang, for example, were
cleared of all poppy crops which were ploughed up and a
62late crop of beans and millet substituted •
The famine also prompted Tso Tsung-t'ang to renew
his fight for total suppression of poppy cultivation.
In a long memorial which appeared in the Peking Gazette
63of 26 August 1877 * Tso explained the method by which
poppy cultivation had been stopped in his province of Kansu. 
He had instructed his subordinates, military and civil,
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to make several visits a month to every village and to
make close search for signs of poppy culture. When these
were found, the poppy crop would be destroyed, the land
ploughed up, watered and sown with beans and wheat.
According to reports from his subordinates, these were
accomplished except in six districts in Ninghsia. However,
by pointing out to these stubborn peasants that large
profits could also be derived from producing grain or
cotton, and that poppy cultivation would receive severe
punishments and penalties, they were convinced and obeyed.
He then gave a list of those officials who should be
ojl
recommended for their diligence .'This was one of the 
few memorials that adopted a practical approach in that 
there were no moral overtones: it dwelt simply on the 
application of prohibition.
In a subsequent memorial, which was appended to the 
first one, Tso Tsung-t'ang outlined in more detail how 
the evil of opium smoking could be permanently stopped.
He argued that the first step should be to strike at the 
source of supply; he proposed prohibition of poppy culti­
vation. This would be an easier matter than to lay an 
interdict on opium, since the drug was a very valuable 
commodity, dear in price and small in bulk and could be 
easily smuggled. Moreover, opium smoking was done in 
secrecy and could not be detected easily. If the interdict 
was strictly enforced, it would only open the door to 
extortion and bribery. Poppy fields, however, were in 
the open, easily detectable, and by educating subordinate 
officials in the value of 'real earnestness', the job 
of prohibition could be easily carried out. Together with 
a set of rules for rewards and punishments, these officials 
would carry out their duties. Tso ended his memorial by
congratulating himself on the success in -Kansu through
68the use of this system Judging from the failure of 
other provincial officials to follow his lead, Tso's . 
memorials can be considered to have had little effect.
Prohibition, however, was effective in Shansi and in 
the Liang-kiang provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Anhwei.
In a memorial Tseng Kuo-ch'uan, Governor-General of Shansi, 
said that one of his officers, while inspecting the 
differen't departments of the province in connection with 
famine relief, had found that poppy cultivation had been 
reduced to 60# to 70% less than the previous year, i.e. 
before the Imperial edict was proclaimed. However, realizing 
that although cultivation of food crops would reap bigger 
profits temporarily, the ’common country people’, possessing 
no judgment of their own, might be tempted once again to 
indulge in poppy cultivation. He suggested that he be
N
given Imperial permission to issue a proclamation to the 
effect that land found to be used for the cultivation of 
the poppy would be confiscated for the benefit o$ the 
village and be placed in the hands of the village Elders
i
to be made available for public use. Officials who were 
diligent in their duty of enforcement of the prohibition 
would be ’submitted for favourable consideration’ (for 
rewards or promotion). This was agreed to by an Imperial
rescript which specially pointed out that it was ’not to
66be regarded as a mere matter of .form.’ However, this 
was not heeded, especially when there was abundant rain 
during the autumn which greatly benefitted poppy growing. 
Proclamations were issued again threatening with the 
confiscation of land and giving suitable rewards to honest 
officials^7.
In September 1878, Shen Pao-chen, Governor-General of 
Liang-kiang, also issued a proclamation. It was one full 
of rhetoric and warnings of ’heavenly wrath*. Shen called 
his people's attention to the sufferings of their fellow 
men in Shansi and claimed that they were suffering because 
of the wrath of heaVen. Shansi had been bestowed with 
blessings, but the people had misused them and cultivated 
poppy, hence their sufferings. Neighbouring Shensi and 
Honan were likewise affected, but.suffered less because the
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degree of poppy cultivation was not so extensive. He 
compared relationships between people and government to 
that between children and parents, saying that if the 
child had committed an error unknowingly, the parents 
would drhw his attention to it. However, if the child 
commits the same error again, he would be severely 
punished. Thus, the people of Liang-kiang had to obey the 
prohibition proclamations or they would be severely
punished, to the extent of their lands being confiscated.
ftpThe law would be assuredly enforced • This was one of
the few proclamations that was enforced, though some
opium was still grown in the northern areas of Anhwei
and was unlikely to be interfered with as it was too far
69away from the capital. .
Repeated memorials and prohibition edicts did have 
some effect on the production and output of native opium.
4
In 18791 the year following such memorials and edicts, 
almost all reports made by consuls and commissioners 
testified to this fact. In northern China, Chefoo,
Newchwang and Tientsin all reported that there was 
intense prohibition resulting in an insufficient supply 
of native opium and a resultant increase in the demand for 
Indian opium. The consul at Newchwang, for example, 
reported that native opium output from Kirin and Feng-tien 
for the year was only one-fifth of former years. In 
central China, Hankow, Chinkiang, Wenchow and Shanghai 
reported similar situations. The commissioner at Hankow 
reported that there was strict prohibition in Shensi,
Honan and Kweichow while the commissioner at Chinkiang 
observed strict prohibition in the Liang-kiang provinces. 
The consul at Hankow also reported that there was a 
shortage of native opium because of the prohibition. The 
commissioner at Shahghai observed that there was no demand 
for native opium at the port; he believed that this was 
probably due to a falling off in production in the north­
western provinces. However, though prohibition was enforced
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it was not totally ineffective. Ichang, for example,
reported that there was cultivation all around the port,
and Chefoo claimed that poppy cultivation had resumed
in Honan, Shansi and Kirin. Tientsin also reported that
a large'output was expected for 1880. Nevertheless, 1879
70was a year that saw the most intensive prohibitionf •
In 1880 there was a complete reversal. All reports
71said that there was an abundance of native opium’ .
Though the year passed without any memorial or edict, 
in the following year, there were new attempts at prohibit­
ion. However, it must be noted that the nature of these 
efforts had changed. This and the 'following years were 
marked by an intensification of negotiations for a settle­
ment of the Opium Question, and most of the memorials, 
though still expressing abhorrence of opium - whether 
cultivated in China or imported from abroad - yet had 
become more diplomatic in approach. Also, in a sense, 
the expression of two different opinions by two groups 
of officials marked a renewal of the opium debate that 
had begun in 1872, but which had been abruptly ended in 
the same year.
In June 1881, Tso Tsung-t’ang started the debate with 
a memorial. He pointed out that China had been plagued 
by opium and that prohibitions had gone unheeded. As 
Governor-General of Kansu and Shensi, he had prohibited 
poppy cultivation and had put foreign opium in bond, 
either to be returned to the place of import or to be 
burnt. However, this was not a solution suitable for all 
of China. The only way was to increase duties on both 
native and foreign opium. This would increase the retail 
price so that the numbers who smoked and their consumption 
would be decreased. After a number of years the scourge 
of addiction should be curbed. However, in order to carry 
out this plan, foreign opium must be put in bond, and 
after a total levy of 150 taels per picul had been paid 
(30 taels for Tariff duty and 120 taels for likin), it
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could be sold to consumers. On native opium, because it was 
less addictive and less popular, taxation could be lighter 
and be graded according to price. Tso emphasized that 
the levying of duties and the control of opium distribution 
was purely a Chinese affair and western nations had no 
right to intervene. Moreover, he argued that such a 
practice should be acceptable even to the British govern­
ment since it had tripled its duty on perfumery, an 
increase which was proportionally much higher than what 
he had suggested for opium. The Imperial edict that 
followed on 5 June 1881 said that Tso Tsung-t'ang's 
proposal was 'not devoid of perception' and agreed with 
his reasoning. The figure of 150 taels per picul was 
considered fair and equitable. Governor-Generals, governors
and Tartar generals as well as the chief superintendents
72of trade were asked to furnish reports within one month’ •
4
Four memorials were received, coming from the Governor
of Fukien, and the Governor-Generals of Chihli, Shansi 
73and Liang-kwang’ . The memorial from Fukien, which was 
addressed to the throne as coming from all high-ranking 
officials, reported that a total of 96 taels per chest 
had always been collected in the province - which was made 
up of 30 taels each for Tariff duty and Chinese duties,
15 taels for p'iao-shui, 16 taels for likin and 5 taels 
for contribution dues - but would agree to collect a total 
of 150 taels per picul. The memorial pointed out that the 
Foreign Inspectorate should collect 30 taels of Tariff 
duty while the rest - adding an extra new likin of 54- taels 
to make up the 120 taels required - should be collected 
•by the provincial government. New regulations and preventive 
services would be installed since Fukien had many inlets 
and outlets, which smugglers would definitely use if dues 
on opium were increased. The province would, of course, 
retain the amount used for tax stations and preventive 
services. The concluding remark of the memorial asked that 
all provincial governments should map out a comprehensive
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plan so that there would be uniforming not only in the
collection of duties but also in the prevention of 
74-smuggling’ • Though the memorial on the surface was in 
favour of Tso Tsung-t'ang’s proposal, the tone could be 
taken tb mean the very reverse. This was possibly due 
to the fear that provincial revenues would be greatly 
reduced if all that was collected were to be sent to 
Peking.
The memorial from Li Ilung-chang, Governor-General of
Chihli, was more to the point. He agreed that the levy
of a heavy duty on opium would decrease the number of
smokers and possibly end addiction in China; but he also
pointed out that this would lead to increased smuggling
attempts, chiefly from Hong Kong. However, by framing
new regulations together with the Foreign Inspectorate,
the collection of a total of 150 taels duty could conceivably
be effected. These would include a system'of-rewards -
and punishments, the issue of licences to native firms
engaged in the retail trade and the bonding of firms to-
gather to introduce group responsibility, and issue of
likin receipts in triplicates, etc.. Li then pointed out
that if Tso's proposal was to be accepted, all provinces
in China should give effect to it at the.same time. But,
all provinces should still be able to retain the amount
formerly levied, and remit the remainder to the Board
of Revenue. Concerning native opium, Li suggested a fixed
duty of 4-0 taels per picul, since it was difficult for
officials to supervise the collection and a higher duty
would lead to more smuggling. The consoling point, he .
•contended, was that when the foreigners found it was no
longer profitable to sell opium to China, then additional
75taxation could be put on native opium’'. Despite Li’s 
concern for the empire at large, the memorial was primarily 
concerned with his province of Chihli. Thus',' he claimed 
that Tientsin should retain 60% of the new likin (120 taels) 
on the grounds that the old likin had been solely used
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for coastal defences and had always been inadequate. 
Moreover, contribution from Shanghai and the Tung Hai 
barrier, which had in the past contributed to the revenue 
of Chihli, should not be stopped.
The memorial from Chang Chih-tung, Governor-General 
of Shansi, arrived fourteen months after the edict, in 
August 1882. Though indirect references were made to the • 
edict, he was much more concerned with the extent of 
poppy cultivation in his province and pointed out that 
the best way to prohibit it was to start with the rich 
and then the poor land, the central and then the outlying' 
districts, and the framing of strict laws. In particular 
reference to the edict, he mentioned two factors. He 
agreed that an increase in the Tariff duty would result 
in less importation of foreign opium but argued that 
native opium growth should likewise be curtailed since it 
would be difficult to silence the westerner*1 s opposition \ 
if this was not done^. '
Chang Shu-shen, Governor-General of Liang Kwang, 
having consulted his subordinates, pointed out in his 
memorial that Kwangtung must be considered separately 
from other provinces concerning Tso’s proposal because 
of its peculiar relationship with Hong Kong. The six 
tax stations that blockade Hong Kong and Macao could - 
be made use of to collect the additional duties. The 
difficulty was that there was no 'central port' with 
Hong Kong and Macao, i.e. one that dealt directly with 
these two places in imports and exports. If the huge 
increase in Tso's proposal were to come into effect, 
there was bound to be a tremendous increase in smuggling 
activities. However, since the proposal was in the general 
interests of the country, it should be given effect to 
simultaneously and on a uniform scale in all the provinces, 
and Kwangtung would 'make every effort to secure the 
successful working of the measure'^.
The next’, two years witnessed an absence of memorials
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and edicts. This could possibly be due once again to 
the intensive negotiations between Britain and China 
over the Opium Question. That Li Hung-chang, the principal 
negotiator for China, was thus involved meant that he 
did not' want to bring up either the problem of increased 
dues (as Tso's proposal) or prohibition of native opium. 
Other officials, more or less in his shadow, likewise 
remained silent. With no initiative from leading officials, 
the Imperial government was quite content to remain 
silent. By raising the matter itself, there was nothing 
to gain or lose - if additional revenue was received- 
by the provinces these were unlikely to be remitted to 
the capital. In the provinces, however, the traditional 
publication of prohibition proclamations continued 
unabated. In some cases, results were achieved,twhile
in others, they became dead letters from the very begin-
. 78 •n m g r •
In conclusion, four points should be noted. 1) Product­
ion of native opium was greatly on the increase, and 
its quality was also improving, so that it could compete 
directly with the best of foreign opium. By the early 
1880s, the amount of foreign opium imported had come 
almost totally to depend on the availability of native 
opium in China. This was partially due to the cheapness 
in price of the native drug, but also due to its quality, 
as well as to the fact that it could be re-smoked many times 
Thus the increased consumption of native opium by the 
Chinese populace did not see a corresponding increase in 
the import of foreign opium. Moreover, because of the 
establishment of opium monopolies in most of the Treaty 
ports, non-Chinese opium firms were gradually forced out 
of the business. By the eighties, there were only two big 
foreign opium firms in China - that of David Sassoon and 
Co..and E.D. Sassoon and Co. (both parsee merchants). Yet, 
even these two firms were being forced out of business in 
a number of Treaty ports. Therefore, when negotiations
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for the opium agreement were concluded in 1885, it was 
much easier for both governments to enforce the stipulations.
2) Although prohibition was always enforced, it was only
after the disastrous famine in Shansi between 1877-78,
during'which millions died of starvation, that stricter
79measures were exerted' . Nevertheless, prohibition was
far from being a success. This was partly because of
the' inability of the Imperial government to enforce its
edicts, since provincial governments had more autonomy
, than acknowledged at the capital; and partly because of
the inability of the provincial governments themselves
to enforce them. Contributing to “these factors was the
desire of the provincial authorities to secure more
revenue through the levy of both the land and likin taxes
on native opium. There was also the argument previously
put forward by Li Hung-chang in 1872 and then accepted
by quite a few high-ranking officials, that it would be
f a wise policy to encourage the growth of native opium so
that less foreign opium would be purchased and the balance
of trade as well as the flow of silver would be in 
80China1s favour
3) It could also be argued that renewed prohibition 
attempts, whether they were successful or not, were a 
direct response to Kuo Sung-t1ao*s memorials. They became 
endeavours made by the Imperial government and its high 
officials to convince the Anti-opium Society of China*s 
willingness and eagerness to exterminate the evil of 
opium. Such measures would also put pressure on the 
British government, both from the Chinese minister and
. the Anti-opium Society, to effect a settlement of the 
Opium Question beneficial more to China than to either 
Britain or India. Thus, whether the prohibition measures 
w.ere wholly effective or completely useless would bear 
little or no significance to their use as a weapon for 
diplomacy®*1*.
4-) Concerning the dues levied on native opium during this
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period, a subject which had not been noted in detail, 
they varied little from those levied before 1876, i.e. 
the total amounted to half of that levied on the foreign 
drug. This practice was still the rule rather than the
o p
exceptioh • As in the period before 1876, most of the 
native opium evaded such dues. The tax imposed on the 
land used for poppy cultivation was very much dependent 
on local authorities and the amount varied according to 
the ‘greediness1 of the local officials and the degree 
of pressure exerted from higher authorities to prohibit 
the cultivation.
Activities of the Anti-opium Society in Britain
The movement against the opium trade had begun in the
first decade of the nineteenth century when it was realized
by some the injury it could cause to China. However, \
this was not an organized movement, although it was
supported by missionary societies and some members of
parliament. A select committee to investigate into the
trade was formed between 1830-32, and in the following
decades motions were tabled in parliament against the
trade. In 1843, for example, Lord Shaftesbury, then Lord
Ashley, tabled a motion which called on the government
to terminate the opium trade. It was later withdrawn. In
1838 Mr. Cobden moved that a select committee should he
appointed to inquire into the state of Britain's commercial
relations with China because he regarded as insufficient
the evidence tabled by the government to justify the war
of 1856-38* Though this was carried by a majority, Lord
Palmerston appealed to the country which returned him
to office with an increased majority. In 1870, Sir Wilfred
Lawson moved 'that this House condemns the system by which
a large portion of the Indian revenue is raised from opium.'
»
It was defeated by a division in the house.
i j ,  L C^ .
Then in,* Autumn ,*1874, the movement was organized with 
the formation of the Anglo-Chinese Society for the Suppress­
ion of the Opium Trade (or Anti-opium Society) with
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Lord. Shaftesbury as its first president. He continued to 
lead the anti-opium movement until his death in 1886, 
when Sir Joseph Pease succeeded him. Although the society 
supported and advocated various measures at different 
times, it was characterized by its vehement objection to 
the opium trade as a whole - not only in China but also 
in British India. Before the signing of the Chefoo 
Convention in September 1876, the society directed its 
attention mainly to the condemnation of British military 
and diplomatic influence under which the admission of 
Indian opium into China was maintained. Failure by the 
government to ratify in toto the agreement gave the 
society the focal point of contention.
The society enlised the support of other organizations,
basically missionary and religious ones, and key .political,
religious and social figures, in its fight for the
* 83ratification of the opium clause m  the agreement .
Towards this end it utilized all the arguments that could 
be thought up, although they were all based on moral, 
humanitarian, religious, ethical and even utopian principles 
Persuasion and.perseverance rather than coercion were
used to attain its goal. The society's official publication
• 84The Friend of China - appeared first m  1875 and 
continued until 1916. When the Additional Article to the 
Chefoo Convention was signed in 1885, its labours were 
rewarded, and dissolution of the society was discussed. 
However, its members decided that its work should continue 
though bn a revised basis. Attention was directed at the 
British government's patronage and promotion of production 
and sale of opium in India. The result was the appointment 
of the 'Royal Commission on Opium' in 1894. However, 
findings and recommendations.of the commission in 1895 
were considered as Unsatisfactory and the society continued 
with its task of exterminating not only the trade but 
the growth of opium in India. In 1916 it finally succeeded 
and having accomplished what it had set out to do, it
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was dissolved voluntarily^.
The Chefoo Convention was signed on 15 September 1876 
and when the contents became known to the public in 
Britain in October, the Anti-opium Society immediately 
took action. In two memorials to the Foreign Office on 
24 November 1876 and 4 October 1877* i^ called on the 
government to ratify the agreement. The society repeated 
the argument used in previous years that the British 
government was upholding the opium trade with its military 
superiority and that the trade was not only inflicting 
serious injury on the population of China but was 1 in 
violation of the plainest dictates'of justice and humanity.1 
It also wanted the government to assure China that it 
would look upon favourably any proposal or legislation 
to diminish or suppress the trade^. Also during,1877* 
three memorials came from the Church Missionary Society, 
the London Missionary Society and the National Bible 
Society of Scotland, addressed to Lord Derby, head of the 
Foreign Office. The first memorial stressed that its 
missionaries in China had observed the evil and harmful 
effects of drug addiction. This would definitely prejudice 
Sino-British relations, and since the opium trade was 
purely for the benefit of the Indian government and to 
the detriment of British manufacturers, the government 
was urged to prohibit gradually the import of the drug 
into China. The other two memorials argued the same case 
on grounds of humanity and political justice^7.
The British government made no response to such 
appeals, and in the January 1878 publication of the 
Friend of China, a much more emphatic entreatment was 
made. It observed that mercantile opposition to the 
Alcock Convention was immediate, but there was practically 
none to the Chefoo Convention. Only the Shanghai General 
Chamber of Commerce objected but this came nine months 
after the agreement was signed. The much-noted objections 
raised by the merchants Michie and Barnes in London came •
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another five months later. If Wade had not been taken ill
and if a more positive answer had been received from the
Indian government, the agreement would have been ratified
long before such opposition bodies 'wake up out of sleep.1
Furthermore, the essence of their arguments boiled down
to.simply, 'we acknowledge the right of the Chinese to .
tax opium as they please, but we object to bestow on them
the power of doing so.' This was an extremely feeble
.argument and it was small wonder that the reputable chambers
of commerce in Britain did not endorse their views.
Though., they expressed some doubts on the clauses on
trade, they were all in agreement 'that the opium clause
was a just one. In another section of the issue, under
'China News', the British government was blamed for
China's inconsistent and unsatisfactory attitude, towards
opium and argued that if the Chefoo Convention was ratified,
China would have no excuse to continue its*present 'hot
88and cold policy.'
During the next month, the Anti-opium Society, together 
with some other associations, wrote to Lord Derby of the 
Foreign Office requesting an interview with him. It also 
presented again a memorial from Lord Shaftesbury and 
others^. In this memorial, which had been first submitted 
in November 1877* the memorialists urged that though the 
Indian government would advice non-ratification, the Home 
government should ratify the agreement all the more. This 
was because the agreement was in the nature of a compromise 
with China, and Wade had insisted that it should be dealt 
with 'as a whole'. Now that China had carried out her 
part of the agreement, it was up to Britain to do the same. 
The value of the opium clause was to help the Chinese 
government in the collection of the opium likin by the 
prevention of evasion of duties at the Treaty ports. This 
alone, they contended, was sufficient basis for ratification. 
Moreover, at the present, many countries were establishing 
tariff barriers to jeopardize Britain's commercial
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interests, but China had adopted the opposite policy.
Britain's tariff imposed on Chinese tea and China's opium 
tariff and likin constituted a good example. Furthermore, 
if the opium clause were to be carried out, China would 
only ben'efit by £1 million while the Indian Exchequer 
would profit by over £6 million. It would, therefore, not
90only be unreasonable but also unjust to refuse ratification • 
To the request for an interview, the Foreign Office 
did not reply, and in April, Mr. Turner, secretary of the 
society, wrote and expressed the feeling that 'considerable 
and increasing number of Her Majesty's subjects are 
waiting with much anxiety for the publication of.the 
final decision of Her Majesty's Government in regard to 
it /the Chefoo Convention7 • ^
In June 1879* the Huddersfield Methodist Conference 
sent a memorial to Lord Salisbury of the Foreign Office 
asking that its resolutions on the opium trade be placed 
on record: 'first#Because as a source of Indian Revenue 
it is commercially unsound, unpolitic and immoral; second.
The unjustifiable and unchristian method by which it’ was 
at first imposed by British arms; third. The terrible 
consequences of indolence, crime, poverty, misery and 
death which it inevitably entails upon the people; fourth.
The disastrous and lamentable effects which it has upon 
Christian Missionary zeal and enterprise among the 
Chinese; and lastly, that it places England in such an 
unenviable and invidious position as to expose her to 
the reproach of inconsistency among other nations, inas­
much as while we send the Gospel and Missionaries to 
teach Christianity and virtue, we also send that poisonous 
drug which demoralizes the land and constitutes an 
almost insuperable barrier to the Gospel's advance.'
Ratification of the* Chefoo Convention would promote 'the
92abolition of the evil complained of.'y
The Foreign Office turned a deaf_.eai|to these petitions. 
However, finally in June 1880 a meeting with the Anti-opium 
Society was agreed to. A memorial was presented at the
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meeting which claimed that the long delay in ratifying 
the Chefoo Convention had tarnished Britain's national 
character for good faith as well as a serious injustice 
to China. It summarized its arguments thus: 'in order to 
procure'his demands /Wade/ summoned war-ships and menaced- 
war.' Thus he procured diplomatic and commercial concess­
ions of great importance from China; giving that country 
two considerable concessions in return. At the last 
moment he secured the almost immediate execution of the 
concessions to this country, and made the concessions to 
China dependent on an uncertain contingency /consent of 
other powers?* The consequence is‘that at this moment 
Great Britain enjoys the Chinese concessions, and China 
has not received one jot of the concessions promised to 
her.
During this period, the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce
also memorialized to the Foreign Office urging the
ratification. It argued that China had already fulfilled
her obligations and if Britain refused to carry out her
part it would be n breach of good faith which 'cannot
but reflect dishonour upon Great Britain in the opinion
of other nations, and give good cause to the Government
of China to complain.' Objections raised by the Indian
government were invalid because by the Treaty of Tientsin
Britain had expressly agreed that 'opium was to be
carried into the interior only as Chinese property' and
that 'the transit-dues on it will be arranged as the
Chinese Government see fit.' Thus the opium clause was
nothing more than a further clarification of terms which
94•Britain had already acquiesced to' .
In October 1882, the Synod of Glasgow and Ayr of the 
Free Church of Scotland memorialized to Gladstone, the 
prime minister, urging the ratification of the opium 
clause on the grounds that the respect of Britain as a 
nation to be respected had been greatly undermined by 
forcing opium on China. They also noted that Malwa opium
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growers should be placed under the same stringent .regula-
95tions as those imposed on Patna and Benares opium growers'*'.
Three months later, J. MacDonald, a missionary,
struck a new note in argument. He quoted the Chinese maxim
of 'do n6t do unto others what you do not like done to
yourself' and asked the Horae government and the Indian
government to do away with petty objections, and to put
their trust in God. He also suggested that opium cultivation
in India could be gradually replaced by the growth of 
•
more useful crops and this would result in the moral
prestige of the British government being exalted and the
96name of Britain glorified throughout the world' •
While these petitions and appeals were being delivered 
and made to the government, another line of action was 
taken in both houses of parliament^, ^he most cqnsistent 
question raised in parliament was to ask for Wade's 
memorandum (the one he wrote on 14 July 18^7) to be made 
available. The government adopted a delaying tactic. Three 
times in 1877 - on 10 February, 13 April and 30 July - 
the government agreed but the memorandum never appeared.
In August 1877 some parts of it were released but these 
only concerned Wade1s negotiations on the murder of 
Margary and not the commercial clauses in section III of 
the Chefoo Convention. When the question was raised again 
on 11 April 1878, the government once more replied that 
It would be laid before the House within two or three days 
but again the promise was not fulfilled. When Lord 
Salisbury was questioned in the House of Lords on 23 July 
1878 and then on 9 May 1879, he replied that delay in 
ratification was because of the dissent of other foreign powers 
and made no mention of the opium clause.
The debate in parliament was resumed when on 18 
January 1881 J.W. Pease, secretary of the Anti-opium 
Society, asked three questions: 1.)' If Wade's promised 
despatch concerning his observations on opium had been 
received? 2) If the confidential part of Wade's Report
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would be laid upon the Table? 3) If Government would
98approve Wade’s arrangement of 1880?' To these, Sir C.
Dilke replied on behalf of Salisbury that 1) it had not 
been received and Wade had indicated that it would 
contain' little new matter; 2) it could not be laid 
before the House until the close of negotiations with 
China; and 3) the Indian government had no objection to 
the arrangement (this was to use the example of the 
Shanghai likin collectorate for a trial period of five 
years) provided certain details on likin barriers could 
be obtained, and the Chinese government was preparing
99an answer".
In late April 1881, A. Pease introduced three
resolutions in parliament which called for the ratification..
of the opium clause, the condemnation of the op^um trade
and financial support to be given to the Indian government
to decrease its cultivation of-the-poppy--— However, . •
two new resolutions, amending his, were introduced by
another member which stipulated that there was insufficient
evidence given for the termination of the opium trade,
and that the Indian government, because of its measures
to ameliorate the condition of the natives of India,
could not possibly do without the revenue acquired from
the opium trade. The amendments were adopted and Pease's
resolutions were consequently defeated^'*'.
In August of the same year, Pease asked the government
for clarification of its stand on the question of the levy
of opium dues by the Chinese government. Dilke replied
that the Chinese government was free to levy what duties
• it pleased on native opium, and on Indian opium, once it
had left the foreign importer's hands, could be treated •
likewise. This was, in fact, a repetition of the arrangement
of 1838 and no neW information or stand was either
102disclosed or adopted by the government
In the parliamentary debate on 28 February 1882,
Pease asked once again if the opium clause had been ratified
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and if Wade's despatches could be laid on the table. To
this the government replied that the clause had not yet
been ratified and the Chinese government had not complained
about the delay. Friendly negotiations were going on
with China and the papers therefore could not be laid
103before parliament . This was another delaying tactic on 
the part of the government. On 22 July, Pease repeated 
his questions and Dilke replied that the matter was 
still under consideration and papers would be laid 'in 
due course. '^ -Op­
pressed continuously and with the mounting support 
of such resolutions and appeals from the public, some 
serious thinking was done by the Foreign Office. In a 
memorandum drawn up by J. Pauncefote, the permanent 
undersecretary and the person assigned to deal with the 
issue of taxation of opium, the entire matter was 
carefully considered. Believing that the Xnti-opium 
Society and its allies would be satisfied as long as the 
British government did not interfere with the inland 
taxation and did not enter into a partnership with China 
over the supply of Indian opium, and arguing that
consequences of such would rest entirely with the Chinese
government, he advocated that the time had come for
105Wade's despatches to be laid before parliament
In the afternoon of 17 August 1882, correspondences 
including Wade*s report and all subsequent information 
from 1879 to 1882 were laid before parliament. The only 
ones 'missing' were departmental correspondence between 
the Foreign and India . Offices which was the result of a
•special request from the latter arguing that since
negotiations with China were still underway, such documents-j
should be kept a secret for the time being
The Anti-opium* Society had scored a definite victory. 
After six years of continuous appeals and representations, 
they had obtained at least half of what they were fighting 
for. Attainment of the other half, to the society,-became
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a matter of time.
Following on the heels of this success, on 1 November 
1882, a conference was held by the society and Pease 
moved a resolution which was unanimously adopted. The 
resolution contained four points: 1) that it was unworthy 
of Britain, as a Christian nation, to continue the importation 
of opium into China at a low rate of duty; 2) that the 
Chinese government should be allowed to pursue whatever 
course of action it wanted regarding opium; 3) that the 
opium clause of the Chefoo- Convention ought to be confirmed 
by the British government immediately; and 4) that the 
society would continue to impress upon the Indian govern­
ment the inconsistency of trading in opium solely for the 
107sake of revenue, .
Then in April 1883, Pease claimed in parliament that 
he had obtained 75,000 signatures supporting his motion 
and he moved a resolution ; 'that an humble address be 
presented to Her Majesty, praying that in all negotiations 
which take place betv/een the Governments of Her Majesty _ 
and China, having reference to the duties levied on opium 
under the Treaty of Tientsin, the Government of Her 
Majesty will be pleased to intimate to the Government 
of China that in any revision of that treaty, or in any 
other negotiations on the subject of opium, the Government 
of China will be met as that of an independent state,
having the full right to arrange its own import duties.'
108The motion was put to a vote but lost by 126 to 66- •
In August of the same year, a Mr. Richard once again
brought up the subject by asking if the Foreign Office
could inform the House of any new developments in the
negotiations with China on opium 'which have been
109proceeding since 1876.' ' To this question, the government
replied evasively that negotiations were proceeding and 
♦still being carried on, and that proposals have been 
made by the Chinese Government to which Her Majesty's 
Government have signified their readiness under certain
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conditions to a g r e e . * T h e  1 certain conditions* were 
not spelt out though they should refer to the ones laid 
down by the Indian government.
Debates concerning the opium clause in parliament 
ended at this stage, but a new tactic was underway. An 
avalanche of petitions and memorials poured into the 
Foreign Office between March 1883 and March 1885. They 
came from the Anti-opium Society and 105 other organiza­
tions^^*. Though the petitions varied in content and 
emphasis, they covered the following broad arguments:
1) it was a dishonour to the nation to carry on with 
the opium trade; 2) it was a hindrance to legitimate 
trade in British manufactures; 3) it was a barrier to 
the progress of Christianity in China; 4) the Pease 
motion made in the conference of the Anti-opium Spciety 
in November was supported; 5) “the Indian government*s 
finances should be put on a sound and healthy footing;
6) the opium trade was a moral and physical wrong done 
to China; 7) China should be allowed to deal freely with 
opium; and 8) a speedy abolition of the opium trade 
should be arrived at.
Apart from these arguments, six other points of 
contention and observation were drawn up by the Manchester 
District Auxiliary of the Anti-opium Society in March 
1884, were put forward; most of them the government cc(uld 
not refute and was put into a more embarassing position.
The six points were: 1) the Indian government derived an 
annual revenue of £7# million from the opium trade of 
which £5# million came from the Bengal Opium Monopoly and 
the other two million from the taxation of Malwa opium 
exported from the native states; 2) provisions in the 
opium clause of the Chefoo Convention *were directed to 
the prevention of opium smuggling. If they had been carried 
out they would also indirectly have enabled China to 
adopt other measures calculated to restrict the trade in 
opium1; 3) financiers even in India were beginning to
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recognize the unwisdom of relying on the opium trade for . 
revenue and the very 'prosperous conditions of our Indian 
finances for the last two or three years affords a 
substantial opportunity for adopting a juster and sounder 
fiscal policy, without laying any increased burden upon 
the people of India1; 4) public opinion as well as 
religious bodies were gathering strength against the 
opium trade; 5) representations against the trade had 
resulted in the closing down by the Indian government many 
opium shops in British Burma and also had resulted in 
a treaty with Korea which prohibited British merchants 
from importing opium to that country; China should therefore 
be accorded the same right; and 6) a comparison of 
exports of British merchandise between 1867 and 1882 
to eight countries showed only a 5$ increase in China, 
the lowest percentage when China had the densest popula­
tion. The chief magistrate at Shanghai was quoted as
saying, 'cease sending us so much opium, and we shall
112be enabled to take your manufactures.'
It is difficult to assess accurately the degree of 
influence activities of the Anti-opium Society (and its 
supporters) had on the British government in persuading 
it to reach an agreement with China on the taxation of 
opium, which was detrimental to Indian, if not British 
interests and beneficial to China's. Nevertheless, a c 
conclusion can be drawn by analysing the anti-opium 
movement in two ways: the movement itself and the 
reactions to it from the British government.
In regard to the movement itself, taking into 
consideration that the government was a democratic one 
based to a large extent on popular and public support, 
it may well have had a certain influence on government 
decisions. The fact‘that the movement persisted, growing 
in momentum and influence through the increasing support 
given to it by the public (such as support from dignatories 
like the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Lord Mayor of 
London), meant that it had greatly strengthened its image
6.39
and 'political' power. Votes taken in parliament on motions
proposed by members sympathetic to the anti-opium cause
(most of them were actually members of the society) showed
that the government's margin decreased progressively
every time a vote was taken. Although the government was
never defeated in parliament during this period, it was
defeated in June 1893, and this led to the appointment of
the 'Royal Commission on Opium'. The victory was heralded
#by the Anti-opium Society as 'the greatest and most solid
forward step that the movement for the suppression of the
113opium trade had yet made.' ^
Arguments put forward by the society and others, 
despite some debatable points such as the interpretation 
of the 1858 and 1876 agreements to suit their reasoning, 
were based on moral and religious grounds, and qs such 
were irrefutable. The slow growth of trade with China
i
in merchandise other than opium, though dependent on many 
other factors totally unconnected with the trade in the 
drug, was conveniently used as a very forceful 'proof' 
in favour of the argument for the termination of the opium 
trade, which would then greatly stipulate British exports 
to China. Bearing all these factors in mind, the anti-opium 
movement in itself must have exerted a great deal of 
pressure and influence on government.
Consideration of the reactions from the British 
government to the movement have to depend on written 
statements or comments made by the various departments of 
the Home government and that of the Indian government.
These are not abundant, but what do exist go to affirm 
•the assertions already made. The evasive or elusive 
answers given by government to questions put to it by 
the Anti-opium Society and members in parliament on•the 
opium trade and thfe opium clause of the Chefoo agreement, 
and the retention of Wade's report, showed that the govern­
ment was not prepared to reveal the complete facts for 
fear, of attacks from the society, from which it would be
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unable to defend itself. There was a great deal of 
correspondence and of opinions exchanged between the 
Foreign Office and the India Office, the latter represent­
ing the Indian government's interests, concerning the 
opium trade and negotiations on the Opium Question with • 
China during this period, and they can be partially 
taken as a result of pressure exerted by the anti-opium 
movement.
Some statements made by the government will confirm 
this contention. In June 1881, the Indian Office wrote 
to the Indian government asking the latter to re-examine 
the question of opium revenue. Among the reasons cited, 
one was the anti-opium movement in Britain: 'Although 
this nlovement is...founded to a great extent on mis­
apprehension and even on prejudice, its importance,
resting on the ability, activity and high character of
«
those by whom it is supported, cannot and ought not to
be ignored; and so long as the position of the Government
of India is not perfectly unassailable, it must be
expected that it will continue rather to increase than
114to dimmish intensity.' The reply from the Indian
government was that the arguments used by the Anti-opium
Society were not at all practical since there were
118many considerations that had been ignored .
In April, the memorandum drawn up by J. Pauncefote 
of the Foreign Office stated that anticipated opposition 
from the society on humanitarian grounds to the govern­
ment 's collection of likin for China would be tremendous.
A 'council of war1 to decide what answers to be given
116to the society's representations was even contemplated • 
Finally in January 1885, the India Office, in 
explaining its decision as to why it would agree to 
China's proposal df a joint collection of 110 taels, 
used the anti-opium movement as one of the principal 
reasons: 'the anti-opium agitation in this country, 
already serious and likely to be yet more formidable in
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a new House of Commons, is a factor in the present 
question to be taken into grave consideration....should 
the negotiation be broken off on the question of the 
amount of the uniform rate, an answer would not be easy 
to frame,' and I need not remind Your Excellency that 
the adoption by the House of Commons of a resolution, 
such as has been repeatedly moved, condemnatory of your
117opium revenue, would prove embarassing to your Government.1
After the Anti-opium Society learnt of this.-decision, a f.
congratulatory mdsaage was sent to the Foreign Office
expressing satisfaction that the opium clause in the
Chefoo Convention had finally been given a satisfactory
alternative^®.
All considered, the anti-opium movement in Britain,
led by the Anti-opium Society, though not influential
before the Chefoo Convention was signed, became a strong
force in the succeeding years and is a factor that
cannot be neglected in our analysis of the Opium 
119Question .
Involvement of the Chinese government with the
activities of the Anti-opium Society was not very marked,
though undoubtedly, a close relationship did exist
between the society and the Chinese legation in London, /
which was headed by Kuo Sung-t'ao and then Marquis
Tseng (or Tseng Chi-tse). Direct support of the activities
of the society was only present in the initial years,
as indicated by the communique that was addressed to Lord
120Derby of the Foreign Office by Kuo in August 1877 •
This came after Kuo had received a deputation from the 
society headed by Lord Shaftesbury. It also resulted in 
Kuo's memorials to the throne and the resultant intensi­
fication of prohibition of poppy cultivation in China.
At an earlier date in May of the same year, Li 
Hung-chang had written to Kuo commending the work of 
the society and recommending that details on the 
suppression of poppy cultivation in China and India
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121should be worked out . Then in raid-1881 Li wrote a
letter to the society, which was published in the Times,
in which the moral issue was emphasized: 1 Opium is a
subject in the discussion of which England and China can
never meet on common ground. China views the whole
question from a moral standpoint: England from a fiscal..•'
The ruling motive of China is to repress opium by heavy
taxation.. .never the desire to gain revenue from such 
122a source.1 In early 1883 the idea of a strong deputation;
m
from China, to be headed by a Chinese official of the
highest rank, to Britain to convince the British people
of China* s sincerity in the suppression of opium and the
disastrous effects of the drug on China was contemplated;
and a letter was received from the Anti-opium Society,
later in the year, that such a move would allow tthe society
to press more successfully for the termination of the
opium trade. Unfortunately, such a deputation never 
125materialized .
Apart from these 'contacts* between China and the
Anti-opium Society, there was nothing else in evidence.
However, deputations from the society frequently called
at the Chinese legation and held discussions with the
124 /Chinese ministers • These-, however, did not result m  
representations, made by the Chinese ministers to the 
Foreign Office. This matter can be easily explained by 
the various plans that were being discussed in China 
and London. It would have been.impolitic to advocate 
total extermination of the opium traffic whilst at the 
same time negotiating for a settlement of the Opium 
Question which would involve continued import of Indian 
opium.
On the whole, encouragement more than support was 
given to the anti-opium movement and the Anti-opium 
Society by China so that in her negotiations with Britain, 
she could use it as a powerful diplomatic lever. As the 
society succeeded in achieving its aims, the Chinese 
government also could be considered as having scored a 
diplomatic victory with the opium agreement of 1885.
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CHAPTER 7: FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE OPIUM QUESTION 
1877 to 1884.
Refusal by the British government to ratify the opium 
clause of the Chefoo Convention meant that conditions 
of the opium trade were still governed by the agreement 
of 1858 (Rule V). However, owing to the introduction of 
new factors, such as the increased growth of native 
opium and the establishment of the Anti-opium Society, 
it was impossible for the question to lie dormant as it 
had done after the Alcock Convention of 1869* Moreover, 
the British government did not reject the opium clause 
outright, for in its refusal it left the door open for 
further negotiations which hopefully would result in 
a settlement agreeable to both the Chinese and Indian 
governments. Thus, there was continued bargaining. 
However, negotiations were not resumed untj.1 1879* This 
was because Wade had left for Britain almost immediately 
after the signing of the Chefoo Convention, not to 
return to China until mid-1879* Fraser, the charg^ 
d*Affaires, was not officially asked to negotiate during 
Wade's absence. It was also due to Britain's late 
confirmation of her rejection of the clause. That China 
did not attempt to begin further negotiations could be 
due to her offence at Britain's unfavourable reaction 
to the opium clause and her concern in internal affairs.
Problems facing the negotiators
When negotiations were resumed, several problems 
confronted the negotiators. It would be well to look at 
them in some detail at this point so that a better 
understanding of the course of action taken during the 
subsequent years can be arrived at. The problems fall 
into the following.categories: 1) the varied systems of 
taxation that existed in China with regard to Indian 
opium, and the difficulties in supervision of such 
collections; 2) the Chinese government did not have a 
definite 'opium policy' apart from hoping to obtain as
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much revenue from opium as possible; and 3) the fears 
of the Indian government to any settlement that might 
result in detrimental effects to its own revenue, since 
. the cost of running the government was very much 
dependent'on it\
The amounts and types of duties and dues, and the 
methods by which they were collected varied in every 
Treaty port. There were monopolies that controlled the 
entire opium trade at the ports and the provincial 
governments received pre-determined sums in lieu of 
collection themselves. There were also ports where the 
local authorities collected the various duties and dues 
levied on opium after it had reached the hands of Chinese 
dealers. There was also the special case of Canton, 
where the existence of the Hoppo and his native custom­
house complicated matters. Moreover, the total amount 
of dues collected varied from port to port and year to 
year, sometimes varying a few times within a year. Even 
where the local authorities collected the levies them­
selves, the method of collection, the rebate given to 
Chinese and foreign merchants, and the amount collected 
if opium was for transit purposes or for consumption 
within the province or port, all differed extensively.
To give a clearer picture of such differences and
2diversities, we can give the following examples .
In reply to two circulars asking for information on 
• the likin on opium (circulars of 30 August 1879 and 
1 November 1880), the following figures were compiled 
for the Treaty ports: for the year 1879* Shanghai reported 
that the total likin was 32.42 taels per chest with no 
distinction between Malwa and Patna, but there was an 
additional levy of 3-267 taels per chest of hai;-fong tax 
in the foreign settlements ostensibly for the maintenance 
of the mixed court; At Tamsui, there were differences in 
the amount levied on different kinds of opium. Malwa, 
Persian and Turkey had to pay $40 per picul while Benares
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and Patna paid $80 per chest. Moreover, the rebate given 
to the foreign importer if he paid the likin was $6 and 
$10 respectively, but only $3 and $5 if the native 
dealer paid it. At Amoy, the collection was farmed to 
a monop'olist who guaranteed a likin of $127.35 per chest 
for 14-2 chests every month; $13 of that amount was to be 
deducted for expenses of the foundling hospital and 
other charitable institutions.
From the same report, a list of rates at seven 
different collectorates was compiled. They differed 
from $127.35 at Amoy to $4-1 at Taiwan, with the other 
ports between these two figures. The differences in the 
amount collected is noteworthy in that they were not 
exceptions to the rule in other provinces. Chinkiang's 
rate was 16 taels per picul, which was also the, rate for ■
all of Kiangsu and Anhwei; while Tientsin varied from 
year to year: in 1875 it was 32.35 taels per picul, then in 1878 
it rose to 34-. 55 taels and dropped to 33*55 taels in 1879.
For Peking, it remained the same from 1875 to 1879 at ,
38 taels per picul; but it was 33 taels at T fung-chow,
10 taels at Paoting-fu and 38 taels at Mi-yun hsien - all 
of them in Chihli. At Swatow in 1879 the addition of a 
new levy brought the total to 27 taels per picul with no 
distinction between the various kinds of opium. Hankow's 
total levy changed almost every year, but in 1879 it 
was standardized at 24- taels per chest. Sassoon and Co. 
monopolized the import and paid only two-thirds of the 
amount, i.e. 16 taels per chest. Newchwang's likin was 
32.88 taels per chest for Patna and 39*4-3 taels for 
Malwa. Chefoo collected 33 taels but there was a customary 
rebate of 1.2 taels. At Canton the nominal rate was 30 
taels per chest but there was a rebate of 20 taels 
beginning in 1876;* but starting in 1878, a monopoly was 
established for the Canton prefecture which paid $14-0,000 
every year to the Canton authorities. However, if opium 
was destined for Fukien it had to pay 12 taels per picul
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more but that to be sent to Kiangsi paid a varied 
additional charge of between 6 to 15 taels. Kiukiang 
reported a total levy of $75*50 per picul though an 
increase was anticipated. At Ningpo the levy on Patna 
and Bena'res was 54- haikuan taels while that on Malwa 
and Persian was 57*79 haikuan taels4 but there was a 
customary rebate of 5 haikuan taels to the foreign 
importer and 5 haikuan taels to the native dealer,
^making the total likin barely 50 haikuan taels. A monopoly 
was also established there which charged the same amount 
but added an additional incidental charge of 1.2 haikuan
7, .
taels<.
Canton was different from the other Treaty ports; 
for opium imported into Kwangtung from Hong Kong in 
native junks, the native customs under the control of the 
Governor-General and the Hoppo would levy the Tariff
4
duty and likin. However, the Tariff duty actually collected 
was lower than that imported in foreign vessels to 
Canton’and collected by the Foreign Inspectorate. This 
was because of a rebate system, in varying amounts, given 
to junk traders by the Hoppo. Taking 1876 as an example, 
the total levy by the Foreign Inspectorate amounted to 
62.12 taels which was composed of the Tariff duty of 56 
taels, likin of 16 taels, sycee premium of 5 taels, 
t1ieh-hsiang (contributory levy to the Governor-General*s 
coffers) of 7 taels and the difference of scales payable 
to the Hong Kong Bank of 0.12 taels. The total levy of 
the native customs, in comparison, was 52 taels, composed 
of just the Tariff duty and likin. In June the commissioner 
of customs managed to reduce the collection at his office 
to 56*12 taels ( Tariff duty of 50 taels, likin of 25 taels 
and difference in scales charge of 12 taels) and obtained 
the consent of the Governor-General and the Hoppo to 
raise theirs to 53 taels. Still the difference of 5*12 
taels between the two accounted for a larger percentage of 
opium passing through the native customs. Moreover,
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payment at the native customs exempted the opium from
further dues if it was to be transported to the interior;
but that that went through the Foreign Inspectorate had
to pay 6 taels per picul additional charges at both the
il
East and Vest Fort barrier stations •
In May 1885 an Imperial decree ordered the amount of
likin on opium to be made uniform at 86 taels per picul
irrespective of type, and native opium was taxed at half 
5of this amount . However, though it was put into practice 
and collected at most of the Treaty ports, it was 
possibly intended more as a lever for the immediate 
signing of the opium agreement than as an attempt by the 
Imperial government to achieve uniformity in collection 
of the likinu
The Chinese government, in a way similar to the British
government, did not have an ’opium policy* to speak of.
#
It wavered between two extremes: the total extinction of 
the opium trade (including the complete destruction of 
domestic production of the drug), and the gaining of the 
maximum advantages (financial) from the trade. These 
were dictated by moral and traditional considerations on 
the one hand, and fiscal ones on the other. Its aims were 
seldom clarified, since it took no initiative. This was> 
partly because of the lack of effective control by the 
Imperial government over the provincial authorities, 
and partiy because initiatives now came from leading 
officials rather than the government. Thus, as we have 
noticed earlier, memorials from Kuo Sung-t'ao and Tso 
Tsung-t'ang could compel the Imperial government to move 
towards total prohibition, but ones from Li Hung-chang 
and the various proposals that came along between 1879 and 
1883 could also swing the government towards the other 
extreme. However, all considered, the direction that the 
government slowly moved towards was that of the fiscal 
side. Total suppression of the opium trade was:.an 
impossible task. Provincial leaders were unwilling to
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carry out prohibition edicts to the extreme while the 
British government, under pressure from India, could not 
agree to a total stoppage of the Indian import to China.
The argument for a highest possible duty on Indian opium 
was considered the soundest. It would not only discourage 
the use of the foreign product and encourage the use 
of native opium, thereby saving a large amount of precious 
silver from being exported. By the imposition of a high 
duty on the foreign drug, though not a prohibitive one, 
it would also replenish the very depleted Imperial 
treasury. It was the lesser of the two evils .
At the same time, there was also a contest for power 
or political predominance amongst certain influential 
Chinese officials. They may be divided into those led by 
Li Hung-chang and those under Tso Tsung-t'ang. The former 
adopted the more practical approach, i.e. fiscal
4
considerations before others; while~the latt er“represented '
the conservative and moral one. However, Li Hung-chang,
as Governor-General of Chihli (the capital province), the.
Chief Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports, and
with his intimate connections with the Tsungli-yamen and
the Foreign Inspectorate (the commissioner at Tientsin,
Detring, was his confidante), was the more influential of
the two protagonists. He was able to convince the Imperial
government of the correctness and practicability of his
approach. Thus, despite the fact that partial ratification
of the Chefoo Convention put him in some sort of 'shame1
because he was the one who negotiated it with Wade and had
to accept responsibility for it, he was still able to
7 .emerge the eventual winner'• The policy of the Chinese 
government, therefore, was reflected in the approaches 
adopted by its high-ranking officials. •
The problems, oh rather the fears, that the Indian 
government faced also greatly increased the difficulties 
in negotiations. It has been pointed out earlier that the 
Indian government was very much concerned with the competition
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to its drug from native opium, which began in the mid­
sixties. This fear continued to increase as more native 
opium was produced and as its quality improved. The 
absence of any increase in the import of Indian opium 
to China was viewed with alarm. Opium revenue, derived 
from excise duties and profit from sales in Calcutta 
of Bengal opium - Patna and Benares, and from transit 
passes sold to Malwa opium growers, amounted to a minimum 
of £8 million a year, and the Indian government always 
budgeted its opium revenue over the £9 million mark 
every year. It accounted for one-seventh of the total 
revenue of the government, and expenditures always 
surpassed revenues • Added to the fact that the Indian 
population was already taxed to the hilt, loss or even 
diminuition of such an important source of revenue would 
do irreparable damages to Indian finance.
4
Thus all negotiations concerning the opium trade had 
to be entered into with much caution and restraint. Any 
agreement that might be arrived at must have as its first 
and foremost concern the financial implications to the
9
Indian treasury . In the thinking of the Indian government 
moral issues were totally disregarded and only practic­
ability was stressed^. Wade had to conduct opium 
negotiations with the Chinese government always with 
this factor in mind.
With these seemingly insurmountable problems, the 
two governments entered into negotiations once again in 
187911.
Continuation of negotiations
After a period of uncertainty, the Indian government 
by 1878 was able to formulate a relatively definite policy 
in regard to its stand over the issue of the taxation of 
Indian opium by China. It gave the Home government as well 
as Wade the necessary terms of reference for future 
negotiations. In January 1878 the Indian government decided 
that it would raise no objection to the opium clause in
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the Chefoo Convention provided that the rate of local
likin to he levied by the Foreign Inspectorate with
Britain*s sanction should be settled beforehand and
restricted to approximately the rates levied at the time
12of the agreement • However, this was revised in November
of the same year when, in response to memorials submitted
by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and the Sassoon companies,
the Indian government included two new demands: 1) 'that
an attempt should be made to obtain the removal of the 
•
prohibition at present in force against English or other
foreign merchants accompanying or selling their opium in
the interior of China1; and 2) 'that the transit dues on
opium should be defined, and not left to the caprice of
. . 13the Chinese authorities.1 ^ The first demand was probably 
due to the fear of competition from native opium, while 
the second may be considered as a reiteration of the 
stand adopted earlier. With these basic principles 
established, Wade resumed negotiations with the Chinese 
government promising the Indian government that it would
1 Ll
be informed and consulted throughout
Negotiations were officially continued when Wade 
returned to Peking in July 1879, although he had conducted 
preliminary talks with Li Hung-chang at Tientsin slightly 
earlier. The first round of negotiations was short and 
possibly unpleasant. Li Hung-chang, who had become the 
official representative for the Imperial government to 
conduct the opium negotiations, started by accusing the 
British government of a lack of faith in the non-ratificaition 
of the opium clause; then he suggested that although Hart 
had suggested a likin of 90 taels per picul with the Tariff 
duty remaining at 50 taels, he was prepared to accept less, 
eventually coming down to 60 taels of likin. Wade made 
a counter offer of 50 taels and then stuck to a maximum 
of 40 taels. However, no solution was reached because the 
Tsungli-yamen instructed Li Hung-chang that China could 
not make such a large concession^.
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Arguments used by both sides were indicative not 
only of the line of policy pursued but also the 
difficulties that the two sides believed would be 
encountered, Wade’s arguments were based on practical 
methods dnd logical deductions. He took the amount of 
opium imported into Hong Kong in 1878 as the basis of 
reference. Of the 94*899 piculs that arrived in Hong Kong, 
72,424 piculs paid Tariff duty at the Treaty ports, 
while the remaining 22,475 piculs were unaccounted for.
Wade calculated that the average likin collected at the 
Treaty ports was 52.7 taels per picul, which would amount 
to a total of 2,577*500 taels. This would account for 
all the 72,424 piculs although a portion of this must 
have evaded the likin altogether or in part. Heavy likin 
levies at some ports such as Foochow and Amoy wou^ Ld 
result in smuggling and the total evasion of likin; 
while at other ports, only half of the official rate 
was collected, and at others, rebates were given or opium 
monopolies were in existence which provided less revenue 
to the local authorities. Of the 22,475 piculs that were 
unaccounted for, consumption in Hong Kong and exports to 
America, Australia and elsewhere would account for some. 
Some would have arrived in China by other means than the 
steamer to Treaty ports. The Hoppo had reported that for 
the financial year 1875-76, he had collected 524,595 taels 
on opium. This, calculating on the rate of Tariff duty, 
would amount to 10,815 piculs. Deducting the amount 
locally consumed in Hong Kong and exported to other places, 
there would still remain a considerable amount unaccounted 
for. Basing his argument on these figures, Wade made his 
offer of 40 taels likin per picul. Still using the 
figures, he calculated that, of the 72,4-24 piculs imported 
into China through the Treaty ports, China would have 
obtained a total of 4,550,220 taels, i.e. a Tariff duty 
total of 2,172,720 taels and a likin total of 2,577,500 
taels added together. Of the 22,4-75 piculs that were
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unaccounted for, 7,500 piculs could be deducted as the
amount consumed in Hong Kong and exported to other places,
and the remainder of 14,975 piculs would have been
smuggled into China. The Tariff duty and likin on this
amount Would be 930,450 taels. Allowing for the Hoppo to
have collected the same amount in 1878 as he did in 1875-76
the total opium revenue would be something less than
5,000,000 taels. However, if his offer was adopted, by•
%deducting the 7,500 piculs for consumption in Hong Kong etc
from the total import of 94,899 piculs, the sum of
87,399 piculs would pay a Tariff duty of 50 taels and a
likin of 40 taels. The total yield' would be 6,117,930
taels - a gain of over 1 million taels annually for the
Chinese government. Wade also proposed that to ensure that
the amount would be collected, the Indian government
would collect the likin for the Chinese government before
opium left for China, and the collection would be based
on quarterly or annual returns of the Foreign Inspectorate.
The customs blockade around Hong Kong could also be lifted
16with this arrangement
Arguments adopted by Li Hung-chang, representing the 
Imperial government, were not as well defined and substan­
tiated by statistics or calculations. He first pointed out 
that Wade's quotations of figures concerned only likin 
levied at the Treaty ports and had completely ignored 
inland charges which were quite considerable. (Wade had 
contended that these were almost totally evaded and the 
amount actually collected was minimal. He based this 
assessment on consular reports which noted the ease with 
which smugglers could carry opium from place to place.) 
Thus, the suggestion of 60 taels likin for the Treaty port 
area alone would be acceptable to the Chinese government 
while leaving inlan’d levies to be decided by the provincial 
authorities. Li also pointed out that if the latter 
authorities were deprived of their collection on opium, 
this would lead to grave consequences. It was also pointed
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out that collection of the likin through the Indian 
government would be quite distasteful to the Chinese 
government. Though such arguments were extremely feeble 
and lacked conviction, Wade was unable to impress his 
proposal on either Li Hung-chang or the Tsungli-yamen.
Rejection of Wade's proposal came officially from the 
Tsungli-yamen which said that the opium clause of the 
Chefoo Convention contained no provision whereby a uniform 
. rate of likin was to be introduced at the Treaty ports. 
China, by Rule V of 1858, was not bound to supply the 
whereabouts of likin stations and likin tariff tables and 
its collection had absolutely nothing to do with the 
Foreign Inspectorate^. Then in early October 1879 the
Tsungli-yamen urged that the opium clause in the Chefoo
18Convention be put ihto practice • The first round of
negotiations ended and no settlement was achieved.
«
Then in January 1880, Wade proposed and the Tsungli-
yamen agreed, that a trial period of five years should
be established at Shanghai whereby the foreign opium
merchant, on importing opium to the port, would have it
bonded, and upon selling it to the Chinese buyer, the
former would pay the Tariff duty and the latter the likin
of 40 taels per picul to the Foreign Inspectorate which
would free it from all levies until the second likin
barrier (the one outside the port-area). If the experiment
was successful, the same agreement could be extended to
the other Treaty ports, thereby providing a settlement
iq
to the opium clause of the Chefoo agreement . This, in
fact, was almost verbatim of the opium clause, and Wade
•thought that it might now receive the approval from other
Treaty powers since Britain was the only country involved
in the opium trade. Nevertheless, this arrangement was
not sanctioned by the foreign representatives at Peking,
20and it was not carried out .
The Tsungli-yamen, at this point, adopted a line of 
action that not only greatly embarassed the British
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government especially with reference to its critics such
as the Anti-opium Society, but also showed China's ability'
to utilize western diplomacy and international relations
to manoeuvre to her own advantage in the international
community of nations.
In November 1880, as a result of continued negotiations
over the question of the limitation of Chinese migration
to North America, a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship
was signed between China and the United States. In the
additional clauses, the second article agreed that
Chinese merchants were prohibited from importing opium into
the United States and vice versa,' whether in ships of
their or other nations. Violation of this agreement by
21any merchant would be severely punished • This article,
almost in verbatim, was included in treaties signed with
22Russia and Brazil •
In 1882, the treaty signed between Korea and the United 
States, with the Imperial government acting as the
23negotiator for Korea, also, contained the same article
In June 1882 Britain also signed a similar treaty with
24Korea which included the opium article • The embarassment of 
its inclusion in the treaty to the British government 
was marked.
When Wade heard about the opium clause in the Sino- 
American treaty, in January 1881, he called on the Tsungli- 
yamen asking for an .explanation of the clause. The .reply 
he received,;, indiis words, was, 'the ministers /of the 
Tsungli-yamen7 did not admit precisely that it was . 
entirely suggested on the American side; but they said 
that it could be of no possible advantage to China, the 
Americans in reality taking but very small part, if any, 
in the opium trade. It was necessary that they should 
have something to *show as gain before they surrendered any 
part of the Burlingame Treaty, and the Commercial Treaty 
now negotiated is simply a set off against the Treaty 
enabling the United States to regulate, in the manner
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25agreed, the immigration of Chinese labourers,* ^ This 
was an evasive and subtle answer to which Wade remarked 
(to the Foreign Office) that Morally, the Article must
26be regarded, I think, as a blow given to the opium Trade.1
In July 1882, back in Britain, the Anti-opium Society
seized the opportunity to ask the question in parliament .
as to whether Britain had signed a treaty with Korea on
similar terms as the Korean-American treaty. Dilke,
replying on behalf of the government, had to admit that
a treaty with Korea had been signed on 6 June 1882 by 
27Admiral Willes (. What was left unsaid by the two sides
was more significant.
The year 1881 was also marked by the consideration of
a number of proposals. We had already seen the suggestions
made by Tso Tsung-t'ang and Li Hung-chang during the
28middle of the year • Although they cannot be considered
as proposals since there was no discussion on them
between the Chinese and British governments, yet they did
exert a considerable influence on the approach of the
Tsu]?gli-yamen at that time. In July the Tsungli-yamen told
Wade that because of Tso's memorial, it would not be
possible as yet to effect any settlement to the issue
29of opium taxation .
In the meantime, the Indian government also expressed 
interest in the five-year plan proposed by.Wade, but wanted’ 
to know the exact location of the second likin barrier 
because if it was situated immediately outside the foreign 
settlements of Shanghai, the proposed arrangement would 
simply mean the raising of Tariff duty from 30 to 70 taels; 
and it asked the Foreign Office to seek more information 
concerning this as well as whether 40 taels was levied at 
Shanghai when the Chefoo Convention was concluded since 
its information wa£ that only 26 taels had been levied^ •
To these queries, Wade replied that the Tsungli-yamen was 
making enquiries and he had received assurances that no 
new likin barriers would be erected between the first and 
second ones existing already in 1876^ .
While- the five-year plan was still being considered by
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both countries, a financier called Joseph Samuel arrived
in Peking. He proposed a scheme which was regarded by Wade
as having distinct possibilities in solving the overall 
52Opium Question-' • Briefly, Samuel would persuade the
Indian gbvernment to become the sole salesman of all
opium, including Malwa and Persian. Apart from a quota
given to places other than China (such as Hong Kong,
Cochin-China, Manila etc.), the whole of the balance
would be forwarded to either a farmer or a monopolist
in China - whether he be a Chinese or foreigner. The
monopolist or receiver would become the sole salesman of
foreign opium in China. He would guarantee the Chinese
government a total levy of 100 taels for every picul
imported which would take the place of both the Tariff
duty and all other dues (including likin), and hence exempt
the opium from all further taxation whether at the Treaty
ports or elsewhere. The revenue“*‘s^r~drerivedrwouTd be
paid to the Foreign Inspectorate.
The Imperial government, possibly due to reactions
from other high-ranking officials after Tso Tsung-t1ang*s
memorial, did not express much interest in Samuel’s 
55scheme", though Li Hung-chang was somewhat in favour 
of it. Hart, however, found it a good plan but he played 
no part in recommending it either to the Chinese or 
British governments and was not consulted on the subject
......................7,lL...........................................
by the Tsungli-yamen^ •
Samuel’s boasting about his scheme, though receiving
no encouragement or even an acknowledgment from the
Tsungli-yamen, did give Li Hung-chang an idea. In September
1881 Ma Chien-chung, Li's secretary and formerly a member
of the Chinese legation at Paris, was sent to India by his
superior to negotiate with the Indian government on lines
55similar to what Saimlel had proposed^ .
Ma arrived in India in October, having been commissioned 
by the Imperial government as a special envoy in July.
He had two meetings with E. Baring, Financial advisor to
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the Indian government, during which he outlined a scheme.
It was a simple one: the Indian government should sell
all the opium directly to the Chinese government and the
latter would pay a fixed sum for a number of years,
from thirty to fifty years, during which time the
56amount purchased would gradually decrease^ .
The Indian government did not express any opinion
except noting that there would be many difficulties that
had to be overcome; but mercantile communities in India
raised strong objections. Messrs. Jardine, Skinner and
Co., heading thirty-six other firms, in a memorial to
the Indian government, said that according to the Treaty
of Tientsin, opium could, not be taxed until it had been
carried into the interior, but China had been levying
about 90 taels per picul near Hong Kong and the Treaty
ports. This was the same 'as if England in working out
the commercial treaty with France were to etcact duty at
the Tariff rate on French wines, and then prohibit their
removal from the ports of arrival until taxes amounting
to three or four times the import duty were paid.' Thus,
a return to the treaty stipulations of 1858 (Rule V) was
called for^. Support to the memorial also came.from the
Sassoon firms in Bombay as v/ell as the Bombay Chamber
of Commerce which also forwarded a letter from a firm
at the Treaty port of Pakhoi, which complained that more
likin offices were being set up in Kwangtung and they
58were crippling the opium trade^ • These memorials were 
promptly transmitted to the India Office and from there 
to the Foreign OfficJ3. Possibly action was believed would 
be taken by the Foreign Office concerning Ma's proposal; 
but it went with him when he left India, and the matter 
was not pursued.
In the meantime, the Indian government (and the India 
Office), realizing the gravity of the Opium Question, 
began to adopt a more compromising attitude. In a revenue 
despatch to the Indian government in June 1881, the India
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Office asked the Indian government to re-examine its
opium revenue. It was reminded of a statement made by
the Duke of Argyll in 1868 that, ’every effort should be
made by increased economy to become less and less,
rather than more and more, dependent on it /opium revenue/* *
Reasons for reconsidering the sources of revenue were .
based on two basic factors: 1) Bengal opium farmers
were finding it more profitable to grow food crops rather
than opium and the Indian government had to provide more
monetary incentives to the farmers. This extra expenditure
could only be equalized by raising the sale price. However,
competition from native and Persian opium would make the
increase impossible and 2) the objections from the Anti- 
4-0opium Society • In the next year, the Indian government 
was informed that the Home government had adopted the 
policy * to press forward as speedily as possible the 
negotiations for the ratification of the Chefoo Convention,
which would satisfy the immediate and reasonable demands
41of the Chinese Government.1
The Indian government agreed with the arguments put 
forward by the India Office, but also introduced new ones 
to argue for its case, especially against the assertions 
made by the Anti-opium Society. In its concluding remarks, 
it reiterated the fact that since substitution of the 
opium revenue by any other form was impossible in the 
near future, it would not agree to any proposal that might 
result in a loss of India's opium revenue. Nevertheless, 
it would do nothing to obstruct the ratification of the 
opium clause in the Chefoo Convention and would be prepared 
•to 'consider any reasonable proposal made by the Chinese 
Government to increase their import duties, provided they 
can afford satisfactory evidence of the bona fide nature 
of their action, aiid of their ability to perform any
engagements they may take, and to execute any fiscal laws
42which they may promulgate.' This attitude, compared to . 
the one adopted in 1878, showed that concessions had been
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made and the Indian government was willing to compromise.-
Back in China, other plans were being proposed. In
June 1881 a certain Ho Hsien-ch'ih, head of a group of
Chinese merchants at Canton, proposed to Li Hung-chang
that th'ey set up an opium monopoly in Hong Kong and pay
the Chinese government 100 taels per picul. Arrangements
would be made with the Indian government - on similar
lines to those proposed by Samuel. Li memorialized to
the throne on 11 July about this plan and argued in favour 
45of it . However, nothing came out of this proposal as
44Wade disapproved of it •
This was followed by the resumption of negotiations 
between Wade and Li Hung-chang. Li proposed that the 
Foreign Inspectorate collect a total of 110 taels per picul 
at the port of entry and the opium would be frep of all 
other levies throughout China. If provincial officials 
attempt to levy extra dues they would be severely punished. 
However, in order to prevent any form of smuggling, an 
official Chinese agency would be established in Hong Kong 
and it would be informed by both the Indian and Hong Kong 
governments of the shipment and arrival of the drug. The 
levy of 110 taels could be collected either In Hong Kong or 
at the Treaty ports, and the Hong Kong government would ■ 
actively help in the prevention of smuggling. If agreed to, 
this arrangement could be tried’ under privisional 
regulations and would replace the opium clause of the
45Chefoo agreement when both governments found it satisfactory •
Wade, however, thought that this would be too much of ■
a levy. Li then suggested that the Tariff duty could be-
• raised to 60 taels per picul while likin and other dues
would be levied by the provincial authorities as before.
Wade would only agree to raising the Tariff duty to 45
taels, a proposal Vhich he had already suggested in the 
46summer of 1881 • Both parties refused to concede to each
other's proposal and negotiations were again temporarily 
suspended.
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In order to gather opinions from the provincial
authorities, Hillier, Wade's assistant, was sent on a
tour of some provincial capitals between August and
October 1881. He saw the Governor-Generals and Governors
of Chihli, Liang-kwang, Liang-kiang, Fukien and Hupeh
at Tientsin, Canton, Nanking, Foochow and Hankow. The
concensus of opinions he gathered was that they were in
favour of a joint collection of Tariff duty and likin.
The amount that was considered most appropriate was Li
Hung-chang's suggestion of 30 plus 70 taels for Tariff
duty and likin respectively. They were very much opposed
to a monopoly scheme, despite the'fact that Li was the
47one who very much favoured it' \ •
In November, a John Pitman suggested another monopoly
scheme to Li Hung-chang. It was similar to what .Samuel
had proposed but with the addition of a provision that
would promise a certain amount of additional revenue to
the Indian government for a number of years in consider*
48ation of its acceptance of the scheme . This proposal,
however, was never taken seriously by Li.
In the autumn of 1881, Hennessy, Governor of Hopg Kong,
arrived in Peking, and it was alleged, he also decided
to get involved in the negotiations. The allegation was
suggested by two issues of the 'London and China Telegraph'
(of 13 February and 21 February 1882) which asserted that
an opium syndicate seemed to have been established and it
would establish itself in Hong Kong to collect the opium
tax there. It was further suggested that the Indian govern-
49ment had apparently consented to this agreement . These 
•articles drew an immediate response from both the Hong 
Kong government and Wade. Marsh, administrator of the 
Colonial government, reported that during a conversation 
in the Executive Cbuncil, Hennessy had mentioned smuggling 
activities from Hong Kong carried on by Chinese junks. He 
had proposed a plan which would involve the stationing of 
some Chinese officials in the Colony who would grant permits
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to Chinese junks carrying opium away from Hong Kong. The 
Colonial government would prevent the departure of \ 
junks without permits. Such an advantage would be advanta­
geous to Hong Kong since the blockade would then be 
removed. 'However, according to Marsh's interpretation, 
this plan remained no more than something mentioned in 
general conversation^.
Wade, in reply to an enquiry from Marsh, recalled that 
while Hennessy was in Peking in September 1881, the 
Governor had had some discussion with Li Hung-chang, 
during which he had voiced approval of the scheme advocated 
by Ma Chien-chung. This was all Wade knew, except that 
he had received some correspondence from Hance, the acting 
consul at Canton, which had made him suspect that there 
might have been an agreement between Li and Hennessy.
Hance reported that on 15 December 1881 he had received
i
from the Governor-General a request asking him to transmit
to Hennessy a letter from the Tsungli-yamen, as well as
a letter of greetings from himself. Prom the size of the
package which contained these 'letters'^ it appeared that
there would be more in it. Hance then refused the request
arguing that this should be done through the minister at
Peking. He learnt subsequently that.the package was delivered
to the Governor by a trusted staff of the Governor-General;
and he was unable to obtain any information about the
contents of the package. Upon hearing of this, Wade questioned
the Tsungli-yamen but was told that the letter only
contained a few cards enquiring into the health of the
Governor and it was done out of sheer politeness. Wade
considered this episode most peculiar and was convinced that
. 51something must have been done without him knowing it-' .
When these were made known to Hennessy, who was on his
way back to Britain'after his tour of duty, he immediately
telegramed the Colonial Office from India in April 1882 that
he had not been in communication with the Chinese government 
52** in any way^ • Upon his return to Britain, he further
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explained that if he had come to some agreement with the
Chinese government the relevant information and documents
would have been forwarded to the Colonial Office as well
as filed in Hong Kong. The only proposal he could recollect
was the one made to him by Ho A-mei in August 1881 but
he had declined Ho's overtures, suggesting that any approach
should be made through the proper channels, that is
through the British minister at Peking. . The matter ended
there but it had aroused the attention of the Hong Kong
Chamber of Commerce which had asked that if any agreement'
regarding opium was to be decided upon, the chamber would
like an opportunity to express its views before it was
54finally concluded-^.
Li Hung-chang and Wade met again towards the end of
November 1881 and again for a few times in December^. At
first a review of the proposals of the past years was
«
made and then bargaining began in earnest. Li insisted 
on a total joint collection of 110 taels per picul, while 
Wade countered with a 90 taels offer. Finally on 7 December, 
an agreement was reached. Upon the collection of a total 
of 110 taels per picul, opium would be exempted from all 
other dues. An official from the Foreign Inspectorate 
and another from the native customs would be sent to Hong 
Kong to inspect the amount of opium imported into the 
Colony, and data on its accuracy would be exchanged with 
the Indian government. The opium clause in the Chefoo 
Convention would be cancelled. Starting from this under­
standing, Li enquired from the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Bank in Hong Kong if it was willing to act as financier.
The latter replied that it was willing and detailed plans
56were formulated^. •
However, there appeared to be a great misunderstanding 
between the two rfegotiators, because when Wade wrote back 
to the Foreign Office, his proposals were entirely 
different from what Li had understood them to be*^7. Wade 
reported that four proposals were now left and each could
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could be considered: 1) a joint collection of 100 taels 
per picul - Tariff duty of 30 taels and likin of 70 taels - 
which would exempt opium from further levies^; 2) the 
Tariff duty would be increased to 50 taels per picul and 
the Chiilese government was still at liberty to collect 
any amount of likin it pleased; 3) China would buy all of 
India*s opium and an agreement made that the production 
in India would be reduced yearly until it ceased completely; 
and 4) an English merchant would have the monopoly and 
all duties and dues but India would agree to cease 
production of opium altogether eventually.
Although there was no abrupt break-off.of negotiations, 
the Chinese government began to think of other ways. This 
prompted a remark from Wade in January 1882, saying that 
he understood that Tso Tsung-t * ang's suggestion o£ a total 
levy of 150 taels per picul had been approved by the 
Imperial government, and that 'this is, of*course, a mere 
report, but I feel none the less bound to observe that, 
if it be true, I foresee considerable difficulties in the 
way of a settlement of this /opium7question.1^  The Tsungli-
1
yamen replied that there was a vast difference between
Li Hung-chang's proposal of 110 taels and Wade's offer of
70 taels, but refused to say if Tso's proposal had really
been accepted or not, except that if opium negotiations
were not terminated quickly, the Imperial government
would adopt Tso's proposal . To this Wade replied that
this was a threat of little consequence since the British
government would certainly reserve the right of deciding to
what extent it would offer assistance to the Chinese 
61government , The rejoinder from the Tsungli-yamen was 
to the point; no threat was intended, since Wade had always 
said that if no settlement could be arrived at, China could 
take it upon hersel’f to increase the likin or to devise 
some other scheme. The Tsungli-yamen, however, expressed 
a desire to know the British government's reply to what 
Wade had proposed^.
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In a communique to Wade, the Foreign Office declined 
to accept his proposal of 100 taels and voiced its 
preference either for Prince Kung's proposal or to fall 
back upon the Chefoo agreement's opium clause. The Foreign 
Office'argued that by accepting the joint collection of 
100 taels it had the following objections: that it was 
a departure from Elgin's principles when he negotiated 
for opium's legalisation in 1858; that the risk of this 
sudden imposition would be a greater burden on the opium 
trade and the Indian government might not be able to 
bear it; that there was still a risk of squeeze or octroi 
inland, despite China's verbal assurance to the contrary; 
and that the Chinese government would in a few years 
press for another increase on 'humanitarian grounds', 
and this would give the Anti-opium Society morq ammunition 
to use^.
In June 1882, Wade summarized the progress of negotiations 
to that date rather aptly. He confided to the Foreign 
Office that only two ways were then open: either a 
monopolistic system or a joint collection by the Foreign 
Inspectorate. However, he believed that the latter would 
be more favourably considered by the Chinese government, 
and that it would accept likin at 70 taels per picul.
This, however, should be ratified by the British government 
as soon as possible as further delay might lead to the 
Chinese government to ask for more. He based his argument 
on the premise that if ratification of the joint collection 
proposal had been done in 1881 the Chinese government 
would have then agreed to a likin of 60 taels. That it 
would not affect the Indian government, and indeed be 
more beneficial, was reasoned as follows: 'the greater 
the benefit secured to the Chinese Government from this 
impost, the more Secure will the revenue of India be from
64disturbing action on the part of the Chinese Government.'
In fact, in late April, Wade had urgently telegramed the 
Foreign Office that the joint collection of 100 taels
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should he ratified immediately as Li Hung-chang had been
granted a month*s leave to visit his sick mother, and
that this might mean Li was in disgrace and might be
replaced by somebody else, which might seriously affect 
65negotiations Although the Foreign Office did not heed 
66his warning , subsequent negotiations as well as the 
final settlement showed that Wade was correct in his 
observations though his Judgments might have been made 
too quickly or emotionally for the liking of his government.
Joseph Samuel had returned to China again in March 
1882, and he offered a new scheme, which occupied the 
attention of both the Tsungli-yamen and Wade.
Before Samuel left Britain for China on this second 
. trip, he outlined his scheme to the India Office. Comment­
ing on the financial losses that the Indian and, British 
governments had suffered because of the existence of two 
monetary standards in Europe and China (the former was on 
gold and the latter used silver) in the past, he was 
willing to buy opium from India in gold. On the other 
hand, if he were to monopolize the entire opium trade 
(he would also make arrangements with the Persian govern­
ment concerning opium from Persia) not only would the 
Indian exchequer gain from it but also the Chinese govern­
ment. Moreover, the blockade of Hong Kong would be lifted 
and he might even be able to convince the Chinese govern­
ment to abolish likin levied in the interior on all 
other western imports6 .^ These overtures were received 
with some wariness by the India Office, but Samuel was 
assured of its support if he could convince the Indian 
•and Chinese governments the feasibility of his scheme.
£300 was even given to him to defray expenses of his Journey 
to India and China68. However, the Home government did 
caution Wade that Samuel had no connections with either 
the British or Iridian governments, and that if his
scheme was to be accepted by the Chinese government, the
69official proposal had to come from China •
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On his way to China, Samuel stopped over in India
and managed to convince the Indian government the value
of his scheme. Charles Grant, secretary to the Indian
government, wrote a letter to Wade, which Samuel brought
with hifn personally to China, saying that the Indian
government was prepared to consider any proposal that
the Chinese government might make in connection with 
70Samuel’s scheme' • Samuel then proceeded to China. At
Peking he discussed possibilities with both Li Hung-chang
and Wade, although he refused to disclose any details 
71of hxs scheme' • Reaction from both men was one of
approval, and they allowed him to'proceed. In June 1882,
Samuel submitted his scheme in writing to Governor-General 
72Chang Shu-shen' .
The scheme now proposed was similar to his £irst one 
of 1881, except that he would now pay a total of 100 
taels per picul and would guarantee an import of 90,000 
piculs a year. However, he wanted to be appointed by the 
Chinese government as a special opium manager and his 
position would be announced to the British government.
As an assurance to the Chinese government, he pointed 
out that his scheme had received approval from the 
British government which had agreed to put it on trial 
for a five-year period.
Reaction from the Tsungli-yamen was ambiguous. On 
the one hand the Tsungli-yamen reported to the throne 
that Samuel's scheme, though similar to the one Li 
Hung-chang had proposed, sounded satisfactory. With the 
increased activities of the Anti-opium Society, this 
•could be used as the first of a series of agreements 
to prohibit the opium trade. However, the drawback was 
that Samuel's offer of 100 taels was identical to Wade's
i
offer, but below bbth Tso's and Li's suggestions, 150 
and 110 taels respectively. The British government might 
not accept the scheme. That a foreigner should be allowed 
to monopolize the opium trade in order to put a stop to
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smuggling and duty evasion would be the same as 'while 
rejecting a suitor, yet at the same time allowing his 
emissary to enter.' It would be a very unwise move and 
acceptance of the scheme should definitely not be entertained. 
Wade, therefore, had been asked to seek further information 
from his government as to whether a central opium 
collection-distribution office could be voluntarily i
established in India. If approved, further negotiations 
on a combined duty and regulations for a trial period . . 
could be conducted' .
On the other hand, Hart was summoned to the Tsungli-
yamen and was told that Samuel's‘scheme was satisfactory
except that China could not appoint him in the way he
had wanted. An alternative method was suggested to Hart.
The Tsungli-yamen would officially inform Wade .that China
had decided to accept his proposal of 100 taels on a
joint collection basis, and he could then officially
inform his government, but while doing this, he could
suggest a scheme that would put all the opium trade under
one organization. Wade should strongly recommend such a
monopoly arguing^that consent of other Treaty powers was --
not needed, ships of other nations could not carry opium
to China and claim the old rate, and it would also protect
British government and mercantile interests. Wade would
then suggest that Samuel had such a scheme in mind which
could become effective on 1 January 1884. Hart was to
transmit this idea to Wade, but also to inform him that
if the British government refused the scheme, then the
proposal of the acceptance of the 100 taels joint collection
74'• by the Tsungli-yamen would be automatically cancelled' .
Then in a meeting with Wade three days later, the
Tsungli-yamen suggested that although they approved of
Samuel's scheme id principle, the difficulty was in the
issuance of a commission to Samuel. It suggested that if;'.
the British government were to issue the commission to him
75first, the Chinese government would follow' .
In a subsequent meeting nine days later, Wade was
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informed that an Imperial decree had been received which
said that the desire by China to increase the amount of
levy on opium was mainly to 'reinforce the redeeming work
of the Anti-opium Society', and was by no means exclusively
for the 'sake of additional revenue. Arrangements would
be favourably considered if an annual diminuition of the
opium trade were included. Commenting on Samuel's scheme,
the decree noted that it differed very little from what
^Wade had already agreed as to the amount of duty. China
could not officially appoint Samuel since this would be
'unbecoming the dignity of the administration' and
unacceptable to China. An alternative would be for the
British government to establish a merchant-farmer, or
even appoint Samuel to the job, and the Tsungli-yamen
and Wade could resume discussions. The Tsungli-y^imen
finally asked Wade if his government had agreed to his
76proposal of 100 taels joint collection' •
This policy adopted by the Tsungli-yamen is worthy of 
note. The basic motive could be partly due to the fear 
of hostile reactions from anti-opium officials such as 
Tso Tsung-t'ang if Samuel's scheme was adopted; but it 
was more likely a diplomatic manoeuvre to force the 
British government to accept the 100 taels joint collection 
proposed by Wade. No matter how such actions are interpreted, 
it will show, on the one side, the element of morality 
and anti-opium feeling prevalent in China, and on the 
other, the acquisition of techniques of western diplomacy.
In fact, Wade very much believed in what the Tsungli-
yamen had to offer as an alternative, and he telegramed
77the Foreign Office seeking immediate approval". It was 
not forthcoming; instead, he was summoned back to England 
to 'give such explanations as might be necessary to 
enable /£he British' government/to arrive at a conclusion 
on the merits of the various schemes proposed for the 
settlement.'*'78 But within the Home government, the India 
Office, with support from the Indian government, was very
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much for carrying the scheme (Samuel's) into effect because
it had four distinct advantages: 1) it would or might help
the government against the agitation from the Anti-opium
Society; 2) it would obviate foreseeable difficulties
with oth'er Treaty powers; 3) it would break down the likin
system in China and perhaps open the road to new markets
for general merchandise; and 4) it would most probably
relieve the financial distresses and uncertainties of the
79^Indian government". For a change, the Foreign Office's 
reaction was one of caution. It wanted to know if Samuel 
really had the financial backing he claimed he had. If 
he could not prove it conclusively*, it would be best to 
consider other alternatives which had been proposed, and 
upon reaching an agreement, the other Treaty powers could 
be asked to accept it8 .^ ,
When Wade left China for Britain, negotiations shifted 
to London and’ the last phase of the protracted bargaining 
began there.
Continuation of the blockade, 1877 to 1884
In the years between the Chefoo Convention and the
signing of the Additional Article, the blockade issue at
Hong Kong became less significant in the Opium Question.
This was partly due to the weight given to settlement of
the question of taxation of Indian opium, and concern in
the increased growth of native opium; but it was also due
to a decrdase in the number of complaints about the
blockade from the Hong Kong government and the merchants.
Nevertheless, it was still an integral part of the Opium .
Question and attempts were made locally as well as in
London to solve it. However, the final solution did not
come about until'after the major issue of the Opium
Question was settled. The blockade of Hong Kong during
«
this period, therefore, should be regarded as an important 
issue of Sino-British relations in its own right.
For the sake of clarity, this period will be discussed 
under three headings: 1) continued cases of seizure and
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complaints; 2) negotiations to solve the issue both 
locally and in London; and 3) the appointment of an 
opium commission in Hong Kong to look into the alleged 
grievances and devise a solution.
Seizures and Complaints
The effectiveness of the blockade by the customs 
stations and cruisers prompted smugglers to adopt drastic 
measures. Instead of making feeble and mostly unsuccessful 
• means to evade the revenue cruisers and stations, whole­
sale smuggling was carried out by vessels which were 
specially constructed and equipped to run the blockade. 
They were built for fast sailing and were very heavily 
armed so that they could fight if necessary. Moreover,
if they were defeated by the revenue cruisers, they
0*1
could seek sanctuary in Hong Kong waters . Such conflicts 
were very frequent. In a memorandum to thq Colonial 
Secretary in June 1877* the acting Captain Superintendent 
of the Hong Kong Police described one of these occur­
rences: 'A case of this sort occurred in November last 
outside the Kap-shui Mun pass, in which three or four 
junks, after exchanging fire for some time with the 
steamer P'ing-chao-hoi, sought refuge in this harbour, 
where they lay for several days in order to recover from
the damage which men and boats had sustained in the 
82engagement.' Consul Robertson, while on a visit in
83Hong Kong, also agreed with the report . Governor 
Hennessy, in an attempt to ensure that such occurrences 
would not blemish the reputation of Hong Kong and pose 
a problem to relations between the Colonial and Canton 
governments, re-enforced Ordinance No. 6 of 1866, and he 
was able to report that such an action had resulted in the 
lessening of organized smuggling and had led to an improve 
ment m  the trade of Hong Kong
Such an understanding, however, was reached also 
because of an incident in October 1876, which resulted 
from an armed smuggling attempt. On 29 of that month, a
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Hong Kong-based junk with several hundred balls of opium 
on board attempted to run the blockade. It was chased 
into colonial waters by a revenue junk belonging to the 
provincial authorities, and it went aground at Cape 
A1guilar.' The owner and his crew, after exchanging some 
shots with their pursuers, escaped to the lighthouse at 
the cape, where they successfully obtained protection 
from the police there. The crew of the revenue junk 
towed the junk with its cargo back to Chinese waters, 
and,later officially confiscated it. When the incident 
was reported to the Hong Kong government, both the 
European police officer-in-charge at the cape,and by the 
owner of the seized junk, it was decided that strong 
representations should be made since the junk was seized 
in Hong Kong waters. Robertson was asked to obtain 
from the Governor-General both the junk and its cargo
85of opium as well as a sincere apology for-hne-incident—-.
When after two months no reply to the demand was
forthcoming, the Hong Kong government addressed a
strongly-worded despatch to Robertson, urging him to
further clarify the matter with the Governor-General
since the latter had amitted to the revenue cruiser's
violation of Hong Kong territory and insisted on an
immediate apology and the return of junk and cargo. The
Colonial government also pointed out that in the initial
protest to the Governor-General, Robertson had only
described the violation as a 'disrespect to the dignity
of the Government of Hong Kong' as though it were only
a matter for colonial concern and not for the British 
86government • This was also communicated to the Colonial 
Office, suggesting that if the demands were not complied 
with 'the Government of Hong Kong would proceed to put 
in force all the restrictions which they could legally 
bring to bear against the revenue cruisers in their 
connection with this Colony.'^
The Colonial Office commented that by treating the 
violation as merely a matter of colonial concern, instead
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of Imperial, was worse than when the Foreign Office 
concerned itself with similar cases at Gibraltar. It 
regretted that firmer language had not been used in 'so 
flagrant an outrage upon British soil.1 These comments 
and all'related documents were communicated to the 
Foreign Office which immediately telegramed both Robertson 
and Fraser that strong representations to the Chinese 
government must be made®®.
In the meantime, Robertson had obtained from the 
Governor-General a sum of $200 for the value of the junk, the 
return of 660 balls of opium (though the owner had claimed 
771 balls but Robertson believed it was an over-demand) 
as well as a full apology. He had advised the Hong Kong 
government that the matter should be regarded as settled®^. 
Hennessy, in fact, was quite satisfied with the.settlement 
and even commended Robertson for his 1 earnest and 
successful representations to the Viceroy, and which 
j had contributed so much to the present cessation of
complaints about the so-called Blockade of Hong Kong.'^
Nevertheless, the violation was considered serious!;' 
enough to warrant a representation at Peking. In 
September 1877 Fraser addressed a note to Prince Kung on 
the lines laid down by the Foreign Office. He pointed out 
the seriousness of the violation which could have led to 
intervention by the British navy and a worsening of 
Anglo-Chmese relations' . To this, Prince Kung replied 
most aptly: he pointed out that revenue cruisers were 
■ used to effect the capture of vessels and merchandise 
concerned in smuggling transactions, but because of the 
•present incident, he had directed the provincial authorities 
at Canton to consider the framing of regulations that 
would 'provide for an effectual and well-considered mode 
of action.' He remined Fraser, however, that the Chef00 
agreement had provided for the appointment of a commission 
that would establish a system 'that may enable the Chinese 
Government to protect its revenue without prejudice to the
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interests of the Colony.1 He advocated that such a
commission should be appointed without any delay in order
to see an improvement of relations between Hong Kong 
opand Canton' •
Th^ subsequent years saw a number of other seizures, •
though they never reached the magnitude of this particular 
93one'-'. This could possibly be due to Britain1 s embarass- 
ment over its non-ratification; but it was also due to 
a comment made by the Colonial Office when this incident 
was settled. Remarking on how the affair was conducted 
by the Colonial government, the Colonial Office criticized 
the two Hong Kong marine magistrates for neglecting their 
duty in not punishing the junk owner for violation of 
Ordinance No. 6 of 1866. They should have either dismissed 
the case for want of evidence, or have formally, convicted 
the owner if they were satisfied with the facts. That
4
they deemed his testimony satisfactory for the Hong Kong 
government to ask the Chinese government for redress,
o il
and yet not convict the owner, was most extraordinary' •
Between April 1879 and June 1880, there were recorded
ten seizures of Hong Kong junks by Chinese customs
cruisers, which were supposed to have taken place in
Hong Kong waters. Although representations in most cases
were made to the Canton authorities by the consul there,
yet they were all dismissed either due to a lack of
evidence, a prompt denial by the Canton government, or
conviction of the complainants by the Hong Kong government
on grounds of violation of Ordinance No. 6 of 1866.
From the settlement of these cases of seizure, it is
obvious that a mutual agreement on toleration of each
others1 activities and the giving of 1 the benefit of
doubt1 had been reached between the Hong Kong and Canton 
93authorities' . 1
In 1881 and 1882 there were only four recorded 
incidents of some importance, in that they received the 
attention of the Colonial and Foreign Offices. The
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spirit of compromise,however, was still present.
On the evening of 26 November 1881, two revenue 
cruisers, while patrolling in the area of Cheung-sha wan, 
had captured a junk laden with about 5*000 catties of 
undeclared salt. While the revenue officers were proceed­
ing with their investigation, they observed a ’hakka 
boat* nearby and ordered it to lower its sails. However, 
the revenue cruisers were fired upon and one was damaged.
Fire was returned and some persons on board escaped to 
Hong Kong by swimming. When the junk was boarded, eight 
persons were found including a wounded person who subsequent­
ly died and was identified as the'owner, and two German 
nationals. A quantity of undeclared opium (8 balls), 
three foreign guns and four packages of bullets and other 
weapons were found. The junk was taken to the yemen of
the Nan-hai magistrate and the Germans were then released
«
to the German consul upon finding them not implicated
of the attempted smuggling because they had only rented
the boat for a shooting excursion. Subsequent to this
incident, Hance, acting consul at Canton, was asked by
the Governor-General to inform the Hong Kong government
*to impress upon British subjects of all classes who may
hereafter hire native boats the absolute necessity of
ascertaining clearly before they start that their boat
is carrying no contraband goods. In making this request,
the Viceroy’s motive is simply dictated by a desire to
96afford adequate protection to all foreigners.1'
On 7 April 1882, a sampan while ferrying a passenger 
from Shaukiwan to Lyeemoon was fired on by a revenue 
•cruiser, killing the passenger. The boatwoman, the only 
other person on board, testified that revenue officers 
then boarded the sampan and searched for opium but could 
not find any. They’then put her ashore on an uninhabited 
island, cast her sampan adrift and left. She was rescued 
the next day by-a passing fishing junk and then made her 
complaint to the Hong Kong government. However, she was
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unable to identity the revenue officers responsible for 
the incident and.could not prove also that the incident 
had happened in Hong Kong waters. Thus, though the Canton 
consul was informed of the case, no action was taken^.
Then'on 12 June 1882, a *hakka boat1, the 'Law Kwong- 
li*, while sailing from Yaumati to Tung-kun city with 
a cargo of saltpetre and sulphur was ordered to stop by 
the revenue cruiser 'Him Yui'• Upon being enquired about 
the contents of the cargo, the owner declared that it was 
salt fish. A search was ordered, and when this was refused, 
the boat was fired on, killing two crew members. The owner 
and the remaining crew swam to Lamd island and safety. .
The Hong Kong government decided not to take up the 
owner's complaint, firstly because he had left the Colony 
after he had lodged his complaint, secondly because when 
his boat left Yaumati it did not have a clearance as 
required by Ordinance No. 8 of 1879i thirdly because the 
boat was not registered in Hong Kong, and fourthly because 
the allegation that the incident happened in Colonial
QQ
waters was unlikely7 .
At an earlier date in April (but the incident was only 
reported in December to the Colonial Office when investiga­
tions were completed) at A Kung Ngam in Hong Kong waters, 
a small boat was searched by a revenue Cruiser and iri the 
processja Chinese was shot dead. When Hewlett, the newly- 
appointed consul at Canton, made representations to the 
Governor-General on behalf of the-Hong Kong government, 
he was told, after an inquiry had been conducted, that 
no such incident was on record in the native customs' 
register. Though Hewlett considered this as a very serious 
incident, lack of further evidence meant that it could
QQ
not be pursued further77.
Although in thdse incidents no action was taken by 
the Colonial government, yet Marsh, the administrator, 
in reporting these incidents to the Colonial Office, 
commented that they were illustrative of 'the mode in
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which what is called the Blockade of Hong Kong is 
carried on by Chinese Revenue Cruisers.1 This could well 
be taken to mean the innate hotility the Hong Kong 
government had against the activities of customs cruisers 
and against the blockade in general100.
On looking at these incidents, casting aside the 
consideration whether the reports made by either the 
Hong Kong or Canton governments and those from the parties 
directly connected with the seizures were wholly accurate 
or not, it becomes apparent that a new system of 
smuggling had developed but, at the same time, response 
from the preventive service had also changed and 
strengthened. It was natural that these resulted in 
fatalities when the two sides clashed. This factor became 
partially responsible in renewed negotiations to, settle 
the problem of smuggling from Hong Kong and thereby 
provide an alternative to the blockade.
Negotiations to solve the blockade issue
On his way back to Peking from London, Wade stopped
over in Hong Kong to meet the government and merchants
to dicuss possible solutions to the blockade question,
since both the suggestions made by the Governor-General
and ex-Governor Kennedy had been rejected by the new
Governor, P. Hennessy. In two meetings with representatives
from the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce in March and April
of 1879, the positions adopted by the chamber and Wade 
102were made plain .
The merchants, before listing their grievances and 
arguments, first complained about the lack of concern 
and consideration afforded them by the Colonial Office, 
and especially about the fact that the blockade question 
was still nowhere near solution. Referring to Elliot's 
proclamation of 1841 declaring Hong Kong a free-port, and 
strenghtened by article 44 of the Treaty of Tientsin, 
which confirmed the privileges of British subjects in Hong 
Kong could claim, they argued that the work of the three 
customs stations and the revenue cruisers which interfered
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with the Junk trade was in violation of treaty stipulations, 
and their actions are, if not illegal, at variance with 
the usage of nations. It was also alleged that the 
revenue cruisers neither belonged to nor were commissioned 
by the'Chinese government, but were merely under the 
authority of the Hoppo, whom the merchants contended was 
not a Chinese official. Moreover, apart from exercising 
surveillance immediately outside of HongKong waters, 
revenue detectives were actually stationed in Hong Kong, 
causing endless harassment to Junk traders and resulting 
sometimes in impersonations by criminals of the Colony.
Thus, quoting articles 24 and 25'of the Treaty of Tientsin, 
which called for import and export duties to be levied 
on the landing and shipment of goods, and that no higher 
duties could be levied than those laid down in ,the treaty 
tariff, the levy of dues by the customs stations were 
considered illegal. Finally, the blockade* had greatly 
retarded the commercial development of Hong Kong and 
had resulted in a low Chinese population: even Singapore 
had a population of 100,000; Hong Kong had 150,000, but 
the Colony should have had many more if they had not been 
scared away by the blockade. An extravagent rise in the 
price of daily staples such as fuel was also noted as a 
result of the blockade. What the merchants suggested as 
a remedy was in essence to 'let the Chinese collect their 
Duties at the Port of Shipment and at the Ports where 
goods are received; and if the Chinese cannot collect 
their Duties as every other civilized country in the 
world collect theirs, let them go without /It7.
To these allegations and arguments, Wade was unsympa­
thetic. He agreed that the blockade did affect the 
prosperity of Hong Kong, but disagreed with the merchants' 
reasoning. He argtied that Elliot's proclamation of 1841 
could not be considered at all, since there was no treaty 
with China at that time. In Pottinger's treaty with 
China in 1842, Hong Kong was ceded to Britain but there
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were no stipulations concerning Hong Kong's commercial 
relationship with China. In the supplementary treaty
104.signed the following year, articles XIII, XIV and XVI 
concerned such a relationship but they were restrictive, 
in that Junks could only trade with the five Treaty ports 
and no other place. The Treaty of Tientsin made no 
mention of the Junk trade in any of the articles. There­
fore, it was perfectly within the rights of the Chinese 
government to levy whatever dues it wanted on the Junk 
trade. To the merchants' argument of the illegality of 
the blockade based on articles 24 and 25 of the Treaty 
of Tientsin, Wade retorted by saying that.these articles 
only applied to goods carried in foreign bottoms and had 
no relevancy to the Chinese Junk trade. He also said that 
the Hoppo was an Imperial official and that the, revenue 
vessels were officially coraissioned, while impersonators,
4
if any, could be easily dealt with by the Hong Kong police.
Finally, Wade summarized his position: 'I see no escape
from this /the blockade/ unless the Colony is prepared to
suggest some arrangement which the Chinese Government will
accept as an effective substitute for the present cordon.
If a system of collection can be devised in which, by the
co-operation of the Colony, the amount of revenue fairly
due, agreed to be due, upon that trade, can be otherwise
secured to the Chinese Government, a first step, at all
events, will have been made towards abatement of the evil 
10Scomplained of.' 7
Governor Hennessy agreed with Wade's attitude, and 
possibly as a response to Wade's contention that Hong 
•Kong must be the first to suggest am alternative to the 
blockade, made his proposal in late May 1879. These 
consisted of a set of five rules and principles to control 
the Junk trade: 1)' that the Chinese customs stations be 
abolished; 2) that the revenue cruisers cease to overhaul 
. ' Junks that had cleared from Hong Kong or that were bound 
for Hong Kong; 5) that Junks trading with Hong Kong pay 
duties only at the port or place of entry or of clearance 
in China according to the published tariffs at.those places
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except salt, opium and munitions of war; 4) that as regards
salt and munitions of war, they were not to be exported
from Hong Kong except to the Chinese authorities or to
lawfully appointed Chinese agents; and 5) that opium
was not to be exported to China in any Junk that has
not a clearance paper to show that the Tariff duty had
been paid to a lawfully appointed agent of the Chinese 
106government • Wade, and later Hart, supported this 
proposal; and opium merchants in Hong Kong, such as 
Belilios, also agreed to it in principle. The influential 
Chinese merchants in the Colony, the Nam Pak Hong group, 
which were only involved in legal trading, also gave 
their support.
Reactions from other merchants and the Home government, 
however, were not favourable. H. Lowcock, a member of the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council, who was in London when 
Hennessy's proposal arrived at the Colonial Office, was 
asked to make his comments on it. He acceded to the first 
three rules, but remarked that the last two 'would almost 
lead to the supposition that the entire scheme proposed 
as the basis of settlement had emanated from the Haikwan 
Zhoppo7 himself.' In view of this China would gladly 
accept such a bribe but it would be most injudicious and' 
undesirable to Hong Kong. Then he reiterated arguments that 
had already been made by the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, 
and concluded by saying that his views would represent 
the Hong Kong mercantile community10'7. In reply, the Colonial 
Offi’ce expressed sympathy to Hong Kong's sufferings under 
the blockade, but pointed out that there was nothing the 
• government could do since the revenue stations and cruisers 
were in Chinese waters, and that Elliot's proclamation was 
invalid as an argument10®.
When Lowcock'S views were referred to Hennessy, he 
immediately rejected the contentions saying that such were 
not representative of the views of the mercantile community. 
Kwok a Cheong, who owned the largest fleet of steamers in
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Hong Kong, had expressed support of the proposal (Hennessy's)
and such a view was more accurate. Hennessy then blamed.
the attitude of the Colonial Office, which, he contended,
had adopted the views of such person as Lowcock, which
were grossly distorted, for the lack of settlement of the
blockade question. The Colonial Office acceded to his
statements but pointed out that the Junk trade and that*,
109m  foreign bottoms were closely inter-related .
Nevertheless, the Colonial Office rejected Hennessy's 
proposal by reasoning that it would introduce Chinese 
customs officials to Hong Kong and the collection of 
China's dues on British territory.' Furthermore, since 
smuggling would not cease, 'the Colonial Government either 
has to undertake the watching for Chinese smugglers or 
to permit the uncontrolled evasion of new laws which you 
^Tenness^/ propose to enact. The first of these contingencies
i
would invoke the Colony in expense and would throw upon
the government a responsibility which it is inexpedient
to assume; and in the other event constant complaints
from the Chinese authorities would be inevitable, and
would in all probability in no longer time be followed
by a renewal of the present system of blockade.'110 The
Foreign Office also believed that the proposal would not
be accepted by the Chinese government since it would be
haphazardy compared to its own. Moreover, because
smuggling would definitely continue, the proposal simply
would result in the substitution of the Chinese blockade
by a British one, and it would definitely lower the
dignity and prestige of the Hong Kong government in the
111eyes of the Chinese community
Before Hennessy received the Colonial Office's rejection 
of his proposal, he had framed another one. This was to 
extend Hong Kong's 'Opium Ordinance in the direction of the 
Straits Settlement's Opium Ordinance, which according to 
Hennessy's interpretation, would satisfy the Chinese 
government and would set free the Junk trade in all articles
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including opium, salt and munitions of war. (The Straits 
Settlement's Opium Ordinance was basically a law that 
regulated the import and export of opium in the interest 
of the opium farmer there. However, what Hennessy envisaged 
was to'extend the system so that no vessel would be 
allowed to land salt, opium or munitions of war at any 
place on the coast of China unless furnished with a 
permit, obtained in China from officers of the Chinese 
government. Such permits would allow vessels to go to 
Hong Kong and load these articles for shipment to places 
in China specified on the permits. The Hong Kong government 
would not allow vessels to clear ‘for Chinese ports unless 
such permits were shown, which would mean that Chinese 
duties had been paid in advance in Chin^"^.
The Colonial Office forwarded this new proppsal to the
Foreign Office asking for its observations, but remarking
that 'it has-not hitherto been found practicable to find -
any satisfactory solution of the difficulties for which
Mr. Hennessy has now suggested a fresh remedy and it may
become necessary to resort to measures which would not be
113thought desirable m  an ordinary case.' ^ To this, the
Foreign Office reiterated in almost the exact words its
reply to Hennessy's first proposal, only adding that
since Wade was engaged in negotiations at Peking, the
Governor, as he himself had suggested, should not start
direct negotiations with the Governor-General of Liang- 
114-kwang • The Colonial Office forwarded this despatch to 
Hennessy without adding any comment1^.
Wade in fact did start to negotiate with the Tsungli- 
.yamen in November 1879. He asked Prince Kung to instruct 
Liu K'un-i, Governor-General of Liang-kwang, to look 
seriously into the question of the continuation of the 
blockade in the light of the vast expenses involved and 
the minimal advantages so accrued. However, the reply from 
Kung was curt. He said that in a previous discussion when 
the matter was brought up, such instructions had been sent
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116implying that there was no need to repeat them again
Negotiations in China ended after this date, not to 
he renewed until after 1885. However, in London, in July 
1882, Marquis Tseng brought up the subject of the establish' 
ment of a Chinese consul at Hong Kong. He remarked that 
the absence of any efficient channel of communication 
between the Canton and Hong Kong authorities had made the 
appointment of a consul necessary. This was especially 
so since there was a large number of Chinese subjects 
either residing in the Colony or constantly go there. He 
also suggested that the special geographical position of 
Hong Kong in its relationship with the Chinese mainland 
should also be considered as an important factor. The time 
was also opportune since Sino-British relations had 
reached a new level of amicability^^. ,
The Foreign Office, after reviewing the history of 
the Chinese consul issue since the Alcock*Convention, 
believed that Tseng* s request was a justifiable one and
11 o
asked the Colonial Office for its opinion • The Colonial
Office’s reply was that Hong Kong would definitely
object since the blockade was still in existence, and
the request should be deferred until a new governor had
119been appointed to succeed Hennessy. . The Foreign Office
then informed Marquis Tseng that the Governor of Hong Kong
was on a leave of absence and that a new governor might
be appointed in early 1885 and the question could be
120brought up again at that time . The matter, however, 
was not brought up again by either side, since negotiations 
for the settlement of the overall Opium Question were 
.soon to begin in earnest in London.
The Opium Commission of 1885
In December 1882, as a result of the address made by 
»
ex-Governor Hennessy in Britain in which he alleged that
121there was a grave smuggling problem at Hong Kong , at 
the Legislative Council's meeting in Hong Kong, F.B.
Johnson moved a resolution that 'In the opinion of this
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Council it is desirable that a Commission should be 
appointed by His Excellency the Administrator to enquire 
into all the circumstances attending the smuggling of 
opium and other goods from this Colony to the Mainland of 
China, a'nd to make a report thereupon to His Excellency, 
the Commission to be empowered to take evidence from 
Colonial Officers and from such other qualified persons 
as may be willing to appear before it.' The motion was 
^seconded by the Colonial Treasurer. Marsh, the. Adminis­
trator, conceded by appointing Sir George Phillippo, 
the Chief Justice, J. Russell, the Treasurer and Registrar- 
general, P. Ryrie and F.B. Johnson, both members of the 
council, to form a commission on 50 December 1882. In a 
despatch to the Colonial Office to seek its approval,
Marsh explained that the commission might be ablp to
obtain some important information, especially from Chinese
«
residents and hopefully from commanders of some of the
Chinese revenue cruisers. This would be extremely valuable
since the information of which Hong Kong government was
in possession was both 'insufficient and contradictory.'
Approval was given by the Colonial Office, and when the
Foreign Office was consulted, it left the decision entirely
in the hands of the former claiming that it was not* the
122concern of the department
The commission met for its first sitting on 10 January
1885 and after nine more meetings, the last being on 6
August 1885, a report, finished on 1 September 1885, was
125submitted to Governor Bowen . Copies were sent to the
Colonial Office on 10 November 1885,'which transmitted one
124to the Foreign Office on 7 January 1884
The commissioners used evidence supplied by the 
Harbour Master's department and the Police, interviewed 
officials from the£e departments, and obtained additional 
information from voluntary witnesses who had come forward 
after an invitation was made to the public through the 
Government Gazette (Notice No. 42 of 5 February 1885)- The
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witnesses included opium merchants Sassoon and Belilios, 
an official from a steam-boat company and a Chinese opium 
smuggler. Their testimonies etc. were compiled into the »
following conclusions written into the report: '(a) Residents
t
in the Colony, other than Chinese, are not concerned
directly or indirectly in the practice of smuggling, (b)
Vessels under foreign flags are not engaged in the
smuggling trade, and there is no evidence...tending to
show that either the officers or crews of such vessels
take any direct part in contraband traffic, although
it is not improbable that in some cases the employes
accept consideration for concealing their knowledge, that
Chinese passengers smuggle Opium by steamers entering at
Chinese ports, (c) Smuggling from this Colony into China
is carried on wholly by Chinese, and is with inconsiderable
exceptions limited to 1. opium, 2. salt and 3* saltpetre,
#
sulphur and munitions of war. The difficulty of evading 
the numerous Revenue Stations by transport across country 
of bulky, goods, otherwise than along usual and guarded 
routes, and the effective "blockade" which the geographical 
position of Hong Kong enables the Chinese authorities to 
maintain, both combine to render the smuggling of general 
merchandise unrenumerative•1
In regard especially to opium, the commission commented 
as follows: 'By far it is taken by Chinese junks to non- 
Treaty Ports though some go to Macao, and dues collected 
by customs stations or recently collected in Hong Kong.*.. 
Evidence leads to the following conclusions: 1. That no 
special class of boats or junks is employed in the 
smuggling of opium, or is fitted out in the Colony for the 
purpose of such smuggling. 2. Customary for junks to carry 
some arms and some smugglers might be armed a bit more but 
none have come to the notice of Police that are so armed 
as can engage successfully the revenue cruisers. Salt junks 
are more heavily armed and they tend to smuggle opium.
3. Could not find any case of "Naval Battle" fought within 
the waters of Hong Kong or in sight of Hong Kong. It is
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only revenue cruisers who do the shooting outside of Hong 
Kong waters and those wounded are smugglers. In effect, 
smuggling of opium is carried on mainly by attempts at 
concealment in ordinary trading junks, by Chinese passengers 
in Fore'ign steamers trading to Treaty Ports, and by small 
boats which seek to evade the Cruisers and Customs 
Stations under cover of night.' \
Under the section called 'General Remarks', the commission 
made the following two recommendations: '1. That the 
Chinese Government should be called upon to verify the 
status of the so-called Revenue Cruisers....2. That the 
gathering together of unauthorised armed Bands in British 
territory, for any purpose whatever, should be prohibited.'
This report, compared with the one prepared by the 
commission appointed in 1873 by Governor Kennedy, shows 
a marked difference. Instead of indiscriminately denying 
the existence of any smuggling activity from Hong Kong, 
the report admitted that there was smuggling although it 
was not carried on in a large way as Governor Hennessy 
believed it was. Although some facts emerged to prove 
that revenue cruisers—and-revenue—officws-^sometimes did 
violate Hong Kong laws, yet it was acknowledged that they 
were under strict directions from the Canton authorities.
The blockade was not condemned as it was before; instead, 
possible remedies were suggested and co-operation from 
the Hong Kong Government to prevent smuggling was anticipated. 
The report, therefore, showed a spirit of compromise and 
understanding. This was in keeping with the cordial 
relations that had been established between the Hong Kong 
and Canton authorities after the departure of Governor 
MacDonnell. Although the report did not have any immediate 
effect on the outcome of negotiations at London, it could 
well be considered as the first step in the right direction 
by a quasi-government commission that paved the way for 
the ultimate conclusion of negotiations that ended the 
blockade in 1887.
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The Colonial Office also reacted favourably to the
report, especially its two recommendations. With regard
to its second recommendation, Governor Bowen was instructed
to take steps to give effect to it, which was done with
the introduction of sections 5 and 4 of the Peace Preserv-
ation Ordinance of 1884- . At the same time, the Foreign
Office was also requested to make representations to the
Tsungli-yamen. In a despatch to Parkes, Britain’s new
minister at Peking, he was directed to ’urge the Chinese
Government to comply with the wishes of the Hong Kong
Government and to verify the status of such of the
Revenue Cruisers as belong to the' Imperial Navy or 
127officials.* ' When this request was made in mid-May 1885*
the Tsungli-yamen agreed to forward a list of cruisers
128and their officers to the Hong Kong government , $ and
Bowen was also instructed to verify the list with the 
129 *'
Canton consul
What the commission had recommended were put into 
effect and further diminished the chances of conflict 
between the Hong Kong and Canton authorities. Nevertheless, 
final settlement of the blockade question had to wait 
until the question of the taxation of foreign opium was 
first solved.
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CHAPTER 8 : PINAL NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENT OF THE
OPIUM QUESTION;
Final negotiations and the Additional Article
When Wade was recalled to London in August 1882 to 
explain in person the progress of his negotiations with 
the Tsungli-yamen, he had already outlined the two 
proposals that were the most feasible, out of ten or 
eleven plans that had been submitted. These were the 
. joint collection of Tariff duty and likin to the amount 
of 100 taels, and a monopolistic scheme as the one 
suggested by Joseph Samuel. To these the Foreign Office 
had raised objections but decided that the matter should 
be referred to the India Office so that the Indian 
government could make a decision. In late November 1882, 
the Foreign Office asked the India Office'to consider 
two alternatives: 1. the execution of the, opium clause in 
the Chefoo Convention; or 2. the joint collection of 
Tariff duty and likin of 100 taels per picul by the Foreign 
Inspectorate. It was also pointed out that acceptance of 
the first alternative would result in Britain having to 
obtain the consent from other Treaty powers, while the 
second alternative would put this duty on China's shoulders^*.
The reply from the India Office came in mid-January 1883* 
Having consulted the Indian government, it was decided that, 
'the result may be a considerable loss of Revenue to India, 
/but the Indian government is7 willing to accede to either 
course proposed in view of the importance of arriving at 
a Settlement of the question.1 Both the India Office and 
the Indian government believed that the first alternative, 
would not have much chance of acceptance by the Chinese 
government at the present stage since likin at the provinces 
had greatly increased. However, if a settlement was 
reached on this proposal, the amount of likin should be 
the same as those levied in 1876. As for the second 
alternative, despite apprehensions which had been expressed 
before, the Indian government would also agree to it if
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the Foreign Office thought this was the more preferable 
one. However, it noted that, 'whichever alternative is 
accepted by the Chinese Government...a maximum and not 
an absolute rate should be agreed to, the Chinese Govern­
ment bging thus left free to diminish the stipulated 
rate should they think fit to do so in the interests of 
their own Revenue.1 It also suggested that in view of the 
necessity for a speedy settlement, the British govern­
ment should aid China in obtaining the consent from other 
Treaty powers^.
This was the go-ahead signal that the Foreign Office 
had wanted, and on 31 January 1883* a communiqu^ was 
made to the Chinese Minister inviting him 'to discuss 
with Her Majesty's Government, with a view of arriving 
at a settlement that shall be satisfactory to tjie 
respective governments, the question of the duties upon 
the importation of opium into China in connection with 
Article III, Section 3 of the Chefoo Convention.'^
Zl
Marquis Tseng replied that he would be pleased to attend ; 
and Wade and Pedder, secretary in the Revenue Department 
of the India Office, were both asked to attend the
5
proposed meeting .
The Chinese government, in the meantime, was also/ 
anxious to reopen talks. In late October 1882, the 
Tsungli-yamen memorialized on the progress of negotiations. 
It commented that Tso Tsung-t'ang's suggestion of 130 
taels likin made in 1881 was sound, but replies from 
■provincial officials had indicated that it would be 
extremely difficult to prevent evasion, and might prove 
unworkable. On the other hand, joint collection had been 
worked out with Wade, and the latter had accepted** a total 
of 100 taels although Li Hung-chang had insisted on 110 
taels. Now that Wade had been recalled to London, it was 
hoped that negotiations could be continued between 
Marquis Tseng and the Foreign Office .
This was followed by a second memorial in mid-April
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which gave details of instructions that should he given 
to Tseng, as well as an authorization to commence negotiat­
ions on the lines of 110 taels joint collection. Also 
mentioning that ‘the iron should be struck while it was 
still hbt* since the Anti-opium Society was actively 
involved on China’s side, the Tsungli-yamen requested that 
an Imperial edict to that effect was to be sent to Tseng 
by telegram. This was done^.
A preliminary meeting between Wade, Pedder, Currie (of 
the Foreign Office) and Sir Halliday Macartney, who was 
Tseng’s English secretary, took place at the Foreign 
Office on 5 March 1883 - this was' after agreement had been 
reached that such informal meetings should be held firstQ
to define the precise range of discussions . At the end
of the meeting, a memorandum was drawn up .by Currie for
Macartney to give to Tseng for his reference. Currie
reiterated the first plan made-by-Prince Kung to Wade in
January 1880 and said that due to serious objections
the second plan (joint collection) could not be considered
q
until Tseng had deliberated on the first one .
After reading the memorandum', Tseng drew up his. It 
was a counter-proposal based on the second plan: 'that, 
instead of the present objectionable system of levying 
different rates of li-kin on opium at the various ports 
open to foreign trade, there should be one uniform rate 
for them all, on the payment of which, simultaneously 
with the import duty, the opium would be exempted from 
all other dues or duties whatsoever whilst in transit to 
its destination in the interior.' A detailed proposition 
•on this was drawn up with the sum of 110 taels per picul.
It was prefaced by arguments in its favour: 1) the adoption 
of a uniform rate as the basis of negotiations would 
expedite the arriv*al at a definite understanding between 
the two governments, since this had underlined previous 
negotiations; 2) such an arrangement, because it was 
favoured by the Chinese government, 'must be taken to be
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the one most suited to the country, and, therefore, the 
one most likely.to work with the least amount of friction1; 
3) the arrangement would be a step in the right direction 
for the removal of likin barriers not only on opium but 
on all other merchandise which would be advantageous to 
the development of the inland trade of China, native as 
well as foreign; and 4) if the uniform rate principle was 
rejected, the adoption of any other agreement would still 
compel 'the Chinese Government to look to the inland 
collectorates for its revenue on opium, /and7 would, 
instead of facilitating the abolition of the inland 
likin barriers, actually tend to their perpetuation.'^
Three days after his proposal was sent to the Foreign 
Office, Tseng called on the ministry himself to see Lord 
Granville, and to request for an early interview on his 
proposal. J. Pauncefote, in the absence of the Foreign 
Secretary, received Tseng, but no definite date was fixed. 
Granville, when he heard of the request, remarked that 
no date should be fixed until the Foreign Office had f 
decided on a definite course of action.^
The India Office was given Tseng's memorandum and 
commented that it was in essence the same as the second 
alternative suggested by the Foreign Office in November 
1882. However, it was not prepared to accede to the 
additional 10 taels. It also wanted the Foreign Office 
to find out whether, if this arrangement was agreed to, 
the provincial authorities in China would obey orders 
from the Imperial government by not levying additional 
dues, and whether native opium would be taxed to the same 
‘amount. The India Office feared that if native opium was 
treated differently by the Chinese government, production 
of the drug would greatly increase and the loss to both 
the trade and reve'nue of the Indian government would be 
heavier1 .^
Upon receipt of this communication from the India 
Office, the Foreign Office felt it had been shouldered
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with the responsibility for making a decision - a
responsibility which it did not want to accept. This was
because the matter was primarily the concern of the
Indian government and the principle and policy of the
joint collection proposal was still open to grave
objections, chie.f of which would be the cancellation of
1-5Elgin’s stipulation .
On 21 April, Marquis Tseng called on the Foreign 
^Office saying that he was not pressing for an answer to 
his proposal, but would like to discuss the matter before
14
his departure for Russia at the end of the month • A 
meeting was eventually arranged fok* the 27th, at which 
Tseng was handed a further memorandum, which stated that 
the British government was not prepared to entertain a 
joint collection levy of more than 100 taels sinpe this 
sum had already been agreed to by Kung on 28 July 1882, 
when he was discussing Samuel’s scheme with Wade. If 
China would agree to the 100 taels offer, the British 
government would require an Imperial decree and proclama­
tion announcing the acceptance. Consent of other Treaty 
powers had to be obtained before the agreement could be 
operational; and a list of five guarantees was also 
required from the Chinese government: 1) transit certificates 
of opium be in accordance with sec iii, paragraph 4 of the 
Chefoo Convention; 2) permission be given to purchasers to 
repack their opium in such fractions of a chest as may 
suit their convenience and that each such package should 
be covered by a transit certificate; 3) that so long as 
these packages are unbroken and the certificate undefaced, 
free circulation within China be allowed, and re-certific- 
ation given if owner wants to convey them to other markets 
not destined in the certificate; 4) that foreign opium shall 
not be subject to amy contribution, licence or tax other 
than or in excess of such contributions on native opium; 
and 5) either government shall have the right to terminate 
the agreement as the end of five years after giving 
twelve months' notice^.
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Tseng replied that since he was authorized only to
negotiate for a total levy of 110 taels, he could not
accede to the Foreign Office’s proposal of 100 taels.
Moreover, the Chinese government would be very much opposed
to the 'carrying of foreign opium inland by persons of
any nationality other than Chinese. However, at Granville's
request, he promised to study the memorandum and would
16reply after he had returned from his trip to Russia •
On 27 September 1884, Tseng replied the Foreign Office.
It was a long memorandum, which both in its Chinese 
original and English translation, demonstrated China's 
newly-acquired ability in the intricacies of western 
diplomacy. It was a document filled with rhetoric. It 
combined the soft with the hard approach: the complacent 
and the harsh as well as the polite and the insplent. It 
began by expressing gratitude at the willingness on the 
part of Britain to negotiate and to effect a solution. '
It added, however, that China could not possibly reduce 
the total levy to 100 taels. The.amount of 110 taels (
insisted on by him was already a very considerable 
reduction of the sum most provincial officials had 
advocated and even Hart had named 90 taels likin as a 
levy opium could easily bear. This sum would be merely 
25# of the cost price of the drug and could only be 
considered as moderate, gince opium was a luxury commodity.
In fact, in some Treaty ports the likin had already 
surpassed this amount. According to the Treaty of Tientsin, 
China had complete right to impose whatever taxation on 
foreign opium once it .passed into Chinese hands; thus,
•by agreeing to this uniform system of joint collection, 
it would be actually 'in the direction of a voluntary 
restriction on their /China7 power of unlimited taxation, 
and a concession they had made to commerce, rather than 
one which they had received.1 It was also pointed out that 
Prince Kung had' been prepared to accept in principle 
Samuel's scheme but not the 70 taels which was included 
in it. The Chinese government had always insisted on 80 taels.
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As to the five guarantees required, China was quite 
willing to give them, except that certain modifications 
had to be made. These were that foreigners should not be 
allowed to carry opium inland - and this should be readily 
acceptable to the British government since this right 
had never been asked for nor raised in previous negotiations 
and that exemption certificates would be issued, not in 
accordance with section iii paragraph 4 of the Chefoo 
Convention since this was never considered to apply to
*
opium, but in accordance with section i of Rule V of the 
commercial agreement of 1858. It was also noted that,*the 
strongest guarantee will consist in the moral obligation 
on them Chinese government^ "by the consideration that 
the arrangement has been of the Chinese Government's own 
proposing.' The present scheme would definitely,harmonize 
with existing institutions and special conditions in 
China and would work much better than any’other, which 
might sound more promising, but which would be in reality 
in defiance of China's unique situation.
The memorandum also pointed out that Britain should 
not insist on a previous accord to be arrived at with 
other Treaty powers before the agreement was put in force.
To do so would result in yet another indefinite postpone­
ment which would 'prevent the Chinese Government deriving 
from the Chefoo Agreement the advantages in return for
which they had consented to open and have already opened,
17to Foreign Trade several places on the Yangtze.1
The India Office, when it received the text of the
memorandum, finally agreed that it was necessary that
.Marquis Tseng's insistence on 80 taels likin must be
accepted in order to reach an agreement for political
reasons. The Indian government was asked if it had any
18objections, by telegram on 24 December 1884 •
The Indian government replied on 5 January 1885 that 
by agreeing to the 70 taels likin it would already result 
in an estimated loss of a minimum of 25 lakhs of rupees 
(£2,500,000) of opium revenue annually, and the government
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was fmost unwilling to assent to the proposed rate of 80
taels.1 It further added that if agreement were reached
it should be pointed out clearly that the British government
would have the right to end it at any time if the Chinese
governmeht failed to stop the separate collection of likin
and that such a move would not be dependent on the consent
19of other Treaty powers .
The India Office, however, did not heed the Indian
government’s objections, and in a communique to the
Foreign Office on 21 January 1885, it agreed to the 80 taels
likin. It, however, repeated the argument for abolition
of the internal likin as a precondition of agreement,
one put forward by the Indian government. It also wanted
clarification of the question of foreigners carrying
opium inland (though the India Office itself was,not in
favour of this mode of trade), adjustment of tax or
licence fee on boats, shops and warehouses between those
levied on foreign and those on native opium; and the
agreement could only be put into practice when all the
20other Treaty powers had accepted it . •
Explaining its decision to the Indian government, the 
India Office pointed out the following factors: 1) if 
negotiations were to fail, the Chinese government would 
certainly impose a heavy likin on opium once it left the 
Foreign Inspectorate in the Treaty ports and the amount 
could be 100 taels or more, as was distinctly intimated 
in Tso.TSung-t*ang1s memorial and accepted by the Chinese 
government in principle; moreover, the present increase 
was only by 10 taels and Wade had estimated that opium 
could bear a uniform rate of 110 taels, while Hart had 
put the figure at 120 taels. Thus, even if the Indian 
government were to lose 25 lakhs annually, it would be 
a worthwhile sacrifice for five years ’to give greater 
security to the opium revenue, now in some danger on 
account of the troublesome political questions which would 
be disposed of and to protect the trade in Indian opium 
against unequal, unexpected, and oppressive enhancements
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of the local likin duties.’ 2) According to Tseng's
memorandum, this would be the first step towards the
commutation of likin on all goods. Although China had
not promised to do so, yet its willingness to suggest a
possibility would greatly harm Britain's stand among other
Treaty powers if it were not entertained, since all had
been asking for this. If the abolition of likin on all
goods were to come about, it would greatly facilitate
Britain's trade with China in other articles. 5) The
increased activities of the Anti-opium Society if the
agreement was not consented to would pose grave political
problems to the government. Thus 'the India Office, even
after taking into consideration the objections raised by
the Indian government (telegram of 5 January), had decided
21to agree to Tseng's proposal •
With the objections from the India Office, and perforce
the Indian government's, removed, the Foreign Office was
22able to accept Tseng's proposal • In the memorandum of 
9 February 1885 to Tseng, Lord Granville wrote that, 'in 
deference to the wishes of the Chinese Government' the 
British government would agree to a commutation of likin 
on opium at 80 taels. The British government 'have been 
mainly induced to consent to an arrangement, which may 
entail a considerable loss of revenue on India, by the 
assurances which the Chinese Minister has given them that 
the Chinese Government will feel morally bound by the 
consideration that the arrangements has been proposed by 
themselves; that they believe that it will harmonize with 
existing institutions, and they will .endeavour to execute 
• it in such a manner as to show that a fair Agreement 
drawn up in conformity with the conditions of the country 
will be advantageous to foreign trade.' Measures to 
guarantee that onl^ r the stipulated amount would be collected 
as well as the doubts which both the Indian government 
and the India Office had expressed were also incorporated 
into the memorandum. They differed little from what Tseng 
had already proposed as safeguards in his memorandum of
8.10
27 September 1884. The only addition was that 'notes 
should be exchanged between the two Governments stipulating 
that the Supplementary Article shall only come into 
force after a period of six months from that date of 
the Chinese Government's acceptance of it, and that it 
shall be competent to Her Majesty's Government at once 
to withdraw from the new arrangement and return to the 
system of taxation at present in operation at the Treaty 
ports, should the Chinese Government fail to bring the 
other Treaty Powers to conform to it.' y
After obtaining approval from the Imperial government,
Tseng replied to Granville on 18 'March 1885 agreeing
24to all the terms the latter had asked • During the
following three months matters of detail were worked
out, so that by 15 June 1885 Tseng was able to pgree to
the English draft of the agreement and in return sent a
draft of the' Chinese text. He also informed Granville
that an Imperial decree had been issued authorizing him
to sign the agreement on behalf of the Chinese government;
he wanted to know when the day for exchange of signatures 
25would be .
However, the change of government might have meant 
that Tseng's request was either ignored or neglected 
until 14 July, when Lord Salisbury, the new Foreign 
Minister, wrote to ask Tseng if 18 July at 2 p.m. would
.......    pc
be convenient for the exchange of signatures .
On the same day, Salisbury wrote another despatch to 
Tseng asking for information about a memorial which had 
appeared in the Peking Gazette of 24 April 1885, in which 
.a.secretary of the Grand Secretariat denounced the taotai 
of the Feng-yang customs in Anhwei for misappropriating 
funds he had collected and also for collecting extra sums 
for his own purse.* Salisbury said that this would mean 
there was a want of efficient control on the part of the 
Imperial government over its internal customs officials; 
and warned that if such illegal exactions were to continue, 
they would be fatal to the enforcement of the agreement
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and wondered what steps would be taken by the Chinese
27government to remedy such a situation r•
Tseng replied by saying that the .charges laid against 
the customs administration at Feng-yang were grave, but 
this was an individual case which was bound to occur no 
matter how vigilant a supervision was exercised over all 
of China* That the Imperial government had taken immediate 
steps to investigate the matter, that the Additional 
Article would remove such collectorates, and that in the• 
charges named there was no mention of the culprit attempt­
ing to levy dues on goods covered with a transit pass,
28would prove that Salisbury* s fears were unjustified. • 
Apparently satisfied by the reply, no further mention of 
this incident was made by the Foreign Office.
On 18 July 1885* Marquis Tseng and Lord Salisbury
signed the 'Additional Article to the Chefoo Convention'
29 'together with a Note % .....  ..
Signature of the Additional Article, however, did
not completely solve the Opium Question although a major
hurdle had been jumped. There still remained the vital
question of how to put it into operation. This involved
firstly the necessity of consent to the agreement by the
other Treaty powers; and secondly a question which
brought Hong Kong into the picture, how to effectively
prevent any smuggling of opium into China. For the first,
it became solely the responsibility of the Chinese
government; and for the second, by article 9 of the
Additional Article, a joint commission was to be formed
on the same terms as that called for by the Chefoo
* Convention. Thus, before the agreement could become
operational, these questions had to be solved and it
took China until February 1887 before the joint collection
of Tariff duty and likin on foreign opium by the Foreign
Inspectorate began, and not until April 1887 when Hong
30Kong and Macao were included^ •
Acceptance by Germany and other Treaty powers
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The dispute over the levy of inland dues on foreign 
imports and Chinese exports in the interior of China had 
always been one of the main complaints made by foreign 
merchants and their governments. The Chinese government 
always dontended that treaty stipulations did not prevent 
the provincial authorities from levying such dues - 
whether they were in the form of likin or octroi - even 
if goods had paid the 2if/o ad valorem 'transit duty'.
The foreign merchants, however, were of the opinion that 
payment of the 'tmsit duty' should free goods from 
further levies until or unless they were 'broken up', i.e. 
into small packages which would then invalidate the 
transit pass. The foreign governments were in two minds 
about the dispute because on the one side, they would 
like to argue for their merchants, but on the otjier, treaty 
stipulations were so ambiguously worded that they could 
not rightfully impose an interpretation - for or against 
either version.
In the negotiations for the Alcock Convention and also
in that of the Chefoo Convention, attempts were made by
Alcock and Wade respectively to define the 'transit duty'
more precisely. But neither agreement was ratified and
the situation remained as before. In 1872 a survey was
made by British consuls at the Treaty ports on the amount
and type of likin and octroi on imports and exports, but
this was only for information of the British government
as well as to provide evidence in future negotiations
with the Tsungli-yamen on the amount of interference with
31trade as privileged by treaty^ • Although the survey was 
incorporated into the arguments used by Wade when he 
negotiated for the Chefoo agreement, he was unable to 
obtain more than a vague definition of the 'port-area' 
which would be definitely exempt from likin. The agreement 
on this was not ratified and the clause was not put into 
effect.
In 1878, the German Minister to China, von Brandt, 
drew .up a memorandum entitled 'Inland Taxation on Foreign
8.13
Goods and Native Produce in China.' It proposed quite 
a detailed narrative of the type and amount of taxes 
levied on different types of merchandise^ . Von Bra.ndt, 
together with the French minister, made representations 
to the 'Chinese government, and asked for 'the commutation 
of likin taxes upon articles forming part of the foreign 
trade in China1, but arguing that this was a concession, 
since likin levies were absolutely illegal in view of the 
treaties and was a 'permanent violation' of them. However., 
they got nowhere with the Tsungli-yamen; Fraser, none­
theless, commented that likin could be argued as legal 
in the sense that it was never levied whilst goods were 
in foreign hands^ .
The dissatisfaction and irritation at China's unwilling'
ness to respond favourably to overtures for a settlement
of the likin issue became the bargaining point, for von
Brandt, when the Chinese government asked for the Treaty
powers' consent to the Additional Article^*. N.R. .0.'.Conor.;
charge d'Affaires at Peking, after receiving details of
the Additional Article, remarked that of the foreign
representatives, von Brandt would definitely ask for a
quid pro quo from China and other representatives would
follow suit since settlement of the likin problem would
3Sbe advantageous to all concerned^ .
The Imperial government was also very much aware of 
such a possible action from the foreign representatives.
By telegrams to its ministers abroad, they were instructed 
to make direct representations to the foreign governments 
asking for approval of the Additional Article^, with 
• regard to the United States, Russia and France, consent 
was easily obtained, since the treaties they had signed 
with China in the early eighties barred their nationals 
from being involved in the opium trade; and they had 
little shipping interests in China anyway^. With Germany 
it was a different situation altogether. Not only did 
von Brandt ask his government not to agree until a quid 
pro quo was received from China, but because German
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shipping interests in China was only second to that of 
Britain, it had a greater say'*®.
Negotiations with Germany were conducted both at 
Peking and Berlin, and although there were attempts at 
co-ordination of actions by both governments and their 
representatives, such attempts failed and resulted in 
two sets of agreements.
At Peking, von Brandt initially wanted the 'strict 
fulfilment of the Treaty provisions with regard to the 
taxation inland of foreign imports and native produce 
destined for exportation with the establishment of certain 
rules by which these provisions heretofore evaded or 
ignored in many particulars, might be duly carried out.'
This would be guaranteed by seven measures that must be 
put into practice"^ .
This was a moderate demand, but the Tsungli-yamen
refused. O'Conor was called on to help mediate with von
Brandt, the Tsungli-yamen arguing that since the Additional.
Article was the only benefit China obtained from the
Chefoo Convention, and since the British government had
agreed to seek the approval of other Treaty powers to the
Convention, Britain should help China and not co-operate
. . 4-0with Germany to impose new conditions • Li Hung-chang,
at an earlier date, had even suggested that Britain
should allow the Additional Article to operate for six
months during which period China would levy the Tariff
duty on opium imported in German ships and then levy a
likin of 150 taels to discourage any further German
attempt to nullify the agreement. This was, naturally,
4-1• refused by O'Conor .
Eventually in early February 1886, von Brandt agreed 
to modify his demands, which were reduced to two: 'The 
publication of the' lists of likin and other tax stations 
in the interior, and the Tariff of dues levied on them; ' 
/and7 the abolition of differential duties imposed on 
certified foreign goods after arrival at their place of • 
destination.' To these the Tsungli-yamen eventually assented
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and von Brandt agreed to recommend to his government
ILO
that consent be given to the opium agreement
However, a few days earlier on 51 January 1886, 
the German government had already agreed to the Additional 
Article when the Chinese minister promised that China 
would do more trade with Germany in purchasing guns and . 
ammunition, for instance . A German trade syndicate 
was to be despatched to China to work out new trade 
agreements. However, this was after a lot of bargaining 
by the Chinese minister to Germany, HsU Ching-ch'eng,
/i /|
after he had received instructions from the Tsungli-yamen ,
and had utilized all the means available to him - logical
il 5
reasonings and moral appeals .
With the final barrier to ratification removed, the
Chinese Emperor ratified the Additional Article; and the
British government was called upon to do the same. Marquis
Tseng also requested that the agreement should be put
into operation immediately, before the exchange of
ratifications, since the new Chinese minister to Britain
was bringing the papers with him and might take some
months. He also expressed apprehension that if the German
trade syndicate were to arrive in China before such a
date, their possibly excessive demands might not be met
by the Chinese government and Germany might consequently
46withdraw her consent . The Foreign Office agreed to this
request, and when this decision was communicated to the
47India and Colonial Offices, they also concurred 1.
O'Conor., , upon receipt of this information, called bn
the Tsungli-yamen in mid-March 1886 and was surprised to
• be informed that the Chinese government had no intention
of enforcing the Additional Article until the commission
for the settlement of the blockade issue of Hong Kong had
48met and deliberated • This news was received with much 
apprehension by the British government. The India Office 
; considered such a move by the Chinese government very^ 
unsatisfactory and feared that some new' items might be 
introduced into the agreement and urged that ratifications
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should be exchanged immediately . The Colonial Office
expressed understanding of China’s attitude, but also
proposed the exchange of ratifications, since the
commission would take some time to make its report as
it had 'not been convened yet^. The Foreign Office,
agreeing to these views, but unable to make strong
representations, contented itself by sending a note to .
Marquis Tseng expressing the government's surprise at
such a move after the British government had consented
to his urgent request for immediate enforcement of the 
51agreement^ •
To this rebuke, Tseng retorted quite sharply, remark­
ing that the Chinese government had no intention of 
postponing the execution of the agreement. 'That" the 
Agreement in its entirety cannot be put in force at once, 
can scarcely...be considered as calculated to excite
4
suprise. It is by no means an unfrequent occurrence to 
find it's either impossible or impracticable to give 
effect to all the provisions of an international Engage­
ment from the first day when according to stipulations it 
is permissible to enforce it.VChina, in fact, was most 
desirous that there should be no undue delay* However, 
clause 5 of the agreement called for the determination 
of size of packages etc., and clause 9 called for a 
Hong Kong commission - both of which had to be decided 
first. Tseng argued that it was the execution of these 
two preliminary measures that prompted the Tsungli-yamen
to ask for operation of the agreement before the formal
52exchange of ratifications^ • To this line of argument 
• the British government had no response and had to wait 
until the blockade issue had been settled by the forth­
coming commission.
During this sh'ort period of nine months, the change 
in approach or attitude by both governments is worthy of 
note. The British government, after signing the agreement, 
was looking forward to the anticipated 'hindrance' that
would be meted out by the German government to China.
This was partly due to its desire to reap the fruits of 
solution to the 'inland dues' problem, and partly due to 
its desire to have China approve the Kashgir Trade 
Convention and the trade mission to Tibet. O'Conor was 
instructed to help von Brandt rather than the Tsungli- 
yamen^ • The British government was accused of this 
'conspiracy' by China in no uncertain terms^. When China 
obtained Germany's consent, the Foreign Office immediately
%
agreed to the enforcement of the agreement prior to 
ratification, and when this did not come about, there 
was a sudden panic, since it could not be explained why 
China had adopted this sudden change of attitude^.
Settlement of the blockade question
The Additional Article had been negotiated by persons
on both sides who possessed little knowledge in the
practicality of principles. The agreement was basically
the acceptance of a principle under which the opium trade
in China would be conducted in future. It also provided the
solution to a question that had been outstanding, one might
56say, since opium became a legalized import in 186CK • As 
such, the agreement did suit the objectives of both 
governments, but more so the Chinese government. However, 
at no time did the negotiators in London consider how 
it should be applied, apart from stating that a commission 
should be established to work out the outstanding problems 
of Hong Kong. This was merely a re-statement of article VII 
of section III of the Chefoo Convention and the rec- 
convening of a commission that had never met. Minute 
details on how the agreement should be put into operation 
were left in total abeyance.
It was more than a possibility that neither side 
thought about it. In China, Hart, to whom the collection 
of both Tariff and likin on opium was to be assigned, was 
never consulted. He volunteered his services when he 
realized the complete involvement of his department in the
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new arrangement. In Britain, likewise, the Foreign Office 
only consulted the Indian Office intensely while the 
Colonial Office was mostly left in the dark unless 
negotiations touched on Hong Kong, and this was very 
seldom.*The Board of Trade was never consulted. All these 
facts prove that it was a settlement of principle, pure 
and simple.
When Hart finally saw and studied the Additional 
Article in October 1885, he immediately wrote a semi- 
* official but confidential memorandum to the Foreign 
Office. In it he outlined in detail a set of supplementary 
rules to the Additional Article which would secure the 
largest collection of revenue to China, with the total 
prevention of smuggling activities from Hong Kong, and 
cause the least trouble to opium merchants. This, was his 
'opium hulks' plan. Briefly, it meant that three hulks 
would be anchored at Hong Kong, supplemented by a godown 
on shore if necessary, manned entirely by staff from the 
Foreign Inspectorate and responsible to the commissioner at 
Canton. These hulks would receive all opium imported into 
Hong Kong whether they arrived in British or other ships, 
and be placed in bond. Upon export by foreign registered 
ships to the Treaty ports, the joint collection of Tariff 
duty and likin would be done by the Foreign Inspectorate 
there. If exported by native junks to non-treaty ports, 
officials of the Foreign Inspectorate stationed on the 
hulks would do the collection. Opium destined for consump­
tion in Hong Kong and that transported to Macao and 
places outside of China would also be levied the same 
duty since the amount would be minimal and purchasers 
could well afford a slight increase in price. Hart also 
gave arguments that could be used if Hong Kong objected 
to such an arrangement. He even went to the extent of 
quoting an extract from a despatch from Palmerston to 
Pottinger (on 51 May 1841), in which the former acknowledged 
the status of Hong Kong as a free-port but suggested 
thst Chinese custom-house officials could be stationed in
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the Colony to levy import duties on goods going from
there to China. He also proposed that regulations should
be made whereby only British ships and those countries
that had consented to the Additional Article would be
57allowed to carry opium to China^ .
Upon receipt of this memorandum, the Foreign Office 
was placed in a dilemma, since it had not come from the 
Chinese government, which obviously knew nothing about it.
It was eventually decided, after consulting the India and 
Colonial Offices which both rejected the scheme, that 
a memorandum would be drawn.up saying that China could 
not ask for anything more than what was contained in 
the Additional Article, but that the British government 
would do all it could to help China realize her opium 
revenue. Hart's scheme would not be commented on since 
a commission would be established to consider ways and 
means of eliminating the--bl-ockader~Thxs was'~sentr to JJD 
Campbell, Hart's private secretary in London, who was
58asked to communicate it to Hart in cypher, as was requested*' •
59O'Conor was also instructed about the memorandums'".
The matter then gravitated towards the establishment 
of the commission called for by the Additional Article. 
Representatives were appointed from the three governments 
concerned - China, Britain and Hong Kong. For the sake of 
clarity in the understanding of the terms of reference the 
commissioners were given, we arrange them under three 
headings according to the governments they represented.
China. In early 1886, after Germany had agreed to the 
Additional Article, preparations were made to appoint a 
Chinese commissioner. Since he would have immense respons­
ibilities, caution in the selection of an. appropriate 
person resulted in the appointment of Shao Yu-lien,
formerly China's chafge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg and
60then Taotai at Shanghai , On 15 February. He was 
summoned to a meeting with the Tsungli-yamen. Also called 
in for discussion were Hart, Li Hung-chang and Tseng Kuo- 
on'uan, Chief Superintendents of Trade for the Northern
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61and Southern Ports, respectively . At the same time,
Marquis Tseng at London was asked to inform the Foreign
Office of Shao's appointment, and to argue in favour of i
62Hart's 'opium hulk' plan . The latter instruction however
was rescinded half a month later because it was decided
that it should be brought up during the meeting of the
63commission instead . O'Conor was also informed of Shao's 
appointment and he was asked to appoint a consular 
representative^.
The meetings among the 'policy-making* Chinese officials 
in Peking were felt necessary by the Tsungli-yamen-there 
were inuendoes that a number of foreigners were attempting 
to undermine the value of the agreement with respect to 
the taxation of 110 taels, and there was also insinuations 
from provincial authorities who disliked the new agreement, 
since it would be a blow to their vested interests. Shao, 
it was felt, must be consulted first before instructions 
were given him. It was agreed, after several meetings, that 
China should put forward Hart's 'opium hulk' plan as it 
would suit China best. The Tsungli-yainen also decided that 
Hart should accompany Shao to Hong Kong, since he was very
experienced in customs businesses and could be of invaluable
66 . . help to Shao during the negotiations . Hart was notified
by the Tsungli-yamen in late April, and he was officially
appointed as a j^oint commissioner with Shao by an Imperial......   eg ' .......... ........
edict on 28 April • The two representatives of China
left for Hong Kong on 19 May, arriving there exactly a
month later^.
Britain. On 11 March 1886, the Foreign Office informed
Marquis Tseng that B. Brenan, Britain's consul at Tientsin,
had been appointed the consular representative to the 
68commission . Before his departure for Hong Kong in mid-June, 
Brenan was given 'detailed and precise instructions by 
O'Conor, who had earlier been instructed by the Foreign 
Office. Brenan. was told that although the Chinese govern­
ment believed that the British government had pledged •
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itself to put the opium trade of Hong Kong under some 
restriction, yet this was not the case. The Additional 
Article only dealt with opium imported in China and not 
into Hong Kong. Brenan should oppose the placing of 
receiving hulks in Hong Kong waters or godowns on Hong Kong 
soil, and should also reject another Hart's proposal: 
the restriction of opium carriers to British ships. With 
regard to the facilities that Hong Kong might afford 
China in the control of the drug while in Hong Kong, this 
was to be decided between the two governments; Brenan 
should not interfere, although he should, bear in mind 
that upon payment of the joint duties, opium would be 
allowed free circulation in China. Moreover, the commission 
was only authorized to devise remedies for the cessation 
of the blockade and the prevention of smuggling and 
could not impose any restriction on the o^ pium trade outside 
the limits of Hong Kong. Therefore, Brenan was not to 
agree to anything that might involve the consent of the 
Indian government, Singapore or any other British authority 
In a final directive, 'throughout the negotiations you 
will bear inmind that the propinquity of an English 
Colony to the Chinese Mainland should lessen China's enjoy­
ment of such rights as she may have obtained from Foreign 
Powers under Treaty, still the Colony of Hong Kong is 
entitled to look for some equivalent in return for such
assistance as it may give the Chinese Government by using
69its executive power to that country's benefit.' '
Hong Kong, Appointment of the Hong Kong representative 
was simple enough. J. Russell, Puisne Judge of the Colony, 
who had been appointed to the proposed commission of 1876, 
asked to be nominated again, and this was accepted by 
the Colonial Office^.
The Hong Kong 'government was very apprehensive about 
the commission and its outcome, since it would affect the 
Colony directly. It asked the Colonial Office for instruct­
ions, especially in regard to Hart's proposal. The Colonial
8.22
government argued that if Hart's proposal of levying
the joint duty on opium for use in Hong Kong and for
transhipment to other places was accepted, it would result
in a loss of $200,000 a year in colonial revenue. The
reason. 'was that the government could no longer obtain
income from the sale of the opium monopoly which would
become defunct under the proposal. This income consequently
would be taken over by the Chinese government. Moreover,
by levying duty on opium that was bound for Macao, the
government there would construe it as an unfriendly act
71on the part of the Hong Kong government' •
The Colonial Office agreed thht such could be considered 
an unfriendly act by the Macao government, but it did 
not issue any instruction to the Hong Kong government; 
the depatch from Hong Kong was forwarded to the.Foreign 
Office without any comment, and the latter also decided 
that no opinion was called for for the moment, since the 
commission would be meeting, and if no agreement was 
reached, it would be referred back and an opinion could 
offered then^.
The Hong Kong government also queried the appointment 
of Hart as a joint commissioner with Shao since if this 
did not have approval from Britain, the appointment would 
be 'ultra vires'. But a telegram from Walsham, who had 
just assumed his post as Britain's minister to China, 
quelled the objection^.
In the end, Marsh, the Administrator, and Russell had 
to draw up the instructions between them. Nevertheless, 
it was a detailed and all-embracing memorandum. The 
■foremost point made, though not expressed in so many words, 
was that Russell, as Hong Kong's representative to the 
commission, was solely interested in negotiations to solve 
the question of thb blockade. To this end, the commission 
was to furnish four pre-conditions to Russell before he 
would agree to negotiations on possible solutions: 1) 
publication by the Chinese government of a tariff of duties
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on native produces shipped to or transhipped from Hong 
Kong; 2) prohibition of all cruisers and boats that 
impersonate Chinese revenue cruisers, and a name-list of 
all revenue vessels; 5) establishment of a board of 
enquiry into the complaints of all seizures made by 
revenue vessels, to be composed of a European officer of 
the Foreign Inspectorate and an official of the Hong Kong 
government; and 4) if the customs stations were to continue 
to exist, they must be under the inspection of an officer 
of the Foreign Inspectorate. The Hong Kong government 
would not consent to the establishment either in Hong Kong 
waters or on its territory any stations, hulks or officers 
for the collection of Chinese customs. Neither would it 
consent to levying a duty on opium going to Macao which 
would not only antagonise the government tjiere b^t also 
would not prevent it from becoming the supplier of opium 
to places outside of China. Agreement to these conditions 
would pave the way for HongKong to accept 'any reasonable 
proposal for assisting the Chinese Government to secure 
payment of duty on goods taken into China or brought from 
it to Hong Kong', although it should in no way affect
niL
either the revenue of the Colony or its legitimate tradef .
Representatives from the three governments, with 
their individual instructions, then met in Hong Kong.
The first meeting of the so-called 'The Hongkong Blockade 
Commission' met on 29 June 1886. It met for seven more 
times, and on 11 September 1886 a joint memorandum was 
signed by the representatives: Hart, Russell and Brenan^.
Meetings of the commission were marked by very tough 
bargaining on the part of Russell, and the Chinese 
representatives were completely placed on the defensive^. 
Brenan, in accordance with his instructions, acted more as 
an observer on behalf of the Indian government than as 
an active participant. Thus, meetings revolved around 
Russell and Hart. Although the final agreement concluded 
was deemed satisfactory to all concerned, yet it was
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Russell's proposal that obtained consent. It was one 
completely different from China's, which was Hart's 
scheme proposed to the Foreign Office in October 1885, 
in that the safeguards against smuggling were not as tight 
and the'plan was almost completely dependent on the 
active co-operation of the Hong Kong government.
In the first meeting, Russell blandly declared that
as far as Hong Kong was concerned, there were no
grievances to be submitted to the commission; and it
was purely in the interests of China that it had been
convened. This was in reply to Hart's opening remarks
that the commission should first discuss Hong Kong's
complaints and then put forward proposals regarding the
blockade question. Russell also refused to put forward
any proposal but was prepared to listen to plans that
77might be submitted' .
♦ ,
The second meeting saw Hart giving a resume of the 
history of the opium trade, adding that implementation 
of the Additional Article would greatly increase 
smuggling activities. However, it was fortunate that a 
clause had been inserted in the agreement whereby an 
arrangement would be made with Hong Kong to prevent 
such activities. To this, Russell protested, arguing 
that the clause was a mere reiteration of an identical 
one in the Chefoo Convention, and had nothing to do with 
the present agreement. Hart then began to explain his 
proposals, which were three in number: China could collect 
her revenue unaided, Britain could collect it for her 
in India, and a Sino-British co-operation with the 
collection beginning at Hong Kong. He emphasized the last 
which was the 'opium hulk* plan. To this Russell dissented 
saying that the Hong Kong government would not entertain 
any plan that called on the collection of duesjon opium 
that would not be sent to China, i.e. to Macao and other 
places. He, in turn, declared that he had a scheme of his 
own and would submit it to the commission provided China
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could obtain similar co-operation from the Macao government.
At the third meeting, Russell outlined his scheme,
but he prefaced by noting that when a commission was
written into the Chefoo Convention, it was a concession
from China to Britain, not vice versa, and reiterated that
Hong Kong had no grievances or complaints. His proposal,
though differing in detail, was based on Robertson*s
memorandum submitted to Wade when he was appointed consular
 ^representative to the abortive commission of the Chefoo
agreement'*®. The proposal, briefly explained was as
follows: 'opium shall be imported /into Hong Kong7 in
quantities no less than one chest,' and that no opium be
landed, shipped or transhipped or removed without
reporting to the Hong Kong Government officer. Monopoly
of sale in quantities of less than one chest is .given to
the raw opium farmer. Possession of opium in less than
*
one chest is forbidden unless intended for export and 
proof of this intention to export will be the permit of 
the opium farmer and a duty' receipt from i?he Chinese 
Customs.' The Hong Kong government would prohibit all 
junks to leave during -the-night , set up -provisions-fo^r- 
search of merchants' godowns, legislate against the 
assemblage of armed bands, and give the Chinese customs 
notice of all shipments by steamer or junk. These measures 
would show the Colonial government's willingness to help 
the Chinese government. This scheme, however, was 
conditional on the acceptance by Macao of an identical 
arrangement and it would be abandoned if it was found to 
be detrimental or injurious to the Colony, or if excessive 
duties were imposed. Hart agreed that it was the next best 
thing to his proposal^.
The fourth meeting saw Hart informing Russell that 
the scheme would b6 forwarded to Peking for approval; he 
also commented that it commended itself because it would be 
^advantageous to China as it was to the Hong Kong opium 
farmer®^.
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Both Shao and Hart telegraphed Russell1s proposal to 
the Tsungli-yamen and Li Hung-chang, giving details and . 
advocating its acceptance. Hart also suggested that since 
the Portuguese had occupied Macao for a long time and
it woul'd involve a huge sum of money to ‘buy* it back,
(if force was used Macao might be given to a Treaty power
which would make things worse) it would be a good idea to
sign a 1 permanent lease* agreement. This would be most 
beneficial to China since Macao should then agree toOl
Russell*s scheme • The Tsungli-yamen agreed to these
op
suggestions by telegram on 11 July •
When the commission met again on 14 July, Hart was able 
to state that Imperial approval to Russell*s scheme had 
been obtained, and that he would be leaving for Macao. A 
copy of the draft ordinance was asked for, but fhissell 
would only allow the Chinese commissioners to see it, 
nor would he put anything down in writing'before Macao 
had agreed to the terms. Russell also insisted that 
minutes of the meeting should note, that while ‘China was 
asking Hong Kong to assist her in repressing smuggling, 
the Chinese Authorities were unable to produce returns 
to show whether smuggling existed or not.* This was 
because Shao had said the Canton native customs collected 
dues on 6,500 piculs annually but because of an unauthorized
rebate of 25$, this could not be put down in writing.
.....................................    83
Hart then asked that his proposal to be recorded likewise •
Hart then proceeded to Macao, where initial negotiations
with Governor Roza turned out to be quite successful.
Roza agreed in principle to Russell*s proposal, but when
details were being worked out, he first agreed to the
•opium hulk' plan, then demanded that any agreement reached
must not conflict with Portuguese or international laws
and regulations add that Macao's interests must be considered 
84as paramount • At a later date, he further demanded 
that Macao become a permanent Portuguese property, and 
the likin barrier stations situated in the mountain range
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between Macao and China must be withdrawn, to be replaced 
by the stationing of Portuguese troops®^. After consult­
ations with Chang Chih-tung, Governor-General of Liang- 
kwang, who said that the barrier stations were an 
effective means of preventing smuggling and could not 
be removed, the Tsungli-yamen refused to acquiesce to 
Roza's demands^.
Finally, Hart was able to obtain Roza's agreement to 
place all opium under the supervision of the Foreign 
Inspectorate with the necessary rules and regulations 
with a sine qua non that the island of Lappa and Macao 
would be ceded to Portugal®^. Knowing very well that 
the Imperial government would not concede to the cession 
of Lappa (which was confirmed when he returned to Peking), 
Hart instructed Campbell, his secretary d,n Londpn, to 
meet Roza there on the latter's trip back to Portugal, 
and to explain China's position again, anA then to proceed 
to Lisbon to negotiate with the Portuguese governmentQQ
if need be •
Seeing that nothing further could be accomplished at
Macao, Hart returned to Hong Kong and the commission
89resumed its meetings . Russell pointed out that during 
the interval, there had been increased activities by 
Chinese revenue vessels as well as an increase in the 
rate of likin. Hart replied that if this had been so it 
must have had the authorization from the Governor-General 
.and would be applicable to all of Kwangtung, and 'the 
Hong Kong trade had to take its chance with the rest.' 
Russell then asked that an officer of the Foreign 
• Inspectorate be appointed to the customs stations around 
Hong Kong to investigate complaints. Hart was agreeable, 
but wanted Russell to make the suggestion; he also stated 
that he believed there had been and would be no complaints 
from Hong Kong.
The next meeting agreed on an amendment to the draft 
ordinance based on Russell's scheme. Hart altered the
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wording to leave the Foreign Inspectorate's officer in '
complete charge of the investigations of complaints, and
that appeals should be directed to Peking and not Canton.
Having solved all the problems, except the confirmation
of th6 scheme from Macao, the next day (11 September 1866)
saw the signing of the joint memorandum, which reiterated
in detail Russell's scheme but embodying the amendments
proposed during the course of the commission^.
This memorandum, and draft ordinances fAf and 'B' (the
former was based on Russell's original.scheme, while the
latter was the revised version containing amendments) were
sent to the Colonial Office^. When Russell's report was
completed, this was also sent to the Colonial Office with
a covering note by Marsh, in which he said that, 'the
terms of that arrangement appear to be advantageous to
the Governments of both China and of this*Colony, whilst
there was nothing in them that was considered to be
prejudicial to the Government of India.' Marsh believed
the advantage to be derived from the agreement would be
considerable since Hong Kong only obtained #180,000 a
year from opium revenue (from the opium farmer), whereas
Singapore, with a smaller Chinese population, obtained
nearly #1,180,000. Now that Hong Kong would have the same
arrangements as Singapore, Hong Kong should look forward
92to a much increased opium revenue' •
The Colonial Office transmitted these documents to
the Foreign Office, adding the view that with the latter*s
concurrence, sanction should be given to the revised
draft ordinance (ordinance 'B') as soon as the Hong Kong
government learnt that the same arrangement between China
93and Macao had been concluded' . To this the Foreign
Office agreed, and also proposed to the India Office that
QZl
it should do the 'same' •
The ball, so to speak, was once more in China's court. 
On the one hand, an agreement had to be reached with the 
Portuguese government so that Macao would introduce and
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follow the same regulations as that for Hong Kong; while 
on the other hand, joint collection had to commence as 
soon as possible, since the commission had met and 
deliberated, and there was to be no further delays. What 
the Iihperial government eventually did was to carry out 
both of these tasks independently and hoping that they 
would be combined in the end.
Negotiations with Portugal
With Roza's departure for Portugal, negotiations also
shifted there. Because Hart had begun the talks with Roza,
he was given the responsibility for concluding them,
although he had to refer to the Tsungli-yamen for
instructions. Campbell, keeping almost in daily contact
with Hart by telegram, negotiated on China's behalf in
Lisbon with the Portuguese government represented by
its Foreign Minister with the help of Ro,za who was an
old friend and former school-mate of his^.
When Campbell began the round of negotiations in
early December 1886, Roza told him that if China could
not cede the whole of Lappa to Portugal completely, it
could give up part of it to prevent conflicts in 
96jurisdiction' • This was refused and China was prepared
to give a good 'status' article if Portugal was willing
to co-operate in China's collection of opium revenue^.
To this the Portuguese minister replied that the Lappa
98request was already a minimum demand' •
At this stage, Marquis Tseng became a member of the
Tsungli-yamen and strongly opposed to the 'status' article
that Hart had already offered to Portugal^. Tseng, for
whom Hart had no liking whatsoever, insisted that the
Portuguese were demanding far too much and that if the
worst came to the worst, he would personally take charge♦
of the customs stations, prevent smuggling and make 
Macao feel the pinch^^. Although Hart did not believe 
Tseng had much influence in the Tsungli-yamen, he still 
recommended that Portugal accept his proposal by 'threatening*
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that a fortnight from then she would only get a 'perpetual1
lease on Macao, and a month later, nothing”**^ . This did
, not obtain the desired effect and negotiations continued
until mid-January 1887, when Hart issued another ultimatum
of sort's. He reiterated that China would neither recognise
nor constitute Lappa a Macao dependency and that the
'status' article would be limited to a recognition of
the Portuguese administration of the Macao government
with a condition of either a lease or an annual payment
of rent. He threatened that the Tsungli-yamen wanted to
terminate negotiations but he had insisted on continuing
because he believed in friendly co-operation rather than
102to hurt Macao by preventive means
This seemed to have achieved some effect because the
Portuguese minister submitted two plans for Chios's
consideration. The first plan called for a treaty of
♦
friendship and commerce giving to Portugal the perpetual
occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies
except Lappa, with Portugal's guarantee of never ceding
Macao to a third power without the consent of China,
full co-operation of the Macao authorities with the
Foreign Inspectorate in the collection of opium revenue
based on the hulk plan, and the suppression of the
customs stations around Macao. The second plan called for
the same treaty and acceptance of co-operation based on
103the Hong Kong scheme, i.e. the one proposed by Russell .
At the same time, Portugal also asked for Britain's
104-help to persuade China to adopt either of these plans • 
The British government's reaction was that the Opium 
•Question had been settled with China as far as she was 
concerned and that she had already made some considerable 
sacrifices towards this end; therefore the goodwill which 
had been generated* with the Chinese government should not 
be spoilt by such an untimely interference on Portugal's 
behalf. If intervention was really necessary, it should be 
more for China's benefit than otherwise. Portugal was told
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that help was not possible1®'*.
After clarification of a few points, Hart replied
through Campbell that the Tsungli-yamen deemed the first
plan satisfactory but that the customs stations would
have to' be retained. This was because the Hong Kong
government, in its agreement with China, had not asked
for the withdrawal of the stations in the neighbourhood
of the Colony. Hart added that if Portugal was apphrensive
about inconveniences resulting from their continued
presence, this worry should cease because the Foreign
106Inspectorate would be taking over their management .
In a subsequent telegram, he further explained that the 
stations were not for the levying of dues on opium alone 
but also on general merchandise, and thus they could not 
be withdrawn1®*'7.
»
To this amendment the Portuguese minister refused
saying that China could not have the dep3l; (opium hulk)
and customs stations at the same time and added that by
accepting the hulk scheme without Lappa, the ministry had
108 'already taken great risks with the Cortes (parliament) •
Hart then issued another threat: not only would negotiations’
cease but Chinese preventive actions might well prevent
Chinese vessels' of all kinds from visiting Macao.
However, Campbell was asked to use his discretion in
109making this intimidation. The next day Hart wanted 
negotiations to close by the end of the week since the 
Foreign Inspectorate would be taking over the joint 
collection on opium on 1 April, and would do so with or 
without either Hong Kong's or Macao's co-operation11®.
When a definite decision from Portugal was not forth­
coming, Hart, authorized by the Tsungli-yamen, made a 
new offer on the following basis: 1) a treaty of friendship 
and commerce; 2) a' treaty recognizing the perpetual 
occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies 
by Portugal; 3) a treaty engagement by Portugal never to 
cede Macao without China's consent; 4) a treaty offering
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the co-operation of Macao to China’s opium revenue
collection identical with Hong Kong’s co-operation; and
3) a continuation of the customs stations which would
111function under the Foreign Inspectorate
Portugal accepted this offer, asked for official
confirmation and that Campbell be authorized to sign
112on China's behalf • This was acceptable to the Chinese
government and an Imperial decree of 17 March empowered
113Campbell to sign the document .
After some differences over the wording of the agree­
ment as well as the definition of the word 'protocol',
agreement was reached and on 26 March 1887 the Lisbon
114-Protocol was signed
At a slightly later date, Letters were exchanged.
This was because Portugal, for the sake of prestige
and to conclude a negotiation answerable to the cortes,
" wanted the continuation of the customs stations omilrbed
from the protocol. Hart, leaving nothing important not
mentioned in writing, wanted the fact to be stated
privately. Hence the exchange of the letters. It was also
noted that Macao would carry out her co-operation
immediately upon the commencement of the same at Hong
Kong11 .^ Roza, appointed as minister plenipotentiary, was
despatched to China to negotiate and make arrangements for
116a treaty called for by the protocol
Subsequently on 4 June 1887* the Macao government
published its ’Regulations for the Import and Export of
Raw Opium in Macao and its Dependencies', which was
identical to the Hong Kong Opium Ordinance of 28 May 1887
except in wording^*'7. Then on 2 September 1887* the P
11 Rcortes formally approved the Lisbon Protocol
However, when Roza arrived in Peking on 13 July, heliq
was received very Coolly by the Tsungli-yamen . This
was because Marquis Tseng had been arguing that China had
120conceded far too much and had obtained so little . 
Moreover, the agreement with Hong Kong had been altered
and it was considered that since Portugal would do the
same thing, the Protocol had not been worthwhile. Chang
Chih-tung, GovernorrGeneral of Liang-kwang, had also
complained bitterly about the agreement and the Tsungli-
yamen \ as a consequence, was very uncertain as to what 
121actions to take •
Negotiations between Roza and the Tsungli-yamen 
centered mostly on a definition of 'Macao and its 
Dependencies1. Roza, on behalf of his government, as well 
as the Macao authorities, claimed that 'dependencies' 
included certain neighbouring islands and part of the 
adjourning mainland. The Tsungli-yamen, however, under 
pressure chiefly from Chang Chih-tung, and also possibly 
from Marquis Tseng, insisted that Macao had no dependencies 
at all122. .
Negotiations were at a standstill most of the time
4
with neither side willing to give in. Finally, a break­
through was effected and a Treaty of Friendship and
123Commerce was signed on 1 December 1887 • On the same ,
day, two more agreements were signed - one was concerned
with the opium trade of Macao, and the other regulated
the collection of opium duties by the Foreign Inspectorate
124-on general lines laid down by the Hong Kong government .
All three agreements were ratified by both governments on 
28 April 1888125.
This marked the final conclusion to the prevention of 
smuggling from Hong Kong and Macao although measures 
concerning this had already been implemented during the 
previous year. It also marked, more important to Portugal 
than China, the commencement of treaty relations between 
the two countries after nearly four centuries of commercial 
and 'semi-diplomatic1 relations. Henceforth, Portugal 
became one of th6 Treaty powers.
Instigation of .joint collection
While negotiations with Portugal were still in 
progress at Lisbon, the Imperial government decided that
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the Additional Article should he implemented. On 16
January 1887* the Tsungli-yamen sent telegrams to all
the provincial leaders informing them that the joint
collection of Tariff duty and likin on opium to the amount
of 110 taels per picul would start on 1 February. The
Foreign Inspectorate would take over the collection and
all provincial likin stations were ordered to cease
collection of opium dues on 31 January, and to hand over
126everything to the Foreign Inspectorate . A priority
message was also sent to the Canton government informing
it that since the Foreign Inspectorate could not make
the necessary preparations in time, the six customs
stations around Hong Kong and Macao were to continue
operations but collect the 110 taels instead until the
Foreign Inspectorate's take-over on 2 Api^Ll1^ . ,The
foreign legations were also informed of this decision,
and Minister Hsu Ching-ch'eng was instructed to inform
128the foreign governments .
The British government was completely taken by surprise.(
Walsham telegraphed the Foreign Office about the 
129decision . The Colonial Office also received an urgent
message from the Hong Kong government which warned that
such a move would definitely cause complications to the
junk trade of Hong Kong, and wanted instructions. This
130was relayed to the Foreign Office  ^ .
The Foreign Office, with no information on the progress
of negotiations between China and Portugal at Lisbon,
could not offer any advice, and in turn, sought inform-
131ation from the India Office  ^ • It took the latter a 
•fortnight to arrive at a decision: the India Office 'does 
not consider it advisable to remonstrate with the Chinese 
Government against their decision to put into immediate 
execution the Additional Article...on the ground that 
the arrangements agreed on by the Hong Kong Commission 
have not yet been brought into operation. The enforcement 
of the Additional Article was not made conditional upon
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the completion of arrangements at Hong Kong.* However, 
two objections could be pointed out. Firstly, to allow 
the Chinese customs at the blockade stations to collect 
the combined duty would be contrary to clause 2 of the 
Additibnal Article since it called for the collection by■ 
the Foreign Inspectorate; and secondly, Marquis Tseng*s 
letter of 23 March 1886 should be referred to, since he 
expressed the view that full effect could not be given 
to the Additional Article until arrangements for the 
suppression of opium smuggling from Hong Kong had been 
made^^.
These arguments given by the'India Office became
the * instructions * that the Foreign Office desperately
needed and they were immediately communicated to Walsham
for him to transmit to the Tsungli-yamen Ttyey were,
however, immediately invalidated by Walsham, who appealed
to the Foreign Office that he should be excused from
addressing such a communique to the Tsungli-yamen, He
reasoned that since the Chinese customs stations around
Hong Kong and Macao only controlled junk^carried opium,
the Additional Article could not be applied. After 31
March when the Foreign Inspectorate would take over these
stations, it would then be in accordance with clause 2,
irrespective of whether the Hong Kong ordinance had been
passed by then or not. Moreover, to use Marquis Tseng’s
letter, Walsham believed that he would receive the
obvious rejoinder that it was written in response to the
British government’s query as to why the agreement had
not been put into operation. There was nothing in the
agreement that would make its general application
conditional on the issue of the specific enquiry entrusted
134to the Hong Kong Commission  ^ • The Foreign Office replied 
that Walsham should use his discretion whether to 
advance the India Office’s arguments or not^^. This was 
tantamount to saying that no representation was to be made, 
and none was. China was allowed to proceed with its plan
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without any interference.
The decision by the Imperial government was, in fact, 
made a month or so before it was made known. On 21 December 
1886, Hart had already drawn up a preliminary circular 
to his'commissioners informing them that the joint collect­
ion would commence early in the spring of 1887, and 
that they must ensure that godown or hulk facilities 
under their control must be large enough to accomodate 
the opium that would be bonded. He also mentioned that 
since Shanghai had long possessed private-owned receiving 
ships, arrangements made there for joint collection would 
be different from the other Treaty ports. Then he gave 
a summary of how the collection should be managed'*'^.
On 20 January 1887, detailed instructions were issued 
to the Shanghai commissioner, and also another .general 
circular to commissioners at other Treaty ports containing 
similar instructions. Briefly, at Shanghai, opium that 
arrived there should be deposited in the Foreign Inspect­
orate's hulks and could only be removed after the joint 
collection had been paid. Different passes etc. were used 
for different destinations of the opium, such as that, 
for re-export. Distinctions were made because Shanghai 
was the centre for transhipment. For the other Treaty 
ports, arrangements were -similar but the circular was more 
concerned with the issuance of proper exemption certificates
which would allow opium freedom of movement after payment
137of the joint duties  ^ .
The problem of whether opium that had arrived at the 
Treaty ports before 1 February 1887, before the
beginning of joint collection by the Foreign Inspectorate, 
should pay the joint duties or whether some other 
arrangements should be made manifested itself after the1 
Foreign Inspectorate took over the collection. On 3 
February Hart, in response to such queries from his 
commissioners, issued another circular which clarified 
the matter. Principles for guidance were four in number:
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1) old likin offices' connection with the levy of likin
had ceased on 31 January 1887; 2) from 1 february 1887
the Foreign Inspectorate had taken over likin collection
on opium; 3) opium that had arrived during February must
pay the'joint duties; and 4) opium that had arrived before
February should have.paid likin at the old offices, but
if this right had not been taken, such opium had three
alternatives - pay the joint duties and obtain freedom from.;
further levies, pay the old likin at the Foreign Inspectorate
but still liable to further levies, and if either of the
above alternatives were not taken, then the opium would
be liable to ^ a special likin of 300 taels^^. Then in •
mid-May, because of the huge amount of opium that had been
imported and placed in bond at Shanghai before 1 February,
a special arrangement was made there whereby if .half the
new likin rate was paid (40 taels), the opium would be
«
exempted from further payments if sold in Kiangsu, i.e.
the province of Shanghai, whereas full payment of 80 taels
likin would secure the drug exemption from further levies
139throughout China
Because of the unsettled state of arrangements that
had been made with Hong Kong.and were being made with
Macao at Lisbon, special instructions were issued to the
two newly-appointed commissioners at the Kowloon and
140Lappa customs stations - F.A. Morgan and E. Farago .
This was done on 4 March. The two commissioners were to 
ensure that junks leaving from Hong Kong call at the 
most convenient customs station and pay the Hoppo's 
duty according to the Hoppo's tariff, provincial likin 
•according to the Governor-General's tariff (these were on 
imports other than opium) and Tariff duty and Convention 
likin on opium, i.e. the joint duties. Sufficient staff 
to carry out the j6b as well as with the help of seventeen 
revenue cruisers would be provided. They, together with 
the Canton commissioner, were to call on both the Hoppo 
and the Governor-General to obtain details of the tariff
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for general duties and likin on general merchandise
levied by them at present, so that the collection could
be continued uninterrupted. They should also familiarize
themselves with details of the customs stations and to
consult with J. Russell of Hong Kong the steps each side.
would take when Hong Kong’s co-operation were to come
into operation. Characteristically Hart cautioned Morgan
(and indirectly Farago too though the Lappa station would
not yet be in operation because Macao would follow Hong
Kong's lead): 'The work which is now to be commenced is
at once popular and unpopular, has its purely colonial
as well as its purely Chinese side, - will meet with
support from some quarters and obstruction from others, -
may produce useful results if well managed and may as
easily do the opposite if there should be any mismanage-
ment, - and your doings of every kind, private and public,
will be watched, noted and talked about;.*.. In a word, I
look to you to introduce our system very quietly and very
gradually, and I rely on you to give neither Chinese
junk-traders cause of complaint nor colonial critics
141mistakes to criticise.'
In a subsequent despatch, Hart noted that he had been
misinformed by the Tsungli-yamen and now knew that the
Governor-General collected likin on certain commodities,
including opium, and that the Hoppo only collected ordinary
duty on opium. Morgan was instructed to ascertain the
facts with discreet enquiries and also to find out the
exact rates etc.. He was also asked to obtain specific
details from the Hoppo and the Governor-General the names
of the customs stations, the amount collected by each
station ending 31 March 1887 and^rom any earlier date
so as to obtain the result of the . amount collected
during a given period, and the amount of goods that had
142paid duties during that same period
The need for this additional information, in all 
probability, was due to the beginning of a 'conflict of 
interests* between the Tsungli-yamen, representing the
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Imperial government, and Chang Chih-tung (Governor-General
of Liang-kwang, and supported by Wu Ta-ch’eng, Governor
of Kwangtung), representing the Canton government, over
the levying of duties and dues - especially the provincial 
145
ones . However, opposition was only manifested from
Liang-kwang; other provincial governments, undoubtedly as
unwilling since it would mean a loss in provincial revenue,
submitted to the Imperial wish. The powerful Shanghai
Taotai, for example, agreed to the directive without
144question in late January 1887 ; Imperial directives
asking for details of amount collected at Treaty ports
148etc. were received promptly , and m  early March 1887*
Hart was able to report that joint collection was working
smoothly"^* •  ,
Conflict between the Imperial and Canton governments
«
began on 24 February when the Tsungli-yamen requested
Chang Chih-tung and the Hoppo to forward returns of the
revenue collected by the customs stations around Hong 
147Kong and Macao f• Chang replied saying that owing to
increased smuggling activities, collection had been
greatly reduced; introduction of Compensation levies*
(or additional duty) had led to a slight increase
resulting in the collection of 100,000 taels which was
just sufficient to compensate for deficiencies in the
provincial coffers. Chang added the comment, in reference
to Macao1s demand for the suppression of the barrier
station between Macao and China on the mainland, that
withdrawal of the barrier would result in increased
smuggling and could lead to serious consequences. He
also insisted that this barrier had nothing to do with
148the joint collection of duties on opium
The Tsungli-y&men replied by arguing that Hart*s 
negotiations with Hong Kong and Portugal had resulted 
in a solution to prevent smuggling activities; Hart had 
estimated that this would increase the Imperial revenue 
by 7 to 8 million taels a year. However, co-operation’
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from Hong Kong and Macao was dependent on the taking over 
of the customs stations by the Foreign Inspectorate and 
the withdrawal of the barrier station. Thus, Chang should 
give the amount of 1 compensation levies' that had been 
collected to the Foreign Inspectorate, and Hart's represent­
ative would call on the Governor-General on 14 March to
obtain the money and to receive tariff and regulations
149at the customs stations
Chang, in three consecutive memorials, tried to justify 
the position he. had taken. He complained that if all 
collections were handed over to the Foreign Inspectorate, 
all of China's revenue would be in 'foreign' hands; 
revenue the Foreign Inspectorate would collect would be 
deposited in a 'foreign' bank at Hong Kong; the Foreign 
Inspectorate could not look after the collections satis­
factorily because its staff did not work after office4
hours or on Sundays; the abolition of the barrier station 
(and some customs - blockade - stations) was conditional 
on the installation of new stations on Macao and Hong Kong > 
territory, and since this was not the case now, the 
stations should be continued; and the duties that had 
been collected by native customs throughout China had 
amounted to over 15 million taels which should prove the 
efficiency of the native customs and these should be 
continued. Chang then agreed to hand over the responsibility
150
of joint collection on opium to the Foreign Inspectorate  ^• 
This apparent disobedience to Imperial orders provoked 
two strongly-worded telegraphic messages to Chang, Wu and 
the Hoppo. The first took the form of an Imperial edict 
which ordered Chang to accept without further complaints 
and delay the collection of all duties and dues by the 
Foreign Inspectorate^^. The second came from the Tsungli- 
yamen which refuted his objections. It said that owing 
to corruption and inefficiency in the past, native customs 
had collected very little. The agreements that had been 
arrived at with Hong Kong and Macao had been the result of
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a year*s negotiations and were totally dependent on the 
Foreign Inspectorate taking over control of all customs 
collection. Chang was reminded that the Foreign Inspect­
orate was founded and controlled by the Imperial govern­
ment and the revenue collected was for the country. It 
was also noted that the new measures would be beneficial 
rather than detrimental to Canton* s treasury**^.
Chang, upon receipt of the Imperial edict, cabled 
the Tsungli-yamen on the same day to say that orders had 
been issued to commanders of the six customs stations 
that they should hand over all power and authority to 
the Foreign Inspectorate on 1 April^^. Governor Wu 
also replied, possibly on behalf of Chang after the 
Tsungli-yamen*s telegram, that orders would be complied 
with but again pointed out that although the Foreign 
Inspectorate's collection would provide more revenue for 
China, at the same time it would be detrimental to the 
Canton budget. The Tsungli-yamen was asked to consider 
this subject^**’.
The 'conflict of interests' did not end at this stage. 
Despite promises that all collections would be given to 
the Foreign Inspectorate, stations at other places were 
still retained outside the Hong Kong-Macao area - they 
were the ones at Canton, Swatow, Kiungchow and Pakhoi.
On 31 May, the Tsungli-yamen cabled the Hoppo that he 
,should hand over the collection of regular duties on 
general merchandise to the Foreign Inspectorate, and 
cautioned him that this was a decision agreed to by the 
Emperor and warned him not to dispute the order. However,
• the tone of the telegram was very much moderated by an 
assurance that the amount so collected would be transmitted
155
to his office ^ • This was followed by a second telegram
156ordering the transfer to take place on 1 July ^ •
The Hoppo did not do so, and a repeated order was 
made, followed by three more telegrams explaining why the 
transfer was necessary^^. The most important reason given
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was that in order to enforce the Additional Article and 
the levy of dues on other goods, there must be a central­
ized customs collectorate to achieve uniformity in collect­
ion and in regulations and methods. The collection of all
t
dues and duties by the Foreign Inspectorate at all customs
stations and land barriers on imports and exports would
greatly facilitate this centralization, and at the same
time would prevent any possible evasion of duties or
• irregularities in the rates charged. The Tsungli-yamen
then reiterated the fact that the Imperial government had
no intention of depriving the Hoppo of the revenues due
him, and had already instructed the Foreign Inspectorate
to transmit the sum collected to his office. Under these
assurances and after the actual transfer of the sum
collected in June and then September (and thereafter at
three-month intervals), the Hoppo finally agreed and
effected the transfer-^ ®-.* - ---
As a result of correspondence accompanied by threats
and explanations from the Tsungli-yamen, similar in
nature to those with the Hoppo, an agreement was also
reached with Governor-General Chang Chih-tung in mid- 
159September 1887 • He was given the likin on opium and
160other merchandise for provincial uses ; the first
payment was made to him from the Foreign Inspectorate
161in late November • On this date, the Foreign Inspectorate 
finally obtained full control of revenue collection at 
Liang-kwang - Kwangtung and'Kwangsi, the only two provinces
of China that had held out against the Encroachment*
162into their native customs* establishment
During this period, two other closely inter-related
issues also made themselves felt. One was of minor,
importance but the other was of major significance.
«
The minor issue concerned the method and amount of 
dues to be levied on ’prepared opium*. The question arose 
in April, when Hong Kong merchants began to complain 
against the restrictions on breaking up chests of opium
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for selling purposes. It was realized that smuggling
into China of prepared opium, in very small portions,
would be extremely easy. The illicit transport of
prepared native opium in Treaty ports would be just as
simple, 'if not easier. This was pointed out by Chang Chih-
tung and Marquis Tseng. The latter suggested that native
customs should collect a tax of 37 taels and a likin of
100 taels per picul on prepared native opium. After
 ^consultation. with Hart, this amount was agreed upon for
any prepared opium imported into China. Payment of this
sum would exempt it from further inland dues and this
did not depend on whether the joint duties had already
165been collected on it or not before it was prepared .
The question of how to prevent prepared opium from being
smuggled into China from Hong Kong was worked out with
the Colonial government at a slightly later date.
«
The major issue happened in Hong Kong. Opposition to
the bill entitled *An Ordinance for the better regulating
of the trade in Opium*, i.e. based on Russell*s proposal
of 1886, started when it was tabled at the Legislative
Council for its first reading on 18 March 1887, and.
passed by a majority because of the pro-govemment vote
164of the official members
The points of contention were clauses 3 and 4 of the
ordinance which read: *3* No person shall bring into
the Colony or the waters thereof or receive therein
Opium except in whole chests, and no person shall be
permitted to export from the Colony or its waters Opium
except in whole chests. 4. No person except the Opium
Farmer shall have in his possession or under his custody
165or control Opium in quantities less than one chest.*  ^
Immediately after the first reading, two petitions 
were presented to the Council. The first was by a group 
of merchants (including the two Sassoon companies) which 
petitioned 'for and on behalf of the Opium Importers and 
wholesale Opium Merchants of the said Colony* on 22 March;
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and the second came the next day from a body of Chinese 
merchants who 'deal largely in Raw Opium, buying and 
selling it in quantities less than one chest, and have 
a large capital engaged in the said business, and they 
employ in their said business many hundreds of persons.'
What the petitioners wanted was a postponement of the 
second reading of the bill until after they had expressed 
their objections and had drawn up amendments. These 
petitions were read by the acting Colonial Secretary in 
the Council meeting of 25 March, and it was agreed the 
petitioners would be heard at the next meeting .
When the Council met again on 50 March, Mr. Francis 
spoke on behalf of the Chinese opium dealers and said 
that about 100,000 chests of opium arrivedjin Hong Kong 
every year and out of that only 48,000 chests passed 
through the Colony. For the remainder, business transactions 
were done at Hong Kong^~Bengal opi’UW was tbgulhted by 
the Indian government to 40 balls per chest and posed no 
problem as far as the bill was concerned. However, Malwa, 
Persian and Turkish opium came in varying quantities and 
different sizes. It had to be repacked to be sold, but 
the bill forbade this. Since the yearly trade in retail 
sale of opium in Hong Kong amounted to 56,000 chests or 
$18 million, passage of the bill would mean to the Chinese 
dealers the loss of this amount every year. Mr. Brereton 
represented the wholesalers and argued that the billjwas 
far too severe in light of the small amount of smuggling 
it was intended to check. Its introduction would lead 
to the extinction not only of the retail trade to the 
amount of 52,000 chests a year, but also of the 48,000 
chests a year in transit1^ .
Then on 4 April, a scheme was proposed to allow 
export of raw opiurA in quantities of less than one chest.
It was framed by C.P. Chater, approved by both Francis 
and Brereton on behalf of their clients, and the Hong Kong 
General Chamber of Commerce also signified its willingness
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to abide by it. The scheme essentially called for the 
issue of special licences by the Hong Kong government 
at a nominal fee, to dealers undertaking such activities.
The licencees would then comply with certain conditions 
which, if duly enforced by the government, would prevent
1  c. Q
any smuggling activities
This was forwarded by Marsh to the Colonial Office 
and to Walsham. In the latter communique, he commented 
. that Morgan, the commissioner at the Kowloon station, 
had seen the amendment and believed that Hart might agree 
to it; he wanted Walsham to gauge China's reaction. He 
added that the Hong Kong government had been doing its 
best to help China in the collection of her duties, such 
as passing the bill for the prevention of armed bands.
The government was also quite prepared to hurry,the bill 
through its second and final readings, which could be
i
easily done because of the overwhelming majority of
official members in the Legislative Council. However, such
a move might arouse the hostility of the entire mercantile
169community and it might lead to much unpleasantness .
Morgan, in reporting these events to Hart, noted that 
Russell, the framer of the bill, considered that the 
proposed alterations rectified the defects in his original 
bill and had reacted favourably to them. He also pointed 
out that the opposition to the bill mounted by the mercant­
ile community was a strong one and had to be considered 
as a factor in deciding whether the alterations should 
be accepted or not**’^ .
Hart cabled Morgan first to ask if the Hong Kong govem- 
* ment would enforce the original version of the bill if 
the Tsungli-yamen decided to refuse the amendments 
suggested? Second, he asked that Morgan and the three 
other commissioners should discuss the matter and provide 
him with their conclusions. He also mentioned that Chang 
Chih-tung had cabled the Tsungli-yamen recommending that 
the amendments should be rejected1*^1. Morgan's replies to
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the questions were that the Hong Kong government would
enforce the original version, and that the conclusion of
the commissioners was that consideration should be taken
of the desire to conciliate mercantile feeling with
China's revenue interests and the smoother working of the
ordinance by the Hong Kong government, and believed that
the amended ordinance would be acceptable if the breaking
172up of chests was confined to the opium farmer r •
Hart and the Tsungli-yamen were very displeased with 
the amended ordinance, but after some long deliberations, 
decided that it was worth a try if 'the export from the 
Colony of opium in quantities less than a whole chest 
would be restricted with respect to conveyance to junks 
and the Canton river steamers.' This would mean, stated 
in another way, the confinement of trade-'under • one chest 
to Canton^^. Hart also was of the opiniqn that the amend­
ment- would -place opium-at- Macao~*mueh better-withiir-the
174grasp of the Foreign Inspectorate r •
The Hong Kong government passed China's proposed 
amendment on 27 May, and on the following day, the amended 
version of the ordinance entitled 'An Ordinance enacted 
by the Governor of Hong Kong, with the advice of the 
Legislative Council thereof, for the better regulating 
of the trade in Opium* was passed by the Legislative 
Council and became Ordinance No. 22 of 1887^^* Then on 
31 May, 'Terms and Conditions: Under the provisions of 
the Opium Ordinances 1884 and 1887* of Licenses for the 
sale of Opium intended for export in quantities less 
than one chest' was approved by the Governor in Council"*’^ . 
After these had been sent to the Colonial Office, the
177Ordinance received the Queen's confirmation on 18 July r . 
This was merely a formality because the Ordinance had 
become law in Hong Kong and had been operating since 
1 June, and Macao had followed on the third of the same 
month^®.
Thus, after more than twenty-seven years of almost
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continuous negotiation since the import of opium was 
legalized, the Opium Question was finally settled. The 
solutions were ones considered satisfactory to all 
governments concerned - Chinese, British, Indian and
9
Hong Kong.
Reactionslhfter the instigation of joint collection
Of the reactions to joint collection, by far the most
important incident, if it could be called that, was the
* refusal by the Canton government to allow the Foreign
Inspectorate to take over the collection. As has been
mentioned previously, this was eventually settled with
the Imperial government giving way to the Liang-kwang
authorities with regard to the allocation of the likin
on opium and general merchandise.
In the three years following the implementation of the
Additional Article, there were three other 'reactions',
but they were insignificant compared to the above. The
fact that they were trivial meant that not only the
governments concerned but also the opium merchants were .
satisfied with the agreement. What Hart had said after
the joint collection had only been in operation for less
than three months held true for the following years: 'Our
opium work is going along satisfactorily, and the result
will be a greater sale of Indian opium than ever and at
179a slightly cheaper rate to consumers.' .
Of the reactions, it would be better to deal with
them in chronological order since this would better
reflect the nature and the 'intensity' of response to the
enforcement of the Additional Article.
When it was known that the Additional Article would be
implemented on 1 February 1887, the likin at Amoy was
drastically reduced from $173 to $70 per chest. Large
quantities of opium were imported and sold. The officiating
consul there remarked that, at one time, within a period
180of three days, 1,000 chests were imported . The attempt 
to evade the new rate of likin through a maximum import
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before it was introduced was manifested in other Treaty 
ports. The Foreign Inspectorate's returns for 1887 
showed that a total of 17,100 piculs was imported to 
escape the new rate181.
This led to the second reaction, and this time it
was from the Shanghai merchants, represented by Jardine,
Matheson and Co. and the Sassoon companies. Before the
joint collection started, 3,600 chests had been imported
„ into Shanghai, had paid the Tariff duty and had been
stored in the foreign firms' warehouses. This was in
expectation of a drastic increase in the price of opium
after the new rate of likin became operative. What the
merchants did not contemplate on was the introduction by
the Foreign Inspectorate, in conjunction with the local
native customs, of three alternatives that the importer
could choose frorn^ ®^ .
d * *
Office. Keswick, representing the Jardine firm, complained
that the ruling by the Foreign Inspectorate was illegal
because Shanghai was recognized as an area where likin
was not leviable and such a levy would greatly threaten
183the international commerce in opium . David Sassoon and 
Co. protested that the Foreign Inspectorate had no right 
to enforce importers to pay the likin since it was stored 
in the foreign settlements and argued that it was contrary
184
to the Additional Article • The 'North China Herald' 
also published an article which denounced the proceedings 
of the Foreign Inspectorate as 'high-handed', but also 
said that,'the importers and dealers in opium in Shanghai 
are a fine body of men, accustomed to look after them­
selves, and we shall look with interest for the develop­
ment of their contest with authority.'
'Authority* in ’the person of Hart and his commissioners 
did not give in. The Foreign Office, after consultations 
with Walsham, the India and Colonial Offices, gave a 
decision contrary to mercantile hopes. Walsham explained
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explained the provisions the Foreign Inspectorate had 
drawn up and rejected the merchants* argument that they 
were forced to pay the new rate, and accused them of 
intending to defraud China*s revenue: 'The present opposition 
in certain quarters to the new system is solely due to 
the hope entertained by Chinese purchasers of the old 
stock of opium that they will be able to evade all payment 
of likin on it, whether at the old or new rate, and I 
have no hesitation whatever in saying without perfect 
frankness that the Foreign Importer should not receive 
any encouragement in becoming even indirectly a party
IOC
to such an attempt at defrauding the Public Revenue.*
The reply that the Foreign Office, with full concurrence 
from the Colonial and Indian Offices, gave to the merchants 
was to the point. They had no grounds of complaint; and 
they had the option either to pay the new rate or to
4
leave their Chinese buyers to pay whatever likin might be 
imposed; they were advised to pay the new rate so as to 
free opium from further levies^*^.
The third incident came in April and August at Foochow, 
when the local native customs attempted to create inter- 
ference with the collection of the Foreign Inspectorate, 
and harassed the foreign importers by trying to levy 
additional dues on opium. However, the incident, on a 
much smaller scale than the opposition from the Canton
government, was closed after a stiff directive from the
188Tsungli-yamen
All considered, the transfer of likin collection 
responsibilities from the native customs to the Foreign 
Inspectorate was accomplished with surprisingly little 
turmoil and obstruction from those directly connected 
with the opium trade - the native customs and the opium 
dealers, foreign'and Chinese. Co-operation from the 
Hong Kong and Macao governments were also as intent and 
earnest as what they had promised. Joint collection at the 
Treaty ports was done smoothly and efficiently. As late
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as March 1894*, Hart was able to remark that, 1 since 
which time /188£7 simultaneous collection has gone on 
easily at the ports, there is no coast smuggling (properly 
so called), and the relations at Hong Kong and Macao 
have neVer become strained#1 A new era indeed had 
beg\in in the opium trade.
9.1
CHAPTER 9 : CONCLUSION.
General Summary
When Elgin negotiated with Kuei-liang for the legalization 
of opium, neither men realized the problems the trade and 
the two governments would encounter in the ensuing decades. 
They knew that despite its official prohibition in China, 
opium had been almost openly imported and taxed. The inability, 
and possibly the unwillingness, on the part of the Chinese 
Government, whether Imperial or provincial, to enforce the 
prohibition meant that China should leave its moral consider­
ations on one side and look on the drug as an additional 
source of revenue. However, because it was an import that 
definitely did and would do harm to China, it had to be 
treated differently from the other western imports. Rule V 
of the supplementary commercial agreement to the Treaty of 
Tientsin laid down the conditions by which'opium could be 
imported into China. The negotiators believed that this 
rule would take care of any problem the trade might encounter
i
in the future; and at the same time provide a fitting end 
to the anomalies that had existed after the first treaty 
settlements of 1842-43.
This confidence could well have been realized if it had 
not been for the introduction of new factors which either 
had not been contemplated by the negotiators or had been 
purposedly ignored. By restricting the opium trade in 
Chinese hands after the drug’s arrival in China, both the 
local governments and the Chinese traders were left free 
to employ different systems regarding not only the trade 
itself but the taxation of the drug (likin and other dues).
Of these, the most prevalent was the return to monopolies 
similar if not identical to the co-hong system of the pre­
treaty period. Eriotion was generated between the foreign 
importers and the monopolies, with the local governments 
also participating in the strife. At the same time, the 
arbitrary and differing rates of likin and other dues levied
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on the drug at different Treaty ports also led to complaints, 
as well as an unnatural channelling of the trade into 
ports that levied the least rates or gave the highest 
rebates. Smuggling of the drug from Hong Kong and Macao 
to the south China coast and from province to province 
created further problems. To add to these complexities, 
peasants in the western provinces of China began to cultivate 
the poppy in increasing quantities and this started to 
affect the import of the foreign drug.
Nevertheless, in the eight years after the legalization 
of opium, apart from complaints and comments, these factors, 
which had become problems, were not taken up by either 
government. However, during the course of negotiations for 
revision of the commercial agreements between China and 
Britain in the 1868-69 period, these problems became more 
and more prominent. The blockade of Hong fcong, enlarged 
into an international conflict' by the Colonial government 
and its merchants from a purely local affair further 
pressed the problems into the limelight. When Alcock agreed 
to the increase in the Tariff duty on the drug, and wrote 
it into his agreement, the Opium Question became an official 
issue. Non-ratification of the Alcock Convention meant that 
in future negotiations this Question would have to be 
included. Subsequently, refusal by the British government i
to ratify the opium clause in the Chefoo Convention of 1876 
on the one hand, and the carrying out of convention stipu­
lations by China on the other, forced the British government 
to find a solution to the Opium Question. This, of course, 
was eventually found with the signing of the Additional 
Article in 1885 and the proclamation of Ordinance No. 22 of 
1887 by the Hong Kong government.
In reviewing the Opium Question as a whole, that it in 
its three aspects - taxation of foreign opium, blockade of 
Hong Kong and native opium - one must bear in mind that each . 
of these aspects played its separate role, in differing degrees 
of importance at different times. Moreover, at certain
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periods they were so closely related as to be inseparable, 
whilst during other times they were almost totally 
unconnected. Looking at the period between 1860 and 1887 
as a whole, we can say, in the nature of a general appraisal, 
the the problems of taxation remained paramount throughout. 
Concern about native opium occupied the minds of both 
governments until the early eighties, when it was realized 
that there was nothing either side could do and tacitly 
agreed to allow it to pursue its own course. The threat of 
its competition to the Indian drug was present all the time, 
and the British government was always conscious of this. 
However, the tacit understanding, which amounted to a 
laissez-passer maxim, meant that this particular issue was 
pushed into the background. The blockade issue was intimately 
related with the taxation question from its inception to
I
the non-ratification of the Chefoo Convention. However, 
after this date, the two went their separate ways until the 
Additional Article of 1885, when they became once more 
completely inter-related. Thus, this agreement had to be 
followed by the Hong Kong Ordinance of 1887, which in fact 
was an agreement reached between the Chinese and Hong Kong 
governments over the blockade issue.
This brief•summary will provide us with the necessary 
background to analyse each of the three aspects of the 
Opium Question separately.
The taxation of foreign opium: The joint-collection of 
Tariff duty and likin by the Foreign Inspectorate saw the 
beginning of an era of centralization and uniformity. It 
contrasted immensely with the methods and irregularities 
of collection in the previous three decades. By its very 
existence, it completely changed the pattern of the opium 
trade in China. Gone were the monopolies that had flourished 
in the Treaty porfcs and opium was traded freely without 
harassment and obstruction from the local authorities. 
Relations between the local governments and dealers greatly 
improved^* • Gone were the different rates of likin and other
dues that were levied at the ports, with their accompanying 
rebate-systems and farm-contracts which had arbitrarily 
channelled the trade to certain ports to the detriment of 
others. The Commissioner at Wenchow remarked in 1887 that
the port previously had a lot of the trade because most of
#
the opium destined for Fukien province came through it
owing to the lower rate of dlues than those imposed at Foochow.
With equalization of the likin rate, most of the trade had
2gone back to Foochow . Previously, a great amount of opium 
was transported clandestinely from province to province and • 
district to district, escaping the likin barriers; once 
broken up into small parcels, it was almost impossible to 
stop such traffic. This was now in the past, since once 
having paid the joint-duty, opium was no longer susceptible 
to any further levies. The drug was circulated freely in 
China without any fear of hindrance. Thus, both' the foreign 
importer and the Chinese dealer did not cpmplain about the 
joint collection. As long as they abided by the regulations, 
simple and uniform at all the ports, they would encounter 
no obstruction. Moreover, the Foreign Inspectorate's officials 
were better persons to deal with than the erratic and 
corruptible collectors from the local governments.
As far as the Imperial government was concerned, joint 
collection meant increased centralization of authority in 
respect to the opium revenue. The provincial governments, 
despite their unwillingness, had accepted this centralization. 
There are no statistics to prove it, but obviously the 
Imperial government benefitted financially from this arrange­
ment much more than the provinces although a percentage 
of the revenue was allotted to these local authorities for 
‘ their use.
As to the question of whether the joint-collection of
110 taels per picul on opium represented an increase or
. #
decrease in the total revenue of China, i.e. the amount 
collected previously by the Imperial and provincial governments 
separately, the answer is that there was a definite increase.
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It should be remembered that during the negotiations in 
the late 1870s, when Wade suggested a total of 40 taels 
likin per picul, he had already said that the figure was 
an over-estimate. By looking at the rate collected at the 
Treaty,ports and at the barriers, and also talcing into 
account monopolies, rebates and evasions, China obviously 
obtained more under this new arrangement. It can be argued, 
however, that Foochow, in 1883, bad collected a likin of 
86 taelsjand was now collecting less; but it is likewise true 
that Chinkiang, which had only been collecting 16.5 taels, 
was now collecting much more^. Again, taking Shanghai as a 
mean, its previous average collection of 35*27 taels 
compared to the 80 taels now would certainly point to an
lL
increase •
All considered, joint collection became an arrangement
t
that was not only beneficial to the governments concerned 
(the British government in the sense that* the Opium Question 
had been solved), but also to the merchants involved in the 
trade. The Additional Article was to last initially for 
a period of four years, and its renewal after the expiry 
of the original term must be taken as an expression of 
satisfaction by both governments to the continuation of 
the arrangement.
The customs blockade of Hong Kong (and Macao): The » 
blockade came about because of the tremendous amount of 
opium smuggling from Hong Kong and Macao - much more so from 
the former place since it was the receiver for almost all 
the opium destined for China. The Imperial government was
I
aware of the extent of this clandestine trade and the amount 
of revenue it was losing every year. The estimate, made by 
Alcock and supported by Hart, that it amounted to one 
million taels every year (this would include Tariff duty, 
likin and other dues) and compared with the total opium 
revenue (from Tariff duty alone) which averaged 1.6 million 
taels a year, would show the effect smuggling had on the 
government's annual revenue^. Nevertheless, the Imperial
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government did not adopt any positive action towards 
eliminating this clandestine trade. This was, in fact, in 
keeping with the ‘traditional* precedents for provincial 
authorities to deal with *barbarian affairs', and the general 
'passive* rQle of the Court at Peking. Thus, initiative in 
setting up the blockade came completely from the Governor-* 
General of Liang-kwang, Jui-lin. Moreover, introduction of 
other levies by the Hoppo and the salt comptroller only 
came after Jui-lin's scheme had been proven successful. The 
‘ Imperial government's 'contribution' simply took the form 
of an acknowledgment of the blockade's existence. During 
the first years all the complainta from the Hong Kong 
government and the mercantile community were dealt with on 
the spot and as far as China was concerned, on the local 
or provincial level. The Canton authorities shouldered full
. .y •
responsibility and reaped the financial rewards of the 
blockade. Even after the blockade issue was brought into the 
negotiations for the Alcock Convention, and it had become 
an international rather than a local affair, the Imperial
»
government still did not interfere or participate in the 
issue. With regard to the commission that was written into 
the Chefoo Convention, the Governor-General of Liang-kwang 
was asked by the Imperial government to appoint a Chinese 
representative. Thus, interest shown at Peking to the 
blockade question was, at most, minimal, until after the 
signing of the Additional Article in 1885 when full control 
was insisted upon.
The explanation very possibly lies in the great degree 
of local autonomy that was given to the provincial governments, 
especially with regard to the collection of local dues, i.e. 
those apart from the Tariff duty. The unwillingness and 
possibly the inability of the Imperial government to control 
provincial affairs, was demonstrated in this case. Conversely, 
the unwillingness on the part of the provincial governments 
to allow this to happen could also be seen. Governor-General 
Chang Chih-tung's reluctance to hand over the stations to
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the Foreign Inspectorate in 1887 is another case in point. 
However, that the Imperial government was finally able to 
implement the joint collection showed that it had re-exerted 
some control over the provincial authorities. It must also 
be pointed out that other provincial authorities did not 
try to contest the authority of the Imperial government 
over this issue. This goes to prove that the control over 
China by Peking, though latent more than obvious, was very 
much present. That such a control, apparent, mostly on paper 
(Ch*ing Statutes, etc.), was seldom exercised to. any 
perceptible degree was due more to a traditional* acceptance 
of local autonomy concerning provincial matters than to 
any lack of effective means of supervision and control •
The blockade itself, purely on the local scene, demon­
strated fully the intention of the Canton government. It 
did ,not want such a vast amount of revenue to slip through 
its fingers. Nevertheless, it had allowed this to happen for 
eight years before the necessary steps were taken. The 
blockade started only because of the additional remittance 
to the capital that was asked for and. additional revenue 
was urgently required. However, the careful planning of the 
blockade, the strictest abidance to Treaty stipulations 
and the full awareness of international law were points to 
be commended. But the contributions made by Consul Robertson 
should not be forgotten either. Without his help, the Canton 
authorities most probably would be unable to achieve, free 
from friction and accusationsJ as much as it did. Conversely, 
the Hong Kong government would have had many more real cases 
of complaint against the illegal activities of the blockade.
The assistance from the Foreign Inspectorate, though 
limited because of the lack of trust and co-operation 
between the two Chinese customs organizations, also has to 
be taken into consideration.
By the early eighties, because of the acceptance of 
the blockade as a necessary evil by the mercantile community 
at Hong Kong, grievances and complaints had greatly diminished.
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On China*s side, this system of surveillance was proving 
more expensive and less rewarding in the sense that there 
were comparatively few smuggling attempts. Therefore, in 
the Hong Kong Blockade Commission of 1886 a solution was 
quite easily arrived at, and after Macao had agreed to 
participate in the scheme, it was carried out with rigour 
and austerity.
The successes of the solutions to the blockade and that 
of joint-collection were summarized aptly by Hart in 
mid-1888: *A year and a half has now gone by since the Yamen 
decided to put the Additional Article in force, and the 
Hong Kong and Macao Ordinances have been almost a year in 
operation. It is gratifying to be able to record the fact 
that the new duties thrown upon the Customs have been well
performed, and that the plan of co-operation is a success
.. . ) »
and gives excellent results both along the coast and locally 
at Hong Kong and Macao. The promptness with which the 
simultaneous collection was commenced, after brief prepara­
tion and at the time fixed, from Newchwang to Pakhoi, - the 
admirable manner in which revenue has.ever since been 
collected, and the tedious and responsible work of ware­
housing, stamping, and releasing Opium carried on, - the 
success with which obstacles that threatened difficulty 
have been met and removed, - the general feeling of content 
that is found everywhere, now that all ports levy likin at 
the same rate, and the natural routes for reaching the best 
markets need no longer be shunned, - and the easy working 
of the Hong Kong arrangement, the linch-pin of the Opium
revenue wheel, - are, one and all, noteworthy, satisfactory,
7and credible....1r
Native opium: This third aspect, as has been mentioned 
earlier, exercised an overall influence on the Opium Question, 
and especially on,the issue of the taxation of foreign 
opium. The Imperial government*s concern was basically a 
moral one, but apart from the debates between Li Hung-chang 
and Tso Tsung-t*ang, and the famines of 1877 and. 1878 which
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drew attention to the amount of land used for poppy 
cultivation, little notice was paid to it. To the provincial 
governments, the taxation on poppy fields and the levy of 
dues on prepared native opium - financial considerations - 
became issues of some importance. The Anti-opium Society, 
in its fight for the prohibition of the opium trade, regarded 
it only as a side-issue, one that should be left entirely 
to the Chinese government to deal with. It was, therefore, to 
only the Indian government that it achieved prominence.
‘The increased production of native opium and its rapid 
improvement in quality was proportional to the growth of 
concern and worry experienced by the Indian government. It 
became directly linked with the drawn-out negotiations over 
the taxation of Indian opium and was mainly responsible
for the Indian government's .acquiescence to the Additional
. .j •
Article.
Although China suggested that she would attempt to 
prohibit the cultivation of the poppy if agreement over 
the taxation of foreign opium was reached, and although the 
British government very much hoped this, would be the case, 
it was not written into the Additional Article and China 
never tried to honour it. From reports submitted in the 
years after 1885,. poppy cultivation expanded in an uninhibited 
way. Attempts were made by provincial governments to levy
duties on it but these were purely for monetary considerations.
\ . . . .  . . . .  . . . .
On the same path, on 21 June 1891,Native Opium Regulations 
were drawn up by the Tsungli-yamen and the Board of Revenueo
and put into operation by an Imperial edict . They called
for the collection through the Foreign Inspectorate of a
lo-ti-shui of 4.8 taels per picul payable in the interior,
an export duty of 20 taels payable at the port of shipment,
and 40 taels of Coast Trade Duty payable on discharge at 
q
any Treaty port'. A,t this stage, it could be said that the 
Chinese government had officially recognized the existence 
of native opium and also had officially tolerated its 
continued presence. Then in September 1906, renewed prohibition^
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of poppy cultivation was promulgated. A year later, an 
agreement was reached with Britain whereby China would 
prohibit poppy cultivation and the Indian government would 
agree to an annually-decreasing import of Indian opium.
In 1911v a ^ew months before the October Revolution, the 
agreement with some minor changes was renewed. However, 
China's attempt at suppression of poppy cultivation was 
unsuccessful both in the last years of the Manchu dynasty 
and during the Republican period which saw the promulgation 
“of similar interdicts^.
Conflict of Interests
The conflict of interests is the key to the full compre­
hension of the Opium Question. Conflicts existed at different 
levels and between different personalities: at inter-govern- 
mental and intra-govemmental levels. We will analyse them 
one by one.
The basic or predominating conflict was, of course, 
that between the Chinese and British governments, each (to 
a large extent) dominated by both its own interests as well 
as those of its subordinate authorities, such as the Canton 
government in the case of China, and the Indian government 
in the case of Britain. There was, however, one marked 
difference between the two central governments. The Chinese 
one was much more concerned with its own welfare or well­
being. The Opium Question was divided and separated into 
three unrelated compartments. The only concern was with the 
taxation of foreign opium and it wanted a settlement to its 
advantage. The blockade issue was left entirely to the 
Canton authorities to cope with until after 1885, while 
the question of native opium was regarded as China's very 
own and of no concern to Britain. Though this division was 
somewhat arbitrary, it ideally suited the government's 
negotiating £latforta.
On the other hand, although the Foreign Office and 
its diplomatic corps in China, was in the forefront of 
negotiations, it placed almost total reliance on the views 
and policies forwarded by the India Office, representing
9.11
the interests of the Indian government, and the Colonial 
Office, representing those of the Hong Kong government. To 
the British government, then, the Opium Question consisted 
of all three aspects intimately related to each other. 
Moreover, whilst China did not have to consider public 
opinion since it had little means of expression, the British 
government had to pay quite some respect to representations 
from both the mercantile communities and the anti-opium 
societies.
Thus, to China, the Opium Question was a simple and 
straight-forward affair; while to Britain, it was the very 
reverse. It is not unnatural, therefore, to observe that 
as negotiations proceeded, China became more and more on 
the offensive while Britain became increasingly on the 
defensive. Moreover, these factors or considerations also 
provided China with a more positive policy in contrast to 
what almost amounted to a lack of policy on the part of 
Britain. The latter, increasingly, reacted to proposals and 
arguments of others and was unable to advance any of its 
own11. It was in this climate that the. solutions to the 
Opium Question were finally found.
At the intra-govemmental level, conflict of interests 
in China could be divided into three categories: that 
between the Imperial and provincial governments, that 
between the Foreign Inspectorate and the native customs, 
and that between officials. Always in the background was 
the over-riding conflict: the moral consideration as against 
the financial, and the ideal against the realistic. The 
question was whether or not the Manchu dynasty should uphold 
its traditional moral and ethical obligations to the people. 
The refusal, after the first Anglo-Chinese War, to legalize 
the drug was due to this; whereas legalization after the 
second war was duetto practical considerations. In the 
years covered by this dissertation, this question came up 
many times. The eventual decision, however, was a foregone 
conclusion. The Imperial government's desire for additional
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revenue and the support from powerful officials such as 
Li Hung-chang had already decided the issue long before 
the final resolution. Nevertheless, for the sake of tradition, 
if nothing else, the pretence or the facade of 'morality' 
was kept up for some time. Opposition from other high- 
ranking officials such as Tso Tsung-t'ang was also a 
consideration the Imperial government had to take into 
account.
The conflict of interests between the Imperial and 
provincial governments did not come into the limelight 
until after the Agreement of 1885. Though it was present 
throughout our period neither side was willing to raise the 
issue. The Imperial government was quite contented to 
receive some revenue from the provincial coffers and had 
no desire to interfere in local governments. It could be
t
called a policy of laissez faire. The provincial governments, 
likewise, verbally heeded directives or Imperial instructions, 
but went on doing what they thought best, either for them­
selves or for their provinces. The edicts calling for the 
total suppression of poppy cultivation and the reactions 
from the provincial authorities could be regarded as cases 
in point. Another example may be found in the inability by 
both the Board of Revenue and the Tsungli-yamen to obtain 
statements as to the amount of likin and other dues collected 
when Wade wanted these figures in order to proceed with 
negotiations. The Tsungli-yamen even confessed that such 
statements were very difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain since the provincial governments were very reluctant 
to reveal the actual amounts they collected.
In view of these facts, it is interesting to note the 
ease with which the Foreign Inspectorate was allowed to 
take over the collection of likin on opium in early 188? at 
the Treaty ports* Although it is impossible to find out 
the actual reasons, a logical deduction would lead to the 
following ones. The Imperial government promised the provinces 
that a certain proportion of the revenue collected by the
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Foreign Inspectorate would be given to them, This would go
to meet the requirements for a steady and effortless income
required by the local authorities. They would no longer be
concerned with the prevention of smuggling, which had been
immense,, and the income, because of the high rate of likin
to be collected, would definitely be more than before.
Under such considerations, the local governments were quite
prepared to allow the Foreign Inspectorate to take over the
difficult and thankless task of duty collection for them,
12The case of Liang-kwang was different. The Canton govern­
ment’s opposition to the takeover by the Foreign Inspectorate 
was due to financial considerations. The relationship 
between Canton and Hong Kong (and Macao), and the nature of 
the Colony as an entrepSt meant that the Canton government 
would lose much more in revenue compared with other provinces,
9
which would gain from the takeover by the Foreign Inspectorate. 
Settlement of this issue, when the Imperial government 
agreed to hand over all the likin collected on opium and 
other merchandise, showed the predominance of economic pre­
occupations. . ’
The conflict between the native customs and the Foreign____
Inspectorate was one based on financial considerations as 
well as the fact that the latter was administered by foreigners. 
The Foreign Inspectorate was established as a result of 
the 1858-60 treaties which came after China's second military 
defeat. Its institution meant that Tariff duties were no 
longer in the hands of the native customs as it was previously. 
It meant the establishment of uniform and impersonal rules 
and regulations for the conduct of foreign trade, conditions 
very different from those imposed on the trade by the 
native customs. It also meant the centralization, to a 
certain extent, of Imperial control over the provinces; and 
worst of all, it was headed and run by foreigners, and by 
the definition of the native customs authorities, they 
were untrustworthy. In fact, not only the native customs, 
but the Imperial government and the Tsungli-yamen, always
9.14
regarded Hart and the Inspectorate with suspicion and 
mistrust. The conflict between the two, then, was caused 
by jealousy and totally different outlooks. However, this 
conflict lay dormant and very seldom came out into the 
open. This was partly because of the perspicacity of Hart 
who called on his commissioners to co-operate and be extra- 
cautious in dealings with the native customs, for fear of 
antagonising them. Hart issued circular after circular to 
that effect. That the takeover in early 1887 was accomplished 
* speedily and without much friction could be partly due to this.
With regard to the conflict between officials, this was
probably more due to a struggle for power than to the Opium
Question. The mid-century rebellions had resulted not only
in a greater degree of local autonomy exercised by the
provincial authorities, but also in an upsurge in the power
of Chinese (Han) officials in control of their own regional
armies. The Manchu government, in a sense; became dependent
on them for the continued survival of the dynasty. Among
the officials themselves, there was a struggle for supremacy
and influence. The Opium Question became one of the tissues 
1-5of contention • Thus, we have Tso Tsung-t'ang advocating
the total suppression of the opium trade and the growth of
the poppy in China, based on moral considerations; and Li
Hung-chang advocating the opposite based on 'realistic'
considerations. The Imperial government was in the middle,
reacting alternately to favour this and that view; its rdle
was a passive one. Li won the contest in the end and the
opposition faded. When Tso died in 1885* Li was left as
14the dominant power •
The conflict of interests within the British government 
was much more complicated, in that not only were there 
different interests represented by the different departments, 
but there was also, public opinion to be taken into consider­
ation. Moreover, there was also the conflict among the 
various services ih Asia. In order to clarify these conflicts 
as best as we can, the interests of the parties concerned
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will be dealt with separately.
The Foreign Office had no interest in the Opium Question 
as such. Its concern was in the regularization of diplomatic 
relations between the British and Chinese governments. 
However,, the inclusion of opium taxation and the blockade 
in both the Alcock and Chefoo agreements, and their non­
ratification, meant that the Foreign Office had to be 
involved. Nevertheless, since the taxation of opium was the 
concern of the India Office and the Indian government, and 
the blockade issue was the business of the Colonial Office 
and the Hong Kong government, the Foreign Office (and its 
ministers at Peking) negotiated with the Chinese authorities 
more on their behalf than for its own interest. However, 
public opinion manifested in petitions and memorials from 
the mercantile communities ,in Britain,', China and Hong Kong, 
and the anti-opium societies were directed at the Foreign 
Office and these had to be relayed to the 'other departments 
concerned. Thus, throughout the protracted period of negotia­
tions, its duty was basically that of a transmitter of
»
decisions or the 'official spokesman* for the British 
government. Occasionally, advise was given to the other 
departments, but they were cautious ones and never seriously 
influenced the issues at stake.
The diplomatic corps in China, from the minister at 
Peking to the consuls at the Treaty ports, being represent­
atives of the British government, acted in a like manner. 
Nonetheless, because of the difficulties in communication^ 
between Britain and China, the diplomatic corps, especially 
the ministers, had a certain independence of action. The 
agreements of 1869 and 1876, for example, were negotiated 
and signed at Peking without much reference to the Home 
government. However, the decision whether or not to act 
independently rested very much on the individual. Alcock,
Wade and Robertson were such persons while their successors, 
were not of this calibre. Their rdles in the Opium Question 
will be dealt with in a subsequent section.
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The India Office was totally dependent on the decisions
arrived at by the Indian government until 1885, when it
forced the latter to agree to the terms of the Additional
Article. Although the India Office, by definition, could
exercise control over the Indian government, yet this was
never done. This could well be due to the fact that it had
no answer to the Indian government’s question as to where
the revenue from opium should come from if the trade was
terminated. Neither did the British government as a whole 
16•had the answer. . The monopoly of Bengal opium and the excise 
duty control over Malwa was continued. Then in 1906, the 
general election in Britain saw the seating of 250 members 
in parliament who were committed to the support of the cause 
of the Anti-opium Society. This was followed by the appoint­
ment of John Morley and John Ellis, sympathisers to the 
Society, to the India Office as Secretary of State and 
Undersecretary respectively. In May, a motion was introduced 
in parliament calling for a speedy close to the opium traffic 
in India. Morley agreed on behalf of the government and 
promised that appropriate measures would be implemented. J 
From that time on, the opium trade in India was gradually 
phased out^.
The Colonial Office v/as not as passive as the Foreign 
or India Offices. It did support the contentions of the 
Hong Kong government and made representations on its behalf 
when illegalities committed by the Canton government were 
proven. But, the Colonial government was reprimanded in no 
uncertain terms when it went to excesses. The assent to 
the legality of the blockade, despite objections from the 
Colonial government, is a case in point. The censure of 
Governor MacDonnell’s criticisms of both Consul Robertson 
and Minister Alcock also show the degree of supervision it 
had over Hong Kong.,When petitions from the Hong Kong mercan­
tile community were received, these were again carefully 
weighed before steps were taken. Nevertheless, apart from 
issuing general instructions to guide the conduct of the
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Colonial government, the latter was given a great deal of 
freedom to work out its own solutions to the blockade.
Russell’s scheme, proposed in the Hong Kong Blockade Commission 
of 1886, was made without any directives from the Colonial 
Office .and was accepted by it without any comment. So were 
the alterations made to the Hong Kong Ordinance in 1887*
In a sense, therefore, the three branches of the Home 
government each took one aspect of the Opium Question as 
its own responsibility. The Foreign Office was concerned 
with the issue of the taxation of Indian opium in China, 
but this question was always referred to the India Office 
for its final decision. The India Office, and by extension 
the Indian government, was concerned with the growth of 
native opium in China. The Colonial Office was solely 
concerned with the blockade question. The Board of Trade,
t
powerful in other matters, did not concern itself with the 
Opium Question which lay outside its jurisdiction.
As to the ’subordinate1 governments in India and Hong 
Kong, they were much more interested and concerned because 
they were the ones directly affected by the outcome of 
negotiations to settle the Opium Question.
The Indian government was worried by the uncertainties 
of the future of the opium trade which would greatly affect 
its revenue. This was partly due to the increasing growth 
of Chinese opium and partly due to the complicated and 
harassing measures adopted by the Chinese native customs to 
levy likin and other dues on Indian opium1'’7. Thus, in the 
process of negotiations, it was even willing to adopt a 
monopolistic scheme such as that proposed by Samuel. Its 
opposition to the introduction of any new legislation that 
would be considered detrimental to Indian interests, such 
as the opium clause in the Chefoo Convention, however was 
rapidly toned down until it finally accepted the Additional 
Article though it was one which would have been definitely 
rejected a few years earlier.
The pattern of the Hong Kong government's interests and
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reactions were quite similar to the Indian ones. The 
initial outburst of anger and remonstration against the 
blockade mellowed to one of acceptance and then to co­
operation in 1887. Possibly it could be due to the realization 
by the government and the merchants that Hong Kong would 
fare better as an entrepot and free-port if it were to be 
rid of any attachments to smuggling activities. Of course, 
the taking over of all duty collections by the Foreign 
Inspectorate, reputed for its honesty and fairness, also 
helped matters greatly.
Influence of mercantile communities, such as the 
chambers of commerce in Britain and Asia, in the shaping 
of Britain's policy towards China was immense. China had 
been 'opened1 and the two welts had been fought for the sake 
of the British merchants, who were powerfully represented
i
in parliament. Their voices could not go unheeded. The 
Alcock Convention suffered its fate because of their opposition. 
With the Chefoo Convention, although it was supported in 
some quarters such as the Manchester and Glasgow chambers 
t* of commerce, yet the great majority of the mercantile
communities were hardly concerned with the outcome. This was 
because the third section of the Convention was very vaguely 
worded and of little importance. On the whole, these 
communities supported moves made by the government to better 
and regulate trade relations with China. Since little was 
done during this period in this direction, their activities 
were not pronounced.
The opium merchants were the most active since their 
future and profits were directly affected. Apart from 
.petitioning to the Home government not to agree to anything 
that would be detrimental to the trade, the two Sassoon 
companies and Jardine, Matheson and Co. also managed to 
obtain support from some chambers of commerce such as those 
of Bombay, Shanghai, Hong Kong and of the London Merchants 
Association. Their representations corresponded with views 
expressed by the Indian and Hong Kong governments and each ^
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gave support to the other either in forcing or restraining 
the actions of the Home government.
The Anti-opium Society,with the support from other 
organizations (mostly missionary ones) throughout Britain, 
also exerted great pressure on the government. The Society 
was committed to the total extinction of the involvement of 
the Home and Indian governments in the opium trade. It 
wanted the end of the Bengal monopoly and the curtailment 
of poppy growth in India. However, during this particular 
period, the Society was more interested in an interim 
measure - the ratification by the government of the opium 
clause in the Chefoo Convention. It pressed on with this 
objective relentlessly. The Society, with growing participation 
by people from all walks of life, grew in importance and 
by the early eighties had become an influential force, 
apolitical in nature, but still posing a serious threat to 
the governments of the day. Its moral voices had to be 
heeded and it was partly responsible for bringing about the 
agreement to the terms of the Additional Article by the 
British government. ’
It is with an understanding of these differing interests 
and motivating forces of the various departments and bodies 
that we can comprehend the Opium Question itself and the 
negotiations that led to its solutions. They were responsible 
for the prolonged length of negotiations because of the 
adoption of changing and different viewpoints and tactics.
They also provided the basis of contention in the conflicts
among the different parties. \
The conflict among the three departments was seen in 
, the interests each had and which were not necessarily compa­
tible with one another. The conflict between the Home 
government and its diplomatic service in China came about 
when they differed in the ways to solve the issues in question.
The conflict of the government with .the mercantile bodies
manifested itself in the non-ratification of the Alcock 
Convention initially and then in petitions and memorials from
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them. The conflict between the government and the Anti­
opium Society was revealed in parliamentary motions and 
debates over the ending of the opium trade. There were many 
others, such as that between the diplomatic corps in China 
and the Colonial government, between the latter and the 
Hong Kong mercantile community, and even between the India 
Office and the Indian government. These conflicts will not 
be repeated in detail, because they have already been 
treated in previous chapters. Suffice it to say that what 
the British government encountered in terms of internal 
conflict was much more complex than what the Chinese govern­
ment was confronted with.
Personalities involved
Personalities also played an important r61e in the
Opium Question. Men like Ministers Alcock and Hade; Consul
Robertson; Governors MacDonnell, Kennedy and Hennessy;
«
Govemor-Generals Jui-lin, Li Hung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang, 
and Chang Chih-tung; Chinese Ministers Kuo Sung-t*ao and 
Tseng Chi-tse; Inspector-General of Customs, Hart; and head , 
of the Anti-opium Society, Lord Shaftesbury - all contributed 
in one way or the other, at one time or another, to the 
Opium Question by doing what they believed was correct.
British officials can be broadly divided into three 
categories. Alcock, Wade and Robertson belonged to one group 
and may be labelled ’Elgin*s disciples* in the sense that 
they acted according to his principles - honesty, justice 
and a sense of fair play. Alcock and Robertson never resorted 
to the threat of force, though Wade did when he negotiated 
for his agreement. Yet all of them believed that in relations 
• with China, a quid pro quo was essential. They took and 
gave. But they fell foul of the times - when the Home 
government, despite believing what they did was correct, 
could not support’them, when the merchants refused to 
recognize the validity and sense of their actions and 
arguments. They were unable to achieve what they wanted to 
accomplish but they left a profound mark on Sino-British
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relations in the nineteenth century. Moreover, what they
advocated was eventually accepted. Lord Shaftesbury, strong
in his moral and uprighteous beliefs, could also fit into ^
this group except that he was much more concerned with
18Britain and India than with the problems in China .
MacDonnell was representative of the very opposite 
trend. He may be considered a disciple of Palmerston. To 
him, everything must be done in the interests of the 
mercantile community, and if China was not agreeable to 
British demands, gunboats should be immediately resorted to, 
and China forced to accept them. Like his antagonists, 
Robertson and Alcock, he also fell foul of the times. The 
British government was unwilling to help the merchants to 
the extent that Palmerston or MacDonnell would go to. His 
contribution was minimal, apart from enlarging the issue
i
of the blockade into international1 proportions.
Kennedy and Hennessy were in between'these two opposing 
poles. They tried to be just and fair, and to please both 
parties; in the end, they pleased no one - neither the Home
. .-j .
government nor the mercantile community at Hong Kong.
‘As to the Chinese officials« they cannot be as easily
categorized as their British counterparts. As a general rule,
they reacted differently depending on the offices or positions
they held, the period in which they were responsible to
the Opium Question (in all its three aspects, collectively
or separately), and the degree of influence and power they
had during a given period. Thus, at one time, they could be
working purely for self-interest, and at another date, for
the welfare of the dynasty. Instead of classifying them
into groups, we have to look at them individually. It is
only through analysing the policies advocated and the
actual deeds performed by each individual that we can
19surmise his motivations . However, they are within the 
framework of the following: 1 self-interest1 defined as 
interest for themselves whether it was one of principle 
or for personal gains; the concern for the Welfare' of the 
provinces or offices over which they rule; the respect for
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moral principles or regard for practical considerations; 
and the interest for the dynasty and its subjects as a whole.
Bearing these points in mind, we can take a brief look 
at some of the key personalities. Jui-lin, when he instituted 
the blockade, did it because he needed additional revenue 
to comply with an Imperial order. He was a Manchu official 
loyal to his emperor, and did not possess ulterior motives.
Tso Tsung-tfangfs moral outbursts seconded by Kuo Sung-t'ao 
possibly did reflect ethical principles but can also be 
‘the result of a struggle for supremacy with Li Hung-chang. 
in China's political arena. Chang Chift-tung in Canton was 
motivated by the preservation of provincial autonomy in 
revenue matters when he opposed the takeover by the Foreign 
Inspectorate in 1887- Li Hung-chang's r6le is much more 
difficult to dissect. One might say that,on the one hand, 
he acted for the sake of the dynasty since he was the most 
powerful official as the Governor-General of Chihli, the 
capital province, and head of a powerful army and navy, in 
order to maintain his position; but, on the other, this can 
also be interpreted as one of 'self-interest'. The sending 
of Ma Chien-chung, his prote'ge*, to India to negotiate for 
a monopoly scheme can be taken to mean that he wanted to 
exert his influence over a settlement to the Opium Question 
and reap some monetary rewards from it. When the Additional 
Article was signed, he was the first to ask for retention 
of parts of the joint collection at Tientsin for his province.
Nevertheless, what Li did, and what the others did, did 
exert a great deal of influence on the outcome of the opium 
negotiations. The debates over the prohibition or relaxation 
of poppy cultivation in China, the proposal of a levy of 
150 taels on foreign opium by Tso and the proposed setting up 
of opium monopolies alarmed the British government, especially 
the India Office whj-Ch urged for a speedy solution. The 
co-operation of Kuo, and then Tseng, with the Anti-opium 
Society also perplexed the British government to no end, 
and forced it to seek a solution even if it might prove to
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be detrimental to the interests of the Indian government.
Hart and the Foreign Inspectorate's involvement in the 
Opium Question was a delicate matter. Only after the Additional 
Article was signed did he become completely involved. Yet, 
he had participated in the negotiations that led to the ’
Alcock Convention, the Chefoo Convention and those leading 
to the final settlement. His rdle was never pronounced, 
since the Foreign Inspectorate was not connected with the 
problems throughout this period except in the collection of 
*the opium Tariff duty at the Treaty ports. He was only asked 
by the Tsungli-yamen when his know-how in customs matters 
was needed. He was never completely trusted by his employers. 
Although Hart's concern for the welfare and revenue of the 
Chinese government was beyond suspicion, he was, at the same 
time, still a British at heart and was equally concerned 
with Britain's interests. Moreover, his total devotion to 
the Foreign Inspectorate must have earned him many enemies 
amongst conservative Chinese officials as well as among the 
mercantile communities. Nevertheless, after the operation 
of the stipulations of the Additional Article, the success 
in which collections were made by the Foreign Inspectorate 
stood him in good stead with the Imperial government and he 
was allowed a free hand in customs affairs.
The personalities mentioned in the previous paragraphs 
left indelible marks on the Opium Question, yet the ones 
who played lesser roles must not be ignored either since 
they also had 'contributed'. Hsu Nai-chi and Huang Chueh-tzu 
were responsible for beginning the debate for and against 
legalization of the drug trade; Hillier's exhaustive reports 
on native opium contributed to a fuller understanding of this 
problem by the Indian government; Russell's scheme provided 
the solution to the blockade; David Sassoon's petitions to 
the Foreign Office provided an understanding of the mentality 
of the opium merchants; Joseph Samuel's scheme provided a 
possible solution to the Opium Question, etc.. This list can 
go on and on, suffice it to say that each played his part
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and his rdle cannot be neglected.
Final Observations
A review of the Opium Question and the conflicts that 
were inter-related leads to the following observations:
1) the British government did not really have an 'opium 
policy'. British reactions changed with each new proposal 
or new event in China, or in the opium trade. On the whole, 
the Foreign Office evaded its responsibility insisting that 
both the India and Colonial Offices should shoulder the 
decision-making. Pressures from the Anti-opium Society and 
the growing uncertainty in the future of the opium trade 
eventually compelled the three departments, though much 
less the Colonial Office, to agree to China's demands. If 
China's insistence in obtaining an agreement that would be 
advantageous to her could be considered a policy,, then she 
had one. Otherwise,.,like Britain, though beset with fewer : 
complexities, she plodded along, step by step;
2) the leaders of both governments, that is the members of 
the Tsungli-yamen headed by Prince Kung, and the British 
cabinet headed by the various prime ministers, were never 
fully involved in the negotiations. For China, Li Hung-chang 
and Tseng Chi-tse acted as her spokesmen. For Britain, it 
was a loose combination of many departments with as many 
people such as J. Pauncefote and Currie, undersecretaries
at the Foreign and Indian Offices, and the ministers at 
Peking as her spokesmen;
5) during the course of negotiations beginning with the 
Alcock Convention, the Chinese negotiators demonstrated 
more and more their ability to use the techniques and 
tactics of western diplomacy. Calling on the British 
government to ratify the Chefoo Convention, since China 
had already fulfilled her part of the obligations, making 
full use of the activities of the Anti-opium Society, and 
hinting that China would take measures to prohibit poppy 
cultivation if Britain agreed to the joint collection are 
some examples of this newly-acquired diplomatic tactics.
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They were not carried to perfection as the Additional 
Article was nearly dissolved in the initial months when 
China failed to secure consent from Germany. But, they 
nevertheless show that she had come a long way from the 
pre-186Q period;
4) the Opium Question and the continuation of the opium 
trade was regarded with importance by hoth governments and 
their subordinate ones. Continuation of the trade, despite 
moral objections, and purely for financial considerations,
* was deemed essential;
5) the Opium Question was one totally unrelated to the other
issues that happened in China. To.name the more important
ones in chronological order, they were the Tientsin Massacre,
the Sino-Japanese treaty, the Margary Affair, the H i
Crisis, the confrontation with Japan over Formosa and the
- >  •
Ryukyus, the opening of Korea and the Sino-French war 
over Indo-China. Apart from the last, which saw a slight 
prolongation of the final stage of negotiations at London, 
they did not affect the outcome. In fact, China was able to 
use some of these to reach agreements with the powers 
concerned, such as the United States, Russia and France, to 
prohibit their nationals from involvement in the opium 
trade. It not only isolated Britain but also created severe 
embarassments for her. As a result, China was able to be
more insistent in her demands and Britain had to give way.
Final Assessment
The Opium Question, which arose as a result of the 
legalization of opium and the lack of^more definite set of 
rules and regulations to control the trade saw its settlement 
in the mid-eighties. The two and a half decades of 
negotiation was marked by frustration, uncertainty and even 
fear on both sides. During this period, China improved, 
though slowly, in her diplomatic techniques and confronted 
her opponent with newly-acquired tactics and manoeuvres. 
Faced with these, together with the rising opposition from 
the Anti-opium Society and the changing policy, of the Indian
government towards a more willing acceptance of a solution, 
the Foreign Office, representing the British government, 
had to accept what China was adamant in insisting upon.
The result was the signing of the Additional Article, It 
was a concession, if not a defeat, for Britain in the sense 
that such an agreement would have been dismissed even a 
year or so ago. The opium clauses in both the Alcock and 
Chefoo agreements were much more favourable to the interests 
of the Indian government and China in those days was more 
‘than willing to accept them. Yet the lack of the serious 
competition from' native opium which led to a stationary 
import of Indian opium to China and the resultant uncertainty 
of her Indian opium revenue prompted their rejection.
At et slightly later date, the Hong Kong government and 
its mercantile community, their initial outbursts of anger 
and frustration at the blockade having subsided,'were 
willing to discuss possible solutions. The ‘Scheme proposed 
by Russell and adopted as the blueprint for the Ordinance 
in 1887, was, in fact, based on Consul Robertson's proposal 
of 1876 which was totally rejected then.. It involved a 
greater degree of participation by the Colonial government 
in the suppression of opium smuggling - unthinkable in 1876 
but a responsibility it was perfectly willing to accept 
, ten years later.
The problem of native opium which had played a large 
part in the early stages of the negotiations and had been 
the stumbling block to settlements then, was finally 
accepted by the Indian government, directly concerned with 
it, as an unpleasant fact that could not be altered. Such 
a realization moved this problem into the background, but 
also removed the most important stumbling block to the 
settlement of the other issue - the question of opium 
taxation. ,
The Opium Question, though it was the same throughout 
this period, witnessed changes in personalities and modifi­
cations in the stand taken up by the various governments
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and organizations concerned in it. It, together with the 
solutions, was not only important considered purely in its 
own light, but also became an integral part of Sino-British 
relations, whether political or commercial, between the 
second series of treaties of 1858-60 and the beginning of 
the so-cdlled 1 scramble for concessions* after 1895. It 
underlined, in no small degree, the attitude or policy 
adopted by both Britain and China after 1860, which amounted 
to one of co-operation and conciliation, and the strict 
abidance to treaty stipulations. Such was reflected in 
Clarendon*s instructions to Alcock: that an unfriendly 
pressure should not be applied to China that was inconsistent 
with the independence and safety of China, that Britain wanted 
to deal directly with the Imperial government, and that China 
must faithfully observe the obligations of the treaties which 
were made *to protect life and property immediately exposed*; 
and in the memorial written by Prince Kung and others
i
requesting the formation-,-of—the 5? oungli-y amen -and other—  ---
20establishments to deal with the Treaty powers .
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provincial capital was at Canton. The,latter term will 
. be used "in this “'dissertati'oii~ “ ” “
57* CCR 1868, Alabaster*s report for Swatow.
58. Alcock to Stanley, No. 125, 31 May 1869, Papers 
Relating to the Opium Question, Calcutta, 1870.
59* Yu, op/cit., pp. 2-7.
60* The took is called ^ $ 1  9 by ; also Yu, ibid.;
and also in report made by Hillier on'Native Opium
Crop in the Province of Chekiang for the year 1878*
(10 July 1878) in which he traced in detail the history 
of opium, Inclosure No. 1 in Praser to Salisbury, No. 130 
7 August 1878, F017/781.
61. CCR 1869, Caine*s report for Hankow.
62. Report by Hillier, see note 60.
63. CCR 1869, Morgan*s report for Tientsin.
64. IMC 1865, reports from Tientsin and Shanghai; in 1861 
Bruce had already noted such a phenomenon when he 
reported that, *The opium trade last winter was seriously 
affected by the holders of native-grown opium*, Bruce
to Russell,No. 62, 7 June 1861, P017/332.
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65* CCR 1869, Caine's report for Hankow; also IMC 1871-72, 
report from Hankow.
66. Lo, op.cit., p. 326.
67* What has been written on this period all tend to shy
awa^ r from the Opium Question. Its importance, therefore, 
has been greatly under-rated. It is the purpose of 
this dissertation to show that the Opium Question was 
a very important one which cannot be neglected as it 
has been if we are to have a full understanding of 
Sino-British diplomatic and commercial relations in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.
68. Throughout this period Macao was also blockaded in a
similar way. However, the Chinese government regarded
this port as a part of China, since it had only been
rented to Portugal beginning in 1557* Moreover,
Portugal did not have any.treaty relation with China
«
until 1888. Portugal also did not have any connection 
with the opium trade, and was not involved in the 
negotiations during this period. Her involvement came 
after the Hong Kong Commission of 1886 when the Hong 
Kong government insisted that Macao must be embodied 
in any agreement over the prevention of smuggling from 
the Colony that was arranged with China. This will be 
discussed in Chapter 8 of this dissertation.
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1. Proclamation Regarding Terms of Treaty of Chuenpi - 
To Her Britannic Majesty's Subjects by Charles Elliot, 
H.M. Plenipotentiary in China, Macao, 20 January 1841, 
The Chinese Repository, volume X, 1841, p. 63#
2. See note 36 of Chapter 1; or The Chinese Repository, 
volume XII, 1843, p. 224.
3. See Chapter 1, pp. 11-14 under section on Hong Kong.
4. CCR 1862, Robertson to Bruce, 20 May 1863.
.5. ibid., Robertson to Bruce, 30 May 1863.
6. CCR 1863-64, Hewlitt to Wade, 1 July 1865.
7. Robertson to Stanley, 28 Feb. 1867, F017/481: there
are 12 inclosures which gave details of the junk trade
8. This became very obvious by the low trade figures 
from Canton. Glover, commissioner at Canton, reported 
in 1867 that trade was 'on the decline for the past 
four years, IMC 1866, Glover to Hart, 19 Feb. 1867.
9. See note 7* ------------------------------
10. This summary is compiled from various sources, chief 
of which are Wright, Morse, Lo, IMC and CCR reports.
11. Bowring to Malmesbury, No. 97, 23 April 1859, F017/318 
There are inclosures from Alcock and merchants.
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bidder would be awarded a licence giving him exclusive 
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Macao. For the amounts derived by the Hong Kong govern 
ment for the sale of such licences, see Annexure H (i)
13. Winchester to Russell, 26 Sept. 1859 and 8 Oct. 1859, 
Canton, F017/319-
14. See Chapter 1, pp 19-20.
15. Robertson to Alcock, No. 62, 24 Dec. 1866, F017/474.
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16* Alcock to Stanley, No. 186, 20 July 1868, F017/499*
17* Article 47 of the Treaty of Tientsin: 'British Vessels 
trading with Ports not opened by Treaty liable to 
Confiscation. British merchant vessels are not 
entitled to resort to other than the ports of trade 
declared open by this Treaty. They are not unlawfully 
to enter other ports in China, or to carry on clandes­
tine trade along the coasts thereof. Any vessel 
violating this provision, shall, with her cargo, be 
subject to confiscation by the Chinese Government.' 
Hertslet, Treaties etc., volume 1, p. 30.
18. Explanation of the seizure was cont^ned in the Petition 
to MacDonnell by Kwok a Cheong in Inclosure No. 2 of 
MacDonnell to Cardwell, no. 68, 3 July 1866 (No. 8576 
H.K.), C0129/114.
19. ibid..
i
20. ibid., Inclosure No. 1, MacDonnell to Alcock, No. 395,
3 July 1866.
21. ‘Carnarvon to Stanley, 12 Sept. 1866, C0129/114; Stanley
to Carnarvon, 12 September 1866, C0129/117; Stanley to 
Carnarvon, 5 Feb. 1867 (No. 1320 H.K.), C0129/127.
22. Yamen to Alcock, No. 7* T'ung-chih 6th year second moon 
thirteenth day; same to same, sixth moon eleventh day; 
same to same, eighth moon seventh day (18 March, 22 
July and 4 Sept. 1867), F0230/81.
23. Stanley to Carnarvon, 5 February 1867: Inclosure No. 5, 
Robertson to Alcock, No. 48,. 5 Oct. 1866, and Inclosure 
No. 6, Mayers to Alcock, No. 49, 11 Oct. 1866, 
C0129/127.
24. MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 275, 26 April, 1867, 
C0129/121;
same to same, No. 321, 8 July 1867, C0129/123; 
same to samd, No. 360, 5 Sept. 1867, Inclosure in 
Buckingham to Clarendon, 6 April 1868, F017/510.
25* Buckingham to Clarendon, 6 April 1868, F017/510.
26. ibid.: Inclosure Buckingham to MacDonnell, No. 145,
26 Nov. 1867.
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27. Robertson to Clarendon, 10 Sept. 1869; and Inclosure 
Alcock to Robertson, 7 Aug. 1867, 1*017/481.
28. See note 18: brief explanation of the seizures of the 
•Scotland* and 'Mercury* were contained in Kwok a 
cteong's Petition.
29• MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 392, 14 Nov. 1867,
(No. 36 H.K.), C0129/125.
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in inclosures. Article 46 of the Treaty of Tientsin: 
'Preventions against Praud and Smuggling. The Chinese 
authorities at each port shall adopt the means they 
may judge most proper to prevent the revenue suffering 
from Fraud or Smuggling.' Hertzlet, volume 1, p. 30.
31. Buckingham to Stanley, 28 March 1868: enclosed letter
from Mallet, secretary to the Board of Trade of 7 March 
1868, F017/501.
«
32.— Buckingham~t©"Stanley, “29 January 1868;'“and Inciosure----
Buckingham to MacDonnell, No. 13, 23 Jan. 1868, C0129/125. 
Buckingham to Stanley, 6 May 1868, C0129/129*
33* MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 461, 10 March 1868,'
C0129/129.
34. Buckingham to Stanley, 20 Feb. 1868: Inclosure No. 3, 
Robertson to Acting Colonial Secretary (Hong Kong), 
no. 197, 5 Dec. 1867, F017/509.
33. Stanley to Carnarvon, 21 Jan. 1867, (No. 712H.K.): 
Inclosure Law Officers to Stanley, 15 Jan. 1867,
• C0129/127.
36. MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 473, 7 April 1868,
(No. 5557 H.K.), C0129/130.
Robertson to Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
4 April 1868: contained details of seizures and 
subsequent negotiations, F017/504.
37* Buckingham to Stanley, 22 June 1868, FO17/511• More 
comments from the Colonial Office were contained in 
remarks to MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 473, 7 April 
1868, (No. 5557 H.K.), C0129/130.
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38. Stanley to Alcock (Draft), No. 169, 31 Aug. 1868; copy 
also sent to Colonial Office and Robertson, F017/495*
39. Robertson to Hammond, 11 Nov. 1868, F017/504.
4-0. ibid.: Inclosure No. 1, Alcock to Robertson, No. 24,
7 May 1868; Inclosure No. 2, Robertson to Alcock, No.
53, 23 June 1868.
41. ibid.: Jui-lin to Robertson, 12 June, 1868.
42. Alcock to Stanley, No. 286, 17 Nov. 1868: Inclosure No.
2, Austin to Robertson, 12 Oct. 1868, F017/501;
Robertson to Hammond, 11 Nov. 1868: Inclosure No. 10, 
Robertson to Alcock, 15 Oct. 1868, F017/504.
43. Alcock to Stanley, No. 286, 17 Nov. 1868, F017/501.
44. Robertson to Hammond, 11 Nov. 1868: Inclosure No. 6,
Austin to Robertson, No. 449, 28 Sept. 1868, F017/504.
Granville to Clarendon, 8 Jan. 1869, F017/504.
45« Robertson to Hammond, 11 Nov. 1868: Inclosure No. 2,
Robertson to Alcock, No. 53, 23 June 1868, F017/504-.
46. Alcock to Stanley, No. 186, 20 July 1868: Enclosure 
Robertson to Alcock, 19 June 1868, F017/499-
47. By the Convention of Peking, China had to pay an
indemnity of 8 million, taels to Britain (Article 3)»
48. Alcock to Stanley, No. 186, 20 July 1868: Enclosure 
Robertson to Alcock, 19 June 1868, F017/499*
49* ibid..
50. ibid..
51. ibid. and Wade to Clarendon, No. 72, 7 May 1870, F017/54-9: 
Robertson noted that the Canton government had been 
contributing 480,000 taels every year to the military 
expenses of other provinces; but for 1870 this had 
been raised to 840,000 taels. Further regular contri­
butions to the Imperial government and Household 
amounted to another 2,400,000 taels a year.
Wade to Clarendon, No. 73, 9 May 1870, F017/5^9:
Enclosure Robertson to Wade, 6 April 1870: Robertson 
observed that for 1869, the Canton government had to 
pay 1 million, taels additional, and for 1870 a further
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600,000 taels to the Imperial Household presumably for 
the Emperor*s wedding.
Memorials from Jui-lin on 27 Sept., 20 Sept1, /and 16 
Nov. 1871 gave figures of the amount of remittances 
to the capital, F0682/341.
52^ Robertson to Hammond, 3 Aug. 1868: Inclosure No. 1,
Robertson to Alcock, No. 18, 4 March 1868, F017/504.
53* The customs blockade will be dealt with fully in
subsequent pages; suffice to say that it consisted of
revenue vessels that patrol the passes through which- 
junks had to pass in order to reach or leave Hong Kong 
and Macao.
54. These incidents were the ones mentioned earlier in 
this chapter - the * Prince Albert* affair, the seizure 
of an opium junk, and the levy of th6 salt ’gabelle in 
Hong Kong waters.
55. Robertson to Hammbri&7~ 3 Aug 1868: iliis^^VspatcE^~ “ “
cpntained 17 enclosures that covered comprehensively
negotiations that led to the customs blockade:
Enclosure No. 1, Robertson to Alcock, No. 18, 4 -March 
1868, F017/504.
56. ibid.: Enclosure No. 1.
57* ibid.: Enclosure No. 1.
58. ibid.: Enclosure No. 1.
59. ibid*: Enclosure No* 4, Alcock to Robertson, No. 25,
9 May 1868; IMC 1869, report by T. Dick, commissioner 
at Shanghai, also arrived at the same conclusion.
60. ibid.: Enclosure No. 1; Enclosure No. 2, Jui-lin to 
Robertson, 28 Feb. 1868; and Enclosure No. 3, map of 
proposed tax-stations.
61. ibid.: Enclosure No. 6, Jui-lin to Robertson, 30 June 
1868; Glover to Hart, No. 80, 20 July 1868, Canton,
CCS volume 6, p. 237*
62. ibid.: Enclosure No. 2.
63. ibid.: Enclosure No. 8; also see Annexure K.
64. ibid.: Enclosure No. 6; Buckingham to Stanley, 30 Sept.
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1868: Enclosure No. 2, Robertson to Austin, Nos. 129 
and 135, 6 and 10 July 1868, F017/513.
65* ibid.: Enclosure No. 7, Proclamation of 1 July 1868, 
translated by Mayers. It was only as late as 3 Dec.
1871 that Jui-lin officially memorialized the throne 
(F0682/341) explaining the establishment and purposes 
behind the customs blockade. This goes to prove two 
/important factors: 1) there was a great deal of 
provincial autonomy; and 2) the blockade was regarded 
by Jui-lin initially as a purely local affair and as 
long as he could remit the required moneys to the 
capital, whatever actions he' took to secure revenue 
was entirely in his own hands. Robertson had noted 
earlier that if the Imperial government obtained the 
required sums from provincial governments,tthe latter 
had practically full autonomy: Alcock to Clarendon,
No. 72, 21 June 1869, F017/523.
67* Alcock to Stanley, No. 208, 14 Aug. 1868: enclosing 
 ^ two despatches from Robertson which explained how 
Europeans served on board Chinese' revenue cruisers, 
F017/499; Robertson to Hammond, 20 July 1869: he gave 
details of the purchases of cruisers by Jui-lin, F017/533; 
this was illustrated in great detail by Jui-lin* s 
 ^ memorial of 30 Dec. 1867, IWSM chiian 55, PP« 5a-6b.
66. Alcock to Stanley, No. 294, 23 November 1868; enclosing 
all correspondences respecting the arrangement of
regulations for the control of piracy with the actual
regulations in Enclosure Now 3 (undated), F017/501*
68. Robertson to Hammond, 20 July 1869, F017/533*
•69* Bowra to Hart, No. 123 (1870), 28 December 1870, Canton, 
CCS volume’ 6, pp. 304-06.
70. Hart to Brown, No. 6 (Canton Series), 9 Feb. 1871,
CCS volume 6,’ pp. 307-08.
71• IWSM chuan 79, PP* 50a-54a.
72* ibid., p. 54a. The part played by Hart and the Foreign
Inspectorate in the blockade scheme was quite extensive, 
but they were always in the background. Hart contributed
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his ideas; hut these were either completely ignored 
by the Tsungli-yamen, or if adopted, were rephrased 
in such a way that credit went to the latter. This 
kind of situation was to list until after the signing 
of the Additional Article in 1885 when Hart's role 
in the Opium Question became more open and influential. 
This would contrast with both S. Wright's and H.B. Morse's 
contentions that Hart was very much in the forefront 
, of all dealings and that he was a trusted and important 
adviser to China. Prom my understanding, Hart wast 
definitely used as an adviser but very seldom a trusted 
one.
73* Bowra to Hart, No. 94 (1871), 6 June 1871* CCS volume
6, pp. 508-09.
74. Same to same, No. 93 (1871), 6 June 1871* CCS volume 6,
pp. 309-10; Hart to Bowra, No. 50 (Canton Series), 25
4
June 1871, CCS volume 6, pp. 511-12: instructions were---
given to Bowra on how to effect the transfer of ownership.
75* Bowra to Hart, No. Ill (1871), 11 July, 1871* CCS volpme
6, pp. 512-17; Wade to Granville, No. 285* 31 Dec. 1871: 
enclosed translation of the Governor-General's proclama­
tion concerning the collection of the Tariff duty and 
likin on opium: F017/590.
76. Bowra to Hart, No. 156 (1871), 5 Aug. 1871, CCS volume
6* pp. 517-22.
77. Hart to Bowra, No. 12 (Canton Series), 12 Jan. 1872,
CCS volume 6, p. 525.
78. KleinWa'chter to Hart, No. 75 (1874), 8 June 1874, CCS
volume 6, pp. 541-51* Kung to Wade, No. 22, 27 July
1874, F0250/95.
79* IMC 1874-, Kleinwachter to Hart, 51 Jan. 1875; Wade to
Clarendon, No. 73* 9 May 1870: Enclosure No. 1, extract 
of Robertsdn to Wade, 6 April 1870, in which he gave
details of the amount collected by the native customs
which was sufficient to meet the revenue demands of the 
Imperial government: F017/549; further statements were
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made by Robertson in Robertson to Wade, No* 32, 5 Junp 
1874, as Enclosure No. 4 in Robertson to Tenderten, '
No* 44, 6 Aug. 1874, F017/684; and in Stanley to 
Carnarvon, 20 Oct. 1874, C0129/169*
80* MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 635, H  Jan. 1869,
(No. 2238 H.K.): Enclosure No. 4, Lister to Austin,
No. 80, 22 Dec. 1868: containing depositions taken 
by complainants, including the seizure of Passage Boat 
No. 108; Enclosure No. 5, Lister to Austin, No. 84,
• 7 Jan. 1869: contains list of passage boats and the 
amount extorted from them by revenue cruisers: C0129/136.
81. ibid.: Enclosure has deposition from the Registrar- 
General^ Office of 22 Dec. 1868, and list of cargoes 
on board the *San Wing Hop*; also in Colonial Office
to undersecretary of state at the Foreign Office, !
6 May 1869, F017/543.
82. MacDonnell to Granville, No. 689, 19 April 1869,
(No. 6310 H.K.): Enclosure Robertson to Austin, No. 51,
22 March 1869, C0129/137.
83. Proclamation contained in F017/54-3: see note 81; Glover 
to Hart, No. 32 (1869), 16 March 1869, CCS volume 6, 
pp. 277-78 (Proclamation in Chinese).
84. The question of the official Chinese flag was raised
by the *Chun Hoi* incident. On 25 and 29 September 1868, 
a Hong Kong registered steamer 'Kinshan1 was fired upon 
and boarded by officers from the revenue cruiser *Chun 
Hoi* for not' saluting its Chinese flag. After this j.
incident, MacDonnell wanted to know what rights the 
Chinese government would give a provincial cruiser like 
the fChun Hoi1 to possess, and also wanted to know what 
authority, commission and type of flag the fChun Hoi* !
had. (Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 15 Jan. 1869: |
enclosing MacDdnnell to Buckingham, No. 606, 28 Oct. [
1868, and Colonial Secretary to Robertson No. 468, 9 
October 1868: F017/54-1). As a result a series of discuss­
ions took place (Clarendon to Alcock, No. 18, 26 Jan. 1869,
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F017/516; Robertson to Hammond, 16 March 1869, F017/533; 
Robertson to Hammond, 31 March 1869, F017/553) which 
saw a decision made by the Tsungli-yamen (Kung to V/ade, 
no. 36, 9 Oct. 1872, F0230/88). The Oorrect colours, 
shhpe and size of the official Chinese flag is shown 
opposite p. 356 of CCS volume 1.
85* Granville to Clarendon, 5 June 1869: Enclosure Hong Kong \ 
government Notification of 30 March 1869 informing the 
public of Chinafs new flat, F017/543.
86. Buckingham to Stanley, 30 Sept. 1868: Enclosure
MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 548, 23 July 1868, F017/513.
87# Alcock to Clarendon (Separate), 3 January 1870: Enclosure 
No. 1, Robertson to Alcock (Report), 28 Dec. 1869, and 
No. 4, memorandum on P*eng Yu by Mayers, 27 December 1869, 
F017/547.
88. ibid.: Enclosure No. 5* Alcock*s notes on interview with
1
Jui-lin on 26 and 27-Dec.“ 186^7"written-!"' Jan. 1870. ~
89 • MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 635» 11 January 1869 
(No. 2258 H.K.), C0129/136.
90. RobJ;ertson to Hammond, 3 Aug. 1868: Enclosure No. 11, 
Austin to Robertson, No. 325* 10 July 1868, F017/504.
91* ibid.: Enclosure No. 13* Austin to.Robertson, No. 335*
20 July, 1868.
92. ibid..
93* See pp. 7-11 of this chapter.
94*. MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 54-2, 9 July 1868 (No. 9555 
H.K.), C0129/131.
95* MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 54-8, 23 July 1868 (No. 9818 
H.K.), C0129/131.
•96. MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 553* 6 August 1868
(No. 10,44-2 H.K.), 00129/132. MacDonnell argued that 
Hong Kong imported about 80,000 chests of opium each 
year, out of iVhich 63,000 chests go north in steamers 
to Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, Shanghai, Tientsin etc. and 
Tariff duty was paid there. Another 10,000 chests were 
sent to Macao, out of which 4—4,500 chests were smuggled
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into un-opened ports. Of the 7,000 chests remaining in 
Hong Kong, 3*000 chests were boiled down for trans­
shipment to California, and only 1,500 chests could 
be smuggled into China. Thus, combining the amount 
smuggled from Hong Kong and Macao, the maximum total 
would be 6,000 chests or a loss of 200,000 taels in 
China’s revenue. By comparing ^ his figures with that 
actually exported from India, and that imported into 
China, it would show that MacDonnell*s statistics 
were not at all reliable, yjpeover, since Hong Kong Was 
a f re e-port and no records were kept of the amouint 
imported and exported, these'figures must have been 
supplied by the opium merchants for their own ends.
97» MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 635* 11 January 1869 
(No. 2258 HK), C0129/136.
98. MacDonnell to Granville, No. 654* 20 Feb. 1869 (No. 4005
II.K.), 00129/136.
99* Robertson to Hammond, 3 August 1868: Enclosure No. 16, 
Extract of Petition in the ’Overland China Mail* of 
24 July 1868, F017/504.
100. ibid.: Enclosure No. 17, Edtract from the ’Overland 
China Mail* of 29 July 1868.
101. MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 635* 11 Jan. 1869 (No. 2258
H.K.): Enclosure No. 3* Memorandum by Keswick, Gibb
and Taylor, 8 Jan. 1869, C0129/136.
102. See Chapter 3*
103. Alcock to Stanley, No. 112, 12 May 1868, F017/497*
104. Stanley to Alcock (Draft), No. 140, 28 July 1868, F017/494.
105* Foreign Office to Board of Trade, 22 Sept. 1868, F017/515.
106. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 Sept. 1868, F017/513*
107. Foreign Office to Queen’s Advocate, 21 Oct. 1868, F017/513*
108. Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 16 Oct. 1868, F017/515*
109* Contained in A memorandum entitled ’Opium Tax Stations
near Hong Kong’ drawn up by the Foreign Office, F017/543* 
additional details of opinions from the legal departments 
contained in Granville to MacDonnell, No. 321, 11 Jan.
16
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1869 (No. 7892 H.K.), C0129/141.
110. The goods *in transit1 was raised by Robertson in ah 
attempt to alleviate the grievances complained of.
See note 112.
t
111. Granville to Hammond, 12 Aug. 1869, F017/544.
112> Alcock to Stanley, No. 131, 29 May 1868: Enclosure
Robertson to Alcock, 1 May 1868, F017/491' Robertson 
initially suggested this solution before the blockade 
started, but in the succeeding months, complaints 
against the blockade occupied the minds of the Hong Kong 
government. His suggestion was looked into by MacDonnell 
in late 1868 and though it was not formally put forward 
as a proposal, the tone of his despatch prompted a 
decision by the Home government: MacDonnell to 
Buckingham, No. 635, 11 January 1869,v F017/543•
113. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 5 June 1869, F017/543.
114. Clarendon to Alcock, No. 158T^20^Aug'T‘”18i59l F017/317*----
115. Comments made by the Colonial Office after receipt of 
MacDonnell1s No. 634 of 20 Feb. 1869 (No. 4003 H.K.), 
and reply to MacDonnell of May 1869, C0129/136.
116. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 12 Aug. 1869: commented 
on Foreign Office*s proposed despatch to Alcock, F017/544-; 
Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 12 Aug. 1869: transmit 
despatch (proposed) to MacDonnell, F017/344.
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1. This is the so-called 'Clarendon policy1 which was 
defined in late 1868 when Anson Burlingame, leading 
the Chinese mission, called at the Foreign Office.
The declaration by Clarendon was, 'we /Britain/should 
henceforward have a right to expect on it's /^ Thina7 part 
the faithful fulfilment of Treaty engagements, the 
prompt redress of grievances referred to the Central 
Government, and friendly treatment of British subjects 
by the Chinese Authorities. This, I /Clarendon/ said, 
was not only just reasonable in itself but also 
necessary in order to enable Her Majesty's Government to 
give full effect to the policy which they desired to 
observe towards China, particularly with reference to 
not having recourse to measures of force unless for
the immediate protection of life and property.1 Clarendon 
to Alcock (Draft), No. 18, 26 Jan. 1869, F017/516; Extract 
front 'The Standard' of 6 Jan. 1869, F017/541; also see 
Morse, volume 2, p. 50,(International Relations of the 
Chinese Empire), Wright, pp. 21-22 (Last Stand of Chines,e 
Conservatism) and Hsu, p. 324 (China's Entrance into the 
Family of Nations).
2. The taxation of opium and the customs blockade of Hong 
Kong, contained in articles 2 and 12 of the Alcock 
Convention, were looked upon as insignificant aspects of 
Treaty revision by most historians, such as T.L. Chao, 
Anglo-Chinese diplomatic relations, with special reference 
to the revision of the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858-1870, 
(Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1952). This could be due to the 
lack of importance attached to it, before and during 
treaty revision, by the Tsungli-yamen. Nevertheless, it
is the contention of this dissertation that the Opium 
Question is significant and vital in the consideration 
of Sino-Briti£h relations of the period under survey.
3. IWSM, chuan 49., pp. 5a-r7b.
4. There were seventeen points made, all connected with 
foreign trade, though none dealt with the Opium Question.
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3. IWSM, chhan 30, pp. 28a-28b.
6. IWSM, chuan 53, pp. 16a-16b.
7. IWSM, chuan 5^, PP* 22b-23a.
8. See Chapter 2, pp. 5-0.
9. Robertson to Alcock, 12 Aug. 1867: Enclosure Hoppo's 
memorial of 11 July 1867, F017/571. The memorial shows 
the ignorance of the Hoppo in the government of Hong 
Kong, and is a point worthwhile noting when at a slightly 
later date, the blockade was carried out fully in 
accordance with treaty stipulations.
10. IWSM, chuan 63, pp. 34a-86b; Alcock to Clarendon (Conf.), 
No. 38, 14 April 1869, F017/576.
11. Wade * to Stanley, No. 75, 10 June 1867: Enclosure 
Circular No. 9 to Consuls, Shanghai, 28 May 1867, F017/571.
12. Stanley to Wade, No. 139, 16 Aug. 1867, FQ17/571. :
13. Alcock to Stanley, No. 199, 23 Dec. 1867, F017/572.
14. Alcock to Stanley Separate—and Coirfv)-*-!^ Novv 1867, ---
F017/571.
15. Stanley to Wade, No. 139, 16 Aug. 1867, F017/571.
16. Chinkiang Chamber of Commerce to Alcock, 30 May 1867, 
Enclosure in Wade to Stanley No. 75 - see note 11.
17* MacDonnell to Buckingham, Nos. 388 & 392, 31 Oct. 1867; 
Enclosure in his No. 392, Memorial of 18 Oct. 1867 in 
the fHong Kong Daily Press1, C0129/125.
18. MacDonnell to Buckingham, No. 405,. 30 Nov. 1867 , 00129/126.
19. Alcock to Stanley, No. 301, 6 Dec. 1868, F017/574; 
same to same, No. 315, 14 Dec. 1868, F017/574; 
same to same (telegram), 38 Aug. 1869, F017/577; 
same to Clarendon, No. 130, 28 Oct. 1869, F017/ 578; 
the Alcock Convention is contained in Hertslet. volume 
1, PP- ’59-71.
20. Alcock to Stanley, No. 252, 12 Oct. 1868, F017/573.
21. IWSM, chuan 63, pp. 34a-86b; Alcock to Stanley, No. 301,
6 Dec. 1868: Enclosure Hart to Alcock (Private), 13 June 
1868, F017/574.
22. ibid.: Memorandum to Isungli*-yamen by Alcock, 8 Sept. 1868:
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in a memorandum Alcock wrote for his own reference on 
5 September,, he believed that with the doubling of the 
Tariff duty on opium, there would not be any perceptible ' 
diminution either in demand or consumption. The revenue 
derived solely from opium by the Foreign Inspectorate 
„ amounted to 2 million taels annually or 7$ of the total 
revenue. Thus, by doubling the duty, the Tsungli-yamen 
could be persuaded to adopt his proposal of a 30-mile 
radius around the Treaty ports that would be free from 
all likin levies. Hart had privately informed him that 
the Tsungli-yamen would be agreeable to this mutual 
concession.
23. Alcock to Stanley, No. 315, 14- Dec. 1868: Enclosure Kung 
to Alcock (Supplement) of 5 Dec. 1868, F017/574.
24. ibid.: Alcock to Kung, 14 Dec. 1868.
23. Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 19 May 1869, F017/576.
26. It should be noted that after the failure of the Alcock 
Convention, the Board of Trade was no longer concerned 
with the Opium Question. Correspondence on the subject , 
were transmitted to the Board by the Foreign Office, but 
it seldom made any comment of significance.
26. Alcock to Kung, No. 70, 17 Dec. 1868, F0230/80.
27. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 16 March 1869, F017/575*
28. MacDonnell to Granville, No. 701, 12 May 1869 (No. 1117
H.K.), COI29/I37.
29. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 22 July 1869, F017/576; 
Memorandum of Hong Kong Executive Council meeting of
3 April 1869, C0129/144.
30. ibid.: Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 22 July 1869.
31. Granville to MacDonnell, 17 July 18699 C0129/137-
32. Clarendon to Alcock, No. 141, 4 Aug. 1869, F017/576*
33. Alcock to Clarendon, No. 122, 13 Oct. 1869, F017/525;
Alcock to Clarendon, No. 107 (Conf.), 28 Aug. 1869:
Enclosure Tsungli-yamen to Alcock, July 1869, F017/578*
34. While the Tsungli-yamen was loudly decrying the opium 
trade, Alcock had obtained access to some secret 
memorials which stated that Li Hung-chang, Governor-General 
Hu-kuang, and his brother, Governor-General of Szechuan,
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were advocating the cultivation of native opium on a 
large scale so that the Chinese drug could ruin the 
Indian import. The two brothers, in fact, had already 
encouraged poppy cultivation in their provinces. Alcock 
to Clarendon (Conf.), No. 107, 28 Aug. 1869, F017/578.
35* Alcock to Clarendon (telegram), 23 Aug. 1869 - but 
received by the Foreign Office on 20 Sept., F017/577-
36. Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 28 Sept. 1869, F017/577.
37. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 Sept. 1869, F017/577*
38. Clarendon to Alcock (telegram) (same as Draft No. 177 
of 29 Sept. 1869), F017/577-
39- Hertslet, volume 1, pp. 59-71; Alcock to Clarendon, No. 130, 
28 Oct. 1869, F017/578; Private letter from Mallet to 
Rogers (Board of Trade to Colonial Office), 5 Feb. 1870, 
C0129/147; IWSM, chiiaii 70, pp. 39b-40b.
40. Alcock to Clarendon, No.- 130, 28 Oct. 1869, C0129/147 or 
F017/573*—  ------- ---- --------— ------- -— —  —
41. These were mainly on the objection to the raising of
the Tariff duty on silk and that the Convention did not* { 
go far enough to satisfy the demands of the mercantile 
communities.
42. Board of Trade to Colonial Office, 26 Jan. 1870 (No. 981 
H.K.), CO129/147.
43. Mallet to Rogers (Private letter), 5 Feb. 1870.(No. 100 
H-.K.) , C0129/147.
44. India Office to Foreign Office, 31 Jan. 1870, F017/579.
45. Memorial from Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 31 Dec. 1869, 
F017/579. The sum of 3 million taels would represent 
the additional revenue to China if the increases in the 
Tariff duties on opium and silk were collected.
46. Alcock to Clarendon, 7 Dec. 1869, Ningpo: Enclosure ‘ 
Resolution of Shanghai Chamber of Commerce which appeared 
in the 'North-China Daily News1 of 27 Nov. 1869, F017/579.
47. Memorial from David Sassoon and Co., London, 22 March 
1870, F017/580.
48. ibid.s Enclosure letter dated 31 Dec. 1869.
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4-9. MacDonnell to Granville, No. 857* 24 Jan. 1870 (No. 24-77
H.K.): Enclosures Memorials of 21 Jan. 1870 of the 
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (submitted by 
Keswick to Austin, 22 Jan. 1870, Enclosure No. 1), and 
of 3 Jan. 1870 (based on a Public Meeting of that day,
. submitted together with the first memorial), C0129/143.
50. ibid.; Memorial from Hugh M. Matheson (London Merchants) 
to the Foreign Office, 14 March 1870, F017/580.
51* MacDonnell's comments were in MacDonnell to Granville,
No. 857* 24 Jan. 1870 - see note 49.
52. Memorial from Hugh M. Matheson - see note 50*
53* The 1Times' of 19 Feb. 1870.
54. Papers read before the Asiatic Society on 16 May 1870,
printed in 'North China Herald' of 2 June 1870.
55. Minute by the Hon. Sir H.M. Durand of 4 Feb. *1870,
Papers Relating to the Opium Question (Calcutta, 1870),♦
10 (12) 1320. In 1871* after the Convention had been 
officially rejected by the British government, Alcock, 
when answering questions put to him by the Select 
Committee on East India Finance, reiterated these views.
He also quoted Prince Kung as saying, 'if you could 
relieve us of missionaries and opium, there need be no 
more trouble in China.' To this Alcock replied that the 
Indian government did not like the increase in the Tariff 
duty on opium because it was already facing difficulties 
in competing with Chinese opium. In reply to another 
question from the Select Committee, Alcock repeated his 
belief that the Chinese government had the earnest desire 
to suppress opium, but it was powerless to do so in the 
face of the determination of Britain to have it inserted 
in the Treaty Tariff; 'Reports From the Select Committee 
on East India Finance' BPP, volume VIII (1872), pp. 277-300
56. 'Papers Relating to the Opium Question (Calcutta, 1870): 
Note by W.R. Mansfield on 6 Feb. 1870, 10 (12) 1320.
57* ibid.: Memorandum of a Conference and Resolution passed 
therein, written by R.B.C., Officiating Financial
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Secretary, 19 March 1870.
38. Indian Government to India Office, No. 11, 27 May 1870 
(No. 9)> India: Separate Revenue Proceedings, 1870, 
p/436/37 (India Office archives).
59• Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 4 Feb. 1870, F017/579#
60. Alcock's Memorandum on 'Further Memorials respecting 
the China Treaty Convention1, 3 May 1870, F017/580.
61. Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 1 June 1870, F017/581. 
Alcock's Memorandum of 3 May 1870 (note 60) was sent to 
the chambers of commerce, but the replies that came
back (all in June 1870) all said that the objections  ^
raised previously had not be'en removed by Alcock's 
reasoning: F017/581.
62. General circular of 25 July 1870, F017/581.
63« No. 70, Roll 28 (July"21 1869 to 16^March 1870), Despatches 
from U.S. Ministers to China (1843-1906); Williams,
Charge d'Affaires, 30 Sept. 1869.
64. ibid.: No. 10, Roll 29 (8 Oct. 1869 to 25 Oct. 1870), 
Frederick F. Low, 19 June 1870.
65* BPP, 1871 (volume LXX) (C.389): Lallemand to Alcock,
9 Aug. 1868, pp. 241-2; Rehfues to Vlangaly, 18 Aug.
1868, pp. 244-46; also see Wright, Hart and the Chinese 
Customs, p. 379- 
66. IWSM, chiian 79» PP* 39a-42a.
67* Hertslet« volume 1, p. 24: Article XXVII of Treaty of 
Tientsin entitled 'Duration and Revision of Treaty and 
Tariff'.
68. Alcock to Clarendon, No. 130, 28 Oct. 1869: Enclosure 
No. 2, Alcock to M. de Rehfues (Doyen of Ministers)
(Conf.), 20 Oct. 1869, C0129/147.
69 • See note 66.
70. See note 60.
71• MacDonnell left Hong Kong on 11 April 1872 on grounds 
of illness and had.asked for retirement; Kennedy arrived 
in Hong Kong on 16 April 1872: Kennedy to Kimberley, No. 1,
16 April 1872, C0129/157.
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1. Opium. China: Imperial Maritime Customs II - Special 
Series: No. 4. Shanghai, 1881.
2. Alcock to Stanley, 11 February 1869: Enclosures: report 
on native opium, Lay to Alcock, No. 23, Kewkeang 
(Kiukiang), 23 Dec. 1868, and extracts from 'local 
press', F017/519*
3. OCR for 1869, Caine's report for Hankow.
4. Alcock to Stanley, 11 February 1869: Enclosure No. 3, 
Extracts from the 'local press' on published information 
brought back by T.T. Cooper, F017/519#
5« Alcock to Clarendon, No. 122, 13 Oct. 1869: Enclosure
No. 3, article in Shanghai's 'Evening Courier' of 9 June
1869, F017/525.
6. CCR for 1863, Dennys' report for Tientsin.
7# CCR for 1865, Lay's report for Chef00. •
8. CCR for 1865, Winchester's report for Shanghai, written 
on 6 April 1867 which included an assessment for 1866.
9. CCR for 1868, King's report for Newchwang.
10. CCR for 1869, Hughes' report for Kiukiang.
11. ibid.: Robertson's report for Canton.
12. ibid.: reports from Tientsin, Shanghai, and Hankow by
Mongan, Medhurst and Caine respectively.
13« OCR for 1870, Markham's report for Shanghai.
14. Robertson to Tenterden, No. 16, 16 May 1877, F017/765*
15. IMC for 1871-72, Taintor's report for Newchwang; also 
see Annexure L.
16. CCR for 1869, Caine's report for Hankow.
17. CCR for 1872, Sinclair's report for Foochow.
18. CCR for 1872, Hughes's report for Hankow.
‘19* CCR for 1872, Medhurst's report for Shanghai.
20. CCR for 1875, Medhurst's report for Shanghai.
21. CCR for 1874, Adkin's report for Newchwang.
22. CCR for 1875, fiarvey's report for Newchwang.
25. CCR for 1874, Forrest's report for Ningpo.
24. IMC for 1875, Holwill's report for Chef00.
25. IMC for 1876, Ropsch's report for Kiukiang.
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26. CCR for 1876, Davenport's report for Shanghai.
27. CCR for 1876, Fraser to Derby, 1 June 1877. Reasons for
the tremendous decrease in the years 1870-71 and 1873-74- 
was due to opium crop failures and relatively effective 
efforts at suppression of poppy prohibition. Note also
„ .that these were only statistics reported by the Foreign 
Inspectorate from the quantity that had paid duties and 
reported in the native customs' returns. The amounts 
that were clandestinely exported were probably many 
times that amount.
28. IMC for 1876, Mouillesaux de Bernikres's report for Hankow.
29. IMC for 1874, Glover's report for Shanghai.
30# See note 14. An estimate by Robertson had put the yield 
in 1873 for the western provinces, i.e. Yunnan, Szechuan, 
Kweichow and Kansu, at between 25,000>and 32,000 piculs 
as compared to 15*000 and 18,000 piculs for 1865. If
1
these figures could he~relied '\ip_on, ,nCh S'"production-had 
nearly doubled within a decade.
31* It is to be noted that because negotiations for the
Chef00 Convention were underway, China had made attempts 
at prohibiting its own cultivation, which naturally led 
to a decrease in supply at the Treaty ports, and thereby 
allowing for a slight increase in the foreign import.
32. CCR for 1862, Bruce to Russell, No. 2, 15 Feb. 1863.
33* See note 1: the special report made in 1864 was contained 
in the publication of 1881.
34. The prices are compiled from CCR and IMC reports for the 
years 1869-76. As a general rule, Indian opium was mostly 
consumed in the coastal provinces while native opium 
dominated the interior of China. In a memorandum drav/n 
up by W.H. Medhurst, British consul at Shanghai, he noted 
the distribution of the various types of Indian opium:
'The distribution of the various classes of imported 
opium into China is peculiar, and does not at first sight 
appear from an inspection of the Customs Returns. Roughly 
speaking, there may be said to be three tracts, the
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inhabitants of which are marked by as many peculiarities 
of taste. Along the coast as far north as the Yangtze, 
with the apparent exception of the districts about 
Ningpo, Bengal opium is almost exclusively made use of. 
The'general taste is for Patna, but B.enares is the 
favourite in Formosa and in some parts of Fuhkien.
Ranging west and north of this line, and including part 
of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Anhwue, and the North-Eastern 
Provinces and Shingking, is a second belt in which Malwa 
is consumed, to the almost entire exclusion of Bengal, 
the latter, apparently, being only smoked by those who 
elsewhere have become accustomed to its use. To the west 
and north of this belt, again, native opium is mainly 
used, foreign drug being considered a luxury, and only 
purchased by the opulent or connoisseurs in .the article.* 
(CCR for 1874, Medhurst's memorandum 'On the use of the 
various descriptions of Opium in China.')
Also it was reported that for 1874 Shansi opium was 
selling much more dearer than Indian opium because of , 
its particularly good quality for the year.
35* See Annexure D; also see Wade to Granville, No. 71,
22 April 1872, F017/650: In mid-1871 Wade called upon 
his consuls to make detailed reports on the 1 operation 
of likin or other similar impost* at the Treaty port 
districts on foreign merchandise, including opium. Replies 
came from ten consular districts (all in enclosures) and 
what they reported, as far as the likin on opium went, 
collaborates with the compilation in Annexure D which is 
based on Chinese sources.
’36. CCR for 1868, King*s report for Newchwang.
37. The list is compiled from Consular Commercial Reports
(CCR) and Trade Reports of the Foreign Inspectorate (FI), 
according to t&e year and Treaty port indicated. For 
1868, the list came from a table compiled by T. Dick, 
commissioner of customs at Shanghai, which was included 
in his report submitted to Hart for 1868.
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38. See Annexure F (i).
39* The . reports were contained in Mactier, Opium Examiner, 
to The Officiating Junior Secretary to the Board of 
Revenue, No. 1, 10 June 1861; Buckle, Opium Examiner to 
The Officiating Junior Secretary etc., No. 12, 27 Jan.
1869; and tabulated into three tables by R.L. Mangles, 
Officiating Secretary, Board of Revenue, Lower Provinces, j 
in 26 Oct. 1870: ‘Papers Relating to the Opium Question' 
(Calcutta, 1870), 10 (12) 1320.
40. See note 34: part of the Memorandum drawn up by Medhurst 
in 1875 for his report for 1874.
41. In regard to the Chinese government's policy towards 
Indian opium, it has been discussed in Chapters 1 and 3; 
and will be dealt with at appropriate places.
42. Alcock to Stanley, 11 February 1869,^F017/519*
43. Yu En-teh, Chung-kuo chin-yen etc., p. 94.
447“'Peking~Gazette1“ of 29~JanT“X869; also in Yu, p. 95; and
Alcock to Stanley, 11 Feb. 1869: Enclosure No. 4, F017/519.
45. Ch'ing shih lu, (Mu-tsung) chuan 356, p. 6b.
46. Yd, op.cit., p. 95; Peking Gazette of 19 Dec. 1872; and 
Wade to Granville, No. 1, 1 Jan. 1875: Enclosure No. 1, 
F017/652.
47. Wade to Derby, No. 110, 18 June 1874: Enclosure Wade to 
Viceroy of India, 6 June 1874, F017/674.
48. 'Peking Gazette' of 26 Sept. 1876; Fraser to Derby,
No. 173, 2 Oct. 1877: Enclosure No. 1, F017/757.
49. IWSM, chuan 95, PP. 21a-24a.
50. ibid.: p. 24a.
31. ibid.: chuan 99, pp. 26b-28a.
52. See note 47.
55# Yu, op.cit., p. 102.
54. Wade, in 1875, observed that the Imperial government was 
very much dependent on revenue derived from foreign 
trade and that though it was arranged that a fund should 
be formed after 1865 when the indemnity had been paid, 
to be kept in the joint charge of the Tsungli-yamen and
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the Board of Revenue, and that this fund should amount 
to some 19*600,000 taels by September 1871 - however,
1 owing to the exigencies of the provincial governments, 
there had been remitted something less than half that 
sum and of this about 4-/5 been lent.1 This can be 
considered a reflection of the laissez-faire policy 
adopted by the Imperial government towards the levy of 
'illegal* dues on opium: Wade to Granville, No. 195*
10 Sept. 1873, F017/655.
55* Annexure I (i).
56. Indian government to Hong Kong government, 10 (12) 1320; 
Alcock to Clarendon, No. 122, 15 Oct. 1869, F017/525; and 
Clarendon to Alcock (Draft), No. 136, 20 July 1869, 
TO17/517.
57* India Office to Foreign Office, 16 July 1869, F017/3^3*
58. The council meetings were composed of the Viceroy and 
Governor-General in Council, the Lieutenant Governor of 
Bengal, and members of the Board of Revenue.
59• Minute by Sir H.M. Durand of 4- Feb. 1870, Memorandum by 
W.R. Mansfield of 6 Feb. 1870 and Memorandum by R.B.C. 
of 19 March 1870, 10 (12) 1520.
60. ibid.: Memorandum by R.B.C.; see note 57 of Chapter 5*
61# 1Trade, Cultivation, Manufacture and Consumption*, No. 2, 
Fort William, 25 Feb. 1871 (Separate Revenue Proceedings, 
July 1871* No. 26), 10 (12) 1520.
62. This judgment was based on a comparison of the qualities
of each, which showed that Indian opium was much superior
- even taken into consideration their respective prices.
It was also based on the lack of comments from the
foreign opium merchants, although some anxiety was
expressed by them, such as those from Jardines in its
concern over the increased growth of native opium which 
*
might affect the import of the Indian drug: Alcock to 
Stanley, 11 Feb. 1869, F017/519.
63• Alcock to Clarendon, No. 122, 13 Oct. 1869, F017/325*
Note that the special memorandum drawn up by the Indian
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government (see note 61) was compiled from reports to 
Alcock’s circular.
64. Alcock to Stanley No. 35, 9 Feb. 1869: Enclosure * 
Cooper’s report, F017/519.
65. Alcock to Stanley, No. 40, 11 Feb. 1869: Enclosure No. 5, 
extracts from the local press on Cooper’s journey, F017/519i
66. Alcock to Clarendon, London, 7 May 1870: Enclosure No. 1, 
extract from the ’Spectator’, F017/549.
. 67. Wade to Granville, No. 1, 1 Jan. 1873: Enclosure No. 1, 
translation of the Imperial decree of 19 Dec. 1872, 
F017/652.
68. Wade to Granville, No. 167, 25 July 1873: Enclosure 
Malet to Wade, 1 July 1873, F017/655.
69. Wade to Derby, No. 110, 18 June 1874, F017/674; also, 
see note 47. '
70. Robertson to Tenterden, No. 20, 8 June 1876, F017/731.
71. Foreign Office to Colbhial OTfTce, 20 Oct. 1874, / 
C0129/169; or Robertson to Tenterden, No. 44, 6 Aug. 1874, 
F017/684: Enclosure No. 3, Report of Commission to 
Colonial Secretary, 28 April 1874.
72. Robertson believed that one cargo out of three would pay 
a handsome dividend: in his remarks on the report of 
the Commission.
73. Robertson to Tenterden, No. 45, 6 Aug. 1874: Enclosure •
No. 2, Memorial in the Hong Kong Daily Press of 1 Aug.
1874, F017/684.
74. Robertson to Derby, No. 53, 1 Dec. 1874: Enclosure No.
1, Resume of cases of seizure by the Canton Customs 
and Salt Commissioner’s cruisers from 1 July 1872 to 
30 June 1874, forwarded by the Hong Kong government - 
resume written on 1 Dec. 1874, F017/684.
73* *Grand Chops* were issed by the Hoppo’s office at Canton 
after payment of the Tariff duties on foreign goods at 
the ports along the coast for goods exported from Hong 
Kong to the•mainland. Possession of such chops would free 
the junks from the interference of revenue cruisers.
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76. Supplementary details of this seizure were contained in 
Carnarvon to Derby, 3 March 1873, FO17/848.
77* Austin to Carnarvon, No. 66, 9 June 1875, F017/848 or 
C0129/170: this contained statement of the three cases 
of seizure by the Hong Kong Government; Remarks on these 
cases by Robertson on a point to point basis is in 
Enclosure No. 2 of Robertson to Tenterden, No. 40,
8 Oct. 1875, F017/848.
.78. Robertson to Tenterden, No. 44, 6 Aug* 1874: contains in 
all 14 enclosures which gave details of the Commission: 
Enclosure No. 2, Hong Kong Government Gazette of 20 Dec. 
1875, giving notice of the formation of the Commission 
with the following terms of reference: 1Whereas for the 
furtherance of Public interests as connected with the 
action of the Chinese Maritime Customs in the neighbour­
hood of the Colony of Hong Kong and the detriment of Trade
«
arising out of alleged abuses of such action, it is 
expedient that enquiries and investigation should be 
made into certain complaints which have been made of such, 
alleged abuses, and generally into the results thereof; 
and whereas such enquiries and investigation will be most 
conveniently prosecuted by means of a ’Commission:* 
F017/684.
79* See notes 74 and 76.
80. Robertson to Tenterden, No. 44, 6 Aug. 1874: Enclosure 
No. 3, Report of Commission, F017/684; and Enclosure No. 
contains Robertson*s remarks on the Report, 5 June, 1874.
81. ibid.: Enclosure No. 4.
82. ibid.: Enclosure No. 10, Robertson to Wade, No. 41,
20 June 1874.
83* Robertson to Tenterden, No. 45, 6 Aug. 1874: Enclosure 
No. 2, Memorial in Hong Kong Daily Press of 1 Aug. 1874, 
F017/ 684.
84. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 27 Aug. 1874; Enclosure 
No. 1, Kennedy to Carnarvon, No. 133, 10 July 1874, 
F017/693.
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i
85* ibid.: Enclosure No. 2, Messrs. Caldwell and Brereton 
to the Colonial Secretary, 25 June 1874.
86. Robertson to Tenterden, No. 45* 6 Aug. 1874: Enclosure 
No. 1, Robertson to Wade, No. 54, 1 Aug. 1874, F017/684.
87* Kennedy to Carnarvon, 9 Nov. 1874, No. 4 of 'Correspondence 
relating to the Complaints of the Mercantile Community 
in Hong Kong against the Action of Chinese Revenue 
Cruizers in the neighbourhood of the Colony1, F017/848.
88. Carnarvon to Derby, 5 March 1875, F017/848.
89. Carnarvon to Kennedy, 22 March 1875, No. 8 of 'Corr.es- 
pondence etc.' - see note 87*
90. Memorandum by Wade (Confidential, Foreign Office, Jan.
1869):This was probably enclosed in Wade to Derby, No.
191, 11 Sept. 1874: F017/675*
91. Wade to Granville, No. 122, 26 May >1871, I Papers Relating 
to the Opium Question' (Calcutta, 1870).
92. “Iflfhitfield" to Kimb^rXhy ,"“N0TT.31, "23 £Ug. 1871: Enclosure 
,No. 1, Wade to Whitfield (Conf.), 21 June 1871, C0129/151.
93. ibid.; Colonial Office to MacDonhell and Rennie (Draft),
22 April 1871: opinion expressed in Minute Paper, C0129/154.
94. MacDonnell to Kimberley, No. 920, 10 Jan. 1872 (No. 2033
H.K.), C0129/156i Enclosure No. 2, David Sassoon and Co.
_ > to MacDonnell, 8 Jan. 1872.
95* ibid..
96. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 11 March 1872, C0129/156.
97. Robertson to Tenterden, No. 44, 6 Aug. 1874: Enclosure 
No. 6, Robertson to Austin, 20 June 1874, F017/684.
98. ibid.: Enclosure No. 13, Wade to Robertson, No. 12,
6 July 1874; and Enclosure No. 14, Robertson to Wade,
No. 55, 1 August 1874.
99- Robertson' to Austin, 5 Aug. 1874: Inclosure No. 9 in 
No. 2 of 'Correspondences etc.' - see note 87*
100. Carnarvon to Derby, 9 Aug. 1875, F017/848.
101. Colonial Office (memorandum) 3 March 1875, F017/848.
102* Robertson to Tenterden, No. 40, 8 Oct. 1875, F017/848)
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Robertson to Tenterden, No. 42, 12 Oct. 1875* F017/848. 
103 • Carnarvon to Derby, 27 Jan. 1876, F017/848.
104. Robertson to Foreign Office, No. 18, 22 May 1876:
Enclosure of Proclamation issued on 12 May but only 
exhibited on 15 May called 1 Punishment for smuggling1, 
F017/848.
105* Robertson to Tenterden, No. 6, 10 Jan. 1876, F017/848.
t
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1. Wade to Derby, No. 125, 26 June 1875* F017/699*
2. Wade to Granville, No. 71* 22 April 1872: contained
11 Inclosures, F017/650.
5. Tsungli-yamen to Wade, 8 Sept. 1875 (No. 5*0 * F0250/95.
4. Wade to Stanley (telegram in cypher), No. 192, Chefoo,
12 Sept. 1876; Wade to Stanley (telegram), Chefoo,
14 Sept. 1876, F017/848.
5# CCS, volume 6, pp. 556-76: the Memorandum also included 
other proposals which called for a slight raise of 
Tariff duty on £he important staples of imports and 
exports, (the Memorandum was much more than the page 
numbers indicated but these contained ‘commercial 
proposals1)
6. 'Supplementary Despatch from the Inspector General of 
Customs to His Imperial Highness the> Prince of Kung and 
their Excellencies the Ministers of the Tsungli Yamen.1 
Peking, 8 Feb. 1876, CCS, volume 6, pp. 455-4-61.
7« At a slightly later date, Li pointed out that he had
originally suggested a duty of 120 taels per chest on , .
opium - identical to the proposal made in Hart's 
memorandum' - and then reduced it to 80 taels for the 
southern ports and 50 taels for the northern ports. This 
was refused by Wade, who contended that at the southern 
ports the likin and duty combined only averaged 50-70 
taels and only 50-40 taels at the northern ports. The 
eventual settlement therefore was a compromise, in that 
it left the amount of levy to the individual provincial 
governments. LHC, Translation Bureau, chuan 6, pp. 45b-46a.
8* Hertslet, volume 1, No. 11, Articles 5* 6 and 7 pages 
77*78 and 78-79 respectively.
9. LHC, Memorials, chuan 27, PP* 58a-58a; Fraser to Derby,
No. 256 (Conf.), 27 Dec. 1876, F017/ 776.
10. CCSL, chiian 7*» 57a-58a.
11. Wade's reasoning and arguments were contained in a 
memorandum written on 14 July 1877* w&s not made 
available to parliament until mid-1882 because of the
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opposition of the Indian government to having it known.
Wade to Granville, No. 34, 3 June 1882: Enclosure of 
his Memorandum, F017/896. 1
12. Memorandum by Wade, 28 Feb. 1877* F017/849.
13. Wade to Salisbury (Conf.), No. 2, 10 May 1879: Inclosure 
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sent to the export pqrts of Bombay and Madras. Patna 
and Benares opium, however, were cultivated in the 
Bengal region which was directly administered by the 
Indian government. Not only was production and quality 
severely regulated, but the inhabitants were under 
severe penalties not to indulge in the vice of smoking 
themselves. This was the point referred to by the 
memorialists.
96. J. MacDonald to Granville, London, 19 and 20 Jan. 1882,
F017/912. What he said was also a biblical one, but he
specifically used it as the Chinese maxim.
97* Anti-opium Society to Granville, 9 June 1880, F017/846.
A summary of parliamentary actions taken by members
«
sympathetic to the anti-opium movement was contained --
in the memorial which was transmitted by this communication.
98. Foreign Office*s memorandum on the questions tabled by. 
Peace on 12 Jan. 1881, and answers prepared by Salisbury 
for 18 Jan. 1881, F017/870.
99* Newspaper cutting from the ‘Times* (undated), F017/870.
100. ibid..
101. Foreign Office*s notes on Mr. Onslow's motion which was 
an amendment to Mr. Pease's motion, F017/870.
102. Foreign Office's notes on Arthur Pease's motion, F017/872. 
103• Parliamentary debate on 28 Feb. 1882 (newspaper cutting),
F017/912.
104. Pease to Dilke, 22 July 1882, F017/913»
105* Memorandum by J. Pauncefote on Pease's question, 23 July 
1882, F017/913.
106. In Foreign Office notes after Memorandum of Pauncefote, 
F017/913* and India Office to Foreign Office, 17 Aug.
1882, F017/913.
107. The 'Times' of 2 Nov. 1882; also extract in F017/914.
108. The 'Times' of 4 April 1883 recording a debate in the
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House of Commons on 3 April 1883; extract also in F017/94-1.
109. House of Commons questions for 9 Aug. 1883 and proposed 
reply by the Foreign Office (final draft), F017/94-2.
110. Foreign Office record of question in House of Commons 
on 10 Aug. 1883, F017/94-2.
111. These petitions and memorials are too numerous to record, 
but they were contained in F017 volumes 94-0 to 972, 
inclusive, and volume 1,001. My count of 103 societies 
that wrote memorials or petitions might be wrong, but 
the difference cannot be more than 10 either way.
112. Anti-opium Society to Granville, 18 March 1884-, F017/969: 
‘Comparison of the Exports from England to the eight 
countries mentioned below shows the relative progress 
made, and the value of the Exports per head in proportion 
to the respective populations.
Countries Values of Exports Increase Popu. .Value per 
1867 £ 1882 % in'13 yr^ head:£sd
Australia 10^57,679 28,4.50J751 173 3 mil. 9 8 .8
Cape & 3,966,971 8077,615 311 1.65 mil .4- 18 0
Natal f
W. Indies 1J337P53 239^70 31 1.25mil. 1 18 4-#
Br. North 
America
6,729^ 03 10j582£4-2 59 4-.5 mil. 2 7 0#
U.S.A. 2^119,630 38,708,64-3 60 52 mil. 14- 10#
India 2^ 34-7,015 30,581,860 34 253 mil. 2 5
Japan 1,694^ 000 24-07,663 42 36 mil. 1 4-
China 7j669,4-06 8,03 5£88 5 300 mil. 6#
113. paragraphs 27 and 28 of Memorandum by Baines, see note 85* 
114-. India Office to Government of India. (Revenue Despatch),
No. 39* 16 June 1881, Correspondence etc.* C-3378, BPP, 
1882 (Vol. XLVIII), pp. 54-7-93.
11$. Government of India to India Office, No. 312 of 1881,
19 Dec. 1881, ibid..
116. Memorandum by J. Pauncefote, 10 April 1883, F017/94-1.
117. India Office to Government of India, No. 7 (Revenue),
22 January 1885* Appendix D, 1 Royal Commission on Opium*: 
see note 85; Kimberley to Granville, 20 Jan. 1885*F017/1001«
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118. Pease to Granville, 25 March 1885* F017/l>001.
119. Note that the Anti-opium Society was only concerned 
with the opium trade, and little attention was paid
- to either the growth of opium in China or the customs 
blockade of Hong Kong, which were considered as of 
negligible importance. This ’negligence* could be due 
to the Society’s over-concern with moral and religious 
aspects of the arguments it used, which were not 
applicable to the blockade; while the cultivation of 
the poppy was considered something China could prohibit 
after the taxation of foreign opium issue had been, 
settled to China’s advantage'. This is an illogical approach 
adopted by the Society, but it fits well with the moral 
arguments it used, and in its determination to end the 
opium trade from India. .
120. Kuo Sung-t'ao to Derby, 24- Aug. 1877* F017/768: this 
communication is in Chinese.
121. LHC, Letters, chuan 17, PP« 8a-8b, 14 May 1877•
122. The 'Times* of 29 July 1881.
125- See note 81.
124. ’The Friends of China'.
/
48
Notes to Ch. 7
1. Coupled to these major difficulties were others: the 
increased cultivation of native opium, smuggling 
especially from Hong Kong, opposition that might be
; encountered from other Treaty powers, and opposition 
from opium merchants.
2. Datas are compiled from: 1) 'Correspondences on Opiums 
1877 ~ 1882', F0252/92 - Nos. 4-17 were replies from 
consuls on likin on opium at the Treaty ports in answer 
to circular of 20 Aug. 1879 from Wade; 2) CCR and IMC 
reports; also see Annexure D for breakdown of opium 
levies, and Annexure J for conversion table.
3* Reports of the amount levied'tend to conflict with each 
other at times. This was basically due to the different 
sources of information: from foreign or Chinese opium 
merchants, secret information from local governments since 
likin rates were seldom published, and personal observ- 
ations. The ImperiaT~governmeirt~was~iiever able to obtain—  
accurate information concerning the amounts levied in the 
provinces and this provided an additional difficulty to, 
the solution of the taxation of opium issue.
4. IMC for 1876, Bredon's report for Canton, pp. 160-70.
5# 7 reports of this uniform collection came from the
consuls: O'Conor to Granville, 26 May 1885 (Tientsin) 
(F017/981); same to same, 2 June (Kiukiang) (F017/981); 
same to same, 7 June (Hankow) (F017/981); same to same,
9 June (Foochow) (F017/981); same to same, 16 June 
(Shanghai) (F017/982); same to Salisbury, 6 July 
(Chinkiang) (F017/982); same to same, 22 Sept. (Ningpo) 
(F017/984)i
6. Wade to Granville (telegrams), No. 21, 25 May 1881; No. 22, 
29 June 1881; No. 25, 6 July 1881: F017/859.
7* Hart, as the interested observer, confided in Campbell 
■ that a struggle for power had ensued between Li and Tso. 
However, his fears that this would deal to chaos did not 
materialise. Li retained his control over foreign affairs, 
but left his office between April and November 1882 to
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mourn the death of his mother. He returned in November 
and once again assumed charge over foreign affairs and 
the army and navy. Tso's influence rapidly declined in 
foreign affairs and his death in 1885 removed Lifs only 
powerful antagonist. HCP, z/9, /51* /?2» /80, /88, /89«
8. From East India Financial Statement in BBP, compiled into 
Annexure I (i).
9. See Annexures I (i) and I (ii). E. Baring, in his Financial 
Statement made on 25 March 1881, noted that about £8 v. 
million of the Indian government’s net revenue came from 
opium although in recent years, the government had only 
relied on it to the extent of '£6.5 million. He cautioned 
that even this amount could not be ignored. ’The degree
of embarassment which would be caused by the whole or 
partial loss of the opium revenue increases j.n the direct 
proportion of the sums which the Indian Treasury derives 
from this source.* BPP 1881 (Vol. LXVIII), Financial 
Statement (East India) 1881-82.
10. Another argument put forward by the Indian government was 
that stoppage of the opium trade would result in a loss of 
£5 million a year, and this would not only affect India’s 
but also Britain’s finances: ’England owes China a large 
sum of money annually, which represents the excess of 
imports from China over exports from the United Kingdom. 
China, on the other hand, owes India a large sum annually, 
mainly for opium. This debt, is, in a great measure, paid 
by transferring to India a portion of England's debt to 
China. If, therefore, the export trade from India to China 
were diminished.••.It is impossible to frame any estimate 
of the depreciatory effect which would be exercised on 
exchange...' Indian government to India Office, No. 312
of 1881, 19 Aug. 1881, 'Correspondence with the Government 
of India respedting the negotiations with China on the 
Subject of Opium’, BPP, 1882 (Vol. XLVIII).
11. Negotiations for the taxation of opium issue resumed when 
Wade returned to China. Note, however, that attempts were * 
made throughout to solve the blockade question.
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12. Answer in the House of Commons (Mr. Stewart), 21 Jan. 1878, 
F017/795.
13» India Office to Foreign Office, 28 Nov. 1878, F017/798.
14., India Office to Foreign Office, 23 Aug. 1879, F017/823:
Thi's re-assurance was in all probability due to some 
reprimand he got from his superior for failing to consult 
and inform the Indian government about his negotiations 
for the Chefoo Convention.
15* LHC, Letters, chtian 18, 5a-7a; Translations, chuan 9, la-6a. 
Li also informed Kuo, and later Tseng, to press for a 
settlement in London.
16. Wade to Salisbury, No. 22, 31' Jan. 1880: Transmits 5 
Enclosures of his correspondence with Kung, F017/829;
A day to day account of the negotiations were contained 
in Wade to Salisbury, 3 July 1879 (Na. 24 Cpnf.), 3 July 
(No. 23 Conf.), 10 July (No. 29) (all in F017/809), 9 Aug.
(No. 58 Conf.) - contains two memorandums by Hillier on---
his discussions with Li Hung-chang, and 9 Aug. (No. 59■
Conf.) (all in F017/810).
17. ibid.: No. 22: Enclosure No. 2, Wade to Kung, 20 Nov. 1879* 
and Enclosure No. 4, Kung to Wade, 14 Jan. 1880. Hart, in 
fact, was never informed of these negotiations until Wade 
called on him to,tell.him,although the Tsung-yamen said 
that he had been consulted. This mistrust of Hart by the 
Tsungli-yamen was to continue until after the Additional 
Article was signed and his services had become essential.
18. Wade to Salisbury, No. 87, 1 Oct. 1879, F017/811; Yamen 
to Minister, No. 16, 20 Dec. 1879, F0230/103.
19* Wade to Salisbury, No. 22, 31 Jan. 1880: Enclosure No. 5, 
Wade to Kung, 30 Jan. 1880, F017/829; Wade to Salisbury, 
(tele.) 19 Aug. 1880, F017/828.
20. The problem of likin and other dues on general merchandise 
had always bee*n complained of by the foreign representatives.
■ On 8 Nov. 1879, headed by von Brandt, the German minister,
| the foreign representatives (12 in all) sent a joint memo.
I ^ to the Tsungli-yamen asking for a conference. The Tsungli-
t ~
yamen refused the request and gave a point-by-point reply
l
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to the allegations including a number of China's own* As 
a solution, it countered with 3 propositions to which the 
foreign representatives refused to agree. Thus, they refused 
the 'five-year' proposal that Wade and Kung agreed upon, and 
von ferandt also refused the Additional Article. The point 
to be noted is that such actions on the part of the foreign 
representatives also contributed to the delay in the settle­
ment of the taxation issue (on opium). Wade to Salisbury,
No. 19i 51 Jan. 1880: with 6 enclosures, F017/829.
21 • Hertslet, No. 68, pp. 416-18; LHC, Translation, chiian 13* 
10a-12b; Holcombe to State Dept., No. 57* 26 Jan. 1882, 
'Despatches from U.S. Minister's etc.*, Roll No. 59-
22. Hertslet, p. 126; and Holcombe to State Dept.: ibid.;
Hertslat, No. 57* PP» 340-48; TW, p. 1166.
23* Wade to Granville, No. 1 (Conf.), 6 Jan. 1881, F017/857*
24. Newspaper extract of parliamentary debate, 13 July 1882,
F017/913.
25# see note 23; Wade to Granville (tele.) 6 Jan. 1881, F017/859*
26. Concern of the British government was evidenced by the 
correspondence between the various departments: Foreign 
Office to India Office (Pressing), 31 Aug. 1883; Foreign 
Office to Board of Trade, 9 Oct. 1883; and Foreign Office 
to India Office, 10 Oct. 1883: Treaty with Korea not ratif­
ied and in negotiations with Korea for a new treaty, the 
anti-opium clause would be omitted. All in F017/942.
27* See note 24.
28. See pages 21 and 23 of Chapter 6. These memorials were 
written after Wade had had discussions with both Tso and 
Li in late May when both wanted to impose a high uniform 
rate on opium, to which Wade had refused. Thus, Tso's 
proposal could be considered as an immediate reaction to 
Wade's refusal, and also an attempt to force Britain's (or 
Wade's hand). Wade to Granville (tele) no. 20, 25 May 
1881, F017/859.
29. Tso's memorial came after he was appointed Grand Secretary 
and a member of the Tsungli-yamen, HCP, z/45, 10 March 1881.
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50. India Office to Foreign Office, 21 Jan. 1881, F017/870.
31. Granville to Wade (tele), No. 6, 5 Feb. 1881: Wade to
Granville (tele.), No. 12, 12 March 1881, F017/859.
The Indian government was very much worried over the 
diminution or lessening of the opium trade. It was even 
fearful of.strong competition from Persian opium which it 
claimed was growing in popularity in China and proposed 
that all the benefits enjoyed by merchants in Persian opium
sales should be forgped^ such as transhipment benefits at
. India. The India Office regarded this view as alarmist and 
no action was taken. India Office to Foreign Office, 3 Feb. 
1881, F017/870.
32. Wade to Granville (Conf.) No. 25, 25 May 1881, F017/857.
The amount Samuel offered to the Chinese government is 
illegible, but it should be the sameJas what he offered
a year later - 100 taels per picul - from the 'tone' of the 
correspondence concerning his scheme. No other books seem 
to contain this particular fact.
33• Wade to Granville (tele.) No. 27, 12 Aug. 1881: Li was in 
favour, but Tso was violently opposed to it. F017/859*
34. HCP, z/50, 22 May 1881.
33* Wade to Granville, No. 14, 25 March 1882: Wade cautioned
that Ma was sent on the personal authority of Li Hung-chang 
F017/901; HCP, z/56, 2 Sept. and z/58, 16 Oct. 1881.
56. IndiS^to^SFfice, 16 Nov. 1881, F017/872.
37* India Office to Foreign Office, 24 Nov. 1881; Enclosure 
No. 2, Memorial from Jardine etc., F017/872.
38. ibid.: Enclosure No. 4, Sassoon to Ripon 7 Sept. 1881; 
Enclosure No. 6, Bombay Chamber etc., 22 Sept. 1881.
39• ibid..
40. India Office to Indian government, No. 59 (Revenue), 10 
June, 1881: for Anti-opium Society*s objection, see 
Chapter 6, p.*40 and note 114 (also reference to source.)
41. India Office to Foreign Office, 4 April 1882, F017/912.
42. Indian government to India Office, No. 312 of 1881, 19 
Dec. 1881 - see note 115 of Chapter 6.
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43# LHC, Memorials, chlian 4-1, pp. 32a-33a; Hance to Granville, 
No. 23, 19 Aug. 1881, F017/862.
44. Wade to Granville, No. 39* 3 June 1882, F017/S96. Samuel 
had talked with Ho while he was in HongKong, and it could 
wel'l be an attempt, as the Ma mission to India, to ensure 
that if there was a monopoly, it would be a Chinese one. 
Wade to Granville, No, 25 (Conf.), 25 May 1881, F017/857»
45. Wade to Granville, No. 38, 3 June 1882: Enclosure No. 2, 
Wade to Kung, 13 Jan. 1882, F017/896.
46. ibid.: (not the Enclosures).
47. Wade to Granville, No. 36, 3 June 1882: Enclosures Nos.
1 to 8, F017/896.
48. See note 46.
49* Wade to Granville, No. 46, 23 June 1882: Enclosure No. 2, 
Extractsjfrom 1 London and China Telegraph' of 13 Feb. &
21 Feb. 1882; and Enclosure No. 3, Wade to Marsh, 8 June 
1882. F017/897*
50. Marsh to Kimblerley, No. 83, 7 June 1882 (No. 12867 H.K.), 
C0129/201.
51. Kimberley to Granville, 14 Aug. 1882: Enclosure No. 2,
Wade to Marsh, 12 June.1882. F017/913* Wade to Granville, 
No. 46, 23 June 1882: Enclosures Nos. 4,5*6,7*9*10 & 11. ■
\ F017/897.
52. Kimberley to Granville (Conf.), 24 April 1882: Enclosure 
No. 1, Hennessy's telegram of 10 April (Simla). F017/912.
53* Kimberley to Granville, 11 Oct. 1882: Enclosure No. 2, 
Hennessy to Kimberley, 27 Sept. 1882, London. F017/914. 
Note 52: Enclosure No. 3* Hong Kong Chamber etc. to 
Kimberley, 4 March 1882. The 'Hennessy' episode was 
concluded in this way. I have not been able to find any 
materials in Chinese. However, it is probable that he was 
involved in some proposal when one considers the actions 
he took in Horfg Kong against smugglers.
55* LHC, Translation, Chtian 12, pp. 22a-24b and 24b-41b.
56. LHC, Translations, chiian 12, pp. 45b-46b. The bank was
to act as the representative of the Chinese government to 
pay for the opium and obtain repayment from opium agents.
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57. Wade to Granville (Conf.), No. 1, 20 Jan. 1882, F017/901.
58. Wade to Granville, No. 4, 9 Feb. 1882, F017/901. In this
communique, Wade explained the arguments in detail. •
59* Wade to Granville, No. 38, 3 June 1882: Enclosure No. 3,
Wade to Kung, 14 Jan. 1882, F017/896.
60. ibid.: Enclosure No. 4, Kung to Wade, 25 Jan. 1882.
61. ibid.: Enclosure No. 6, Kung to Wadg, 2i Feb. 1882..
62. ibid.: Enclosure No. 5* Wade to Kung, 28 Jan. 1882;
63* Granville to Wade, No. 58, 6 May 1882, F017/893; same
to same, No. 7 (extender No. 58), 6 May, 1882, F017/901.
64. Wade to Granville, No. 39» 3 June 1882, F017/896.
65# Wade to Granville (tele.), 23*April 1882, F017/901.
Three days after this telegram, Wade wrote to say that
Li's mother, had died and he would be returning to negotiate
after the official mourning period of 3 months. The Foreign
Office, on hearing this, commented that since this would
«
‘ mean shelving negotiations temporarily, Wade's full report 
should be studied before coming to any decision. This view 
'was communicated to the Colonial Office which subtly 
commented that it should not have been left in the dark 
since Hong Kong was also involved. It refused to comment 
until Wade's full report had been received and studied. 
Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 1 May 1882, No. 7801 H.K. 
Comments were in the minutes. C0129/205* Then the Foreign 
Office transmitted all relevant documents: Nos. 14714 and 
15107 H.K. dated 11 Aug. and 24 Aug. 1882, C0129/205.
66. Wade to Granville, No. 16, 27 April 1882, F017/901.
67* Hartington to Granville, 1 June 1882, F017/913.
68. Wade to Granville, No. 62, 25 July 1882: Enclosure No. 2,
Mallet to Samuel (Conf.), 12 Nov. 1881, F017/897*
69. Granville to Wade, No. 8 (tele.), 2 June 1882, F017/901.
70. Wade to Granville, No. 62, 25 July 1882: Enclosure No. 1,
Grant to Wade’, 13 Jan. 1882, F017/897*
71. Wade to Granville, No. 17, 28 April 1882, F017/901;
LHC, Translations, chuan 13, pp. 4b-7b.
72. CCSL, chuan 27, pp. 33b-37^ (8 June 1882); full text in
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F0682/369: This document, together with comments by Hart 
should have been submitted to the Tsungly-yamen and 
dated 13 June 1882. These were also submitted to Wade, 
confidentially, and transmitted to the Foreign Office 
a^ enclosures 1 and 2 in Wade to Granville (strictly 
conf.), 21 July 1882. F017/897.
Chang Shu-shen was Governor-General of Liang-kwang ,• but 
he was summoned to Peking to act also as Governor-General 
of Chihli during the latter*s period of absence, and it 
was in this capacity that he held negotiations with Samuel.
73. CCSL, chuan 27, 37b-39a, (11 June 1882).
74. Wade to Granville, No. 56, 21 July 1882: Enclosure No. 3* 
Hart*s observations on the Tsungli-yamen*s reactions,
16 July 1882. F017/897.
75. Wade to Granville, No. 54, 20 July 1882, FQ17/897.
76. Wade to Granville, No. 65, 3 Aug. 1882, F017/897- By this
4
time the Tsungli-yamen had almost certainly abandoned 
Samuel*s scheme and was more interested in a joint collect­
ion measure. Hart was very much in favour of Samuel's 
scheme, but he was not consulted.’ HCP, z/71,z/80,z/86,z/88, 
z/89,z/95,z/96,z/98,z/99.
77* Wade to Granville, No. 30, 1 Aug. 1882, F017/901.
78. Minutes by J. Pauncefote, 7 Aug. 1882, F017/915.
79. India Office to Foreign Office (private), 3 Nov. 1882, 
F017/914.
80. Foreign Office to India Office, 2 Nov. 1882, F017/914.
81. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 7 Jan. 1884, F017/968.
82. Hennessy to Carnarvon, No. 45, 30 June 1877 (No. 9732. H.K.), 
C0129/178.
83. Hennessy to Carnarvon, 6 July 1877 (Conf.) (No. 10162 H.K.), 
C0129/178.
84. Carnarvon to Derby, 2 Oct. 1871' Enclosure, Hennessy to 
Carnarvon, No'. 84, 3 Aug. 1877, F017/772. For Ordinance 
No. 6 of 1866, see Annexure G (iii).
85* Carnarvon to Derby, 18 May 1877* Enclosures Nos. 1, 2,
3 and 4, F017/770.
86. ibid.: Enclosure No. 2, Colonial Secretary to Robertson,
29 Dec. 1876.
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87. ibid.: Enclosure No. 1, Extract from Minutes of the 
Executive Council, 8 Dec. 1876.
88. Draft of Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 25 April 1877, 
attached to Kennedy to Carnarvon, No. 35» 28 Feb. 1877
(N<5. 4-506 H.K.), C0129/177; Derby to Fraser (Draft), No. 66,
23 June 1877* F017/751; Robertson to Derby, 17 Aug. 1877,
F017/763* Wade, who was then in London, commented that 
the Hong Kong governments demands were just one but 
believed that the threat it contained could only be made 
through the minister at Peking, but that it would be 
premature to make it. Carnarvon to Derby, 25 April 1877: 
Enclosure No. 3* Memorandum by Wade, 2 May 1877* F017/770.
89. Robertson to Derby, 14- May 1877$ F017/763*
90. Carnarvon to Derby, 2 Oct. 1877: Enclosure, Hennessy to
Carnarvon, 3 Aug. 1877» F017/772.
, 91. Fraser to Derby, No. 158, 1 Sept. 1877: Enclosure No. 1, 
Fraser to Kung, 1 Sept. 1877* F017/756.
92. Fraser to Derby, No. 166, 12 Sept. 1877: Enclosure No. 1,
Kung to Fraser, 7 Sept; 1877, JF017/756* The Chefoo
Convention had only been signed a year before and the
British government had not yet refused—ratificahLon. -— -
This became the first instance of a snub from the Tsungli-
yamen since China’s part of the agreement had been fulfilled
\ .
93# Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce to Granville, 25 
November 1882: With details of seizures. C0129/204
94-. Carnarvon to Derby, 17 Sept. 18771 F017/771- The state of 
affairs was also due to restraint exercised by the native 
customs after a directive from the Tsungli-yamen. See 
note 92.
• 95* Derby to Granville, 7 Jan. 1884-: Enclosure contains a
'Precis of cases relating to seizures by Chinese Customs 
Cruisers of junks in Hong Kong Waters.' F017/968.
96. Hance to Tentdrden, No. 31 * 17 Dec. 1881: Enclosure No. 4, 
Governor-General to Hance, 30 Nov. 1881, F017/862.
A 'hakka* boat is a small-sized vessel somewhere in between 
a trading junk and a sampan.
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97* Marsh to Kimberley, No. 40, 28 April 1882, (No. 10017 
H.K.), 00129/199.
98. Marsh to Kimberley, No. 139, 22 July 1882 (No. 16419 H.K.), 
C0129/202.
99. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 16 April 1883,00129/214.
„100. See note 98.
101. TW, pp. 1517-8: Memorial from Tseng Kuo-ch'uan, 15 May 1883
102. Wade to Salisbury, No. 18, 28 May 1879, F017/849.
103. Robertson to Salisbury, 30 April 1879, F017/849; Hennessy 
to Beach, No. 24, 4 March 1879 (No. 5779 H.K.), C0129/184; 
Wade to Salisbury, No. 3, Foochow, 13 April 1879, F017/849.
104. These articles provide: 1(1) that Chinese vessels trading
s
between the treaty ports and Hongkong must be provided 
with a special pass, valid for one trip only, to be issued 
by the Customs authorities at the port from which the 
vessel cleared for Hongkong; (2) that a British official
1
would be appointed at Hongkong to examine the registers 
and passes of all Chinese vessels; (3) that any Chinese 
vessel found without a pass or register would be considered 
as an unauthorised or smuggling vessel, would not be 
allowed to trade, and would be reported to the Chinese 
authorities; (4) that the Customs authorities at each 
port should render to Canton a monthly return of the 
passes granted to Chinese vessels proceeding to Hongkong, 
with details of the cargoes carried, and (5) that these 
separate port returns should every month be embodied in 
one return by the Canton authorities and sent to the 
proper British official in Hongkong, who on his part was 
to render similar returns to the Chinese authorities at 
Canton of all Chinese vessels arriving at and departing 
from Hongkong with details of their cargoes, such returns 
to be transmitted by the Canton authorities to the 
Customs officials at the ports concerned.1 Wright,
Hongkong and The Chinese Customs, p. 4.
105. Wade to Salisbury, No. 3, 13 April 1879; F017/849; ;
106. Wade to Salisbury, No. 18, 28 May 1879, F017/849.
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107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
Lowcock to Herbert, London, 20 Aug. 1879 (No. 15590 H.K.), 
C0129/186.
Herbert to Lowcock, Oct. 1879, F017/849.
Hennessy to Beach, No. 122, 26 Dec. 1879, (No. 1988 H.K.), 
C0129/185.
Beach to Hennessy, 7 Nov. 1879, F018/849.
Salisbury to Beach, 18 March 1880, F017/849.
Hennessy to Beach, No. 121, 26 Dec. 1879 (No. 1987 H.K.), 
C0129/185« The explanation is derived from Herbert's 
(undersecretary at the Colonial Office) explanation of 
what Hennessy was contemplating since Hennessy did not 
clarify what he intended to'do.
ibid.: Draft of despatch to the Foreign Office, 18 March 
1880: contained in No. 1987 H.K.
Granville to Kimberley, 12 June 188Q, C0129/191* 
ibid..
Hennessy to Beach, No. 108, 26 No v.~ 18?9“~(Norr~il0 H.Xr)~:—  
Enclosures, correspondence between Hennessy and Wade, and 
the latter with Prince Kung. C0129/185*
Tseng to Granville, 22 July 1882, F017/911.
In October 1882, J. Russell, Registrar-General and 
Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong, wrote a memorandum in 
which he stated that for a number of years, there had been 
an illegal collection of Chinese duties on opium in the 
Colony. However, though this was illegal, Russell suggested 
that no action should be taken since it would be more 
convenient for traders to pay them in Hong Kong. This is a 
very interesting piece of evidence in that this was almost 
identical to the Chinese idea of a consul at Hong Kong, to 
which the government and merchants had objected violently 
in 1869. The Governor, Bowen, and both the Colonial and 
Foreign Offices agreed to Russell's view and the latter 
even commented that this should not stand in the way .of 
opium negotiations under progress. Marsh to Kimberley,
No. 258, 50 Oct. 1882 (No. 21150 H.K.), C0129/205; Derby 
to Granville, 5 Jan. 1885, Granville to Derby, 15 Jan. 1885, 
F017/940; Derby to Granville, 8 June 1885: Enclosure,
59
Notes to Ch. 7
Bowen to Derby No. 35, 21 April 1884, F017/941.
118. Memorandum by J. Pauncefote, 25 Feb. 1882, F017/912.
119* Kimberley to Granville, 4 Sept. 1882, F017/914.
120. Granville to Tseng, 11 Oct. 1882, F017/9H.
121. The animosity of the mercantile community to someone 
who was not completely on their side was shown in the 
vehement objections raised to Governor Hennessy1s 
speech made at the Social Science Congress in Notting­
ham in Sept. 1882. In his address, Hennessy made 
references to opium smuggling activities from Hong 
Kong, giving statistics and accounts of battles 
between smugglers and Chinese customs officials. To 
these remarks, the Hong Kong General Chamber of 
Commerce wrote memorials both to the Foreign and 
Colonial Offices refuting Hennessy's .'allegations'
as sensational exaggerations. By quoting government 
sources, it maintained opium smuggling was only con­
fined to hiding small amounts in the luggages and an 
occasional 'run' of the customs blockade. This 
attitude is almost in complete contrast with what had 
been taken earlier, i.e. the blockade was ruining 
Hong Kong'B legitimate junk trade, etc.. Marsh to 
Kimberley, No. 261, 27 Nov.- 1882 (No.199 H.K.), 
C0129/204.
122. Derby to Granville, 3 Feb. 1883, F017/940.
123* Derby to Granville, 7 Jan. 1884, F017/968: Copy
of the report.
124. Bowen to Derby, No. 298, 10 Nov. 1883 (No. 21355 
H.K.), C0129/212.
125* Appended to the report were some tables that showed 
the amount of opium imported into Hong Kong, 
detailed returns of duties paid by Chinese opium * 
importers since 1858, resumes of cases of seizures, 
a copy of the Governor-General's proclamation of 
16 Aug. 1882 which ordered revenue .officers to be 
diligent in the pursuance of their duties and to
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abide by regulations, and a memorandum by a police 
officer giving detailed accounts of 'battles* between 
smugglers and revenue officers.
126. Bowen to Derby, No. 298, 10 Nov. 1883, (No. $1335 H.K.) 
00129/212.
127. Granville to Parkes, No. 13, 18 Jan. 1884, F017/947.
128. 0*Conor to Granville, No. 232, 19 May 1885, F017/981.
129. Granville to Derby, 18 Jan. 1884, F017/968.
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.}
Pauncefote to Mallet (Draft), 25 Nov. 1882, F017/914-.
Other reasons were given but these had been mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The other additional reasons was that 
in lieu of the blockade* agreement to the second proposal 
might force Britain to introduce bonded warehouses or hulks 
in Hong Kong under the supervision of the Foreign Inspecto­
rate.
India Office to Foreign Office, 17 Jan. 1883, F017/940. 
Granville to Tseng, 31 Jan. 1883, F017/939.
Tseng to Granville, 5 Feb. 1883, F017/939*
Granville to Wade, 23 Feb. 1883, F017/919; Granville to 
Kimberley, 23 Feb., and Kimberley to Granville, 26 Feb.
1883, F017/940.
CCSL, chiian 29, 28b-30b, Memorial from Tsungli-yamen, •
23 Oct. 1882.
CCSL, chiian 31, la-4-a, Memorial from Tsungli-yamen, 19 
Feb. 1883. According to Hart, this wa's a suggestion made 
by him although the Tsungli-yamen never acknowledged this 
fact. Hart insisted that the Tsungli-yamen wanted to 
resume negotiations because they very much favoured Samuel's 
scheme; but since both Tseng and the Foreign Office refused 
to propose it, the Tsungli-yamen had been placed in a 
dilfemma. This was Hart's personal assessment of the situa­
tion which was not evidenced in the actual negotiations.
Hart could be prejudiced because he himself was very much 
in favour of the scheme. (HCP, z/103, 20 Feb., z/113, 3 
March 1883.) It could also have been a response from Li's 
suggestion in early January 1883 that negotiations with 
Britain over the scheme should be continued at London so 
that the Foreign Office would have no reason to put forward 
excuses for delaying negotiations. (LHC, Translations, 
chuan 13, 52b-53b, 3 Jan. 1883.)
Granville to Tseng, 1 March 1883, F017/939.
Memorandum by Currie on meeting of 5 March 1883, F017/94-0. 
Macartney in fact had been instructed by Tseng to negotiate 
on the second and not the first proposal.
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10. Memorandum by Tseng, 12 March 1883, F017/939*
11. Memorandum by J. Pauncefote, 15 March 1883, F017/940.
12. Granville to Kimberley, 17 March 1883; Kimberley to 
Granville, 29 March 1883, F017/940. In a memo, written by 
Pedder concerning the financial effect to the Chinese 
government by the imposition of a joint collection of 100 
taels, he calculated that it would mean an increase in 
revenue by 2,813,500 taels or an increase of 5 2 Cross 
to Currie, 29 March 1883, F017/919.
13* Memorandum by J. Pauncefote, 10 April 1883, F017/941.
14. Granville to Grosvenor, No. 63, 21 April 1883, F017/919.
15. Granville to Grosvenor, No. 67\ 27 April 1883, F017/919*
16. ibid.•
17# Memorandum by Tseng, 27 Sept. 1884, F017/967* No valid 
reasons were given for wanting an immediate acceptance 
except that it would allow China to estimate with more1
certainty the revemre~she could derive, and. British 
merchants would be able to know exactly what the imposts 
on the drug would be especially since the present critical 
position between China and 'a certain foreign power'(i.e. 
France) might result in fiscal changes. This could be 
considered a veiled threat and it was carried out in mid- 
1885 when a uniform likin of 86 taels was imposed on 
foreign opium. The Additional Article was signed very 
quickly after this move.
18. Secretary of State to Viceroy of India, 24 Dec. 1884,
Appendix D of 'Royal Commission on Opium etc.* The 'political 
reason1 was the activities of the Anti-opium Society which 
would cause great embarassment to the government if not 
its actual fall.
19 • Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3 Jan. 1885: ibid..
20. Kimberley to Granville, 20 Jan. 1885, F017/1001.
21. Secretary of Sthte to Viceroy of India, 22 Feb. 1885, 
Appendix D of 'Royal Commission etc.'.
22. Before finally succumbing to China's demands, the Foreign 
Office made a last attempt. It agreed to a likin of 75
62
Notes to Ch. 8
taels, but this was turned down and a few days later the 
Foreign Office finally agreed. CCSL, chuan 52, p. 2a,
Tseng*s telegram of 25 Jan. 1885; Currie to Granville,
5 Feb. 1885, F017/1001.
25. Granville to Tseng (Memorandum), 9 Feb. 1885, F017/1000.
24-. Tseng to Granville, 18 March 1885, F017/1000.
25. This was prompted by the change of government in Britain, 
with Salisbury succeeding Granville on 24- June. Tseng, on 
learning of this, telegramed on 11 June to the Tsungli- 
yamen asking if he should sign the agreement before the 
change. The reply was affirmative - by telegram of 14- June 
- and Tseng duly informed Granville. On 5 June, Tseng had 
already telegramed a precis of the agreement to the Tsungli- 
yamen. TY (2), Tsungli-yamen to Tseng: 17 Feb. 1885 (ts*e 1), 
14- June 1885 (ts*e 2); TY (5) Tseng to Tsungli-yamen: 3 June, 
11 June and 12 June 1885 (ts*e 1).
26. Salisbury to Tseng, 14- July 1885, F017/1000.
27* Salisbury to Tseng, 14- July 1885, F017/1000 (different ■
despatch from that of note 26.). The point raised was based 
on O'Conor to Granville, No. 197, 28 April 1885, F017/980.
28. Tseng to Salisbury, 16 July 1885, F017/1000.
29. Hertslet, No. 14-, pp. 83-87; see Annexure A (i).
30. During the final stages of the negotiation, the Tsungli- 
yamen assumed full responsibility though Li Hung-chang was 
also consulted, but never Hart. It was also possible that 
some pressure was put on the Foreign Office by the raising 
of likin on foreign opium to a uniform 86 taels, 6 taels 
more than the agreement of 1885.
31. Wade to Granville, No. 71, 22 April 1872, F017/650.
‘32. Fraser to Salisbury, No. 100 (Conf.), 11 June 1878,F017/781. *
33* Fraser to Salisbury, No. 110, 27 June 1878, F017/781.
34-. The above paragraphs have little direct relevance to the 
dissertation, *but they have been included in order to give 
a clearer idea of the 1likin problem* which did become the 
bargaining point of Germany before she was willing to 
consent to the Additional Article.
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55* O'Conor to Salisbury, No. 15* 9 Sept. 1885* F017/990.
56. TY (2), Tsungli-yamen to Tseng and Hsti, 5 Sept. and 11
Sept. 1885 (ts'e 5); O'Conor to Salisbury* No. 596 (Conf.), 
15 Sept. 1885, F017/984.
57• ^he treaties all contained an anti-opium-trade clause. 
Hertslet, Nos. 68* 51 & 52, and 57 - treaties with the 
United States, France and Russia, respectively.
58. O'Conor to Salisbury, No. 4-28, 14- Oct. 1885* F017/985- 
'Shipping interests in Chinese waters' means the amount 
of trade, actually conducted by ships registered with the 
particular Treaty power. Britain's shipping interest in 
China was the largest, followed by Germany; while most of 
the other Treaty powers used the ships of these two nations 
Thus, Germany could allow opium merchants to use her ships 
and this would pronounce the 'death sentence' on the 
Additional Article. For a comparative list of shipping in 
China, see IMC's 'Reports on Trade etc.'. ----
59# O'Conor to Salisbury, No. 4-65* 25 Nov. 1885* F017/986;
same to same, No. 25* 22 Jan. 1886, F017/1014-.
4-0. same to same, No. 4-54-, 17 Oct. 1885; same to same, No. 441, 
28 Oct. 1885, F017/985.
4-1. same to same, No. 428, 14 Oct. 1885, F017/985*
42. O'Conor to Salisbury, No. 56 (Conf.), 4- Feb. 1886, F017/
1014-.
45* CCSL, chuan 62, p. 51a: Tsungli-yamen to Hsli, 25 Jan. 1886; 
Salisbury to O'Conor, No. 50A (Conf.), 28 Jan. 1886; and 
Rosebury to O'Conor, No. 4-2, 11 Feb. 1886, F017/1012.
44. CCSL, chuan 60, Hsii to Yamen, 20 Sept. 1885* P- 32a; 
chuan 61, p. lb, Hsu to Yamen, 10 Oct. 1885.
4-5. Hsu to Bismarck* 10 Nov. 1885, F017/1000.. HsU pointed out 
that Germany had never been engaged in the opium trade 
and therefore should not prevent China from 'promoting 
the humane 'object of the agreement' , especially since 
Britain had acceded to China's moral considerations.
4-6. Rosebery to O'Conor* No. 4-2, 11 Feb. 1886, F017/1012;
Tseng to Rosebery, 24 Feb. 1886, F017/1054.
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4-7. Rosebery to Tseng, 5 March 1886, F017/1034-; Kimberley to 
Rosebery, 19 Feb. 1886, F017/1035; Granville to Rosebury,
4- March 1886, F017/1035.
4-8. O'Conor to Rosebery, No. 132, 20 April 1886, F017/1016.
4-9# Kimberley to Rosebery, 20 March 1886, F017/1035*
50. Granville to Rosebery, 20 March 1886, F017/1035*
51 • Rosebery to Tseng, 23 March 1886, F017/1034-.
32. Tseng to Rosebery, 25 March 1886, F017/1034-.
,53. Salisbury to O'Conor, No. 295, 20 Nov. 1885, F017/976.
54-. O'Conor to Salisbury, No. 4-28, 14- Oct. 1885, F017/985;
CCSL, chuan 60, p. 32a, Hsii to Tsungli-yamen, 20 Sept.1885.
55« The arguments put forward by Tseng could be considered as 
a clever twist of facts, similar to what the Tsungli-yamen
had done to Kung's acceptance of the 70 plus 30 taels
joint collection in 1882.
56. A more definite date might be 1870 when the Alcock
«
Convention was rejected by the British government. The 
argument for this date is that although the taxation of 
opium, apart from the Tariff duty, had created problems 
almost immediately after the drug's legalization, and no 
official action or remedy was taken by either government 
until the problems were introduced into the Alcock 
Convention.
57. Hart to Pauncefote, 31 Oct. 1885, F017/1003; HCP, z/24-1,
, 20 Nov. 1885. This was the only plan that was suggested.
However, in a copy of this memorandum which appeared in 
the CCS, possible modifications or alternatives were also 
suggested. These included: 1) the opium hulks could be 
the property of the Hong Kong government if it so wished;
2) the opium revenue could be collected for China by 
Britain in India; and 3) China could devise her own means 
5* of securing collection which might cause friction with the
. Hong Kong, if n’ot British, authorities. CCS, vol. 1, 
Enclosure No. 1 in Circular No. 4-18 of 1888 (Second Series) 
entitled: 'Opium: simultaneous collection of Duty and Likin; 
co-operation of Hongkong and Macao Governments; review of
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negotiations and arrangements to date.’Peking, 16 May 1888.
58. Memorandum by members of the Foreign Office, in Minutes 
following Hart to Pauncefote, see note 57.
59* Rosebery to O’Conor, No. 4*7, 18 Feb. 1886, F017/1012.
60. CCSL,' chuan 63, pp. 5si-5b, Tseng to Tsungli-yamen, 8 Feb. 
1886; TY (2), Tsungli-yamen to Tseng, 7 Feb. 1886 (ts’e 4).
61. Tsungli-yamen to Minister, 15 Feb. 1886, F0230/117.
63. TY (2), Tsungli-yamen to Tseng, 20 Feb.’* and 9 March 1886 
(ts’e 4-). From this it can be gathered that although Hart 
had submitted his plan to the Tsungli-yamen, he did not 
inform them that the Br. government had known of it before­
hand, and in fact, had rejected it. During the meeting of 
the commission, Hart was to raise it again. It is quite 
impossible to explain his motive, except perhaps that he 
really believed it was the best and the most ^appropriate
f plan.
62. Tseng to Rosebery, 15 March 1886, F017/io34*. ----
64*. O’Conor to Rosebery, No. 70, 28 Feb. 1886, F017/1015.
65& O'Conor to Rosebery, No. 132, 20 April 1886, F017/1016;
66. Marsh to Granville (Conf.), 5 May 1886 (No. 1054-6 H.K.), 
C0129/226; CCSL, chuan 63, pp. 28a-28b, Tsungli-yamen's 
memorial; HCP, z/263, 25 April 1886.
67. z/267, z/268 (HCP), 15 May and 11 July 1886.
68. Rosebery to Tseng, 11 March 1886, F017/1034-.
69. Roseb'ery to O’Conor, No. 68, 6 March 1886, F017/1012.
70. Iddesleigh to O'Conor, No. 236, 18 Aug. 1886, F017/1013; 
Stanley to Salisbury, 11 Nov. 1885s Enclosure, Russell's 
letter of 5 Nov. 1885, F017/1004-.
71. Marsh to Granville (Conf.), 17 May 1886 (No. 1124-6 H.K.). 
C0129/226.
72. Granville to Rosebery, 1 July 1886, F017/1037.
73• Walsham upon receiving the query thought that something 
must have happeried since the Colonial government had not 
raised the objection before when they were informed of 
Hart's appointment on 12 May. In fact, nothing occurred, 
and the query could well be a result of an attack of 'nerves' 
when no instructions were received from London. Marsh
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explained later that Hart's appointment as joint commission­
er was even more than what Wade would have contemplated in 
1876 when he drew up the article. Stanhope to IddLesleigh,
6 July 1886, F017/1058.
74. ibid'..
75*. Shao left rather abruptly on 1 August because he said that 
there was no point in his staying since Hart could nego­
tiate everything, and there Was no need to draw up a joint 
report since the Imperial government had agreed to the 
proposal. This led to the belief among British negotiators 
that Shao had left because he was unwilling to see the 
agreement carried out, as had Been observed by Consul 
Alabaster at Shanghai, and by Russell during the meetings.
In point of fact, he was recalled by an Imperial edict as 
a result of a suggestion by Li Hung-chang, and subsequently
promoted to Chief Justice of Honan. Whether Shao was for or
*
against the agreement, in the sense that the Foreign 
Inspectorate would be left in charge of all customs collect­
ions, cannot be conclusively established. Nevertheless, 
this can be considered as an indication of the sensitivity 
to the Foreign Inspectorate's new responsibilities.
Marsh to Stanhope (tele.), 16 Sept. 1886 (No. 16704 H.K.), 
C0129/228; Walsham to Rosebery, No. 205, 17 June 1886: 
Enclosure, Alabaster to Walsham, 12 June 1886, F017/1017; 
CCSL, chuan 67, pp. 27b-28a, Li to Tsungli-yamen, 18 Aug..
76. HCP, z/268, 11 July 1886, Hong Kong.
77* Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 256 (Conf.), 12 Aug. 1886, 
F017/1019: Transmits summary of first five sittings of 
the Commission.
78. See Chapter 5, PP* 15-14. Hart at that time had approved 
the proposal,and both the Colonial Office and the Hong Kong 
government had expressed some interest though the matter 
was never pursufed further than on paper.
79. This was because Russell's proposal would entail a large 
degree of preventive work done by the Hong Kong government, 
and China would be dependent on its 'whims'. CCS, Circular 
no. 418 of 1888, 16 May 1888. (Vol. 1, pp. 547-87.)
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80. The Straits Government received about $1.8 million annually 
from its opium farm because the monopoly of sale of broken 
chests was in the hands of the farmers and there was no 
fear of others buying in small quantities from the importer, 
then preparing and selling it. In Hong Kong this was 
exactly what had been happening and the Hong Kong opium 
farmer estimated that the amount thus prepared came to 
more than half of what they sold. As a result, the Straits 
farmer could sell for $2.20 what the Hong Kong farmer was 
obliged to sell for 83^. By giving the Hong Kong farmer
the same monopoly, revenue for the government would be 
greatly increased. Granville to Rosebery, 18 Aug. 1886, 
F017/1038.
81. CCSL, chuan 67, telegrams of 7 July, 9 July, 10 July and
10 July: pp. 20a, 20b-21a, 22b-23a and 23a,; LHC, Telegrams,
9 July, 10 July and 11 July: pp. 26a, 26a-26b and 26b-27b,
♦
chuan 7.
82. TY (2), Tsungli-yamen to Shao, 11 July 1886 (ts’e 4-).
83« £hat both Russell and Hart insisted on this could well ,
mean that they wanted some documentary proof that could
be used in the future if there was a need to re-examine 
the discussions of the Commission, say, if and when this 
scheme failed or ceased to work.
84-. CCSL, chiian 67, pp. 4-5a-4-5b, Li to Yamen, 27 July 1886.
85. CCSL, chiian 68, pp. 14-b-15a, Hart to Yamen, 23 & 25 Aug. 1886
86. CCSL, ibid.: Chang Chih-tung to Yamen, 7 Sept. 1886, p. 24-b.; 
TY (2)(ts’e 4-): Yamen to Li (28 July) , to Hart (11 Aug.),
to Hart (23 Aug.), tdphang (27 Aug.), to Chang (29 Aug.), 
to Hart (3 Sept.), to Hart (7 Sept.) - all 1886.
87. HCP, z/273 - 30 Aug., z/273 - 12 Sept. 1886.
88. HCP, z/275 - 8 Nov. 1886.
89* Walsham to Iddesleigh, No. 288 (Conf.), 11 Oct. 1886: 
Transmits acdount of meetings by Russell, F017/1019*
90* ibid.: Enclosure No. 1; also see Hong Kong Government 
Gazette, 26 March 1887, pp. 297-8.
91# Marsh to Stanhope (Conf.), 15 Sept. 1886 (No.18704- H.K.),
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C0129/228; Hong Kong Government Gazette, VOL. XXXIII, 
Government Notification No. 98, 19 March 1887.
92. Marsh to Stanhope (Conf.), 10 Oct. 1886 (No, 20629 H.K.), 
C0129/228; also see Annexure H (i): expenditure almost 
always surpassed revenue.
95. Stanhope to Iddesleigh, 4 Dec. 1886, F017/1039.
94-. Iddesleigh to Cross, 9 Dec. 1886, F017/1039-
95. Negotiations that led to the signing of the Protocol of 
Lisbon on 26 March 1887 are contained in CCS, Vol. -7* 
pp. 133-54• It is a record of telegrams between Hart and 
Campbell from 1 Nov. 1886 to 1 April 1887. References 
will be made to the important telegrams and also from 
HCP, Foreign and Colonial Offices correspondence, and 
Chinese sources; but these are used only as supplementary 
information.(note: H is Hart, C is Campbe.ll)
96. C to H (982), 5 Pec. 1886.
97* 'Status'meant that China would acknowledge the fact that
there was a Portuguese government on Macao soil, and that 
‘ this. government had been there for centuries. In view ,of 
this fact, short of recognition of Macao as a Portuguese 
Colony, China was prepared to accept the ’status quo* of 
the peninsula. A ’good status* implied that China v/as 
agreeable to the cession of Macao to Portugal and relinquish 
her rights to the peninsula if this was asked. H to C, 10 
Dec. 1886, (991).
98. C to H (980), 20 Dec. 1886.
99. HCP, z/241 - 20 Nov. 1883; z/280 - 14 Dec. 1886.
100. HCP, z/281 - 22 Dec. 1886.
101. H to 0,(990), 21 Dec. 1886.
102. H to C (986), 13 Jan. 1887# At this time, the British
government became interested in the negotiations and its 
outcome, and instructed its minister at Lisbon to report 
on all new developments. Salisbury to Cross, 15 Jan. 1887, 
to Holland 15 Jan. 1887, and Holland to Salisbury, 15 Jan. 
1887* All in F017/1053.
103* C to H (965), 19 Jan. 1887. 5
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104-. Portuguese Minister to Salisbury, 27 Jan. 1887* F017/1053.
105* Salisbury to Holland, 1 Feb. 1887* No. 2005 H.K., C0129/235
106. CCSL, chiian 70* Yamen to Chang* 1 March 1887* PP.'15a-15b.
107. H to C (979), 12 Feb. 1887.
108. C to H (94-8), 18 Feb. 1887-
109. H to C (976), 18 Feb. 1887.
110. H to C (97 ) 9 19 Feb.. 1887.
111. H to C (972), 1 March, 1887.
112. C to H (930), 4- March 1887; C to H (928), 5 March 1887; 
V/alsham to Salisbury, No. 17, 7 March 1887, F017/104-1.
113. H to C (969), 20 March 1887; H to C (968), 20 March 1887; 
Walsham to Salisbury, 21 March 1887 (No. 5619 H.K.), 
C0129/255.
114-. C to H (912), 26 March 1887. To Hart, the term •protocol! 
meant simply a memorandum of 'understanding respecting 
certain basis1, whereas to the Minister, it was nearly 
equivalent to a treaty.
Hertzlet, No. 4-4*, p. 275.
115.’ C to H (908), 51 March 1887; No. 6228 H.K., 1 April, Q0129/
116. H to C (960), 51 March 1887; 255-
No. 7131 H.K., 14- April 1887.
117. CCS, Vol. 1, pp. 581-87.
118. Maurice de Bunsen to Salisbury, No. 82 of 3 Sept. 1887, 
C0129/255.
.119.. HOP, .a/501 - 17 July 1887; z/303 - 31 July 1887; z/304- - 
7 Aug. 1887.
120. ibid.: z/303 and z/304-.
121. HCP, z/304-: ibid..
122. HCP, z/299, 3 July 1887; TY (2), all of ts'e 5 and 6
(Tsungli-yamen to Chief Superintendents of Trade, Governor
and Governor-General of Liang-kwang, and the Hoppo: more 
details in pp. 38 - 4-2 of this chapter.)
123. Hertslet, p£>. 274—88, No. 4-5.
124-. ibid.: pp. 288-89, No. 4-6; pp. 290-91, No. 4-7.
125* ibid.: p. 274- of No. 4-5
126. CCSL, chiian 69, Tsungli-yamen to all provincial leaders,
16 Jan. 1887, PP. 36a-36b.
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127* TY (2), Tsungli-yamen to Chief Superintendents of Trade,
4 Jan. 1887; to Governor-General of Liang-kwang, 15 
Jan. 1887 (ts’e 5)* ^
This was because negotiations with Portugal over Macao!s 
co-operation in the Hong Kong scheme had not been 
concluded, and Hong Kong would not put its scheme into 
practice.
128. ibid.: Yamen to Hsu, 24 Jan. 1887 (ts’e 5); Yamen to 
Minister, No. 2,15 Jan. 1887, F0230/118.
129. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 7, 16 Jan. 1887, F017/1041.
130. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 15 Jan. 1887, F017/1053.
131. Foreign Office to India Office, 15 Jan. 1887, F017/1053*
132. India Office to Foreign Office, R.S. and C. No. 96,
1 Feb. 1887, F017/1053.
133* Salisbury to Walsham, 3 Feb. 1887, F017/1Q40.
134. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 9 (Conf.), 8 Feb. 1887, F017/1041.
135* Salisbury to Walsham (tele.), No. 5, 26 Feb. 1887,Fol7/1044.
136. CCS, Vol. 1, Circular No. 352, pp. 512-4.
137* CCS, Vol. 1, Circular No. 356, pp. 515-21.
138. CCS, Vol. 1, Circular No. 358, pp. 521-27.
139* CCSL, chUan 71, P* 2a, Shanghai Taotai to Yamen, 15 May 
1887.
140. CCSL, chiian 70, p. 17a, Yamen to Chang, 15 May 1887.
141. CCS, Vol. 6, Hart to Morgan, No. 2/Kowloon, 4 March 1887, 
pp. 549-60. The ships included two steamers, three steam 
launches, six chartered guard-boats and six small steamers.
142. CCS, Vol. 6, Hart to Morgan, No. 4/Kowloon, 8 March 1887, 
pp. 560-62.
That the Foreign Inspectorate would take over the collect­
ion of Chinese duties and dues on general merchandise was 
because of Hong Kong’s insistence - made by Russell 
before the Colony would co-operate in the scheme he 
himself intr'oduced. This was one of the two conditions 
imposed on China -' the other was Macao's agreement.
143. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 9 July 1887: Enclosure, 
Cameron to Holland, No. 204 H.K., 2 June 1887, F017/1055*'
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144. CCSL, chuan 70, pp. lb-2a, Li to Yamen, 24 Jan. 1887.
The reason why other provincial governments did not 
object strongly (i.e. in manifested forms) could be due 
to the fact that it only affected opium; whereas for 
'the government of Liang-kwang, the Foreign Inspectorate 
took over control of all native customs.
145. TY (2), for Board of Revenue to Kiukiang customs,
Kiangsu and Chekiang haikuan and Kiangsi Governor -
10 June, 10 June and 15 June 1887 respectively (ts'e 5).
Acknowledgments and information were received.
147. TY (2), Yamen to Chang Chih-tung, 25 Feb.; to Hoppo,
28 Feb. 1887 (ts'e 5).
146. HCP, z/282, 5 March 1887; IMC for 1887, transfer effected
with complications in reports from Tientsin, Hankow,
Kiukiang, Wuhu, Chinkiang, Shanghai, Ningpo, Wenchow,
Foochow, Tamsui, Takow, Amoy, Swatow, Canton, Kiungchow,
«
Pakhoi. Some reports mentioned that joint collection was ' 
very much appreciated because there was now no different­
iation in rates: Ningpo, Wenchow, Foochow and Tamsui.,
148. CCSL, chuan 70, pp. 13a-13b, Chang to Yamen, 28 Feb. 1887.
149. LHC, Telegrams, chiian 8, 10b, Translation Bureau to
. Chang, 1 March 1887; TY (2), Yamen to Chang, 5 March 1887* 
(ts'e 5).
150. CCSL, chiian 70, three memorials by Chang Chih-tung, 
received 26 March 1887* PP. 22b-26a.
151. TY (2), Yamen to Governor-General of Liang-kwang, Governor 
of Kwangtung and Hoppo, 29 March 1887 (ts'e 5)* TW, pp. 
2241-2, Telegram to Chang etc., 29 March 1887.
152. LHC, Telegrams, chuan 8, Translation Bureau to Chang etc., 
50 March 1887* pp. 12a-13a.
153* CCSL, chiian 70, p. 26a, Chang to Yamen, 29 March 1887*
154. LHC, Telegrams, chiian 8* p. 15b, tele, from Chang, 31 Mdrch
155. TY (2), Yairien to Hoppo, 31 May 1887 (ts'e 5).
156. ibid.: Yamen to Hoppo, 23 June 1887*
157* ibid.: Yamen to Foochow Generals, to Chief Superintendents, 
to Governor-General of Liang-kwang and to Hoppo on 15 Jan., 
28 Jan., 15 Jan. and 25 Feb. 1887 respectively.
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158. TY (2), for Board of Revenue to Chang, 25 June 1887 (ts'e 
5); for Board of Revenue to Chang, 12 Sept. 1887 (ts'e 6).
159* CCSL, chuan 72, Yamen to Chang, and Chang to Yamen: 5i 7 
and 9 Aug. 1887, PP* 3a-5b; TW, p. 2282, Memorial from 
Chang, June-Aug. 1887; LHC, Translations, chiian 8, pp. 
23h-27b, 7 telegrams from Chang dated from 8 July to 
18 July 1887.
160. CCSL, chiian 72, pp. 18b-25b, Chang to Yamen, 10 Sept. 1887; 
pp. 27b-28b, Yamen to Chang,12 Sept. 1887*
161. TY (2), Yamen to Chang, 23 Nov. 1887, (ts'e 6).
162. Despite such disobedience,. Chang Chih-tung was still a 
powerful official to retain the governor-generalship of 
Liang-kwang until August 1889 when he was transferred to 
the Governor-Generalship of Hu-kuang. Both Chang and Wu 
continued to press for the non-alienation, of Macao until 
it was ceded in 1888 (date when Sino-Portuguese treaty
4
was ratified.) CCSL, chiian 73, Chang's memorial, 15 Oct. 
1887, PP- 6h-14b; Wu's memorial, same date, pp. 15a-18b.
163* CCSL, chiian 70, Yamen to Tseng Kuo-ch'uen, 6 and 8 Apr;i.l. 
1887, PP* 27a-27b; Yamen to Charig Chih-tung, 9 April 1887, 
pp. 27b-28a; TY (2), Yamen to Chief Superintendents, 12 
April, 1887 (ts'e 5).
164. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 36, 28 May 1887, F017/1042.
Official (Government) members always outnumber Unofficial 
members (nominated by the Crown on the advice of the 
Governor and the Colonial Office) in both the Legislative 
and Executive Councils. Thus, in case of dissent, the 
government would always win by a majority vote, since the 
Official members had to vote for the government (by law).
165* See Annexure A (ii).
166. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 37» 29 May 1887: Enclosure No.
3, Marsh to Walsham, 5 April 1887, F017/1042; also see 
Hong Kong Government Gazette, Vol. XXXIII, No. 14, 2 April 
1887, PP. 318-319, C0130.
167* ibid.: Enclosure No. 4, Extract from 'The Daily Press'
of 19 March 1887 on Legislative Council meeting of 18 March.
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168. ibid.: Enclosure No. 3, scheme submitted by C.P. Chater 
dated 4 April 1887*
169* ibid.: Enclosure No. 2 - see note 166.
170. CCS, Vol. 6, Morgan to Hart, Inspector General No. 5,
7 April 1887, PP. 562-66.
171. ibid.: Morgan to Hart, IG No. 12, 22 April 1887, pp. 567-8.
172. ibid..
175. Cameron to Holland (tele.) 9 May 1887, No. 8983 H.K., 
Col29/232.
174. HCP, z/287, 17 April 1887.
175* Walsham to Salisbury (tele.), No. 14, 28 May 1887, 
F017/1044; Cameron to Holland (tele.), 28 May 1887,
No. 10219 H.K., C0129/232. The Ordinance is in Hong 
Kong Government Gazette, Vol. XXXIII, No. 24, 28 May 1887, 
pp. 600-03, and Chinese in pp. 636-39.(C0130)
176. ibid.: Hong Kong Government Gazette, No. 231 of 31 May 
1887, PP. 617-78 r Chinese-in-pp. 639-40T- -—
By this, the smuggling of prepared opium into China 
could be prevented although this was not explicitly 
stated.
177. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 85, 18 July 1887, F017/1040;
Salisbury to Holland, 18 July 1887, F017/1055.
178. HCP, z/293, 29 May 1887.
179. HCP, z/288, 24 April 1887.
180. Allen to Salisbury, No. 3, Amoy, 29 Jan. 1887, F017/1049.
181. IMC for 1887, Report for China by E. McKean, pp. 1-2.
182. See note 138.
183. ibid.: Keswick to Currie, 2 Feb. 1887.
184. Sassoon to Salisbury, 7 Feb. 1887, F017/1053*
• 185* Cutting from 1 Chinese Times* of 12 March 1887, F017/1053.
186. Walsham to Salisbury, No. 8, 3 Feb. 1887, F017/1041; same
to same, No. 11, 21 Feb. 1887, F017/1041. *
187. Salisbury to* Keswick, 5 Feb.; same to Keswick & Sassoon,
23 Feb. 1887, F017/1053.
188. Holland to Salisbury, 3 June 1887, F017/1055*
189. CCS, Vol. 6, pp. 580-82, Hart to Hobson, No. 1370/Kowloon, 
29 March 1894.
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See note 14-6 of Chapter 8. In 1889 the Ningpo authorities 
had a private arrangement with an opium guild which 
monopolised the sale of opium in that port. However, this 
only affected the consumption of the drug there and did 
hot in any way interfere with the working of joint 
collection by the Foreign Inspectorate. IMC for 1889, 
Rocher's report for Ningpo.
IMC for 1887, Brazier's report for Wenchow.
CCR for 188J, Sinclair's report for Foochow, and Oxenham's 
report for Chinkiang. The likin rates at these two ports 
are taken only as examples.
CCR for 1881, Hughes' report for Shanghai. This rate is 
again taken only as an example.
The figure of 1.6 million taels is the average for the 
years 1863 to 1869, derived from IMC annual trade returns. 
Also see Annexure E (ii).
See Hsiao. Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth
Century; Ch'ien. The Government and Politics of China; and
Hsieh, The Government of China.■■■ ■ "■■ * \
CCS, Vol. 1, Circular No. 4-18 of 1888, paragraph 7 (PP» 
54-7-87 - for the entire Circular). Hong Kong's co-operation 
continued for many years. In 1890 Hart noted this fact 
although he was always aware that the Colonial government 
might terminate its co-operation at any moment, and the 
commissioners at Kowloon were instructed to keep a watchful 
eye and to be prepared with alternative measures once this 
co-operation ceases. (CCS, Vol. 6, pp. 578-80, Hart to 
McLeavy Brown, No. 721/Kowloon, 3 April 1890.) By 1894-, 
this co-operation was still in existence. (CCS, Vol. 6, 
pp. 580-82, Hart to Hobson, No. 1370/Kowloon, 29 March 1894- 
and p. 583, Hobson to Hart, No. 2608, 21 Aug. 1894-.*), It 
continued until 1898 when the 'scramble for concessions' 
saw the inclusion of the New Territories into the colony. 
Smuggling increased tremendously because instead of the 
20 mile coastline that the Foreign Inspectorate used to 
guard, it was extended to 80 miles, making it almost 
impossible for the preventive service to do its duty
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satisfactorily. Nevertheless, the Ordinance of 1887 
continued until Oct. 1911 when the Foreign Inspectorate 
was allowed to establish its collectorate on British 
Kowloon - for the first time. This led to a new system of 
cbllection and terminated the co-operation- called for by 
the Ordinance of 1887. (Wright, Hongkong and the Chinese 
Customs, .pp. 14-15, 48-53 - Appendix H: 1911 Draft of the 
Anglo-Chinese Agreement of Hongkong.)
8. Yu, Chung-kuo chin-ven etc., p. 103*
9# IMC for 1891, Hobson*s report for Chungking, Ludlow's 
report for Ichang, Hughes' report for Amoy.
10. Yu, op.cit., pp. 124-220. From reports from the People's 
Republic of China, after 1949, poppy cultivation had been 
successfully prohibited, and opium smoking as well as the 
'opium trade' had also been effectively stopped.
11. Another reason could possibly be due to her involvement in 
European affairs during this period, especially with the 
Ottoman Empire. The Foreign Office thereby gave less 
attention to affairs in China (especially the Opium 
Question) than it would have otherwise. Another factor 
was that the Foreign Office was basically negotiating on 
behalf of the Indian government and the Colonial government 
and it itself did not have any vested interests in the 
Opium Question, since this was considered as totally 
independent of the foreign trade with China.
12. The conflict really affected only the province of Kwangtung, 
and the city of Canton. However, because the province was 
tied up with Kwangsi administratively until the governor- 
generalship of Liang-kwang, we have used Liang-kwang instead,
13• During this period, there were, of course, many other 
issues. The differences in opinion and policy adopted 
towards the 'Hi Crisis' with Li Hung-chang advocating the 
strengthening of maritime defences and ignoring the 'crisis' 
and Tso Tsung-t'ang fighting for the supremacy of China's 
land forces, would be a case in point.
14. Tseng Kuo-fan was also a power to be reckoned with, and 
when he was alive, both Li and Tso did not have much say.
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However, after his death in 1872, it became a struggle 
between the two, his former lieutenants. Chang Chih-tung 
and Liu K'un-i were also officials of importance, but i 
they never achieved the status of either Li or Tso; and 
a'fter -the latter1 s death in 1885, they were more under 
the wings of the former than in opposition to him. The 
same also can be applied to minor officials such as 
Tseng Chi-tse and Shao Yu-lien. Li’s power and influence 
lay partly in his control over the most powerful regional 
array (incorporated in name into the national army) and the 
only navy in China, and partly in his official position as 
Governor-General of Chihli '(and at the same time the Chief 
Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports and Grand 
Councillor), the capital province. The latter post had 
always been the one as having the maximum,influence on the 
Imperial government and in policy-making. He was the only 
one to hold that post three times and for a period of about 
25 years stretching from Aug. 1870 to his death in 1901. 
‘(See Annexure B) He was never a member of the Tsungli-yamen 
but his close connections with it likewise enhanced his 
influence and power.
15. Taxation in Britain and India had reached a hilt and it 
was almost impossible to raise the additional revenue 
called for by the termination of the opium trade. It was 
possibly one of the reasons why the Anti-opium Society's 
motions in parliament were voted down. See Annexures I 
(i), I (ii) and I (iii) for details of Indian revenue 
and expenditure and the Indian contribution to Britain.
(16. In 1905, the election of 250 members of parliament
committed to the cause of the Anti-opium Society was 
followed by the appointment of John Morley and John Ellis 
to the India Office as Secretary and Undersecretary of 
State. Both Were sympathisers to the Society. In May, a 
motion was introduced in parliament calling for a speedy 
end to the opium trade in India. Morley agreed on behalf 
of the government that measures to that effect would be 
implemented. P r o m ) delete all that in brackets.
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16* Agreement with China in 1907 stipulated that since the 
import of Indian opium averaged 51 *000 chests a year, the 
Indian government would, reduce its annual export by 5,100 
chests for 5 years, at the end of which, if the Chinese 
government could prove its prohibition of poppy cultivation 
was effective, the amount would continue to be reduced 
until the destruction of the Indian opium trade to China i 
was accomplished. This agreement was renewed in May 1911 
with some minor alterations, which would mean that, at the 
latest, no Indian opium would be imported into China by 
1917* The final 'touch' happened on 25 Jan. 1919 when the 
symbolic 'last' chest was destroyed at Shanghai. Owen, 
British Opium Policy etc., pp. 334— 5, 337-4-3 and 351-52;
Lim, Britain and the termination of the India-China opium 
trade, 1905-1913- '
17. In the eighties, the Indian government was also worried
about the competition from both Persian and Turkish opium-;—  
much more so the former. This was because the import of 
these varieties had increased. However, the concem was, 
'exaggerated' and the government, if it so desired, could 
stopped such imports at India because they were imported 
via Bombay. See Annexure F (i) for break-down of opium 
imports into China.
18* The services they rendered to their government; and to China 
were never recognized during their days. Alcock, almost 
immediately after the non-ratification became a businessman 
holding a directorship of a company in Borneo; Wade became 
a scholar though he did not completely divorce himself from 
Chinese affairs; and Robertson died shortly after he was 
transferred to the Shanghai consulate.
19. The difficulty in assessing to any accurate degree the 
motivations of Chinese officials lay partly in the fact 
that what thefy write, whether memorials or private 
correspondence, seldom expressed what they really think. 
Written Chinesei especially 'official Chinese', can be so 
vague that any number of interpretations are possible.
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Assessment has been made, thereby, by looking 'between 
the lines' of what they had written, and by deducing 
conclusions from their policies and actions, their 
reactions to those of others, and comments made on them 
bjr colleagues and friends. Such assessments are, of course, 
unsatisfactory, but they do give some references to what 
was happening.
Clarendon to Alcock, 30 Dec. 1868, F017/4-95; and same to 
same, 13 Jan. 1869, F017/516; also see Morse, International 
Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 2, p. 197; Wright, 
Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism etc., pp. 21-22; and 
Hsu, Modern China, p. 324*.
The years between 1887 and 1895 saw the continuation of
the operation of the Additional Article and the Hong Kong
Ordinance of 1887, as well as the continued growth of
native opium. Thus, although our period ended in 1887,
«
it could well have continued until the beginning of the 
'scramble* period. The date decided on to terminate the 
‘present dissertation is because the years after 1887 were 
simply continuation of the decisions reached between 
Britain and China between 1885 and 1887- Moreover, the 
period between 1860 and 1887, with regard to the Opium 
Question, was an era in itself in that it was isolated 
from all other happenings and issues during the period.
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Of ADDITIONAL AiiliT.^ 20 Chel AGR.AL'iiStiT BI3JWEbU GRZAT 
Ai 0 CHINA SIGN JD AT CH^OO 01* T i 13th GNPTKtSER, 1876.
ClGNLD AT ION DOM, 18th JULY, 1885.
Area within v/hi^ h Likin ought to be collected, on Foreign Goods.
The Governments of Great Britain and of China, considering 
that the arrangements proposed in Clauses 1 and 2 of Section 
III of the Agreement between Great Britain and China, signed 
at Chefoo on the lpth September, 1376 (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Jhefoo Agreement"), in relation to the area within 
which likin ought not to be collected on foreign goods at 
the open ports, and to the definition of the foreign Settle­
ment area, require further consideration;
traffic in. Opium.
Also that the teri£3 of Clause 3 of the same section are not 
sufficiently explicit to servo as an efficient regulation for 
the traffic in Opium, and recognising the desirability of 
placing restrictions on the consumption of Opium, have agreed 
to the present Additional article.
1. as regards the arrangements above referred to and proposed 
in Glauses 1 and 2 of ooction III of tno Cnefoo Agreement,
it is agreed that they shall be reserved for further consider­
ation between the two governments.
Treatment of Foreign Opium on its Importation into China.
Import and Likin Duties.
2. In lieu of the arrangements respecting Opium proposed in 
Clause 3 of Section III of the Chefoo Agreement, it is agreed 
that foreign Opium, when imported into )hina, shall be taken 
cognizance of by the Imperial Maritime Customs, and shall be 
deposited in bond, either in warehouses or receiving-hulks 
which had been approved of by the Customs, and that it shall 
not be moved thence until there shall have been paid to the 
customs the Tariff duty of 30 taels per chest of 100 catties, 
md also a sum not exceeding 0 taels per like chest as likin.
kepacking in bond.
3. It is agreed that the aforesaid import and likin duties 
having been paid, the owner shall be allowed to have the 
Opium repacked in bond under the supervision of the Customs, 
and put into packages of such assorted sizes as he may select, 
from such sizes as shall have been agreed upon by the Customs 
authorities and British Consul at the port of entry.
Transit Certificate*
The Customs shall than, if required, issue gratuitously to 
the owner a transit certificate for each such package, or 
one for any number of packages, at the option of the owner.
jo Transport duty to be Levied*
i...; - A.Urtb A (i) (contfd)
ouch certificate shall free the Gpiua to which it applies 
.from the imposition of any further tax on duty whilst in 
transport in tne interior, provided that the packages has 
not boon opened, and that the Customs * seals, marks, and 
numbers on the packages have not been effaced or tampered 
w i tn *
Certificates only Valid in Chinese nan&e.
much cox'tificate sliall have validity only in the hands of 
Chinese subjects, and shall not entitle foreigners to convey 
or accompany any Opium in which they may be interested into 
the interior.
Peculations respecting Issue of ransit Certificates.
A. It is that the regulations under which the said
certificates are to be issued shall be the same for all the 
porta, and that the form shall he as follows
"Opium Transit Certificate*
"This is to certify that Tariff and 11-kin duties at the 
rate of —  taels per chest of 100 catties have been paid 
on the Opium marked and numbered as under; and that, in 
conformity with the Additional Article signed at London the 
18th July, 1885, and appended to the Agreement between China 
and Great iiritain signed at Chefoo the 13th September, 18?6, 
and approved by the Imperial Decree printed on the back 
hereof, the production of this ccrtificata will exempt the 
Opium to which it refers, wherever it may be found, from the 
imposition of any further tax or duty whatever, provided 
that tn© paokagos are unbroken, and the Customs1 seals, marks, 
and numbers havo not been effaced or tampered with 
;l .ark ;io.
X - 00 packages*
"Port of entry,
1 Date
’‘signature of Commissioner of Customs.n
neaoectinn Taxation of Opium on opening of the Packages at
place of1 consumption.
p. The Chinese Government undertakes that when the packages 
shall have been opened at the place of consumption the Opium 
3hall not be subjected to any tax or contribution, direct or 
indirect, other than or in excess of such tax or contribution 
as is or nay hereafter be levied on native Opium. In the 
event of such tax or contribution being calculated ad valorem 
the same rate, value for value, shall be assessed on foreign 
and native Opium, and in ascertaining for this purpose the 
value of foreign Opium the amount paid On it for li-kin at 
the port of entry shall be deducted from its market value.
Additional Article to form part of Chefoo Agreement.
G. It is agreed that the present Additional Article shall be
considered as forming part of tha Chefoo Agreement, and that
A .I!L..URL A . i J (cont*A)
it shall have the gam® force and validity as if it were 
inserted therein word for word.
Rat ifications.
It shall come into operation six months after its signature, 
provided that ratifications have then been exchanged, or if 
they have not, then on the date at which such exchange takes 
place.
duration of Additional Ai^ ticle.
7. The arrangement respecting Opium contained in the present 
Additional Article shall remain binding for four years, 
after the expiration of which period either Government may 
at any time give 12 months1 notice of its desire to terminate 
it, and such ice 1 Leg given, it shall terminate accordingly.
Li, lit to Great Britain to terminate Additional Article in 
event of Certificate not exempting Opium from ’Taxation.
It ia, however, agreed that the Government of Great Britain 
shall have the right to terminate the same at any time, 
should the transit certificate be found not to confer on the 
Opium complete exemption from all taxation whatsoever whilst 
being carried from the port of entry to the place of consump­
tion in the interior. Treaty of 26th June, 1856, to Revive 
in event of Termination of present Additional Article.
In the event of the termination of the present Additional 
Article the arrangement with regard to Opium now in force 
under the Regulations attached to the Treaty of Tien-tsin 
shall revive.
Additional Article may bo modified.
&• the 'ifigh Contracting Parties may, by common consent, adopt 
any modifications of the provisions of the present Additional
Article which experience may show to be desirable.
SmuKKlim] firbm China from HongKong.
9. It is understood that the Commission provided for in 
Clause 7 Lection III of the Chefoo <.greeraent to inquire 
in the question of the prevention of smuggling into China 
from hoagKong shall be appointed as soon as possible.
Chefoo Agreement and this Additional Article to be Ratified 
together.
10. The Chefoo Agreement, together with, and as modified by, 
the present Additional Article, shall be ratified, and the
ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.
In witness Whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised thereto 
by their respective Governments, have signed the present
Additional Article, and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at London, in quadruplicate (two in Lngliah and two in 
Chinese), this 18th day of July 1385, being the 7th day of 
the 6th moon of the 11th year of the reign of Xwang-31i.
(L.3.) SALISBURY
(L.L.) TSUllGr
(Hertslet, Ii'eaties, etc., between Great Britain and China, etc., 
Vol. 1, No. 1A, pp. 83-36.)
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i
An Ordinance enacted by. the Governor of Hong­
kong. with the advice of the Legislative Council 
thereof, for the better regulating of the trade 
in. Opium.
[27th  May, 1887.]
W H E R E A S  it. is expedient to regulate and control the ' movement of Raw Opium within the Colony and the waters thereof: Be it enacted by the Governor of 
Hongkong, with the advice of the Legislative Council 
thereof, as follows :—
1. This Ordinance and the Opium Ordinance of 1884, 
hereinafter called the principal Ordinance, shall be construed 
together as one Ordinance to be called The Opium O rdi­
nances 1884 and 1887.
2 .  Opium  in this Ordinance means raw, crude, or un­
prepared Opium.
Chest, o f  Opium  means the package, with the opium 
therein, such as is usually imported by merchants 
in the Colony.
^hip  in ibis Ordinance and in (he principal Ordinance 
shall be construed so as to include auy steam- 
vessel, junk, boat, sampan, or any kind of craft 
used for conveyance of persons or things by water.
3 .  N o person shall bring into the Colony or the waters 
thereof, or receive therein Opium in quantities less than 
one chest so brought into the Colouy or its waters.
f, •
4 .  It  shall be lawful for the Colonial Treasurer on such 
terms and conditions as may be approved by the Governor 
in Council, to grant licences for the sale of Opium intended 
for export in quantities less than one chest, and no person 
except the holders of such licences shall lie permitted to 
sell or barter within the Colouy or its waters Opium in 
quantities less than one chest. T he purchase, sale, or 
barter of quantities less than one ball of Bengal Opium or 
three cat ties of Maiwa, Persian, or Turkish Opium is hereby 
forbidden.
5 .  It shall be the duty of holders of licences to attach saio c-rtin-
to all parcels o f Opium sold by them in quantities less than b'yUcfnw'.T1
one chest, a certificate in the following form :—
Date, 188 .
No. •
Sold this day to
balls Bengal, catties Malwa or
to be exported by him to 
per ship
This certificate shall not be valid after noon of the
Chop.
6 . No person except the Opium Farmer or the licensed wut person,
retail dealers shall have in his possession or under his opmmfn
custody or control Opium in quantities less than one chest i'mthanono
without a certificate of purchase from a Licensee except he c c‘
can show to the satisfaction of a M agistrate:—
(a .)  That the said Opium is covered by a certificate 
of one of the Licensees.
(b .)  That lie has received it under an official export 
permit. Provided always that it shall be in the . 
absolute discretion of the officer charged with 
issuing export permits to grant or withhold the 
same, and that this section shall not apply to 
samples not exceeding two taels covered by a 
certificate of the importer.
Construction.
Im port of 
Opium less 
thtin one chest 
prohibited.
Sale of Opium 
ill quantities 
less than  ono 
chest.
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1 5 . N o junk or other Chinese craft, whether licensed or 
not, shall leave her anchorage, unless the safety of the 
vessel (through stress of weather) shall render it necessary, 
between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. from October to 
March inclusive, nor between the hours of 7 p.m. and o a.m. 
from April to September inclusive, under a penalty, on 
conviction before two Stipendiary M agistrates, not exceed­
ing live hundred dollars, or the forfeiture of junk and cargo.
Special Permits or N ight Clearances hitherto grantable. 
under Ordinance 8 of 1879, section 38, sub-sections 8 and 9 
shall be no longer allow ed,except in the case of H ongkong 
specially licensed fishing boats.
1 6 . On the coming into operation of this Ordinance, 
every person having in his possession, custody, or control 
any Opium within the Colony or its waters shall furnish to 
the .Superintendent an account of all such Opium, and in 
case of chests the numbers and marks on such chests, 
and the Superintendent or his deputy shall be at liberty 
at any tinie, and as often as ho shall think lit, to demand 
in writing from every person having any Opium in his 
possession, custody, or control, an account in writing of 
the Opium so held at the time of such demand, and in case 
of chests the marks and numbers, and the said Superin­
tendent or his deputy shall be at liberty at any time, to 
enter the premises where such Opium is, and to inspect 
the same, and any person refusing to give such account, or 
without reasonable cause shewn to permit such entry, or 
giving a false or incorrect actount shall be liable, on con­
viction, to a penalty not exceeding five hundred dollars, 
in addition to any other penalty which may be recoverable 
under the terms and conditions of section 4 of this Ordinance.
1 7 . I f  any Opium is found, on search authorised under 
this Ordinance, to have been imported contrary to the pro­
visions of this Ordinance, or to be missing from the place 
in which it was stored on importation, or from the place 
where, according to the permits, it ought to be found stored, 
the person in whoso possession such Opium so imported 
may bo found, or in w hose name such Opium so missing 
shall have been so stored, shall be liable, on conviction, to 
a penalty not exceeding five hundred dollars for evc«y 
chest of Opium which shall be found to have bceu so im­
ported, or to be so missing.
I S .  If the Opium Fanner shall neglect or refuse, or shall 
without sufficient cause unreasonably delay to do any of the 
acts or things hereinbefore provided and required to be 
done by him, lie shall.be liable to a penalty for each such 
offence not exceeding five hundred dollars.
1 9 . Every person who shall under the "provisions of this 
Ordinance m ake any application, or supply any particulars, 
Return, or Account, or other written Statement required 
by this Ordinance to be made or supplied, shall sign the 
same himself, unless he be absent from the Colouy or 
unable, from sickness, to attend to business, in which
, case the same may be signed by his A gent for him ; and 
if any such application, particulars, Return, Account, or 
other Statement shall be false or incorrect, either in whole 
or in part, to the knowledge of the. person so making or 
supplying the same, whether the same be signed by himself 
or by his A geut, such person shall, in every case not 
otherwise provided for by this Ordinance, be liable on 
conviction to a penalty not exceeding one thousand 
dollars for the first oJfenee, and two thousand for every 
subsequent ofTence: and such Agent shall also and In 
like manner if offending be liable to penalties of the like 
amount.
2 0 .  A ny Justice of the Peace may, by his warrant 
directed to any Police Officer, not under the rank of a Ser­
geant, empower him by day or by night to enter and search 
any dwelling house, shop, or other building or place, or any 
ship not being a man-of-war or ship having such status, 
lying or being within the waters of the Colony, in any 
ease in which it shall appear to such Justice of the Peace, 
upon the oath of any person, that there is good and sufficient 
cause to bclicvo that in any such dwelling house, shop, or 
other building or place, or on board any such ship is con­
cealed or deposited any Opium subject to forfeiture under
. this Ordinance, or as to which an offence has been com­
mitted against any of tlio provisions of this Ordinance, and 
to take possession of any such Opium found to be concealed, 
or deposited therein, and of the ship in which the same may
Colonial 
w aters 
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certa in  hours.
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officermnr he foiind, and to a rre s t and lake any person, or persons
donnTftrticior being in such dw elling house, shop, or o ther building, or
place, or 011 board any such ship, in whose possession, 
custody, or control any such Opium may lie found, or 
whom 1 he said O iliccr may have good aud sufficient reason 
to suspect to have concealed or deposited therein or there­
abouts any such Opium, and any Officer to whom such 
w arran t shall be directed m ay, in case of obstruction  or 
roweri<> resistance, break open any outer or inner doors of such
door*.n|>' u dw elling  house, shop, or o ther building, or place, and enter
therein to , and forcibly en ter sueli sh ip , and every part 
thereof, and rem ove by force any obstruction  to such entry , 
search, seizure, and rem oval as aforesaid, and m ay detain 
Hoy<ict«in every person found in such place until the said place shall
have been searched, and all inform ations to be laid and all 
w arrants to be issued, and all arrests  and seizures to be 
suntinyr. made under this O rdinance, may be had or done 011 a 81111-
day as well as on any o ther day.
Excise Officer*, 2 1 . E xcise  Officers duly appointed under the principal
■^ (•ointment O rdinance shall be deemed to be E x c ise  Officers for the
purposes of th is O rdinance, and shall have the like pow ers, 
duties, rig h ts  and liabilities w ith  reference to Opium under 
•th is O rdinance as they have w ith reference to prepared 
O pium  under the principal O rdinance.
Arrest without 2 2 .  I t shall be lawful for any Police or E xcise  Officer
to arrest w ithout w arrant any person w ith in  the Colony 
whom lie reasonably suspects, to lie conveying or to have 
concealed 011 his person any Opium in contravention of the 
requirem ents of this O rdinance and to take him before a 
M agistra te  to be dealt w ith according to law.
2 3 .  I t  shall l>e law ful for any Inspector of Police or an 
E xcise  Officer, hav ing  reasonable ground for believing tha t 
there is Opium in any ship w ithin the w aters of the Colony 
in contravention of the provisions of th is O rdinance (such 
ship not being a ship of w ar or vessel having such s ta tu s) to 
proceed w ithou t w arran t 011 board such ship, and search for 
such Opium, and seize any so found, and it shall be law ful 
fo r such Inspector to take the Opium so found, together 
w ith the person in whose custody, possession or control it is 
found, before a M agistrate , to lie dealt ivith according to law.
2 4 .  T h is O rdinance shall come into operation on a  day 
to be proclaimed by the  G overnor.
Passed the L egislative Council of Ilongkong , th is 27th  
day of M ay, 1887.
• I
A k a t h o o x  S e t h ,  
Clerk of Councils.
A ssented to by H is E xcellency  the Officer A dm inistering  
the G overnm ent, the 27th  day of M ay, 1887.
F r e d e r i c k  S t e w a r t ,
• A cting Colonial Secretary.
.Search i ng 
•hips.
Suspending
clause.
ANN TKURIC B : GOVBm-JOR-GiNi^La OF SKLLCTLD PROVINCBS. 1360-90,
(with heads of the Tsungli-yamen 
ministers to Britain.)
and
Year Chihli Liang-kianp;
1360 Heng-fu Tseng Kuo-fan
1861 W en-yu it
1862 Tsung-hou ti
1365 Liu Chang-yu it
1864 t it
1865 it Li Ilung-chang
1866 ti Tseng Kuo-fan
1867 ti it
1868 Tseng Kuo-fan m  Hsin-i
1869 H it
1870 Li Ilung-chang Tseng Kuo-fan
1871 ti ti
1872 n Ho Ching
1875 t Li Tsung-hsi
1874 n Liu K’un-i
1875 ti t
1876 n Shen Pao-chen
1377 it it
1873 ti ti
1379 n it
1880 ti Liu K’un-i
1881 ti t
1882 Chang Shu-shen P* eng Yu-lin
1885 Li Hung-chang Tso Tsung-t’aj
1334 it Yung-lo
1885 ti Tseng Kuo-ch’i
1886 n i
1887-90 t
Note: Thi3 list is only intended as
Llanr;-kwanj:,
Lao Tsung-kuang
Yen T'uan-shu 
Mao Hung-pin 
Jui-lin
Liu K’un-i
Chang Shu-shen
w
Tseng Kuo-ch’uan 
Chang Shu-shen 
Chang Chih-tung
a general reference. For 
details, see Oh*ien, Ch’ing-chi chung-yao chih-kuan nien-piao.
csung 1 i-yamen: Prince Kung, 1860-1884; Prince Ch’ing from 1885*
Ministers to Britain: Kuo Sung-t’ao from 1875; Tseng Chi-tse
from 1379; and Liu Hsi-hung from 1888.
ANNMFURL C : M1NI3IRIB3. SFCRMTARILS OF SIAT B« MINISTERS TO 
CHINA . GOVFRNQR3 OF HQNG KONG AND VUBR0Y3 OF 
INDIA, loGQ-1390.
MINISTRIMS: Palmerston (Whig) 1859-65? Russell (Whig) 1865-66; 
Derby (Tory) 1866-68; Disraeli (Tory) 1863; Gladstone (Liberal)
1868-74; Disraeli (Tory) 1674-o0; Gladstone (Liberal) 1880-85? 
Salisbury (Tory) 1885-86; Gladstone (Liberal) 1886; Salisbury 
(Unionist) 1886-92.
S. of S. (FQRJIGN OFFICE): From 18 June 1859 Russell; 5 Nov.
1865 Clarendon; 6 June 1866 Stanley; 9 Dec. 1868 Clarendon;
6 July 1870 Granville; 21 Feb. 1874 Derby; 2 April 1873 
Salisbury; 28 April 1880 Granville; 24 June 1885 Salisbury;
6 Feb. 1886 Rosebery; 3 Aug. 1886 Idd©3leigh; 14 Jan. 1887 
Salisbury.
S. of S. (COLONIAL OPFIOL): From June 1859 Newcastle; April 
1864 Cardwell; June 1866 Carnarvon; March 1867 Buckingham;
Dec. 18G8 Granville; July 1870 Kimberley; Feb. 1874 Carnarvon; 
Fob. 1873 Beach; April 1880 Kimberley; Dec. 1882 Derby;
June 1885 Stanley; Feb. 1386 Granville; Aug. 1886 Stanhope;
Jan. 1387 Holland.
S. of S. (INDIA OFFICS)t From 18 June 1659 Halifax; 16 Feb.
1866 Ripon; 6 July 1866 Salisbury; S March 1367 Iddesleigh;
9 Dec. 1368 Argyll; 21 Feb. 1874 Salisbury; 2 April 1873 
Cranbrook; 21 April 1878 Hartington; 16 Dec. 1832 Kimberley;
24 June 1885 Churchill; 6 Feb. 1836 Kimberley; 5 Aug. 1886 
Cross.
I 'INI 61 .-.R3 TO CHINA; Bruce 1853-65? Alcook 1865-71? Wade
1871-82; Parkes 1885-35? Hart 1385? Walsham 1835-92.
GOVERNORS OF HONG KONG; From Sept. 1859 Robinson; March 1805 
Mercer (Administrator) ; March 13,66 MacDoimell; April 1872 
Kennedy; April 1877 Hennessy; March 1882 Marsh (Administrator); 
March 1885 Bowen; Dec. 1385 Marsh (Administrator); April 1387 
Cameron; Oct. 1387 Des Yoeux.
FlCFRGYS OF INDIA: 1 Nov. 1858 Panning; 12 March 1362 Mlgin;
21 March 1865 Napier; 2 Dec. 1865 Denison; 12 Jan. 1864 
Lawrence; 12 Jan. 1669 Mayo; 9 Feb. 1872 Strachey; 25 ;,eb. 1872 
Napier; 5 May 1872 Northbrook; 12 April 1876 Lytton; 8 June 1830 
.iioon; 13 Dec. 1384 Dufforin; 10 Dec. 1388 Lansdov/ne.
ANH^UHk D : TYPJS OF LIKIN AND I)UEG LkYI^D UN OrlUti.
f' &
hsin-li *j. (transit likin) (sometimes galled
hou-li 'a ~  )
tao-Ii (chou-li)X -;1> (likir^  on landing;) (also called
(lo-ti~shui &  fa , chilli &  ^  or pan-li 'K —
hai-fang-shui ,tf M  tfa (maritime defence ta^ (also called
(hai-fang ohing-iei^ ^  > )
ohun-hsiang (military tax)
hua-ahui jf AX> (luxury tax)
** ?p*iao~ahui > 4;^  (stamp duty)
t1 ieh-hsiani; Hz (premium on sycee)
ohuan ]f\ (contribution levies) (also called
(pu-chu 4$ fy )
as*an chuan /2| (warehouse contribution)
jen-chuan (acknowledged contribution)
chia-ohuan /*( (additional contribution)
siao-hao £,j ij (meltage fee)
Iraa-hao fi} ^  (registration fee)
ti-shui igj fa or ti-ting ftL J (land tax) (levied on
native opium)
tt^u-ta^n-ti likin J!} yjf. '(Jg ’X (likin at place of
production)(native opium)
\f jjL
Note x likin and dues on opium was based on pai-huo li > g,
(likin on general merchandise)
AHN-XUHE S (i)
FORSCGM OPIUM TRADE IN CHINA i VALUE, 1863 to 1890*
Year Amount 
(Picul3 )
Value 
(Hk Tls)
Value
(Hk Tls) . 
(Imports)*
Value (Hk Tls) 
(Imports and 
.jcports)*
1363 50,037 ' 17,550,450 5 5 ,700,000 109,800,000
1364 52,085 20,255,200 46,210,431 94,864,945
1365 56,155 25,321,160 55,715,458 109,318,732
1366 64,516 54,858,640 67,174,481 - 117,770,704
186? 60,943 31,994,576 62,459,226 114,617,526
1368 55,915 26,127,869 63,281,804 125,108,079
1869 55,415 26,329,953 67,108,533 127,247,770
1870 56,817 27,715,588 63,693,260 155,294,866
1871 59,670 23,910,925 70,103,077 136,956,238
1872 61,195 28,077,596 67,317,049 142,605,174
1875 65,797 29,143,577 66,637,209 136,088,486
1874 67,468 27,233,421 64,360,864 131,073,732
1875 66,461 27,013,566 67,803,247 136,716,176
1876 68,042 27,661,466 70,269,574 151,120,080
1877 70,179 50,257,312 73,253,170 140,698,192
1378 72,424 32,262,957 70,804,027 137,976,206
1879 35,051 36,556,617 82,227,424 154,508,686
1830 71,654 32,344,028 79,293,452 157,177,039
1331 79,074 37,592,208 91,910,877 163,363,651
1382 65,709 26,746,2)7 79,504,243 148,630,104
1365 67,405 25,545,613 74,954,138 14o,538,267
1834 67,181 26,150,241 74,350,232 143,047,486
1885f 66,645 25,438,914 89,406,883 155,619,459
1886 67,788 24,988,561 89,310,480 168,348,205
1837 75,877 27,926,865 104,496,136 192,588,811
1888 32,612 32,330,506 126,826,043 221,271,460
1839 76,052 50,444,369 113,260,906 212,585,289
1390 76,616 28,956,329 127,758,290 217,567,579
Note: Hk Tls represents Haikuan Taels
Refer t o Annexure F (ii) for notes on *a, *b and *c.
AHlii&URa E _Cii2
.■‘OR-ILGH OJIUii 1‘HADS 111 GHIHAi R2VBNUE, 1863 to 1890
Year Opium Revenue (Opium Revenue 
(Hk Tls) Computed)
Total Revenue (Hk 
(Imports & Sxport:
1363 1,389,034 (1,502,610) 6,380,910
1364 1,539,084 (1,562,490) 5,915,524
1365 1,635,075 (1,683,990) 6,629,670
1866 lf916,988 (1,965,480) 6,923,351
186? 1,773,907 (1,828,440) 7,030,450
1668 1,602,526 (1,617,450) 7,680,815
1369 1,595,907 (1,602,590) 0,043,452
1870 1,758,734 (1,764,510) 7,835,502
1871 1,775,196 (1,790,100) 9,094,456
1872 1,830,021 (1,835,790) 9,516,350
1673 1,707,248 (1,973,910) 8,783,034
18?4 1,802,230 (2,024,040) 9,349,132
1875 1,974,255 (1,993,830) 9,544,501
1876 — (2,041,260) 9,836,291
1377 — (2,105,370) 9,873,396
1878 2,147,616 (2,172,720) 9,991,577
1879 2,477,512 (2,4)1,530) 10,300,700
1380 — (2,139,620) 11,314,063
1881 — (2 ,3 7 2,2 2 0) 11,871,497
1882 2,052,157 (1,971,270) 11,272,286
1883 2,081,354 (2,030,150) 10,560,678
1064 2,067,843 (2,015,430) 10,665,092
1385 1,965,506 (1,999,350) 11,367,380
1886 2,033,556 (2,033,640) 12,053,029
1387 2,218,058 (2,316,310) 12,359,016
1888 2,482,091 (2,478,360) 13,135,102
1389 2,283,327 (2,281,560) 12,258,309
1890 2,301,534 (2,298,430) 12,158,568
Hote: I?or the years 1376, 1877, 1880 and 1881, a number of
Treaty ports failed to submit Opium Revenue Returns;
so no returns are compiled for these years. 
Refer to Annexure R (ii) for note on d.
? (j)
TYPiiS OF PORKIGH OPIUM COHSUi-iSD IN OIIIJ,-i, 1363 to 1890
Year Total
(Piculs)
i ;alwa
(Piculs)
Patna
(Piculs)
Benares 
( icula)
Sorta** 
(Piculs)
1863 50,087 34,96? 12,757 2,363 none
1364 52,083 29,998 16,412 5,063 610
1865 56,133 27,483 17,823 9,601 1,221
1866 54*516 35,365 19,076 9,172 883
1367 ft returns incomplete
1368 50,94# 31,163 9,097 9,511 1,173 (65)
1869 56,341" 30,303 15,387 8,802 1,349 (58)
1870 54,03a7 30,693 13,141 8,585 1,606 (7 2 2)
1871 53,873 ' 34,357 15,571 7,745 1,205 (450)
1872 61,674 37,407 15,942 7,553 972 (430)
1873 37*217 64,141 15,744 7,104 228 (172)
1874 95,402" 69,465 19,119 6,041 769 (429)
1675 72,052 51,073 15,608 4,960 405 (250)
1876 68,042 42,708 15,639 8,359 1,286
1877 70,179 41,705 15,237 10,622 2,415
1678 73,424 37,005 13,563 12,373 4,458
1879 33,051 M 40,140 21,151 16,279 5,481 (1,376)
1380 66,691,/ 32,892 16,502 17,297 4,961 (2,023)
1881 78,974 36,461 17,9% 18,067 6,530 (1,530)
1882 65,709 29,336 15,379 15,017 5,977
1683 66,257^ 35,137 12,843 14,107 4,165
1884 67,131 36,796 13,645 12,375 4,368
1385 66,645 33,635 14,217 14,288 4,505
1866 67,301* 35,124 14,923 12,509 5,245
1387 73,377 34,ol3 20,523 15,723 4,813
1388 82,612 33,127 28,814 16,226 h h.Jl G,T 9 TT /
1889 76,052 28,408 24,673 17,813 5,153
1890 76,616 28,896 25,436 17,263 4 , 9 9 9
** 1Sorts1 included Persian, Turkish, prepared and native 
Gpiura (last-named only included on occasions the 
amounts were minimal* Pron 1187* there were separata 
returns made for Native Opium.
Refer to Annexure F (ii) for notes on
aliN^URh P (ii)
Notes:
While examining statistics on the Foreign Opium Trade in 
China, compiled from the Foreign Inspectorate's Annual 
Returns, the following points should be noted; (1) before 
1863, no separate returns were made on Foreign Opium 
except from a few Treaty Ports| (2) the total value of 
Foreign Opium was not dependent on the amount imported into 
China because of sale-price fluctuations; (3) datas on 
Foreign Opium imported and values varied in the Foreign 
Inspectorate's Returns, i.e. depending on which table was 
referred to, because of unsold Opium at the Treaty Forts, 
additional imports from Hong Kong, re-exports fi'om Shanghai 
which might not have arrived at a Treaty Port before the 
annual returns from there were made, and different systems 
of x'etums used at Treaty Porto and during different years.
*8 From 1863 to 1868,Imports included both Foreign goods and
Native (Chinese) produces. From 1869, Imports oxily x*epresented 
Foreign goods*
*° From 1863 to 1868, Imports and exports included Foreign 
goods and Native produces for Imports, and Native produces
exporposited and Native and Foreign goods re-exported to 
Foreign Ports and to Home (Chinese) Ports for exports.
From 1369, Imports only represented Foreign goods and 
Exports only Native produces.
*d calculated according to the amount imported (Column 2 of 
Annexure R (i)) and multiplied by 30 Taels (Tariff duty).
The amounts differed from those actually collected by the 
Foreign Inspectorate because (1) the fluctuating value of 
the iiaikuan Tael which was not a currency but a 'standard1 
set up by the Foreign Inspectorate. It vacillated, depending 
on exchange rates of otner Taels, such as the Shanghai 
Currency Tael, and foreign currencies, such as the Pound 
Sterling (refer to Annexure G); and (2) some of the Foreign 
Opium, as in Shanghai, were stored on board privately-owned 
receiving ships which had not paid the Tariff duty when 
Returns wore compiled.
j] Ttrai~lffiportsrwer$-axrrererrc • rrora those in Anpexur© E (i).
For the returns of 1673, 1874 and 1675, Shanghai Opium 
Returns only showed 'Opium Imported and Stored on board 
Receiving Ships' which included both Opium landed for local 
consumption and Opium re-exported to other Treaty Ports.
Thus, the totals were in excess of the actual amounts imported 
For the other years, differences were duo to the fact that 
returns from some Treaty Ports wore in chests a^d other 
returns wei'e in picula, and one chest contained more than 
one picul.
FOREIGN OPIUM: TOTAL IMPORTATION INTO HONG KONG, AND ITS
RXCOSS OVER TitL ENTRIES AT THE TREATY POINTS 
- 1S66 to IS)0
Year Imported into 
Hong Kong*
Imported into 
Treaty Ports
Hong Kong Excess
1866 81,350 piculs 64,516 piculs 16,834 piculs
1867 86,550 60,348 25,582
1368 69,557 55,915 15*622
1869 86,065 55,413 32,652
13?0 95*045 58,817 36,228
1371 89,744 59*670 30,074
1872 86,365 61,193 25,192
1873 88,382 65*797 22,585
1874 91,082 67,468 23,614
1375 84,619 66,461 18,158
1876 96,985 68,042 28,943
1877 94,200 70,179 24,021
1873 94,899 72,424 22,475
1379 107*970 83,051 24,919
1380 96,839 71,654 25,135
1881 98,556 79,074 19,482
1882 85,565 65*709 19*856
1363 94,036 67,405 26,631
1684 86,163 67,181 18,982
1385 90,329 66,645 23,684
1386 96,164 67,788 28,376
1387 89,639 75*877 15*492
1368 68,830 82,612 6,218
1889 90,193 76,052 14,141
1390 66,629 76,616 10,013
Estimated by the Foreign Inspectorate according to datas 
in the Government of India's Opium Returns.
Note also that the amount imported each year was dependent on 
expected market (demand), price fluctuations, currency exchange 
rates and stocks hold over from the previous year.
„ excess con be accounted for in the following wa^rs, each 
accounting for a portion of the total excess: a; consumption 
in Hong Kong; b) for use as reserve stock; c"^ exported to places 
such as Macao, (3alifomia etc.; d) expo. . to China via junks;
arid o) smuggled into China. No returns on Hong Kong's consumption 
are available because they are non-existent since it was a 
free-port.
aKHEXURE H (i)
hv.a*G KOi»u : REVi&IUE AE D EXPEI1 Dili)RE, loGO to 1890
,iith Revenue derived from Opium Farmer (Monopoly) 
or Opium licenses - included in Total Revenue.
Year Total Revenue Total Expenditure Monopoly/Licenses
1860 £ 94,182.16.5 £ 72,390.12.10 + * & 10f 355 , 15 . 0 M1
1861 127,241. 5.3# 109,632. 0.9 ♦ 12,412.10.0 M
1862 131,512. 9.11 122,434.14.9 + 15,921.17.6 M
1863 120,073. 3*9 122,201. 3.5 - 16,175. 0.0 H
1804 132,334.13.2# 159,022. 9.8# «OT* 16,312.10.0 M
1865 173,717. 6.3# 195,376. 1.10 - 14,387.10.0 M
1866 160,226. 1.5# 196,008.19.0# - 15,340.12.6 M
1867 179,043. 3.11# 152,780. 4.1 + 17,604. 3.4 M
1368 236,275.11.4 203,651. 0.0# ♦ 19,785. 8.4 M
1369 192,464.17.2# 192,309. 1.7# + 22,637.10.0 M
1870 190, 673.12.1# 183,595.11.1# + 23,558 . 6. 5 M
1871 175,962. 5.4# 186,675. 1.10 - 23,767.14.2 M
1872 192,714. 4.11 174,631.10.3 + 25,500. 0.0 M
1373 176,579.11.5# 165,100.13.6 + 26,145.16.3 M
1874 173,107.10.7 192,398. 3.10# mm 27,291.13.4 M
1373 /H,613. 5.8 181,337.9.3 28,541.13.4 M
1376 134,405.13.11 187,569. 3.7 - 27,708. 6.8 M
1877 §1,005,312.03# $ 873,207.36 + $132,000.00 M
1878 947,637.72 910,532.32 + 132,000.00 M
1879 964,094.99 926,867.86 + 209,916.63 M
1830 1,069,947.64 948,014.33 205,000.00 M
1331 1,524,455.97 981,582.10 + 137,916.67 H
1532 1 ,20<?;5/7.0£ 1,094,804.92 + 209,005.71 M
1385 1,289,448.29 1,342,299.24 - 246,449.95 L
1334 1,171,098.99 1,546,107.06 - 113,826.13 L
1885 1,251,389.70 1,621,250.39 - 153,751.64 L
1836 1,567,977.74 2 ,'*'20,3bJL«6 5 - 173,500.00 L
1387 1,427,485.79 2 ,0 2 3 ,0 0 2 .0 6 - 182,400.00 L
1838 1,557,300.03 1,992,329.6? - 132,074.13 L
1889 1,823,549.13 1,833,718.79 - 423,400.00 M
1390 1,995,220.47 1,915,350.47 + 477,600.00 H
ABefore 1377 Returns were made in £.s.d, and from 1377 1^ HK•w' . j
*Annual surplus or deficit; shown by plus and minus si&ns
stands for Opium Farmer or Monopoly, and L for Opium licences
.iOte: Annexure H (i), (ii) and (iii) Returns compiled from 
C0133 Volumes 17 to 47$ inclusive.
H (il)
Hum KONG: TOTAL BRITISH AND PO&SIGN SHIPPING f 1860 to 1890
Year Entered Cleared
No* of Total Ho* of Total
Vessels Tonnage Vessels Tonnage
1860 1,534 875,199 1,354 680,446
1661 1,259 658,1% 1,286 652,187
1862 1,390 688,829 1,330 655,281
1863 1,322 394,924 1,835 911,957
1864 2,264 1,013,748 2,294 1,032,634
1865 2,206 1,063,259 2,239 1,070,905
1866 1,396 949,856 1,387 941,425
186? 23,233* 2,562,528' 22,876* 2,535i194*
1868 27,500 2,501,815 24,641 1,827,845
1869 25,458 2,525,408 24,936 2,493,325
1370 27,391 2,836,436 27,410 2,796,676
ia?i 34,550 3,360,622 28,635 3,158,519
lci?2 31,394 3,777,676 30,875 3,723,082
1873 29,576 3,424,950 28,959 3,396,397
1674 25,481 3,150,202 25,185 3,119,190
1875 26,068 3,562,774 25,673 3,523,259
1876 28,181 3,900,891 27,768 3,879,476
1877 29,369 4,244,543 28,807 4,164,984
1878 28,779 4,352,663 28,377 4,340,419
1879 27,237 4,122,668 26,687 4,117,732
1380 26,801 4,135,845 26,418 4,174,149
i.Hjl 27,553 4,533,304 27,051 4,475,820
1832 23,668 4,976,233 24,148 4,938,555
1383 27,657 5,301,667 27,261 5,264,807
lam 26,703 5,167,231 26,374 5,149,084
1385 27,102 5,663,931 26,632 5,607,780
1886 27,222 6,324,16'S 36,369 6,239,457
1837 27,599 6,401,337 27,213 6,327,623
1388 27,779 6,400,410 27,369 6,309,974
1889 26,746 6,235,536 26,410 6,153,735
1690 27,626 6,688,994 27,279 6,654,826
* Returns from 1867 included Chinese Junk Trade*
uN.uXu.^ .; h (iii)
HONG KONGi JHINL8L (HATIVA) JUNK TNADA, 1867 to 1890
Year Anterod Cleared
Ho. of Total No. of Total
Junks Tonnage Junks Tonnage
1867 ♦ 20,787 1,367,702 20,443 1,353,700
1863 25,457 1,510,698 25,038 1,490,705
1369 23,255 1,3)7,446 22,733 1,370,238
1870 25,491 1,508,706 25,029 1,484,059
1871 26,501 1,660,167 25,800 1,623,273
1672 28,340 1,371,810 27,830 1,833,332
1873 27,049 1,739,598 26,611 1,758,630
1674 23,290 1,631,594 23,020 1,603,762
1875 23,459 1,610,919 23,081 1,586,427
1876 25,314 1,727,456 24,884 1,693,295
1877 26,500 1,798,738 25,975 1,758,843
1876 25,722 1,761,496 25,303 1,722,154
1379 24,508 1,652,023 23,913 1,624,038
I860 23,920 1,650,258 23,524 1,630,868
1831 24,339 1,680,025 23,853 1,642,611
1362 25,231 1,805,390 24,705 1,772,374
1883 24,258 1,851,239 23,395 1,832,854
1364 23,473 1,687,594 23,063 1,666,963
1383 23,674 1,797,222 23,233 1,775,390
1836 22,971 1,752,868 22,672 1,730,363
13S7 23,521 1,793,923 23,139 1,766,003
1688 23,958 1,863,968 23,609 1,839,739
1839 22,926 1,716,922 22,642 1,700,409
1890 23,512 1,795,261 23,174 1,776,818
•Junk Trade Returns commenced after the enforcement of 
•Ho* 6 of 1666: An Ordinance -Aiacted by the Governor of Hong 
Kong, with the Advice of the e glair.'’.{vo Council thereof, for 
the Better Regulation and Control of Certain Vessels Frequenting 
the t.aters of Hong Kong* (14 August 1866)* This Ordinance, brief­
ly, required junks trading between Hong Kong and China to obtain 
special Licenses which would allow them to frequent the Colony* 
Upon arrival, after depositing the license, the junk would be 
issued with an •Anchorage Pass* allowing it to anchor at spccifie 
places in Hong Kong Waters. It would not be allowed to leave 
during the night unlessAOpecial * Night Clearance • .fier-ntt „ was 
secured. An 13-hours notice had to be given and a •Clearance' 
Permit obtained before it was allowed to depart during the daytim 
oimilar regulations were made for un-licensed junks* Details of 
the junk, cargo, crew, consignee, place of departure or destina­
tion, etc., wore all required before Permits were issued. 
Violation of this Ordinance would result in fines & imprisonment. 
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ah hlxurl x Ci)
iriUlA: « 1853-9 to lo9Q-l» (With, comparisons oetween Het
Revenues on Land and Opium, the two largest sources 
of income, and Budget Lstimate on Opium Revenue)
xear
I . >-59
1859-60
1860-61 
1861-62 
1862—65
1363-64
1364-65
1865-66 
1806-6? 
1867-68
1866—69
1869-70
1870-71 
1671-72
1872-75
1875-74 
1874-75 
1679-76
1876-78 
1877-73 
1378-79 
1879-80 
1380-81 
1681-36 
1832—65 
1685—<->4 
1834-65 
1685-66 
1886-87 
1837-38 
1886-39
1889-90
1890-91
Opium
Revenue
£ 5,546,591 
5,169,778 
5,758,292 
4,909,304 
6,199,198 
4,525,506 
4,984,585 
6,625,982 
5,726,078 
7,049,415
6.755.215 
6,152,58? 
6,051,054
7.657.215 
6,o?0,425 
6,325,599 
6,214,782 
6,232,026 
6,280,781 
6,521,537 
7,699,032 
8,249,608 
8,451,185 
7,803,220 
7,216,443 
7,701,100 
5,849,440 
5,884,625
2x6,213,845
6,090,758
5,964,365
6,977,385
5,690,334
Budget
Lstiaate
)
—  )
5,473,900) 
6,107,561) 
6,300,000) 
8,000,000) 
8,200,000)
7.723.000)
8.500.000)* 
7,715,750) 
8,385,300) 
8,286,540) 
6,922,281) 
8,036,500) 
7,700,000) 
7,500,000)
—  )
)
)
)
)
Land
Revenue
£16,151,576 
16,915,552 
16,693,177 
18,366,272 
18,213,098 
18,546,129 
18,466,411 
19,109,944 
15,741,605 
16,364,429 
16,113,b75 
17,437,943
17,090,365 
18,328,821 
19,636,243
19,320,lc;l
18,410,851
13,491,252
16,934,453
16,901,738
19,311,693
18,869,550
13,082,504
18,896,217
13,742,085
18,811,163
18,420,283
19,130,307
9,000,000)
)
8,763,000)
9,500,000)
9,200,000)
3,594,200)
9,025,500)
9,227,600) 3x19,556,263 
8,393,300) 19,654,010
8,453,900) 19,456,300
3,260,000) 20,302,190
Total (Net)
Revenue
£29,711,620
33,227,426
35,475,685
35,721,062
36,662,867
35,636,893
36,674,333
40,483,067
34,484,906
39,576,948
40,012,325
41,670,258
42,146,755
41,551,328
41,332,225
40,442,903
38,057,715
38,714,612
37,531,464
39,698,813
43,114,733
44,938,676
44,778,630
46,567,408
42,353,336
44,761,712
41,521,36?
42,637,047
i<x44,735,940* * 
45,342,843
46,462,365 
49,952,162 
49,354,2198,203,300) 20,318,631
•Budget estimate for 12 months; Actual Revenue only on 11 months 
**Rrom 1886-87 Returns shown in Rx* 10 Rupees » 1 Rx » £1
x:i:LZi\jil£ I Cii)
1 $53-5') to 1690-91. (With comparisons of 
expenditures on Opium, in India and in eneland)
Year expenditure 
in India,, (on Opium)
oxpenditurg 
in -England
.ncuenditure
Total*
1 -.76-59 £57,241,625 ( 799,951) £ 6,051,566 £49,642,359
1859-60 58,145,874 ( 718,000) 5,042/945 50,475,683
1860-61 52,980,690 ( 918,467) 5,3*94,646 46,924,619
1861-62 29,157,346 (1,449,465) 5,209,264 43,880,100
1862-65 28,519,920 (1,856,278) 4,943,428 45,143,752
1865-64 29,111,658 (2,306,493) 4,777,630 44,613,032
1864-65 30,475,716 (2,376,981) 4,802,401 45,846,418
1865-66 52,668,771 (1,894,270) 4,981,185 48,935,220
1866-6? 37,094,406 (1,077,330) 7,545,518 44,639,924
1367-68 41,646,947 (1,874,121) 8,497,622 50,144,569
1868-69 43,225,567 (1 ,7 2 0 ,1 1 1) 10,181,747 53,407,334
1869-70 42,791,013 (1,820,633) 10,591,013 53,500,695
1670-71 41,015,502 (2,014,425) 10,083,004 51,413,686
1871-72 33,765,600 (1,596,646) 8,127,694 48,614,512
1872-75 40,086,234 (1,814,268) 8,441,651 50,638,386
1875-74 44,637,637 (2,001 3,884,239 54,959,228
I8 7 4 - 7 5 43,876,921 (2,341,5^6) 9,379,062 54,500,545
1875-76 44,008,789 (2,218,565) 8,327,64b 53,911,747
1876-77 44,710,800 (2,841,64?) 13,467,763 58,178,563
1877-78 48,464,038 (2,661,266) 14,048,350 6 2 ,512,388
1876-79 49,314,060 (1,698,750) 13,851,296 63,165,356
1879-80 55,119,951 (2,067,492) 14,547,664 69,667,615
1880-31 6 2 ,183,808 (2,028,757) 14,420,525 76,604,333
1831-82 57,471,349 (2,057,355) 15,433,371 73,904,710
1882-85 5 8 ,5 2 6,12? (2,282,816) 16,744,995 75,271,122
1885-84 58,403,244 (1,854,690) 16,393,389 78,635,389
1684-65 53,548,721 (2,966,640) 14,100,332 71,077,127
1835-86 58,839,753 (3,057,674) 14,014,733 77,265,923
1386—87 Rx 57,329,672 (2,729,063) 2x14,490,949 Rx77,153,707
1887-88 58,932,873 (2,424,575) 15,389,065 80,788,576
1388-69 59,705,004 (2,597,905) 14,983,221 8 1 ,659,660
1889-90 60,960,o05 (1,605,107) 14,848,923 82,473,170
1890-91 61,397,459 (2,180,797) 15,568,875 82,053,478
:;ote: without any exception, Annual .Expenditure surpassed 
Annual Revenue, and the difference between the two 
increased yearly.
~ , / and * refer to Annexure I (iii)
#Expenditure in India included both Imperial and Provincial 
ones. It encompassed expenses towards the running of the 
Government of India, civil and military; and other items 
such as cost of public works, railways, mint charges, losses 
on exchanges, interests on Government debts etc..
Expenditure on Opium was the ‘direct demands on the Revenue' 
which included expenses towards collection, payment to the 
Opium farmers at Bengal, preventive services etc..
/Expenditure in England was divided into Civil, Military and 
; nrine charges. These included expenses of the Indian Office, 
Political Agencies and other Foreign Eervices including costs 
of maintenance of political establishments in China and 
Persia, transport of troops, fUuriough and retired pay to 
military and marine officers of the Indian establishment, 
repayment of moneys spent in respect to Queen's Troops 
serving in India and those that had retired, Euperannuation, 
Allowances and Assignments under Treaties and Engagements,> 
capital on railways, stores and depots, upkeep of places like 
sci engineering college, a lunatic asylum and lew Gardens, 
interests on debts and losses on exchanges, charges such as 
telegraphs, stamps, stationary,etc.•
(Details of items of expenditure obtained from East India 
Financial statements (B*P#f> ) and the Opium Revenue and 
Indian Finance by R. Brown) below)
•Total Expenditure should be equal to the combined Expenditures 
in England and India. However, some were not equal because 
(a) from 1858-59 to 1865-66, Expenditures in England and India 
represented only actual payments within the period, i.e. 
charges on Indian Revenue for guaranteed interest were 
included in Total Expenditure; (b) from 1869-70 to 1875-76 - 
excluding the financial year 1870-71 - excess of Total 
Revenue over Total Expenditure excluded Public Works Extra­
ordinary while for 1670-71 this item was included; (c) from 
1683-84 sums spent on Exchange on transactions with London 
were included in Total Expenditure#
Rote: The third largest source of revenue was the tax on salt, 
which was £3,064,96$ in 1860-61, £5*685,259 in 1870-71,
£6,611,868 in 1880-81 and 2x8,058,695 in 1890-91.
Annexures I (i), I (ii) and I (iii) were compiled from the 
following sources: East India (Finance and Revenue Accounts)t 
published in British T'axlicimantary .'apers - Tor 1659-^,Vol. 1860 
.. from page 153; 1560-61 1861 ELI 11 17; - XXXVtII‘493;
62-63 1563 XL 1; 63-64 1864 XLII 35; 64-65 1865 XXXVIII 275;
65-66 1866 LII 1; 66-67 1867 L 1; 67-68 1867-68 XLIX 1; 68-69 
.iVI 1; 69-70 1870 LI 1; ?©-?! 1871 CLIX 1, 67; 71-72 1 78 XLIV 1; 
72-73 1873 L 443; 73-74 1374 XLVTI 1; ?4-75 LIV 1; 75-76 1876 LV 1 
76-7? 1677 LXII 1; 77-78 1873 LVII 1; 76-79 1876-79 LV 1, 215;
7 - 0 1880 LII 1; 80-81 1881 LXVIII 1; 81-82 XLVIII 1; 82-33 1381 
LJCVTII 295; 83—84 1832 XLVIII 293; 84-85 1633 L 305; 55-56 1864 
LIC 71; 36-87 1884-35 LVIII 165; 87-88 1886 XLIX 77; 38-89 1387 
LXII 109; 89-90 1888 LXXVI 111; and 90-91 1889 LVII 111. (From 
1331—32 Returns were in East India (Financial Etatemont).
AM J s M k J . 1 CONYJKBION TABLES OF OURREHCIEo ARD WEIGHTS
OURHrPJCIES:
one uaikuan tael equivalent to
Year 8 Hong Pong % Mexican 8 
(gold)
American
(gold)
1864 6 s 8d — — —
1869 6s 7 3/4d — — 1*60
1878 5s lltfd — 1*45 —
1683 5s 7M 1*55)2 — 1.55/2
1385 5s 3 M 1*52 — 1.28
1887 4s 10/*d — 1.54 1.20
1890 5s 2/^ d — 1.54 1.27
one Uaikuan tael equivalent to
1*28 Canton taels or 1*278 Chauping (.shanghai ) taels
1,000 Shanghai (Currency) taels* 916 2/3 Chauping (Clianghai)
taels
100 ohanghai (currency) taels - 314*276 rupees
one rupee * 2 shillings (until 1873)
* " * 1 shilling (from 1873)
n ” * Is 4d (1899 - made legal tender)
WEIGHTS:
One picul « 133 1/3 pounds * 60.433 kilogrammes
one catty * 1 1/3 " - 0*60453
One tael * 1 1/3 ounces * 0*037783 M
One picul - HMcattn?; one catty - 16 taels; 1 tael ® 10 mac os; 
1 mace * 10 candareens; 1 candareen * 10 cash.
INDIAN OPIUM WEIGHTS:
One chest of Bengal (Benares and Patna) Opium is calculated
to about 1 maund 28 seer3 2 chittacks « 136a pounds
(2 lbs to 1 seer)
(1 maund = 40 seors; 1 seer ® 16 chittacks)
One chest of Halwa Opium contains 140 pounds net weight, to
which l)i pounds added for leaf and du3t making a total of
141)$ pounds
ANNEXURE K: THE CHINESE CUSTOMS
HONG KONG AND MACAO, 1868-1887.
ANNEXURE L : OPIUM CULTIVATION IN CHINA.
I
ANN EXIT RE M: THE OPIUM TRADE IN'CHINA (with distribution
of Indian opium and its cultivation in India).
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Personal names:
Chang Jhih-fcung jk <: H
Chang ohu-shen )i m  /
Ch* i-kung *r -i
Ch* i-shan P] A
Ch1 i-ying I ^
Chiang I-li *  l ;i
Prince Ch’ing /| H i
Gh'ien-kiang
Heng-fu a  fa
Ho-ching ft 1A
Ho Kuei-ch*ing h  It-Pi
A  w^nperor Hsien-feng
I su Chiag-ch* eng. 'T 'f, • 1—
Hsu Nal-chi i f  PJ /*
Huang Jhueh-tzu 1 fi ■/’*
Huang V.ei-hsuan 1, .4 ^
I-liang rs ti
I-li-pu if i 4
Jui-lin f t <4_ t- i k
emperor Kuang-hsu
Kuei-liang f t  f t
trinee Kung
Kuo oung-t’ao >ii £ T  >1 /
^  A Lao Tsung-kuang r u ^
Li Hung-chang
Li Hung-ping
Li Tsung-hsi
Lin Tee-hsu
Liu Chang-yu
Liu Hsi-hung
Liu K'un-i
Lu K'un
Lui I-ch* eng
Ma Hsin-i
Kao Hung-ping
P*eng Yu-lin
Chao Yu-lien
Shen Pao-chen
Ltaperor Tao-kuang JL
eng T'ing-cheng /| g
Tseng Chi-tso
f> r 
» 1
Tseng Kuo-ch*uen .5 'ty
Tseng iuo-fan 1 g  .' i
Tso Tsung-t*ang 1  ft ^
Tsung-hou ' M
.  m ;/>
Lmperor I'ung-chih i j ,-z.
A
'T P
i
-r :h  A
*
-r •n
It m  ;./.
f t
I bPi-
t’j il;
f t P  -
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-p
' 1
* 4 i i
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